

*Rama III and the Siamese Expedition  
to Kedah in 1839,  
The Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat*

*Translated by  
Cyril Skinner*

*Edited by  
Justin Corfield*

**Published by**  
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies,  
Monash University,  
1993.

Monash Papers on Southeast Asia - No. 30  
*Rama III and the Siamese Expedition  
to Kedah in 1839,  
The Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat.*

© 1993 Centre for Southeast Asian Studies

This book is copyright. Apart from any dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publisher.

National Library of Australia  
Cataloguing-in-publication data

**ISBN**            0 7326 0521 0  
**ISSN**           0727 6680

**Typeset by**  
Justin Corfield,  
Winnie Koh

**Printed and bound by**  
Aristoc Press Pty. Ltd.  
Australia.

For further information on other publications from the Centre, write to:  
**Winnie Koh,**  
**Publications Officer,**  
**Centre for Southeast Asian Studies,**  
**Monash University,**  
**Clayton, Victoria 3168**  
**Australia.**

17 NOV 1997

Perpustakaan Negara  
Malaysia

M 884991 / 959.5112

RAM

# *Contents*

Editor's Introduction	v
Translator's Introduction	vii
Map of the Region	ix
Photo of Prince Damrong	x
<b>'The Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat'</b>	
Historical Background to the Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat by Prince Damrong	1
The First Dispatch 6th March 1839	33
The Second Dispatch 14th March 1839	85
The Third Dispatch 23rd March 1839	99
The Fourth Dispatch 29th March 1839	115
The Fifth Dispatch 26th April 1839	129
The Sixth Dispatch 5th May 1839	155
The Seventh Dispatch 15th May 1839	165

The Eighth Dispatch 22nd May 1839	175
The Ninth Dispatch 2nd June 1839	181
The Tenth Dispatch 5th June 1839	193
The Eleventh Dispatch 7th June 1839	197
The Twelfth Dispatch 14th June 1839	201
The Thirteenth Dispatch 6th July 1839	213
The Fourteenth Dispatch 28th July 1839	233
The Fifteenth Dispatch 15th August 1839	255

## **Appendix**

Appendix A Developments subsequent to 'The Dispatches' compiled by Prince Damrong	263
Appendix B compiled by Prince Damrong	269
Appendix C The Singapore Free Press compiled by Justin Corfield	273
Appendix D The Penang Gazette compiled by Justin Corfield	297



## Appendix E

Vessels mentioned in 'The Dispatches'  
compiled by Cyril Skinner

315

## Index

Index of People

319

Index of Places

329



## Editor's Introduction

Professor Cyril Skinner joined the staff of Monash University in 1963, originally in the Department of History, later moving to the Department of Modern Languages. After the division of the Modern Languages into separate departments, Cyril Skinner founded the Department of Indonesian Studies (now Department of Asian Languages and Studies). His linguistic ability and agility were, by all accounts, remarkable. The books from his library be they in Dutch, Indonesian, Arabic, Tamil, Thai, Russian, Turkish or Portuguese are annotated with corrections and comments: usually in the language of the original. Although there has been much interest in Malay-Thai relations, Cyril Skinner was one of the few scholars who was fluent both in Malay and Thai.

It is therefore no surprise to find that his considerable fluency in Thai introduced him to the Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat in that language. It is clear from the pages that he left that he had decided that this study of British, Siamese and Kedah politics and conflict in the late 1830s was a story worth a wider audience. He set about rendering it into English. It is this that I have had the good fortune to edit, and to a small extent, organise. Professor Skinner completed all the translations before he died in 1986 at Penang, but had not brought the Dispatches together into a cohesive volume.

I have included the Appendices prepared by Cyril Skinner; and have appended verbatim transcripts from both the *Penang Gazette* and the *Singapore Free Press* which paint a contrasting picture of the events in the region in the late 1830s.

My interest in this particularly turbulent period of Malay-Thai history is mainly due to my former lecturer, the late Dr David Bassett, who introduced me to the history of Southeast Asia, and who himself researched extensively into Malay-Thai relations, albeit in a slightly earlier period.

It is hoped in the near future to publish more of Cyril Skinner's unpublished work, which includes translations of the Letters of King Rama II, eye-witness accounts of the British invasion of Java in 1811, and many papers concerned with Malay-Thai relations.

I am grateful to the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society for permission to reproduce Cyril Skinner's translation of Prince Damrong's Introduction to the Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat which was published in the *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* in 1981. In that regard I was fortunate to be able to use Cyril Skinner's corrected copy of the article from JMBRAS. I must also acknowledge help from the Cyril Skinner Travel Fund at Monash University for defraying much of the cost of editing; Scott Sanders and Alison Fisher of the Computer Facility at the University of Melbourne; and Winnie Koh of the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Monash for their help.

Justin Corfield

October 1993.

## Translator's Introduction

'The Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat' were first edited by Prince Damrong in 1906.\*<sup>1</sup> They comprise some fifteen rather lengthy letters which record in detail the discussions held by Rama III and his ministers on the Kedah uprising in 1838-39 and the resulting disaffection in the Malay tributary states. The compiler, Luang Udomsombat, was an assistant of Phaya Si Phiphat, whom Rama III had appointed to command the expedition to be sent down from Bangkok to pacify the south, and Phaya Si Phiphat obviously wanted to have at his disposal a written record of the discussions affecting the campaign he was undertaking. Udomsombat possessed an excellent memory (a 'photographic' memory in fact), and his (what appear to be verbatim) reports provide a wealth of detail on the administration of Siam and on the events in the south. For those interested in the history of the Malay states under Siamese rule, the 'Dispatches' are a primary source of considerable value, and it was for this reason that I decided to attempt the task of translating them.

In editing the 'Dispatches', Prince Damrong also provided them with an 'Historical Background', in which he traces the events leading up to the despatch of the expedition from Bangkok in 1839. This introduction is valuable in its own right, not only for the summary it provides of events in the south during the fifty or so years preceding 1838, but because it presents, from a Siamese point of view, events which have hitherto usually been seen through British or Malay eyes.\*<sup>2</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

This introduction and Prince Damrong's introduction are taken from the *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (see editor's introduction). However some footnote numbers have been changed for greater consistency.

1 The work was republished in 1915, 1932, 1960 (twice), 1962 and 1972. My translation of the 'Historical Background' is based upon the seventh edition, published in Bangkok on the occasion of the cremation ceremony held in honour of Lady Bunkeua Benchakan, on 24 July 1972.

- 2 As representative of a 'British' viewpoint one might cite Crawford (1830) Burney (1914), Mills (1925) and Winstedt (1935); as representative of a 'Malay' viewpoint, one might quote e.g. Muhammad Hassan (1968), Bonney (1971), and Rahmat (1979). Of the non-Thai historians only Vella (1957) can be said to give, 'reproduce' would be a better word, the Siamese point of view. Incidentally in his chapter on 'The Malay Vassal States', Vella quotes nine times from the 'Introduction' as against only four times from the 'Dispatches' themselves (with another six references to the 'Appendices' in the 'Dispatches'). It is a pleasure to acknowledge the help given me (Cyril Skinner) by Ms. Dianne Ellis, Ms. Susan Fletcher, Mrs. Layla Masterton, Miss Suwilai Premisrat, Mr. Chalong Soontravanich and Mr. Yongyuth Sukvanachaikul.

# Map of the Region



*Photo of Prince Damrong*





# *'Historical Background to the Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat'*

*Prince Damrong*

The states of Kedah and Patani had long been vassals of Siam but Trengganu, which was established during the Thonburi period did not acknowledge the sovereignty of Bangkok until the reign of Rama I.\*<sup>1</sup> Kelantan was originally under Patani but later became subject to Trengganu: it was separated from Trengganu and became a vassal of Bangkok during the reign of Rama II as will subsequently become clear.\*<sup>2</sup> The history of these four states is set out in their respective 'chronicles' published in Thai in Parts 2 and 3 of the 'Collected Chronicles' which I have summarised in the 'Chronicle of the 2nd Reign'.\*<sup>3</sup>

In discussing details of the events relating to the 'Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat' we must begin with the capture of the old capital [Ayuthaya] by the Burmese in the Year of the Pig, the 9th of the decade C.S.1129/B.E.2310 [1767]\*<sup>4</sup> when Siam was in a state of complete disorder. At this time the rulers of many of the provincial centres broke free of Bangkok and became independent. In the south, the rulers of Nakhon Si Thammarat, Kedah and Patani also became independent. After Khun Luang Tak [Taksin] had defeated the provincial centres in the north and in the east and brought them under his control, he set up his capital at Thonburi. He then led the army down to subdue the Southern provinces but was only able to restore Siamese authority over Nakhon Si Thammarat. Kedah and Patani remained independent as His Majesty was engaged in campaigns elsewhere throughout the whole of his reign.

In the reign of Rama I, in the Year of the Snake, the 7th of the decade, C.S.1147/B.E.2328 [1785-86] King Padung [Bodawphaya]\*<sup>5</sup> of Ava sent a large army, in six divisions, to attack Siam on every available front with King Bodawphaya himself commanding the division taking the route via the Three Pagodas Pass. At this time the strength of the Thai forces was less than half that of the Burmese. Rama I ordered Krommaphra Rachawanglang\*<sup>6</sup> to take a force and set up camp at Nakhon Sawan, to prevent the Burmese launching an attack upon Bangkok. His Majesty collected a large force which he placed under the command of his brother, Krommaphra Rachawangbowon

Mahasurasinghanat,\*<sup>7</sup> to attack the main Burmese army under King Bodawphaya which was advancing by way of the Three Pagodas Pass. The provincial centres on the Malay peninsula, from Chumphon down to Nakhon Si Thammarat had to be left unprotected as there were insufficient men to send down to defend them.

After the Siamese forces had decisively defeated the main Burmese army under King Bodawphaya, His Majesty [Rama I] ordered Krommaphra Rachawangbowon to lead his troops to attack the Southern provinces and recapture them. By this time, the Southern provinces on both west and east coasts, from Chumphon down to Nakhon Si Thammarat, had fallen to the Burmese, all except Thalang, which Thao Thep Krasatri and Thao Si Sunthon had managed to defend.\*<sup>8</sup> After the Siamese army had driven off the Burmese and regained control of the south, Krommaphra Rachawangbowon set up camp at Songkhla. He sent an envoy to the rulers of Patani, Kedah and Trengganu, commanding them in His Majesty's name to resume their allegiance to Bangkok. The ruler of Patani refused, whereupon orders were issued for the Siamese army to attack Patani. After Patani had been captured, the population and their weapons (including the great cannon known as 'Phaya Tani')\*<sup>9</sup> were carried off to the capital so as to reduce Patani's war potential, and a descendant of the former rulers of Patani was appointed as its governor.\*<sup>10</sup>

At this particular juncture, Britain was in need of a base on the west coast of the peninsula for its warships and merchant vessels, to compete with its trade rivals, the Dutch, who were established in Malacca. The British sent envoys requesting the lease of 'Areca Island' (or 'Penang' as it is called in Malay) from the Sultan of Kedah.\*<sup>11</sup> Fearing a Siamese attack upon Kedah, the Sultan agreed to allow the British to lease Penang and sent them the draft of a treaty stipulating that the British would send troops to defend Kedah against attack from any quarter. The British however insisted that the provisions of the treaty be amended so as to commit them only to the defence of Penang. It is not certain whether the Sultan had received a reply from the British (saying that they would not commit themselves as the Sultan had desired) before he learnt that the Siamese army had captured Patani, whereupon, apprehensive of the consequences of flouting His Majesty's will the Sultan agreed to recognize the suzerainty of Bangkok with the ruler of Trengganu agreeing to do likewise. His Majesty Rama I was graciously pleased to confirm the two states as his vassals, as in former times. When the Sultan realised that Siam meant him no harm, he began to regret the loss of Penang, as the British had continued to occupy it while the treaty negotiations were going on. The Sultan demanded the return of the island but the British refused, whereupon the Sultan attacked the island in the Year of the Pig, the 3rd of the decade, C.S.1153/B.E.2334 [1791-92].\*<sup>12</sup> However, the Sultan was unable to defeat the British and was eventually compelled to sign a treaty allowing the British to lease Penang in return for a payment of \$6,000 per year. The treaty also stipulated that the

Sultan would allow the British to purchase supplies of food for the island without let or hindrance and without paying duty.

Subsequently, in the Year of the Dog, the 4th of the decade, C.S.1164/B.E.2345 [1802-1803] an incident occurred when some Malay pirates crossed over from the mainland and attacked Penang. The British, suspecting that the Sultan had encouraged the attack, brought pressure to bear and forced him to sign another treaty granting the British the lease of the territory on the mainland opposite Penang (which the British call 'Province Wellesley'), for an additional \$4,000, making a total of \$10,000 per year in rent. It is not clear whether the fact that the Sultan had made these two treaties with the British was known to Bangkok.\*<sup>13</sup>

As regards the Siamese provinces in the south, at the beginning of the reign of Rama I there were two important centres - Thalang [Phuket] on the west coast, a barrier against possible Burmese attacks, and Nakhon Si Thammarat, whose territory stretched from the west to the east coast and which controlled the Malay states. In Thalang, His Majesty appointed Chao Phaya\*<sup>14</sup> Surintharacha as Comptroller to supervise both Thalang and the adjoining provinces such as Phuket,\*<sup>15</sup> Takua Pa and Takua Thung. In Nakhon Si Thammarat, His Majesty was graciously pleased to appoint Chao Phat, who had been the Uparaat [Viceroy] of Chao Nakhon (Luang Nai Sitthi) as Chao Phaya Nakhon Si Thammarat. The records do not state whether he also supervised the provinces of Chaiya and Phthalung. However, it does appear that His Majesty was pleased to place Songkhla under the supervision of Nakhon Si Thammarat. In Songkhla at this time Luang Suwankhiri (Bun Hui) was governor. He had performed meritoriously in the campaign against Patani and His Majesty was graciously pleased to promote him to the rank of Phaya Phichaikhiri Si Samutsongkhram,\*\*<sup>16</sup> Governor of Songkhla, although still under Nakhon Si Thammarat.

Then in the Year of the Dog, the 2nd of the decade, C.S.1152/B.E.2333 [1790-91] a Sayyid, i.e. a man claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad, came into the realm and began to preach his doctrine in Patani, making claim to supernatural powers that enabled him to perform feats of magic, and the Malays paid him the greatest respect. The new ruler of Patani, who is referred to in the chronicles as 'Raja Patani', saw his opportunity and conspired with the Malays in the region to foment a rebellion, persuading bands of Malay pirates from various places to join him in an attack upon Songkhla. Phaya Songkhla (Bun Hui)\*<sup>17</sup>, realising that his forces were not strong enough to withstand the Malays, withdrew and fortified himself at Phthalung, at the time governed by Phra Si Krailat, although the latter had fled as soon as he received news of the outbreak of hostilities. His Majesty was furious and gave orders that Phra Si Krailat was to be dismissed. His Majesty appointed as governor of Phthalung a certain Khun, also called Khang Lek [Iron Jaw] who

was an ancestor of the lady who became the mother of HRH Krommameun Kraisonwichit. When news reached Bangkok of the attack by the Patani Malays, the King at once sent off a force from the capital, but before it arrived, Chao Phaya Nakhon (Phat) had led a force from Nakhon to join up with the forces of Phaya Songkhla (Bun Hui) and had attacked the Patani Malays and driven them out of Songkhla. He then ordered Phaya Songkhla to recapture Patani. The latter did so, taking prisoner the ruler of Patani. When the Bangkok army arrived, Chao Phaya Nakhon and Phaya Songkhla had begun to quarrel, and each complained to the King about the other. The King decided that Nakhon by itself was not able to supervise the affairs of the Malay states and prevent trouble arising in them, and he therefore gave instructions that Songkhla was to come directly under Bangkok. Bun Hui was promoted to the Rank of 'Chao Phaya' and charged with the task of supervising the Malay states on the east coast. viz. Trengganu and Patani, the latter being split up into seven states, namely (Pat)tani, Nong Chik, Yala, Raman, Yiring, Saiburi and Rangae\*<sup>18</sup> with Siamese and loyal Malays being appointed as governors. Nakhon was to supervise only the large state of Kedah on the west coast.

Subsequently, in the Year of the Dragon, the 10th of the decade, C.S.1170/B.E.2351 [1808-1809], Chao Phaya Songkhla (Bun Hui) reported to Bangkok that Dato' Paklan [Pangkalan], the Governor of Yiring [Jering], had conspired with Malays from Trengganu and pirates from outside the realm to join in an attack upon Songkhla. The King thereupon put Chao Phaya Phonlathep (Bunnak Ban Macla) in command of an army to go down and join up with the provincial troops in order to crush the revolt and restore order in Yiring, a task that was successfully accomplished.

Towards the end of the reign of Rama I - it is not certain in which year - the ruler of Kedah, Sultan Abdullah Mukarram Shah, died.\*<sup>19</sup> He had ten sons, viz. [1] Tengku Raya (?=Tengku Raja),\*<sup>20</sup> [2] Tengku Pangeran, [3] Tengku Bisnu, [4] Tengku Ibrahim, [5] Tengku Sulaiman, [6] Tengku Su, [7] Tengku Daud, [8] Tengku Mom, [9] Tengku Ahmad and [10] Tengku Yusuf. These children were apparently the sons of different mothers. When Sultan Abdullah Mukarram Shah passed away, Tengku Dziauddin,\*<sup>21</sup> the Raja Muda, became ruler of Kedah for a short while, but when he died, apparently without any male issue, the sons of the former ruler conspired against each other, each one wishing to become ruler. Tengku Raja, the eldest son, had apparently died earlier since there is no further mention of him and it appears that the main rivals for the throne were Tengku Pangeran, the second son, and Tengku Bisnu, the third son, who was a close adherent of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Phat). Tengku Bisnu may have been the son of Sultan Abdullah's principal wife\*<sup>22</sup> and there is evidence that Chao Phaya Nakhon endeavoured to further Tengku Bisnu's cause. He took both Tengku Pangeran and Tengku Bisnu up to Bangkok, but His Majesty decided that as Tengku Pangeran was the eldest son, *he* should be ruler of Kedah, with the title of 'Phaya Ratnasongkhram Ramaphakdi Si

Sultan Muhammad Ratnarachawangsa'. The King also appointed Tengku Bisnu as Raja Muda with the title of 'Phaya Aphainurat'.<sup>\*23</sup> The two then returned to Kedah to administer the state.

In the Year of the Snake, the 1st of the decade, C.S.1171/ B.E.2352 [1809-10], which was the first of the reign of Rama II, a Burmese force attacked Thalang.<sup>\*24</sup> The Sultan of Kedah (Pangeran) apparently raised a force from Kedah to help fight the Burmese at Thalang.<sup>\*25</sup> Subsequently, at the end of the Year of the Snake, the 1st of the decade (or at the beginning of the Year of the Horse, the 2nd year of the decade) [1810], the Sultan led a force against Perak, a Malay state on the southern border of Kedah, and was successful in compelling the ruler of Perak to acknowledge the suzerainty of Bangkok.<sup>\*26</sup> It was apparently because of these two acts of merit that His Majesty Rama II was pleased to promote the Sultan to the rank of 'Chao Phaya'; it is not clear in which year this happened, but an old document from Nakhon Si Thammarat has been found, dated the Year of the Goat, the 3rd of the decade, C.S.1173/B.E.2354 [1811-12], in which he is already referred to as 'Chao Phaya'.<sup>\*27</sup>

When the war with the Burmese was over, Rama II considered what measures he could take to increase the security of the realm. At the cremation of Rama I, Chao Phaya Nakhon (Phat) had apparently been granted an audience with the King at which he pointed out that his advancing age had made him infirm, and he begged to be allowed to leave His Majesty's service. The King was consequently pleased to promote him to the rank of Chao Phaya Suthammamontri, Comptroller, and appointed Phra Borirak Phubet (Noi), the Deputy Governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat, to be Phaya Si Thammasokarat and governor. This was in the 9th month in the Year of the Goat, the 3rd decade, C.S.1173/B.E.2354 [July/August 1811].

The new governor of Nakhon, i.e. Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi), was a man of considerable ability, whose governorship was quite different to that of any other governor of the province, and it is worthwhile giving a brief biography of him. Although officially referred to as the son of Chao Phaya Suthammamontri (Phat), it was generally understood that he was the son of the King of Thonburi (Taksin) and not the son of Chao Phaya Suthammamontri (Phat). The story goes that when the Ruler of Nakhon (Luang Nai Siththi) took up his duties in Thonburi, he presented one of his daughters, called Chim<sup>\*\*28</sup> to His Majesty. She became the King's favourite minor wife and bore him two sons called Phra Phongnarinthon and Phra Inthraamphai. One of her younger sisters came to stay with her at the palace and the Chronicles relate that in the Year of the Monkey, the 8th of the decade, C.S.1138/B.E.2319 [1767], Chao Phaya Phichairacha, the Governor of Sawankhalok, arranged for a marriage broker to ask for the hand of this sister. The news reached the ears of the King of Thonburi, who, enraged by Chao Phaya Pichairacha's presumption in attempting

to become his brother-in-law, ordered him to be executed. Chim's sister apparently remained in the palace until, towards the end of the Thonburi reign, the King presented her to Chao Phaya Suthammamontri (Phat). It was generally believed that she was already pregnant by the King of Thonburi and she subsequently gave birth to a son, viz. Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi). The account of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi)'s origin given here is borne out by other works, for example, the 'Phrarachawichan'\*<sup>29</sup>; the story is also found in English in Major Low's book, written during the 3rd reign.\*<sup>30</sup> Phaya Nakhon (Noi) was promoted to 'Chao Phaya' at the end of the 2nd reign or at the beginning of the 3rd reign, but there is no record as to the exact year.

At around the same time that His Majesty appointed Noi as Phaya Nakhon, Chao Phaya Songkhla (Bun Hui) died, leaving the governorship of Songkhla vacant and His Majesty was graciously pleased to appoint Luang Ritthi, an officer in the Corps of Pages (whose name was Chong and who was the son of Phra Anantasombat, the younger brother of Bun Hui) as Phaya Wisetphakdi, Governor of Songkhla.

It was at this time that the Sultan of Kedah (Pangeran) fell out with Phaya Aphainurat (the Raja Muda) over the latter's request to be granted the Kuala Muda district and its revenues. The Sultan offered him an alternative district, but he refused. Instructions were issued for the Governor of Phthalung to act as an envoy on behalf of His Majesty and go down and try to settle the dispute, in the Year of the Cock, the 5th of the decade, C.S. 1175/B.E.2356 [1813-14], but the mission was not successful. Eventually, however, an agreement was reached because His Majesty was pleased to allow Phaya Aphainurat to go and administer Setul (a dependency of Kedah) while Tengku Ibrahim, the third brother, was appointed as Raja Muda of Kedah. According to the Kedah people, the reason that Phaya Aphainurat was so obstreperous and refused to soften his attitude towards the Sultan was because of the backing of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi), and there may well be some truth in this as there is evidence to support it in the events that ensued. Moreover Phra Thanintharaniphat, the maternal uncle of Chao Phaya Kedah [Sultan] Abdul Hamid,\*<sup>31</sup> once related to me how earlier generations had believed that, as a result of His Majesty's transcendental virtues, Kedah had remained happy and prosperous until Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) has taken over the administration of Nakhon. The latter, seeking to extend his authority by making Kedah part of Nakhon, did his best to calumniate Kedah and caused that state a great deal of trouble; such are the views of Kedah Malays. However, if we see matters from Chao Phaya Nakhon's point of view, one can understand why he acted in the way he did, for the Sultan of Kedah's association with Europeans must have been a constant source of irritation to him.

After Phaya Aphainurat had taken over the administration of Setul (which bordered on Nakhon territory) it seems likely that he became closer to Chao

Phaya Nakhon than to the Sultan - the main reason for the Sultan becoming alienated from Siam. Phaya Aphainurat (Tengku Bisnu) administered Setul for only two years before passing away<sup>•32</sup> and there is no record as to who his successor was, but examination of the events that followed suggests that it was one of his relations, who was closer to Nakhon than to Kedah.

In the Year of the Dog, the 6th of the decade, C.S. 1176/B.E.2357 [1814-15] Chao Phaya Suthammamontri (Phat) passed away and his cremation ceremony, held in the year of the Pig, the 7th of the decade, C.S. 1177/B.E.2358 [1815-16] was attended by his grandson, Krommaphra Rachawangbowon Mahasakdiphonlasep (then Krommameun Sakdiphonlasep).<sup>•33</sup> It appears that Krommameun Sakdiphonlasep had just received orders from His Majesty to reorganise the administration of Nakhon Si Thammarat. It was at this time that a problem arose involving Trengganu and Kelantan. Originally Kelantan had been subject to Trengganu, but when Long Muhammad became ruler, he had fallen out with the ruler of Trengganu; he had requested Phaya Songkhla to be allowed to send the gold and silver trees directly up to the capital, but Phaya Songkhla (Chong)<sup>•34</sup> had refused, whereupon the ruler of Kelantan complained to Phaya Nakhon Si Thammarat (Noi). It seems that as a result of the backing of Krommameun Sakdiphonlasep, His Majesty eventually agreed to allow Kelantan to become a vassal state resorting directly under Bangkok but - by mutual agreement - still under the supervision of Nakhon Si Thammarat. From that time onwards, Nakhon Si Thammarat supervised the affairs of Kedah and Kelantan, while Songkhla supervised the affairs of Patani (which was divided into seven smaller states) and Trengganu.<sup>•35</sup>

The records do not state in what year the Sultan of Kedah began to conspire with the Burmese, but the Burmese Chronicles confirm that he sent the gold and silver trees, along with other offerings, up to the King of Ava.<sup>•36</sup> In the Year of the Goat, the 5th of the decade, C.S. 1185/B.E.2366 [1823-24], the King of Ava, Chakkaimaeng,<sup>•37</sup> fitted out a Burmese force to invade Siam once again. On this occasion, the King sought to persuade Kedah to have the Malays attack from the south while the King of Annam, Min Mang,<sup>•38</sup> was to attack from the east, thus making a three-pronged attack upon Siam. When the news reached Bangkok that the Burmese were raising armies at Martaban, Tavoy, Tenasserim and Mergui, His Majesty sent out Siamese troops to block the way. The main army, under the command of the future Rama III, set up camp at Kanchanaburi, while another army, under Krommameun Sakdiphonlasep set up camp at Phetburi, and a third army, under Phaya Kalahom Rachasena<sup>•39</sup> (the father of Chao Phaya Yomarat, 'Suk') set up camp at Thalang. It was probably at this time that rumours reached Bangkok of Kedah's disaffection, and it appears that His Majesty was pleased to issue orders for forces from Nakhon Si Thammarat and Songkhla to establish a boatbuilding yard at Setul, by way of keeping an eye upon Kedah. The Burmese did not proceed with the invasion as planned, because they became engaged in a dispute with the

British in Manipur and Chittagong and had to withdraw their troops in the south.\*<sup>40</sup>

After the withdrawal, Tengku Mom, the younger brother of the Sultan, went to Nakhon Si Thammarat and accused the Sultan of being on friendly terms with the Burmese.\*<sup>41</sup> There was also the affair of Lim Hoi, a Chinese trader from Thalang, who when sailing back from Penang, met a Burmese ship which seemed to be rather different from the normal type of trading vessel. As Lim Hoi was the more powerful, he boarded the other vessel and searched it and found that the Burmese were carrying a letter from the King of Ava to the Sultan. Lim Hoi arrested the Burmese and sent them and the letter to Phaya Thalang. When His Majesty received details of these two examples of the Sultan's disloyalty and complicity, he summoned the Sultan to the capital to answer the charges made against him. Upon receiving His Majesty's message, the Sultan threw off his allegiance to Bangkok and refused to send the gold and silver trees up to the capital as he had done in previous years.\*<sup>42</sup> His Majesty thereupon sent orders for the forces from Nakhon, Chaiya, Songkhla and Phthalung to be put under the command of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi), to attack Kedah. There was a brief battle but the Kedah forces were unable to withstand the attack and the Nakhon forces captured Kedah on the 8th waning of the 3rd month, in the Year of the Snake, the 3rd of the decade, C.S.1183/B.E.2364 [14th February 1822], with the Sultan seeking refuge with the British in Penang.\*<sup>43</sup> Chao Phaya Nakhon sent some of the Kedah Malays and their families up to the capital and others up to Nakhon, in order to reduce Kedah's strength. He appointed his two sons, Phra Phakdi Borirak (Saeng) and Nai Nut of the Corps of Pages to act as governor and deputy governor respectively. From this time on Kedah was completely under the rule of Nakhon.

By the time the Sultan threw off his allegiance to Bangkok, the Government of India, then still under the British East India Company, had become aware of the serious fall in the company's trading profits resulting from the long drawn out wars between the various European powers during the reign of Napoleon I. When peace came, the British consulted their records and discovered that they had formerly carried on a profitable trade with Siam and Annam. During this period the British had founded Singapore and obtained Malacca from the Dutch and these two settlements, along with Penang, were under the rule of British India. The British were keen to re-establish their trade with Siam and Annam and a British merchant was sent to Bangkok to investigate matters. He returned with the news that there were European vessels of various nationalities trading there, and that the Siamese were not opposed to trading with Europeans. With the Siamese desirous of purchasing arms to use against their enemies, it was a favourable time for European merchants to trade with them. Drawbacks to European trade with Siam arose from the way trade with the crown was conducted and from the procedure in collecting duty, which might well cause resentment.



After the Government of India had received this information, the Governor-General (the Marquis of Hastings) appointed Dr. Crawford as envoy to Siam and Annam entrusting him with letters and gifts for the court in Bangkok, charging him to deal with two matters, viz. trade, and the position of Kedah.\*<sup>44</sup> As regards trade, Crawford was to request a revision of those procedures which might cause difficulty to British merchants, but even if he were unsuccessful in this, it would suffice if relations with Siam could be put on a friendly enough footing to allow the Government to enter into discussions with Siam aimed at assisting British merchants. When friendly relations had been established and trade had developed, the Government would then consider whether the time had come to conclude a treaty with Siam. As for Kedah, the British records state that the Sultan had informed them that he had twice been caused great distress because of his dispute with Siam. I think it likely that he was referring to his quarrel with Phaya Aphainurat and to the occasion when the Siamese had sent a force to set up a boat-building yard at Setul. The British, who had leased Penang from the ruler of Kedah and who still needed to purchase food from Kedah, felt that they had to assist him in some way, but were not sure how. The Marquis of Hastings sent Crawford to discuss matters with the Governor of Penang, as the person nearest to the scene, although Crawford's instructions made it quite clear that he was to take care not to involve the British in any controversy that might arise as a result of the dispute between the Sultan and Siam. When Crawford left India he had not yet heard of Chao Phaya Nakhon's capture of Kedah and only received the news upon his arrival in Penang, for it was at this time that the Sultan fled from Kedah to take refuge in the island. Chao Phaya Nakhon sent a letter to the British asking for the Sultan to be handed over and in Penang there was some apprehension that the Siamese would attack the island. As soon as Chao Phaya Nakhon learnt that Crawford was an envoy from India, he sent a messenger to him with a letter explaining why he had been compelled to attack Kedah and stating that Siam had no intention of attacking Penang; the British need therefore have no anxiety on this score. However, British suspicions were not allayed and the only instructions Crawford received from the Governor of Penang were to seek means to persuade the Siamese to restore the Sultan as ruler of Kedah.

Crawford arrived in Bangkok in the 5th month of the Year of the Horse, the 4th of the decade, C.S.1184/B.E.2365 [April 1822], and was received as an envoy in accordance with the traditional protocol. He was granted an audience with His Majesty but as regards the two matters raised by the British, he did not meet with the success that had been hoped for. As regards trade, Crawford was to request that the British be allowed to trade freely with all parties without paying duty, although they were prepared to pay a levy based on the tonnage of their ships. The Siamese pointed out that if this were granted, the Crown would lose a good deal of revenue but nevertheless, if the British would guarantee to send at least five merchant ships to Bangkok every year, they were prepared to waive the duty and collect a single tax based on the tonnage

of the vessels, as the British desired. However, Crawford was unwilling to give any guarantees on this point.

With regard to Kedah and Crawford's charge that Chao Phaya Nakhon had invaded the state, the Siamese replied that Chao Phaya Nakhon and the Sultan were both liegemen of His Majesty and if the Sultan had any complaint to make about Chao Phaya Nakhon, he had merely to seek an audience with His Majesty, who would be pleased to look into the rights and wrongs of the matter and see that the Sultan had full justice done to him. However, the arguments put forward on these two points were merely pretexts and the real cause of the dispute between the Siamese and Crawford at this time stemmed from two other matters. Firstly, the Siamese argued that if the British wanted preferential treatment for British commerce, they must allow the Siamese to purchase weapons freely from any British territory. Crawford however believed that the Siamese desired to purchase the weapons in preparation for an attack upon Burma. At this time the British were at odds with the Burmese but had not yet decided to attack them. Crawford was afraid that if the Siamese were allowed to purchase whatever weapons they wanted in order to attack the Burmese, the Burmese would have cause to be annoyed with the British. Crawford sought to avoid this by saying that the Siamese might purchase the weapons provided that they were not used against any country with which Britain maintained friendly relations. This caused the Siamese to believe that the British were only out to gain an advantage for themselves, and were not prepared to make any concessions. Another reason for distrust arose because when Crawford came to Bangkok, he went around taking soundings and making charts of the main waterways leading in and out of the city. Crawford had also quarrelled with the captain of the ship that had brought him, and the captain spread the story that, in talking with his entourage, Crawford had said that if ever the British wanted to conquer a country like Siam, two or three warships would be quite sufficient to accomplish the task. This annoyed the Siamese and their discussions with Crawford consequently failed to reach any agreement.

The Siamese nevertheless acted in a diplomatic fashion; Phaya Phiphatkosa\*<sup>45</sup> wrote a letter in reply to the Government of India and instructed Phaya Chularachamontri\*<sup>46</sup> to draw up a document for Crawford giving British merchants permission to trade with Siam, without however exempting them from paying duty at the usual rate. Crawford consequently left Bangkok without achieving his aim and went on to Annam, which also refused to conclude a treaty with him. Crawford was subsequently appointed Resident of Singapore\*<sup>47</sup> and became much more friendly to Siam, and trade between Britain and Siam gradually increased, as the Government of India had desired.

In the Year of the Monkey, the 6th decade, C.S.1186/ B.E.2367 [1824-25], the British and the Burmese fought their first war over the sovereignty of the states between India and Burma, viz. Arakan, Manipur and Assam, which Burma

had previously conquered (and which were subsequently captured by the British). The British had originally planned to march their army overland to attack Ava but the route was so difficult that the British changed their mind and sent their army by sea. Sir Archibald Campbell was placed in command of the army which went up the Irawaddy and captured Rangoon, which was made the headquarters of the expedition. The British had then intended to advance and attack the Burmese but it was then the rainy season, and the terrain was very difficult. As a result of their miscalculation over the weather, the British troops were suffering from malaria, and in order to attack the Burmese they would have had to make a long march through Mon territory before reaching Ava. The British were therefore compelled to remain in Rangoon for the duration of the rainy season. However, during this time they despatched an expedition to attack the Burmese towns on the south coast-Martaban, Tavoy, Tenasserim and Mergui. The attacks were successful and all four towns were taken.\*<sup>48</sup>

The first Anglo-Burmese war occurred at the end of the 2nd reign and no documents have been found to serve as evidence as to exactly how the Siamese government viewed the events. However, it appears that His Majesty took the view that, as the war had occurred in a neighbouring country, extreme vigilance was called for and three forces were assembled. On land, one army was put under the command of Chao Phaya Mahayotha (Thoria Khachaseni)\*<sup>49</sup> to advance via the Three Pagodas Pass; this was supported by a reserve force under the command of Phaya Surasena (Chim); at sea, Phaya Chumphon (Sui)\*<sup>50</sup> was ordered to take a fleet and guard the area bordering on the Mergui-Tenasserim region. The British were informed that these forces had been despatched and would assist the British.

On the British side, after their advance had come to a halt in Rangoon, bearers were needed to carry supplies of food and weapons to the army that was to advance in the dry season. They wanted help from the Siamese and urged the army under Chao Phaya Mahayotha to advance and set up camp at Martaban, which the British had already captured. In Siam a new King (Rama III) had just come to the throne and misunderstanding occurred between Siam and Britain on four points.

In the first place, the British wanted only draught animals and Siamese personnel for use as a labour force under the direction of the British, claiming that British methods of waging war were different from those of the Siamese. They proposed that if the Siamese wished to mount a separate attack upon the Burmese, they should send another force to attack Burmese territory from Chiang Mai. The Siamese considered that the British were taking advantage of them and refused to allow Chao Phaya Mahayotha's force to come under the command of the British. The force was subsequently called back to the capital in preparation for the cremation ceremony for the late King.

In the second place, the British had originally contemplated returning Tenasserim and Mergui to Thailand once they had defeated the Burmese, but the cession was to be only of the highlands in the interior, with the British retaining the coastal region, i.e. the trading centre. In the event of their forces defeating the Burmese, the British contemplated re-establishing the Mons as an independent nation in the territory adjacent to upper Burma, to reduce the power of the Burmese. By now, however, the old Hangsawadi dynasty was extinct,<sup>\*31</sup> so the British sought to find someone universally respected by the Mons to become King of a restored Hangsawadi and one of the likely candidates was Chao Phaya Mahayotha. These two matters could only cause dissatisfaction among the Siamese, for Mergui and Tenasserim had been under Siamese rule since the time of the Ayuthaya dynasty and as important trading ports produced a good deal of revenue. If the British were to retain control of the coastal region, the Siamese would be cut off from these trading ports and would derive no benefit from them. The Siamese would moreover have to take on the responsibility of looking after the highlands, which would benefit not them, but the British. As for the British plan to re-establish a Mon kingdom, particularly if Chao Phaya Mahayotha was a likely candidate for the throne, this naturally disturbed the Siamese. The Mons had emigrated to Siam and become Siamese subjects as far back as the Thonburi period and there had been another wave of immigration during the 2nd reign so that there was now a considerable number of Mons resident in the country. These Mons might well wish to return to their original home and thus become adherents of the British - a possibility that caused the Siamese considerable displeasure.

In the third place, although we have no details as to the instructions given by His Majesty to Phaya Chumphon, it seems that he had carried off a considerable number of families from Mergui and Tenasserim. After the British had captured Tenasserim and Mergui, the population complained to them about Phaya Chumphon's behaviour. The British were anxious to win over the people in these areas and consequently arrested a number of the Chumphon people involved. When news of this reached Bangkok, His Majesty Rama III was furious at Phaya Chumphon's behaviour and ordered that he be arrested and detained in Bangkok.

In the fourth place, as regards Kedah, when the Sultan of Kedah had made the treaty leasing Penang to the British, it had been stipulated that the British might obtain supplies of food from Kedah without having to pay duty. However, when the Siamese took over the administration of the state they began to levy duty according to the procedure customary in other Siamese provinces, claiming that the British treaty with the Sultan had been concluded without reference to Bangkok, and was in breach of protocol. Another problem was that after Chao Phaya Nakhon had captured Kedah, the Sultan of Perak had ceased to send up the traditional offerings of the gold and silver trees. Perak was divided into two parties, one wishing to conciliate Chao Phaya Nakhon

and the other opposed to such a move. For their part the British were unwilling to allow the Siamese to extend their authority beyond the boundaries of Kedah.\*<sup>32</sup>

For these four reasons, at the end of the Year of the Cock, the 7th of the decade, C.S. 1187/B.E.2368 [1825-26], when the British were on the point of achieving victory in their war against Burma, Lord Amherst, the Governor-General of India, despatched Captain Henry Burney as his envoy to Bangkok, to try to reach an agreement with the Siamese and to conclude a treaty as the basis for further negotiations.\*<sup>33</sup>

Burney first went to see Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) who, after he had received permission from Bangkok, duly took Burney up to the capital. In the 12th month [November/December 1825] Burney was granted an audience with His Majesty on the same term as earlier foreign ambassadors and His Majesty's ministers were instructed to hold discussions with Burney. These discussions led to an agreement being signed, the first treaty ever to be concluded with the British, on the 1st waning of the 7th month in the year of the Dog, the 8th of the decade, C.S.1188/B.E.2369 [20th June, 1826]. The treaty contained 14 articles but we shall discuss here only those relating to Kedah and Perak, viz. articles 13 and 14.

Article 13 stated that the Siamese were the ruling power in Kedah but that people from Penang and Kedah might come and go to trade as freely as before. In addition, people from Penang might purchase provisions from Kedah, such as livestock and food, and bring them back to consume in Penang without having to pay duty. As regards items on which import or export duties were collected, the Siamese would establish customs posts at the mouth of the rivers in the state and levy duty at a reasonable rate; they would not farm out the collection to persons who might levy duty in an arbitrary fashion. Furthermore, when Chao Phaya Nakhon returned from Bangkok he would release the family, followers and servants of the Sultan who had been carried off, and they would be allowed to remain or leave, as they wished. For their part the British stated that they had no designs on Kedah and that they would not attack it or cause it any harm, nor would they allow the Sultan's adherents to create trouble in any part of His Majesty's realm, whether Kedah or elsewhere. The British also agreed to ensure that the Sultan (who was then living in Penang) would move and not be allowed to reside in Penang, Province Wellesley, Perak, Selangor or Burma. If the British did *not* move him to another location, as agreed, they were prepared to allow the Siamese to levy duty at the usual rate on provisions purchased from Kedah by the people of Penang.

Article 14 stated that both parties would allow the Sultan of Perak to govern the state in whatever fashion he desired. If he wished to send the gold and silver trees and other offerings up to His Majesty, the British would not prevent him. Nor would they object if Chao Phaya Nakhon were to send an

envoy to call upon the Sultan of Perak, by way of maintaining friendly relations with the state, or if the Sultan of Perak were to send his councillors up to see Chao Phaya Nakhon. Both Siamese and British agreed not to attack Perak; in addition, the British would see that Selangor did not attack Perak while the Siamese undertook not to attack Selangor.

At the same time as this treaty with the British was concluded, a commercial agreement was drawn up. It contained six clauses, the more important details of which were as follows:

Clause 1 forbade British traders to export paddy and rice from Bangkok and also stipulated that arms, powder and shot brought into Siam by British merchants should only be sold to the crown; if the crown did not wish to purchase them, they must be taken back and not remain within the kingdom. Apart from these two points, British merchants might trade freely and without restriction, nor need they pay any duties other than a levy on the vessel's tonnage, the rate of which the British agreed to raise. This meant that vessels bringing goods into the country to sell would pay a levy of 1700 baht for each fathom of the ship's beam; vessels entering Bangkok without cargo would obviously be coming to buy Siamese goods, and would be charged a rate of 1500 baht per fathom.

Clause 3 stated that British merchant vessels entering Bangkok and carrying arms, powder and shot for their defence, must first deposit them with officials of the crown at Samut Prakan; the vessels might then proceed up to Bangkok. \*\*<sup>54</sup>

Apart from the formal treaties concluded with the British at this time, agreement was also reached on other matters which according to the records were as follows:

- (1) The Siamese agreed to repatriate the people carried off by Phaya Chumphon, i.e. people from Mergui and Tenasserim which had now come under British control. On their part, the British agreed to release the Chumphon people they had captured.
- (2) The Siamese agreed to allow the British to lease the island of Penang and the mainland territory of Province Wellesley, according to the treaty concluded with the ruler of Kedah. Chao Phaya Nakhon was to draw up an agreement determining the boundaries on the mainland, in collaboration with the Governor of Penang at the time.
- (3) When the British had defeated the Burmese and the latter had signed a capitulation, the British would insist that the Burmese conclude a treaty with them stating that the Siamese were the allies of the British and the

Burmese must agree never again, under any circumstances, to violate Siamese territory.

Apart from these points, there were others, such as the British intention to establish a Mon kingdom, and to fix the boundaries of the provinces of Tenasserim and Mergui that were to be handed over to Siam. The Siamese were not keen on this and the British, once they had defeated the Burmese, changed their minds, so nothing eventuated.

When the British had concluded the treaty with the Siamese, His Majesty was pleased to appoint Phra Phakdi Borirak (Saeng) as Governor of Kedah<sup>55</sup> and Nai Nut, of the Corps of Pages, as Phra Senanuchit, Deputy Governor of Kedah.

After the treaty with Britain had been concluded, both sides set about implementing its provisions. The only problem was the provision that the British would ensure the departure of the Sultan of Kedah (Pangeran) from Penang. Ever since the Sultan had taken up residence there, he had been unremitting in his efforts to persuade the British to attack Kedah, and when he realised that they would not do so, he sent men to incite the Kedah people and stir up trouble. The British administration in Penang, according to the records, appears to have been divided in its views, one party anxious to see the British attack the Siamese in Kedah, and the other which, while aware that the Government of India had no intention of attacking Kedah, nevertheless saw the advantage to be derived from the Sultan remaining in Penang and stirring up trouble in Kedah. This would result in a considerable number of Kedah people fleeing the state and taking up residence in British territory, and would thus benefit the British. There was therefore a great deal of talk about rebuking and restraining the Sultan, but no real action. Chao Phaya Nakhon did his utmost to remain on friendly terms with the British by continuing the policies of the Sultan and adopting a conciliatory attitude towards the people of Kedah. This is testified to in the documents compiled by Captain Low who maintained that in fact the Siamese administration of Kedah was far better than that of the Sultan.<sup>56</sup>

However the British in Penang did nothing to compel the Sultan to leave the settlement, and answered Chao Phaya Nakhon's complaints by saying that, in allowing the Sultan to take up residence in Penang, they were merely following the custom normally adopted by great powers, i.e. offering asylum to those who had been forced to flee their country. They did indeed remonstrate with the Sultan, saying that if he were to stir up trouble in Kedah, they would stop payment to him of the sum fixed by treaty for the lease of Penang. This was in fact quite useless because the Sultan did not openly take part in fermenting strife in Kedah, but secretly gave his support to others, who went there to stir up trouble on his behalf. After the Government of India had

concluded the treaty with Siam and had pledged themselves to see that the Sultan left Penang, an attempt was made to move him but he refused to leave. When the British tried to compel him, he engaged a solicitor to take out a summons against the Governor of Penang, alleging that he was being deprived of his rights as a free man, under the law. When he was given to understand that the court would decide the case according to the provisions of the treaty, he fled secretly to the village of Beruas, a district in the state of Perak. The British had to send a warship to arrest him and fighting took place; the British forces fired upon the Sultan's men, killing several of them, and having a few of their own men killed before they were able to arrest the Sultan and convey him under guard to Malacca, where he remained from that time on.<sup>\*57</sup>

In the initial stages of the Siamese occupation of Kedah, when vigilance was needed in their dealings with the British, Chao Phaya Nakhon went down himself, but after the Anglo-Siamese treaty had been concluded Chao Phaya Nakhon appears to have handed over the administration to the Governor of Kedah (Saeng). There seems to have been no further trouble in the state during this period. However, in Songkhla, Phaya Wisetphakdi (Chong), the Governor of the state, passed away, and His Majesty was pleased to appoint his younger brother Phra Suntharanurak (Seng) to succeed him as Governor with the title of Phaya Wichiankhiri Si Samutsong-khram.<sup>\*58</sup>

There is one matter that deserves comment: according to records and the accounts that have come down to us, ever since Songkhla had been put directly under Bangkok and, along with Nakhon Si Thammarat, given the task of supervising the Malay states, successive governors of the two provinces had engaged in a running feud. This fact had unpleasant consequences for the provincial centres in the south, as will become clear. In the Year of the Tiger, the 2nd of the decade, C.S. 1192/B.E.2373 [1830-31], Tengku Din, the son of Tengku Raja,<sup>\*59</sup> the elder brother of the Sultan of Kedah, having succeeded in gathering together a number of foreign Malays, made a sudden attack upon Kedah and captured it on Friday, the 1st waning of the 3rd month [17th February 1832],<sup>\*60</sup> forcing the Governor of Kedah [Saeng] and the Siamese to retreat and take up a defensive position in Phthalung. Chao Phaya Nakhon sent off word to Bangkok and from Nakhon set about raising an army to march down and recapture Kedah. He instructed Phra Surin, the Commissioner from the Front Palace, who was in Nakhon at the time, to proceed to Songkhla and levy a force from that province and from the seven states into which Patani had been divided prior to it being placed under Songkhla. The two forces were to link up and assist each other in an attack upon Kedah. There are no details explaining why Phra Surin was sent and how he carried out his mission, but the reports we have lead us to suppose that Chao Phaya Nakhon was not on good terms with the Governor of Songkhla (Seng). Chao Phaya Nakhon probably thought that if he were to order the Governor to raise a force without any authority other than his own [i.e. Chao Phaya Nakhon's], the Governor would



refuse and that it would therefore be better if the instructions came from the Commissioner from Bangkok, who happened to be in Nakhon at that time.

For his part the Governor of Songkhla probably thought that the trouble had arisen simply because of the inefficiency of Chao Phaya Nakhon in organising the administration of Kedah, and that Chao Phaya Nakhon now wanted to involve Songkhla in the responsibility of calling upon Malays to fight against their fellow Malays. Whatever the reason was, the Governor sent Phra Surin to the seven states to levy men by himself. It appears that when he attempted to do so, they united against him and rose up, with the Malay rulers of the Patani states joining them, only the Governor of Yiring [Jering], a Siamese, remaining loyal. The Governor of Songkhla (Seng) sent a letter to Bangkok complaining that, in levying men, Phra Surin had robbed the Malays of their gold, silver and valuables, with the result that the Malays had risen up against him.

When the news reached Bangkok that trouble had broken out in the Malay provinces, His Majesty sent a force consisting of four detachments, under the command of Phaya Narongritthikosa, Phaya Rachawangsan, Phaya Phichaiburintra and Phaya Phetburi ('Suk'—who later became Chao Phaya Yomarat in the reign of Rama IV) respectively. It appears that when these four detachments arrived in Songkhla they learnt that Chao Phaya Nakhon had already levied a force from Nakhon Si Thammarat and set off to attack Kedah. The Bangkok troops thereupon set out for the Patani area but they did not have enough men to put down the rebellion, as the Malays from Kelantan and Trengganu had come to the assistance of the Patani Malays. They therefore sent a request for reinforcements from Bangkok and His Majesty was pleased to place Chao Phaya Phra Khlang\*\*<sup>61</sup> (who was also in charge of the Ministry of War and the Department of Ports and Harbours) in command of a naval force with orders to set sail. This was on Sunday, the 2nd waning of the 4th month in the Year of the Dragon, C.S.1194/B.E.2375 [18th March 1832].

Before this force arrived in Songkhla, Chao Phaya Nakhon's force had advanced against Kedah, and had succeeded in cutting off Tengku Din. When the latter realised that escape was impossible, he committed suicide, along with the other Malay chiefs.\*<sup>62</sup> Chao Phaya Nakhon then attacked Nakhon Si Thammarat\*\*<sup>63</sup> and succeeded in capturing it, after which he led his army to the assistance of Songkhla. He arrived there a little before the arrival of the force under Chao Phaya Phra Khlang, and despatched a fleet to blockade Patani Bay. When Chao Phaya Khlang finally arrived, he ordered Chao Phaya Nakhon to lead his force down from Songkhla to support him. On the 3rd waxing of the 8th month [30th June 1832], the joint Siamese forces decisively crushed the rebellion of the Patani Malays and captured nearly all of the rulers of the Patani states and the Malays who had conspired with them. They learnt that the ruler of Kelantan (Long Muhammad) had sent a Kelantan force under

his two younger brothers - Phaya Bangoi [Raja Bangul] and Phaya Ban Thale [Raja Kampung Laut] - to assist the ruler of Patani (his nephew by marriage) against the Siamese.\*<sup>64</sup> In addition, the ruler of Trengganu had also sent a force to assist the ruler of Patani, under the command of Tengku Dare [(I)dris], Che Kulan [?Ghulam], Wan Kama [?Kamal] and Che Samae [(I) smail]. Chao Phaya Phra Khlang was preparing to attack Kelantan when the ruler of Kelantan, apprehensive of the consequences of his disloyalty, sent Che Long and Che Yaba [Jab(b)ar] up to Chao Phaya Phra Khlang, with a letter acknowledging his guilt and declaring his readiness to hand over the ruler of Patani to the Siamese. He begged that Kelantan be pardoned and be allowed to expiate its guilt by paying a fine of \$30,000, with a further payment of \$20,000 to cover the expenses of the Siamese forces - in all \$50,000. Chao Phaya Phra Khlang consequently pardoned Kelantan.

As for Trengganu, its ruler (Muhammad) remained silent, so Chao Phaya Phra Khlang sent a Crown Commissioner down with a warning. Sultan Muhammad received the letter with due ceremony but, after he had learnt of its contents, said that he was very ill. The Commissioner attempted to obtain some action but the Council insisted that nothing could be done while the Sultan was still sick. After waiting for some time, the Commissioner realised that he was accomplishing nothing and so he left. Chao Phaya Phra Khlang discussed matters with Chao Phaya Nakhon and they agreed that if they were to have their forces attack Trengganu, the Trengganu Malays would flee en masse into British territory and they would capture a deserted state, which would be of no benefit to them. At this time, the Trengganu Malays were divided into two parties because some three years earlier, Sultan Mansur (the father of Sultan Muhammad) had fought Tengku Umar in order to obtain the throne. The Siamese had intervened on the side of Sultan Mansur and Tengku Umar had consequently been forced to flee to Lingga in Dutch territory.

Chao Phaya Phra Khlang now sent Tengku Umar a letter asking him whether, if he were appointed as ruler of Trengganu, he would guarantee to maintain law and order in the state. Tengku Umar swore that he would faithfully do his duty, ever mindful of the favour bestowed upon him by His Majesty, and would guarantee to maintain order in the state. The ruler of Lingga, who was a relation of Tengku Umar's, also sent a letter, to vouch for Tengku Umar's good intentions. Chao Phaya Phra Khlang sent a report up to His Majesty who was duly pleased to give the proposal his consent and sent instructions to depose Sultan Muhammad and install Tengku Umar as Sultan of Trengganu. When the people of Trengganu learnt that the Siamese were backing Tengku Umar and that a Siamese army was encamped at Songkhla, there was no thought of resistance and Tengku Umar became Sultan without any trouble. The former Sultan (Muhammad) fled to Kelantan, where he died three years later.\*<sup>65</sup>

In what I conjecture to be the Year of the Monkey, in the 8th decade or the Year of the Cock, the 9th of the decade, C.S. 1199/B.E.2380 [1837-1838]-the uncertainty is because the dates given in the 'Kelantan Chronicles' are given in the Islamic style and do not tally with the Siamese system-the ruler of Kelantan (Long Muhammad) passed away.\*<sup>66</sup> He had no male issue and the remaining members of the ruling houses were his younger brother, Phaya Bangoi [Raja Banggul] and four nephews (the sons of another brother, Raja Temenggung) viz. Tuan Toka [Kota], Tuan Mika [?Senik Gagap], Tuan Senik (Pak Daeng) [=Mulut Merah] and Tuan Musu [Busu]. Raja Banggul had a son called Tuan Tango [Tengah]. There were two sons of the Raja Muda (Long Salo, whom the Malays called Raja Ban Thale [Kampung Laut] and who was the younger brother of Long Muhammad) viz. Tuan Besar and Tuan Busu. Summing up, when Long Muhammad died, he left behind a younger brother and seven nephews.

After the younger brother, Raja Temenggung, had died, Long Muhammad looked after the latter's four sons but showed most favour towards Tuan Senik (Pak Daeng), the ablest whom, he decided, should carry on the dynasty. However, after Long Muhammad's death, his relations could not agree, and began to quarrel with each other for possession of the throne. Chao Phaya Nakhon consequently sent his second son, Phra Saneha Montri ('Noi Klang' [= 'middle Noi'] who became Chao Phaya Nakhon in the 4th reign) down to admonish them. Phra Saneha Montri saw that Tuan Senik was the most popular of the candidates and arranged a settlement that was agreed to by all members of the family. Tuan Senik (Pak Daeng) was to be Ruler of Kelantan and see that law and order were maintained. Phra Saneha Montri arranged for Tuan Senik to have the gold and silver trees made, along with the other offerings for His Majesty, and then appointed Raja Banggul (Senik's uncle) with Tuan Busu (Senik's younger brother), and Tuan Besar (the son of Raja Kampung Laut) to lead the delegation that was to present the offerings to His Majesty. His Majesty was duly pleased to appoint Tuan Senik (Pak Daeng) as 'Phaya Wichit Phakdi', Ruler of Kelantan. Tuan Kota, his eldest brother, was appointed 'Phaya Sunthra Thibodi Seri Sultan Dewa Maharaja', and Comptroller of the State, Tuan [Seni Gagap?]. Senik's other elder brother, was appointed 'Tengku Seri Indera Perdana Menteri' and Tuan Busu, Senik's younger brother, was appointed 'Raja Muda', all being given the marks of honour appropriate to their high rank, i.e., the title of 'Tengku'. However neither Raja Banggul nor [Tuan] Besar were given any mark of favour, being mistrusted because of their complicity in assisting the ruler of Patani in his attack upon the Siamese in the Year of the Tiger, the 2nd of the decade C.S. 1192/B.E.2373 [1830-1831], as has been related above. It appears that His Majesty intended to have them both arrested, or at least have Raja Bangul detained, as His Majesty suspected that he would only stir up more trouble. However, Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) was keen to avoid any fuss in Kelantan and, believing that the relations of

the late Sultan were now in agreement with each other, begged His Majesty to allow the two to leave Bangkok. Raja Bangul went to Nakhon and then made off to Pahang, outside His Majesty's domains, but [Tuan] Besar returned to Kelantan where things remained peaceful for a while.\*<sup>67</sup>

In the Year of the Cock, the 9th of the decade, C.S. 1199/B.E.2380 [1837-1838], Her Royal Highness Queen Sulalai, the Dowager Mother, passed away and preparations were commenced for the royal cremation ceremony. At the beginning of the Year of the Dog the last of the decade, C.S.1200/B.E.2381 [1838] most of the provincial administrators began to assemble in Bangkok for the ceremony. It was at this juncture that Tengku Muhammad Saad and Tengku Abdullah (the nephews of the Sultan of Kedah) who had made off to become pirates on the west coast, began to conspire with Wan Mali, the chief of the Malay pirates on Ko Yao [Pulau Panjang] in the Phuket area.\*<sup>68</sup> They succeeded in persuading a considerable number of Malays to join in an attack upon Kedah, at a time when the Siamese were off their guard. The Siamese were unable to hold Kedah and had to retreat to Phthalung once again. After the Malays had captured Kedah they were full of confidence, knowing that most of the provincial governors in the south, such as Chao Phaya Nakhon and the Governor of Songkhla, had gone up to Bangkok. They advanced upon Trang, in Nakhon territory, and easily captured it. After the capture of Trang they advanced across the peninsula to attack Songkhla and sent envoys to persuade the Malays from the seven (Patani) states to rise up as before. When the news reached Bangkok, His Majesty ordered the provincial governors to hurry back home and defend their provinces. However, in view of the fact that during this latest rising, the Malay rebels had attacked Trang and then crossed over the peninsula to threaten the important centre of Songkhla, His Majesty also deemed it advisable to raise an army from the capital, in case the Malay states on the south-east coast (Trengganu and Kelantan) should again rebel. Command of the army was given not to Chao Phaya Phra Khlang, who had commanded the earlier expedition, but to his younger brother Pha[ya] Si Phiphat (Thad), who was to become Chao Phaya Borommahaphichaiyat under Rama IV.

At the time of raising the force in accordance with His Majesty's instructions, Phaya Si Phiphat appointed Luang Udomsombat, an official in the Treasury Department, as his Assistant Secretary, charging him with the duty of attending all discussions in Bangkok on matters connected with the expedition and sending him details. It would appear that Luang Udomsombat was a man with an excellent memory and Phaya Si Phiphat wished to have written records made of the official discussions for his perusal, detailing what had gone on from the time it had first been decided that Phaya Si Phiphat should be sent out as commander. The details given in the dispatches therefore commence by outlining the situation shortly before Phaya Si Phiphat left Bangkok and continue regularly. Altogether some 15 dispatches have been

found and an analysis of their contents indicates that these were probably all that were written.

At the time that Phaya Si Phiphat was leaving Bangkok, an incident occurred in Kelantan in the Year of the Dog, the last of the decade [1838-1839], when [Tuan] Besar quarrelled with the Ruler of Kelantan (Senik Pak Daeng) about their respective claims to land and vassals. [Tuan] Besar and Raja Bangul were resentful of the fact that the Ruler of Kelantan had not asked His Majesty to grant them any land and they may have also known about the situation in Kedah and about Trang being captured by the Malays. When the dispute arose, [Tuan] Besar encouraged Raja Bangul to invade the state with a band of men and set up camp and attack the Ruler of Kelantan. However, by the time trouble broke out in Kelantan, the Bangkok army had reached Songkhla and so was now faced with the additional problem of finding some way to put an end to the Kelantan trouble.

So much for the background; details of what happened subsequently will be found in 'The Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat'.

## Notes

- Double asterisks refer to the original footnotes compiled by Prince Damrong and supplemented by comments from His Majesty Rama V (and subsequently supplemented by further notes made by the Department of Fine Arts). Notes by Cyril Skinner and the Editor have been denoted with a single asterisk in the text.
- 1 The 'Thonburi period' refers to the reign of King Taksin (c. 1767-1781) but Trengganu was established well before this (in 1725, according to the 'Tuhfat al-Nafis' see Sheppard (1949) p. 11).
- 2 Rahmat (1979) Chapter 3, suggests that Kelantan finally established its independence of Trengganu in 1802 (Rama reigned from 1782-1809). A document in the National Library, Bangkok, C.S.1171 No.7/2 not published in 'Chodmaihet Rachakan thi Song' records how in the 11th month of the Year of the Snake, the 1st of the decade [i.e. between 9 October and 6 November 1809] representatives from the Malay states Or Sai(buri) [= Kedah], Trengganu, Kelantan, Nongchik, Raman and Rangae [= Legih] paid homage to Rama II and presented him with the 'gold and silver trees'. This would have been only a few weeks after Rama II had succeeded his father and certainly suggests that the states referred to had paid homage to Rama I.
- 3 Prachum Phongsawadan [Collected Chronicles] part 2 (1963) contains the Chronicles of Saiburi [Kedah] Trengganu and Kelantan while part 3 (1963) contains the Chronicle of Pat(t)ani: for Damrong's edition of the '(Royal) Chronicle of the 2nd Reign' see Damrong (1962).
- 4 'C S' refers to the 'Lesser Era' ('Chu(n)lasakarat') commencing in A.D. 638: B.E. refers to the Buddhist Era ('Phuththasakarat') commencing at the death of the Buddha in B.C. 543.
- 5 The Thai records refer to him as 'Badung' or 'Padung' presumably derived from his title of 'Badun Meng' (Prince of Badun). As King of Ava he was probably best known by the title of 'Hsengbyu Mya Sheng' (Lord of the White Elephants). But after his death he was known as 'Bodoaphra' (Royal Grandfather) and it is by this posthumous title usually in the form of 'Bodawphaya' - that he is best known in the West. See e.g. Phayre (1883) p. 208 et seq. (I have followed Phayre's romanisation of the Burmese names.)
- 6 Rama I's nephew (the eldest son of his eldest sister) whose given name was 'Thong In'. Before the 1783 campaign his title was 'Chao Fa Krommaluang Anurakthewet' but after the campaign he was made 'Prince of the Rear Palace' ('Krommaphra Rachawanglang'). He was born in 1746 and died in 1806, see Flood (1973) vol. 4, p. 284; Wenk (1968) p. 48.

- 7 Rama I's younger brother (given name 'Bun Ma') born in 1743. Rama I appointed him 'Krommaphra Rachawangbowon' - Prince of the Front Palace (and heir apparent) - in 1782 and he played a prominent part in the Burmese wars. However before his death (in 1803) there were serious quarrels between the two brothers; see Flood (1973) vol 4, p. 286; Wenk (1968) p. 12-13.
- 8 The resolute defence of Thalang [the modern 'Phuket'] in 1785 by the Governor's wife Lady Chan and her sister Muk is one of the epics of Siamese history. For their bravery Rama I awarded them the titles by which they are referred to in the text. Their statue stands at the crossroads of the modern town of Thalang.
- 9 This magnificent piece which could fire a 9" calibre shot and which has a barrel some 20 feet long now occupies a place of honour on the lawn outside the Ministry of Defence (Kalahom) in Bangkok.
- 10 According to Ibrahim Shukri (?1961) p. 95 this was Tengku Lamidin.
- 11 For the negotiations leading up to the occupation of Penang see e.g. Bonney (1971) chapter 3.
- 12 According to Bonney (1971), p. 98 et seq. the British in Penang launched pre-emptive attacks on the Kedah forces assembling on the mainland to attack the island (on 12 April and 16 April 1791).
- 13 Damrong's references to the Sultan are misleading. Sultan Abdullah had died in 1798 and his brother Dziauddin, had apparently obtained the ascendancy in the state. It was Dziauddin as 'Raja Muda of Perlis and Kedah' who signed the treaty referred to on '12 Muharram 1215' [4/5 June 1800] so Damrong has also got his dates wrong. Indeed, the references to 'Malay pirates' makes one suspect that Damrong has confused the 1800 Treaty with the 1791 Treaty (which had indeed been preceded by the appearance of a Lanun fleet which Sultan Abdullah had hoped to use in his attack upon Penang), see Bonney (1971) chapters 4 and 5, Appendices 4(a) and 4(b).
- 14 'Chao Phaya' at this time was in effect the highest rank bestowed upon persons outside the Royal Family, although in later reigns a chosen few had the rank of 'Somdet Chao Phaya' conferred upon them.
- 15 At this time 'Phuket' appears to have been used for the port of Tha Reua in the centre of the island, and not for the modern town of Phuket (situated in the southern part of the island).
- 16 According to 'Appointments to the Rank of Chao Phaya in the Bangkok Period', his title was '*Chao Phaya Phichaikhiri*' etc., while another version gives his title as '*Chao Phaya Inthakiri* etc.
- 17 A note here says that in the 'Chronicles of Songkhla', the name 'Bun Hui' is given a Thai spelling which would result in the pronunciation of the name 'Hui' with a falling tone-[hui]-instead of, as here, with a level tone.

- 18 'Yala' is the Malay 'Jala/Jalor'; 'Yiring' is the Malay 'Jering'; 'Saiburi' (pronounced [sajburii]; not to be confused with 'Sai(buri)' pronounced [sajburii], the Thai word for Kedah) is sometimes referred to as 'Teluban' and the state of Saiburi includes the (now more important) town of 'Narathiwat' or 'Bang Nara' situated a little to the south; 'Rangae' is often referred to as 'Legih'.
- 19 Rama I died in 1809 but Sultan Abdullah had died as early as 1798.
- 20 Neither Anderson (1824) nor Low (1908) mention a 'Tengku Raya/Raja'. Damrong later says that 'Tengku Raya/Raja' was the father of Tengku Din but Low (1908), p. 189 says that Tengku Din was the son of Tengku (Hi)Tam, the *sister* of S. Ahmad Tajuddin. I suspect that 'Tengku Raya/Raja' and 'Teng(Hi)Tam' are one and the same *woman*.
- 21 On the death of Sultan Abdullah in 1798, his younger brother, Tengku Dziauddin, the Raja Muda and Administrator of Perlis, appears to have acted as 'Sultan' or 'Sultan Muda' until about 1804 when as a result of Siamese pressure, he agreed to his nephew (Tengku Pangeran) becoming Sultan. Dziauddin appears to have continued to administer Perlis until his death c.1822, see Burney (1914), vol 2 part 4, p. 173 et seq.
- 22 According to Anderson (1824), p. 154 and Low (1908), p. 189. Tengku Pangeran and Tengku Bisnu were sons of the same mother (Wan Mas).
- 23 Damrong is premature here; Tengku Bisnu was originally appointed 'Phra' Aphainurat. His promotion to the rank of 'Phaya Aphainurat' is announced in a letter to Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin dated 2 August 1811, see Chodmaihet Rachakan thi Song (1971) vol. 2, p. 67.
- 24 The standard account of the Burmese attacks on the island of Thalang (sometimes known as 'Junk Ceylon' but now usually referred to as 'Phuket') is Gerini (1905) but Gerini's dating is not always reliable. Documents in the National Library Bangkok confirm that the first Burmese invasion of the Thai provinces south of Tavoy took place in *October* 1809 (and was *not*, as Gerini states, preceded by an earlier attack in July-August 1809). Gesick (1976), p. 157, note 2, rightly criticizes Gerini's dating but says that there was 'only one invasion in 1809/1810'. The documents referred to however show that there were *two* invasions, one in 1809 and another in 1810.
- 25 The part played by the Kedah fleet is described in detail in the 'Syair Sultan Maulana'.
- 26 Damrong's dating is confused; the Kedah attack upon Perak began towards the end of 1816 and was apparently not completed until 1818, see Bonney (1971), p. 128.
- 27 See e.g. the three letters from the Minister of War and Southern Provinces (Kalahom) to 'Chao Phaya Saiburi' [= Kedah], dated 'Friday 13th waxing, 9th month, C.S. 1173, Year of the Goat' (i.e. 2nd August 1811) in Chodmaihet Rachakan thi Song (1971) vol. 2, p. 3-7. As noted above, the Kedah invasion



of Perak had not yet taken place, so Tajuddin's promotion to the rank of 'Chao Phaya' was obviously a reward solely for his contribution towards driving the Burmese out of Thalang.

- 28 The traditional custom was for parents simply to call their children 'O Chim'. This is borne out in the expression used in the 'Chu Chok' section (of the 'Maha Chat') when Nang Phramani, the mother of Nang Amitta complains to Chu Chok, 'When O Chim's father (i.e. her husband) gets annoyed, he threatens to hit me'. This is a form of address from the Ayuthaya period but even in the time of the Bangkok dynasty the Nakhon aristocracy still used the expression. Children would have their parents' name and be called simply 'Nui' (equivalent to 'Noi') or 'Nu' or 'lad'—most of which mean the same as 'Lek' [small]. The daughter of Chao Phaya Suthammamontri (Phat), who was the mother of HRH Krommaphra Rachawangbowon Mahasakdiphonlasep, was called 'Nui', and another daughter, who married Chao Phaya Thipakorawong, was called 'Nu'. The two daughters of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) who were presented [i.e. as minor wives] to His Majesty King Rama III, and whom I knew personally, were called 'Khun Noi Yai' [Lady Noi Senior] and 'Khun Noi Lek' [Lady Noi Junior] respectively.
- 29 Section 60 on page 59 of the B.E.2482/A.D. 1939 edition.
- 30 I cannot trace this statement in Low (1836) or Low (1908) but it does however occur in Burney (1914), vol. 2, part 4, p. 178.
- 31 Sultan Abdul Hamid (who was born in 1864 and reigned from 1882 to 1943) was the son of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin Mukarram Shah III and Wan (H)ajar. Wan Hajar was the younger sister of Wan Mohammad Saman (the Prime Minister of Kedah) who may be the 'Phra Thanintharaniphat' referred to here, see Mohammad Hassan (1968), p. 198.
- 32 The Thai records state that *Phra Aphai Nurat* was the administrator of Setul (and Langu) until 1811, when he was made Governor of the Kuala Merbok, Kuala Muda and Yen districts (and promoted to the rank of 'Phaya'), see Chodmaihet Rachakan thi 2 (1971), vol. 2, p. 6-7. He *may*, as Damrong says, have administered Setul for two years, but he did not then 'pass away', in fact, he did not die until 1815, see e.g. the document C.S. 1177, No. 3 (179) in the National Library Bangkok.
- 33 Chao Phaya Suthammamontri's daughter (Nui Yai) was presented (as a minor wife) to Rama I and in 1785 bore him a son, Phra Ong Chao Arunothai, who in 1807 was promoted to the rank of Krommameun Sakdiphonlasep. Chao Phaya Suthammamontri's son (Noi) who became Phaya (subsequently Chao Phaya) Nakhon Si Thammarat was thus closely linked with the court through his sister and nephew (a connection that became even closer when two of his daughters became minor wives of the future Rama III). It was during the reign of Rama III (1824-1851) that Krommameun Sakdiphonlasep was promoted to the rank of 'Krommaphra Rachawangbowon' (their apparent) but he died in 1832, see Flood (1974), vol. 4, p. 289; Rabibhadana (1969), p. 228.
- 34 In the 'Chronicles of Songkhla' his name is given as 'Chong'.

- 35 Phaya Wichiankhiri (Chom)'s statement (in his 'Chronicles of Songkhla') that Kelantan was a vassal state directly under Bangkok from the time of the first reign, and that Songkhla exercised supervision over the affairs of Kedah (until) the Governor of Songkhla (Chong) requested His Majesty to have Kedah placed under Nakhon, cannot be substantiated when examined against the historical evidence e.g. the letter of appointment of Chao Phaya Nakhon, the 'Chronicles of Kelantan' or the events related in the 'Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat'.
- 36 The Sultan's ablest defender, Bonney (whose dating however is sometimes at fault, because of his reliance upon Gerini) agrees that Tajuddin recognized Burmese overlordship, see Bonney (1971), p. 116.
- 37 Bodawphaya died in 1819 and was succeeded by his grandson the Prince of Sagaing (in Burmese: 'Sagaing Meng', in Mon: 'Chakkaimaeng' - the Siamese obtained most of their information about the Burmese through Mon refugees). He is usually referred to in Burmese as 'Hpagyidoo' (Bagyidaw) see Phayre (1883), p. 231-232.
- 38 Minh-Mang, Gia Long's son, who reigned from 1820 to 1840.
- 39 Thong In.
- 40 The first clashes occurred in Chittagong in September 1823 and in Kachar (adjoining Manipur) in January 1824. In the same month the Burmese general, Maha Bandula, began his advance on Chittagong. The British declared war on Burma (strictly speaking, the Kingdom of Ava) in March 1824. see e.g. Bruce (1973).
- 41 Tengku Mom (also referred to as 'Tengku Embon' and 'Tengku Ya'kub') was the half-brother of the Sultan. Kedah sources are bitter about his betrayal of the Sultan, e.g. Mohammad Hassan (1968), p. 150-151 takes a grim pleasure in relating how as a 'reward' for his treachery, Tengku Mom and his son were executed by their Siamese masters, see also Bonney (1971), p. 102-103.
- 42 To the British, the Sultan claimed that he had delayed sending the gold and silver trees because he had heard that cholera had broken out in Bangkok. However, his connection with the Burmese was known to the British who accepted it as a fact. The details are to be found in the British archives.
- 43 Once again Damrong's dating is at fault. The Siamese attack upon Kedah took place on Sunday 12 November 1821, see Anderson (1824), p. 2.
- 44 For details of the Crawford mission see Crawford (1830) and Crawford (1915).
- 45 Phaya Phiphatkosa was the senior official in the 'Krom Tha' (Department of Ports and Harbours) under the Phrakhlung. Crawford described him as a 'venerable old chief'.
- 46 Phaya Chularachamontri is described as 'Collector of Customs and Duties on Ships in the Port [of Bangkok]', see Crawford (1915), p. 64.

- 47 Crawford was Resident of Singapore from 1823 to 1826.
- 48 These four districts were captured between August and November 1824 and troops taking part returned to Rangoon in time to join the British advance upon Ava in 1825.
- 49 Chao Phaya Mahayotha was a Mon noble, who commanded the Mon detachments in the service of Siam.
- 50 The maternal grandfather of Phaya Wachisatayarak (Kham Siyaphai).
- 51 The Mons (often referred to as 'Talaings') from the Kingdom of Pegu or 'Hangsawadi' had for centuries fought the Burmans for control of the territory now known as Burma. In 1759 the Burman Alaungphaya had overthrown the Hangsawadi dynasty and established himself as ruler of both lower and upper Burma. The Mons never recovered from this defeat and thousands of them, among them princes such as the 'Chao Phaya Mahayotha' referred to above, subsequently emigrated to Siam.
- 52 See Mills (1925) Chapter 8.
- 53 For details of the Burney mission see Burney (1914).
- 54 The practice of detaining a vessels' guns, powder and shot, as stipulated in this treaty, was applied even more strictly in Burma. Foreign vessels trading with Burma had not only to hand over their guns, powder and shot, but even dismantle the ship's rudder and deposit it with the local officials.
- 55 In the 'Chronicles of Songkhla' compiled by Phaya Wichiankhiri (Chom), the honorific name is given as follows: 'Phaya Aphaithibet Mahaprathehsarachathibodin Inthraaisawan Khanthasema Matyanuchit Sitthisongkhram Ramaphakdi Phiriyaphaha'.
- 56 Perhaps referring to Low's comments quoted in Burney (1924), vol. 5, part 1, p. 195; see also Skinner (1964), p. 161-2.
- 57 For 'The Affair at B(e)ruas', see Gibson-Hill (1951).
- 58 In the 'Chronicles of Songkhla' compiled by Phaya Wichiankhiri (Chom) it is said that the Governor of Songkhla (Chong) passed away during the second reign in the Year of the Ox, the 9th of the decade, C.S.1179/B.E.2360 [1817-18], before the Governor of Nakhon's attack upon Kedah.
- 59 As noted above; English sources suggest that Tengku Din was the son of Tengku Hitam, the Sultan's *sister*.
- 60 The '1st waning of the 3rd month' (in the Year of the Tiger, the second of the decade) corresponds to Saturday 29 January, 1831. According to Low (1850), p. 363, the Malays attacked the fort in April, 1831.

- 61 'Dit', who was promoted to the rank of Somdet Chao Phaya Borommahaprayurawong during the 4th reign.
- 62 A brief account of the rising will be found in Low (1950), p. 360-366 (according to which Tengku Din did not commit suicide but was killed in battle).
- 63 Presumably 'Kedah' is intended here.
- 64 cf. Ibrahim Shukri (?1961), p. 108.
- 65 Damrong (apparently basing himself upon Thiphakarawong's 'Phrarachaphongsawadan Krung Ratanakosin Rachakan thi Sam' (Chronicle of the Third Reign) would appear to have confused events from three different periods of Trengganu's history. In 1831 Tengku Mansur had driven out his nephew Tengku Umar and become Sultan. T. Umar retired to Lingga. When Sultan Mansur died (in 1836) his adherents were strong enough to ensure the succession of his young son, T. Muhammad. Three years later however Tengku Umar returned from Lingga and succeeded in driving out his cousin and ascending the throne, although (as Damrong suggests) not without Siamese encouragement, see e.g. Sheppard (1949) and Skinner (1964a).
- 66 The events subsequent to Long Muhammad's death are discussed in some detail in Skinner (1965); see also Rahmat (1979).
- 67 The narrative relating to Kelantan here differs from the account given in the 'Kelantan Chronicles' (compiled in the reign of Rama IV), and that which appears in the 'Royal Chronicles' compiled by Chao Phaya Thiphakorawong. I have based my narrative mainly upon the dates given in the instructions issued by His Majesty King Rama III, amending the accounts to conform with the details given in these instructions, which will be found in the 'Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat'.
- 68 According to Low, Wan M(uhamm)ad Ali was the son of the Chief of Langkawi (whose title, according to the 'Syair Sultan Maulana' was 'Seri Pekerma Jaya'). After the Siamese invasion of mainland Kedah in 1821 Langkawi was also occupied, but Wan Mat Ali appears to have expelled the Siamese from the island early in 1837. See Burney (1914), vol. 5, part 1, p. 161-162.

# Bibliography

- Anderson, J.  
1824 'Considerations Relative to the Malayan Peninsula', *JMBRAS* 35(4), 1962.
- Bonney, R.  
1971 *Kedah 1771-1829*, Kuala Lumpur.
- Bruce, E.  
1973 *The Burma Wars, 1824-86*, London.
- Burney, H.  
1914 *The Burney Papers*, 5 vols., Bangkok 1910-1914, reprinted London 1971.
- Chodmaihet Rachakanthi Song.  
1971 *Chodmaihet Rachakanthi Song* (Documents from the 2nd Reign), 2 vols, Bangkok.
- Crawfurd, J.  
1830 *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China*, 2nd edition, London.  
1915 *The Crawfurd Papers*, Bangkok.
- Damrong Rachanuphap.  
1962 *Phrarachaphongsawadan Rachakanthi Song* (Royal Chronicle of the 2nd Reign), Khuru Sapha edition, Bangkok.
- Finestone, Jeffrey.  
1989 *The Royal Family of Thailand*, Phitsanalok Publishing Co Ltd: Bangkok.
- Flood, C.  
1973 *The Dynastic Chronicles Bangkok Era, the Fourth Reign*, Tokyo, 5 vols. 1965-73.
- Gerini, G.E.  
1905 Historical Retrospect of Junk Ceylon Island, *Journal Siam Society*, vol 2, p. 117-268.
- Gesick, L.M.  
1976 *Kingship and Political Integration in Traditional Siam 1767-1824*, Ph.D., Cornell University.
- Gibson-Hill, C.A.  
1951 'The Affair at Bruas', *JMBRAS* 24(3), p. 163-167.

- Gullick, J.M.  
1983 'Kedah 1821-1855', *JMBRAS* 56(2).
- Ibrahim, Syukri.  
1961 *Kerajaan Melayu Petani*, Pasir Putih, Kelantan.
- Lewin, Ronald.  
1980 *The Chief: Field Marshal Lord Wavell*, London.
- Low.  
1850 An Account of the Origins. *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and East Asia*.
- Low, J.  
1908 *Marong Mahawangsa: The Kedah Annals*, Bangkok.
- Mills, L.A.  
1925 'British Malaya 1824-1867', *JMBRAS* 3(3).
- Muhammad Hassan.  
1928 *Al-Tarikh Salasilah Negeri Kedah*, Alor Setar, reprinted Kuala Lumpur, 1968.
- Phayre, A.  
1883 *History of Burma*, London, reprinted London, 1947.
- Prachum Phongsawadan.  
1963 *Prachum Phongsawadan* (Collected Chronicles), part 2 containing Chronicles of Saiburi (=Kedah), Trengganu and Kelantan; part 3 containing Chronicle of Patani, Bangkok.
- Rabibhadana, A.  
1969 *The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period 1782-1873*, Cornell.
- Rahmat, S.  
1979 *Perkembangan Politik Melayu Tradisional Kelantan*, Kuala Lumpur.
- Sheppard, M.C.ff.  
1949 'A Short History of Trengganu', *JMBRAS* 30(3), p. 1-74.
- Skinner, C.  
1964 'A Kedah Letter of 1839', *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, Oxford.  
1964a 'A Trengganu Letter of 1839', *JSEAH* 5(1), p. 178-187.  
1965 *The Civil War in Kelantan in 1839*, Singapore.
- Suwannathat-Pian, K.  
1986 'The 1839-41 Settlement of Kedah', *JMBRAS* 59(1).

Vella, W.F.

1957 *Siam Under Rama III*. New York.

Wenk, K.

1968 *The Restoration of Thailand Under Rama I 1782-1809*. Tucson.

Winstedt, R.O.

1935 A History of Malaya. *JMBRAS* 13(1).





*The Dispatches of  
Luang Udomsombat*



# *The First Dispatch*

## *6 March 1839*

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat, begs to inform Your Excellency<sup>1</sup> as follows:

On 11th September 1838, in the evening, His Majesty asked Khun Phiphat<sup>2</sup> if any ship had put in [with news of] the situation. Khun Phiphat replied that no vessel of any sort had put in. His Majesty asked: "Why have we not heard anything? I was waiting to hear from the Songkhla vessel as regards what is happening in Trengganu, but it has brought no news, nor is there anything about the situation in Kedah - no one has sent in any reports. It makes me feel very worried. What is happening? Will the rebels go on to take Thalang or what?" His Majesty then asked whether any of the Chumphon people had arrived. Phra Narin<sup>3</sup> replied that no one had arrived. His Majesty said: "Phaya Senaphubet<sup>4</sup> is due to arrive from Chumphon, but so far there is no sign of him."

His Majesty then asked Phaya Chodeuk<sup>5</sup> what he had learnt about the situation in Kedah from his interrogation of the Chinese called Phong, who had arrived from Songkhla. Phaya Chodeuk replied that his questioning had elicited no further information. His Majesty said: "He has quite a large crew, get hold of them and interrogate them, and we shall probably learn something. If they will not say anything, or make out they know nothing, punish them by giving them a few lashes." His Majesty then informed Krommaluang Rakronaret<sup>6</sup> of the statement Phong had made earlier. [This was to the effect that] the Kedah Malays had raised an army of 3,000 men and were advancing on Songkhla; the former Governor of Chaiya<sup>7</sup> had got together a force of 800 men and had marched out to engage them, and that after three days fighting, the Malays had been driven back and had set camp on the outskirts of Sadao, a day's journey from Ban Prik. The former Governor had set up camp at Ban Prik and had divided up his 800 men into two bodies, one of which had been sent to establish defences at Phangla just behind Ban Prik, and the other to establish a defensive position at Nom Khwai. The Assistant Governor of Songkhla was said to have gathered a force of 500 men, which had been put under the command of Luang Anurakphubet, and sent to set up a defensive position at Nong Bua. [His Majesty commented:] "This seems incredible. If the commander has established his base at Ban Prik, why should he divide up his force and establish defences at Phangla, to the rear? He should have

set up defences to his front. Dividing up his force in positions twenty-four hours journey from each other means that they won't be able to cope with an emergency. Despite having so few men, he has split them up into even smaller units, and stationed them a long way from each other.<sup>8</sup> He ought to have concentrated his force and kept them together. He should have them drawn up in closed ranks; even if the Malays had established a defensive line, he could have launched an attack upon them with his entire force and driven them into the jungle - they certainly would not have been able to withstand an assault."

His Majesty then asked Your Excellency what Your Excellency had learnt from Your Excellency's discussion with Chao Phaya Nakhon.<sup>9</sup> Your Excellency replied that, with His Majesty's permission, Your Excellency had asked him about the rice needed for his force and he had replied that although he would have the rice from the provinces, there was only enough for four months. As for relying upon this season's crop, no planting had been done, and he was worried in case supplies should run out and his men would not have enough to eat. His Majesty said: "I said all along that the rebels would burn a good deal of the food supplies [in the area] so there would not be all that much left for us." His Majesty then asked what else Your Excellency had learnt and Your Excellency replied that Your Excellency had asked Chao Phaya Nakhon what plans he had to deal with Kedah and he had replied that this time it would be easier than last time, when Tengku Din had caused so much trouble, Tengku Din being a very tough man and a brave, capable fighter.<sup>10</sup> This time, however, they would only be dealing with small fry lads who would not put up much resistance. His Majesty said: "Is he not rather underestimating the courage of the enemy?" and went on to ask: "How can he say it will be easier this time? They have attacked Kedah and taken it, and they have attacked Trang and taken that as well. Did they capture Trang last time? Of course not, they only took Kedah. Last time the people of Trang and Phthalung stood their ground well, and we were able to raise men from all over the area. This time he will have difficulty in collecting many men from Phthalung or Nakhon, as they say they have dispersed and taken to the jungle<sup>11</sup> - it will take him some time to assemble them and it is unlikely that he will be able to do so in time to deal with the situation. In that case, how can he say that it will be easier than last time?"

Your Excellency replied that Chao Phaya Nakhon had said that when the present revolt had broken out he was staying in Bangkok and did not therefore know the full details of what had happened in his absence; at the time of Tengku Din's revolt, he had been in the South and had known exactly what had happened. In the Kedah campaign against Tengku Din, the British had sent two warships to help blockade the Kedah river.<sup>12</sup> The Nakhon forces had kept in constant touch with the British, who had adopted a cooperative attitude to the Nakhon forces, while the latter had been instructed to adopt

the same attitude to the British. This time however, he did not have all the details and had thus not been able to devise plans to deal with the situation. His Majesty then said to Krommaluang Rakronaret: "It seems from what he says that he doesn't have any definite plan. He admits that the last time, the British sent two warships to blockade the mouth of the Kedah river, so how can he say it was more difficult last time? This is just a miscalculation on his part - you see if he does not make a mess of things! Or does he really think that things will be easier this time because the Malays in our territory [have been forced into rebellion by outside pressure],<sup>13</sup> so that if they have a change of heart and come back over to us, the Kedah business can be settled? Is this why he thinks it will be an easy task? If this *is* the case, then the families of the Malay rebels and their relations must be scattered all over the place; they won't have had time to get away and they must still be there, dispersed over a wide area. If they can be sent to seek out their relations and persuade them to come back over to us, then the Kedah business really can be settled easily. If he can do this, then he is right when he says that this time will be easier than last time."

His Majesty then spoke about the last campaign, when Tengku Din had made a stand in his stockade at Ton Pho and Chao Phaya Nakhon's force had attacked him. [His Majesty then said:] "He's split his force into a number of camps situated some distance from each other. He had to fight for two or three days before being able to drive off the Malays. By dispersing his men like this he's made it impossible for them to come to each other's assistance in time and each camp will be concerned only with its own defence. From what I hear, in former days they took care not to disperse their troops like this. The main headquarters would be set up say here, with their forward position no further away than from here to Wat Saket,<sup>14</sup> certainly no further. If things became serious, the men could be drawn up in ranks, with messengers being sent to and fro to keep in touch with the situation, so that they would be ready to act as one body to deal with any emergency. In making his dispositions, if the commander takes due care then everything will be all right. Even this time, when the Malays have taken up strong positions here and there, we need only bring up a battery of heavy cannon to bombard them and give them a bit of stick and they won't be able to hold out - they'll make off into the jungle."

On Wednesday, 12th September, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Treasurer<sup>15</sup> what had been the result of his discussions with Chao Phaya Nakhon. The Treasurer replied that Chao Phaya Nakhon had said that he would like His Majesty to send a force of 3,000 men from Bangkok down to Nakhon. He would then collect the men who had dispersed, to supplement the Bangkok troops, and have them attack Kedah and deal with the situation in a manner that would enhance the crown's prestige. His Majesty said: "I have already issued a good many instructions to deal with the situation - just let me know

exactly what he wants. If he wants 3,000 Bangkok troops, he can have them, and even have them disembark at Nakhon. He is a cunning chap; the reason he wants to have them disembark at Nakhon is so as to have them at his disposal to facilitate his task of assembling the local levies." His Majesty then said: "Let us wait until we have more information - tonight or tomorrow we are bound to get some news. If we send an army down now, during the rainy season, it will get bogged down and will not be able to advance: it will have to wait in Songkhla, which will mean an unnecessary waste of labour, men and supplies. In any event, we shall not be able to move before the end of November. Why should we send any army now? Let us wait a day or two and we should know the details. If we hear anything which requires the despatch of a large force, it can set out towards the end of November or a bit later and make sure of defeating the enemy and recapturing Kedah, and we shall not waste our men and our supplies."

In the evening His Majesty discussed other government business and did not mention the situation in Kedah.

On Thursday, 13th September, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Treasurer if any news had been received. The Treasurer replied that there was still no news; however, he had heard that a party of seven men in a small vessel had set out from Nakhon with dispatches and should arrive here in a day or two's time. His Majesty said: "I have been waiting all this time and it still has not arrived." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "Is Chao Phaya Nakhon setting off today?" The Treasurer replied that he was setting off that afternoon. His Majesty then gave orders that as soon as he reached Nakhon, he was to be sure and send off a messenger at once, to report how serious the situation was. We would then be in a position to deal with the matter as appropriate. If the situation was serious, we could send down an army right away to deal with it.

In the evening His Majesty made no mention of the situation in Kedah.

On Friday, 14th September, in the morning, the Treasurer reported that Phra Wichitsorakrai<sup>16</sup> had sent Nai Reuang up with a message the gist of which was that some 500 of the Kedah Malays had set up camp at Ban Sadao with another 300 at Yang Ngam. The former Governor of Chaiya had set up defences at Ban Prik and his force was biding its time and awaiting a favourable opportunity [to attack]. The Governor of Saiburi [Kedah] had collected men from Kedah, Phthalung and Nakhon and had put the Deputy Governor of Saiburi in command of a force of 1,194 men, with instructions to advance with all speed through Kubang Pasu into Kedah territory. If any village had appreciable supplies of food, prompt action should be taken to seize the food and issue it to the men in his force. The Governor of Saiburi was continuing his efforts to collect more men and if he succeeded he would send another

force to advance via Perlis; he would see to it that reinforcements arrived promptly. He had sent men to purchase rice from Songkhla and had obtained 20 coyan, which had been collected and issued to the 1,194 men at Hadyai, who had set out on 25th August. At Trang,<sup>17</sup> Wan Mali had arrived with a fleet of some 95 vessels, large and small, and about 1,000 men. Phra Songhramwichit, the Governor of Trang, had fought Che Mat Ali's men at Khao Rachasi but the Malays in the village(s) behind [Khao Rachasi] had joined in and attacked the Siamese and flanked them, forcing Phra Songkhramwichit to retreat with only 6 companions. Phra Wichitsorakrai and Phra Senaphipit had managed to assemble a force at Tha Thong in Nakhon province and would return to the attack along with Phra Songkhramwichit. The Malays from the various districts of Kedah had all made off and were hiding in the jungle but had not yet joined the rebels; they were waiting to hear news of the army.

His Majesty told the Treasurer: "See that Chao Phaya Nakhon returns home right away." Once he is back here, all those Malays will join him. His Majesty then asked: "This Kubang Pasu - where is it?" The Treasurer replied that it was a day's journey from Ton Pho on one side and about a day's journey from Taphan Chang on the other. His Majesty said: "The force of 1,194 men had set out was far too small. We really need 3,000 men." His Majesty then asked why it proposed to advance through Perlis; "where were they going?" The Treasurer replied that by taking the Perlis route they could rely on obtaining food and reinforcements. They should pass through Ban Prik and straight on to Kedah - they would not have to go through Ban Sadao. The Deputy Governor's force would however have to attack Yang Ngam before being able to proceed. His Majesty asked: "What about the Songkhla forces - I wonder whether they've attacked the Malays at Sadao yet? Why has someone not been sent to find out what is going on?"

His Majesty then asked: "What about Thalang<sup>18</sup> - is everything quiet?" The Treasurer replied that all was quiet and that no reports had been received. His Majesty gave orders to see that the officials from Thalang, Phangnga, Takua Thung and Takua Pa who had come up to the capital<sup>19</sup> and were still there, should be packed home without delay, so that they could look after their provinces in the event of an emergency. His Majesty asked: "When is the Governor of Chaiya setting out - he can help with the defence of Thalang. If the Malays haven't already attacked Thalang, arrangements must be made to form a combined fleet, made up of men from Thalang, Phangnga, Takua Thung and Takua Pa, to attack the enemy." The Treasurer replied that all the people referred to had already left. However, the Governor of Chaiya would wait upon His Majesty to take his leave on 15th September and upon his departure would make for Thalang. If the Malays did not attack Thalang, he would fit out a fleet and sail off to attack the Kedah Malays. There were already some 40 vessels in Phangnga.

His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Make sure that Chao Phaya Nakhon is aware of the fact that the Governor of Chaiya has no expertise in naval warfare. Wan Mali has some 95 vessels. To take someone with no experience is a waste of time and will only harm the interests of the Crown. Chao Phaya Nakhon should endeavour to use Nakhon men and people from Thalang, Phangnga, Takua Thung and Takua Pa for his fleet. He can put Phra Wichitsorakrai or someone else in command of the fleet and they should be able to take on the Malays and beat them. He should put the Governor of Chaiya in command of a land force, to advance along the coast. However, the latter must see that he obeys any instructions given by Chao Phaya Nakhon, and does not make a mess of things." His Majesty then said: "Tell Chao Phaya Nakhon that when he leaves, he must send messengers to all the southern provinces without delay, urging them to be on their guard. If the situation is serious, he must inform us right away; if we have to send in the army, it will be able to go down there and take prompt action."

In the evening His Majesty asked whether Chao Phaya Nakhon had set off yet, and whether he had met the Governor of Chaiya. Phra Narin replied that the Treasurer had taken the Governor to see Chao Phaya Nakhon, who had already set sail, although his vessel was now anchored off the landing stage used for His Majesty's state vessel, the *Amonmaensan*.<sup>20</sup> Chao Phaya Nakhon would wait upon His Majesty to take his leave early the next morning. His Majesty said: "Ah, so they have met, that's good. The Chaiya people have no experience of the waters on the west coast; they must work out something between them so that appropriate action is taken to deal with the situation. Now about Thalang; Wan Mali's home is on Ko Yao<sup>21</sup> and he knows the Thalang area like the back of his hand. What do you think? Is he planning to attack it or what - I am very worried. The Nakhon people who have come up here set out on the 1st September. Wan Mali attacked Trang on the 27th August; if he was planning to attack Thalang, he would have done so round about the 8th or 9th of September, so the people on their way here wouldn't know anything about it; shall only know round about the middle of September or a bit later." His Majesty then told Khun Phiphat to send letters to Samutprakan and Sakhonburi telling them to report the arrival of all vessels from the south.

On Saturday, 15th September, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Treasurer whether the Governor of Chaiya had met Chao Phaya Nakhon and whether Chao Phaya Nakhon had set off yet. The Treasurer replied that he had taken him to see Chao Phaya Nakhon, who had arranged that, after his departure, he would have the Governor meet him in Phthalung and see about procuring men to serve with the fleet. If he could raise sufficient men to enable him to send the Governor to look after his own province, then he would do so. However, Chao Phaya Nakhon had taken his leave that morning. His Majesty said: "Let him hurry back home - when he gets to Nakhon, he can



see how serious the situation is. When his men hear of his arrival, they will recover from their fright and rally to him. If he considers he has enough men to deal with the situation, then let him send the Governor of Chaiya back to look after his own province. To take the man along with him will only mean a waste of men and supplies."

His Majesty made no further mention of the situation in Kedah from the evening of 15th September until the 20th September. On the 21st September, in the morning, Phaya Thap<sup>22</sup> informed His Majesty that Phra Suntharanurak,<sup>23</sup> the Assistant Governor of Songkhla, had sent Khun Chaiya up with a letter, saying that between the end of July and the end of August, Panglima Pop and Panglima Mara had set up camp at Ban Sadao with about 1,000 men. To Padang had set up camp at Taphan Sung [Titi Tinggi] with 400 men; another Panglima had set up camp at Saba Phen with 300 men and Che Mat Jiwa had set up camp at Thung Ban Pho with over 1,000 men. Phra Suntharanurak had sent Che Long San and Che Long Yong out to reconnoitre. They had gone as far as Kubang Pasu, where they had remained for two nights before returning to Songkhla on the 13th September with the news that Tengku Abdullah, the son of the ruler of Kedah,<sup>24</sup> had set up camp at Taphan Chang but it was not known how many men he had. All they knew was that the Malays who had set up camp at Ban Sadao had carried off the Malay families from there to Saba Phen, and had taken the men from Saba Phen to garrison the camp at Ban Sadao. Phra Suntharanurak had sent his officers to take a force of 1,081 men to set up defences in all the 17 villages guarding the border routes, stationing 500 men in one camp, 200 in another, 50 in another, 30 in another and so on. However, the Governor of Saiburi,<sup>25</sup> who was in Phthalung, had sent a letter ordering that the 400 men sent as reinforcements for Songkhla should be withdrawn and sent back to Phthalung. Wan Mali was reported to have sailed with his fleet to attack Trang on 27th August and to be engaged in fighting at Phra Muang, the estuary [of the Trang river]. Unfortunately the former Governor of Chaiya was ill in Songkhla with an anal fistula.<sup>26</sup>

His Majesty exclaimed: "This is useless - I thought they would have been fighting the Malays instead of scattering their men all over the place - these tactics are idiotic, the damned fools! Do they think the Malays will not attack Songkhla? Is this why they have split the force up into small detachments? If the Malays attack them, dispersed as they are, how can they possibly come to each other's aid in time? Their force was already insufficient and here they are splitting it up even more!" His Majesty went on: "As soon as the Governor of Songkhla<sup>27</sup> gets home, he should be able to organise the defense of the province and assemble a force to attack the Malays and crush them."

On 21st January, 1839,<sup>28</sup> in the evening, Phra Narin informed His Majesty that Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent Khun Chamnong up with a message to the effect that Chao Phaya Nakhon had raised an army and sent the Governor of

Saiburi to attack the Malays in the Perlis area. The Governor had advanced as far as the road junction and was preparing to attack the Malays who had set up camp at Perlis when the Governor of Songkhla sent Chao Phaya Nakhon a letter reporting that on the 8th December, 1838, the Malays had<sup>29</sup> attacked Chana<sup>30</sup> with 300 men. The Deputy Governor of Chana had held out for a day but had been finally forced to retreat. The Malays had then set fire to the houses in Chana and burnt it down; they were still encamped in Ban Na, a district in Chana and had sent emissaries to persuade the people of Thepa to join them. The Governor of Songkhla requested Chao Phaya Nakhon to send every man he could to assist him.

Chao Phaya Nakhon had ordered the Governor of Saiburi to go to the help of the Governor of Songkhla's force, but the Deputy Governor of Phthalung, who was guarding the camp at Setul - the route that Wan Mali had taken - told Chao Phaya Nakhon that Wan Mali's men had seized all food supplies in Setul, so that his men did not have enough to eat. Chao Phaya Nakhon therefore requested His Majesty to ship him rice from Bangkok to feed his men.

Furthermore, the levies from Chumphon, Chaiya and Prathio, whom His Majesty had ordered to assemble and proceed according to instructions, had been expected for about a month now but had not so far arrived. Chao Phaya Nakhon had not waited for them but had determined to settle the business without delay and had sent Nai Thongdet to see about buying a boat from New Town [Singapore]<sup>31</sup> to be used in the campaign. He requested His Majesty to furnish him with supplies of powder and shot, to send him 3,000 men from Bangkok, and to issue directives urging Chumphon, Chaiya and Prathio to make haste and march their troops down to ensure that matters were brought to a successful conclusion.

His Majesty asked: "Have they informed us as to the size of the forces in the provinces?" The Treasurer replied that they had not. His Majesty then said: "The Malays attacked Chana with a force of 300 men - it seems unbelievable that only 300 could accomplish so much. There were lots of people in Chana and Thepa and between them they could have assembled a force to beat off the Malays. And Songkhla is only a day's journey from Chana - if they had sent them help, they could have prevented this disaster. Surely the Governor was aware of what was going on? He must have known quite well where the Malays were encamped and yet he did nothing - he lets 300 Malays attack Chana and burn the place down! How could this happen?" The Treasurer replied: "The Nakhon and Songkhla forces have been constantly in touch with each other. From what I hear from Khun Chamnong it appears that the Governor of Songkhla has arranged for his force to attack the Malay camp at Ban Na." His Majesty then said: "Let us wait until we hear from Songkhla. You Chancellor, and you Treasurer,<sup>32</sup> are to discuss what arrangements

can be made to send a force down. Now about his request for 3,000 men to be sent down there marching overland, what possible purpose could this serve? If they march down there, the men will be quite exhausted upon their arrival and will not be able to achieve anything, and then he will ask us for more reinforcements, I should not wonder! That is what will happen - it would be nothing more than a complete waste of men and supplies." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "When you took an army to deal with Tengku Din last time,<sup>33</sup> how many men did you have under your command?" The Treasurer replied that, including the levies from Nakhon, Phthalung and Songkhla, he had altogether 9,000 men. His Majesty observed: "That was the first time we had to deal with such a situation, but this time we have the benefit of experience. Before he left Bangkok for the provinces, we were able to discuss what strategy to adopt. If it now appears that Chao Phaya Nakhon is unable to cope with the situation, you, Treasurer, must send him a letter telling him to concentrate upon defending his territory as best he can. We'll wait to hear from the Governor of Songkhla first and if the situation is really too much for him to deal with, then we can discuss ways to raise a force from the capital - if we *have* to raise an army, we shall do so and get the business over with as soon as possible. After we defeat them, we will carry them all off - they can be given to the Bangkok army as a reward for their efforts." His Majesty instructed the Treasurer to send a reply on these lines. If food was running short, they should inform Chao Phaya Phonlathep,<sup>34</sup> who would see that supplies were sent down. Letters were to be sent to Chumphon, Chaiya and Prathio, urging them to hurry up and join Chao Phaya Nakhon to assist him in dealing with the situation.

His Majesty then asked the Chancellor<sup>35</sup> when he was going to have a look at the canal being dug<sup>36</sup> and the Chancellor replied that, with His Majesty's permission, he proposed to go on the 25th January. His Majesty observed that Your Excellency had been there for several days now and said: "I suppose he is waiting until he is relieved. You would better go and see him so that he can return here as soon as possible to take part in our discussions on the situation."

On the 30th January, in the evening, Phra Narin informed His Majesty that the Governor of Songkhla had reported that on the 21st October [1838] he and his officers had led a force to Had Yai. On the 6th November he had sent the Governors of Sai and Yiring [Jering] to attack the Malay camp at Sadao. The Malays had retreated to Thung Pho. The Governors of Sai and Jering had followed them up and attacked them at Thung Pho. In the fighting, the Malays had outflanked them and cut off their supply train, causing them to break off the fight through lack of supplies and retreat as far as the Hin Lek Fai and Phala rivers. Tengku Akip had pursued them and the Governors of Sai and Jering were still fighting with the Malays at Hin Lek Fai and Phala. The report went on to say that on the 8th December, the Malays had attacked

Chana and burnt it down. They were still encamped at Ban Na and had sent emissaries to persuade the people at Thepa and Nongchik to join them, in the latter case with success. They were not planning to attack [Pa]tani and Jering, and Jering had asked Songkhla to send a force to their assistance. The Governor of Songkhla thought he did not have enough men and begged His Majesty to send a Bangkok force to Songkhla as well as powder and shot. The Governor had returned to Songkhla and had taken steps to establish a stockade around the town to defend it.

His Majesty said: "What nonsense! All he does is dither about! This will serve no purpose at all! He just believes everything the Malays tell him. He is used [his own] Malays but their advance was too rash and the rebels put them to flight. What does he think he's doing, setting up a defensive position in the town? He should have assembled his men, formed them into brigades to support each other and sent them out to defend the border. How many men do the rebels have? How could the Malays attack Songkhla with a force that size?" His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "Supposing they attack Songkhla - they have just over 2,000 men; do you think they can take it?" The Treasurer replied: "To capture Songkhla they would need to have about 1,000 men." His Majesty said: "There was no need for them to panic - it's not right for them just to sit tight in the town and let the enemy occupy our territory" His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Send Chameun Rachaban<sup>17</sup> with the official seal to summon the Chancellor and Phaya Si Phiphat back to Bangkok to discuss the situation. If he has to take an army down there, we shall make sure he achieves victory. In the meantime, Phaya Wichitnarong<sup>18</sup> is to take a force of 500 men and go down there right away to help in the campaign and prevent things going wrong."

On 31st January 1839, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Treasurer whether he thought it would be a good idea to send someone along with Phaya Wichitnarong and his men, to help direct operations. The Treasurer said that he thought that in the present situation it might be better to send 1,000 men. His Majesty said: "Have Phra Racharin go along too. See that he's given 500 men - 300 crown serfs<sup>19</sup> and 200 soldiers from the right and left battalions of the Ahmad<sup>20</sup> regiment. See that Phaya Wichitnarong gets 200 men - this will make 700 men altogether - have them set off without delay. And send instructions to Phaya Senaphubet to raise another 500 men from the Southern provinces and take them down to help in the campaign." His Majesty then told Phra Racharin: "You go down there and help those the Malays. If anyone vacillates or plays up, chop his head off as a warning to the others."

In the evening His Majesty asked the Treasurer whether the Songkhla force fighting the Malays was using field guns against them. The Treasurer replied that one piece had been issued to the Governors of Jering and Sai at Hin Lek Fai. They had succeed in hitting and destroying one of the Malay

gun platforms. His Majesty said: "They should have taken a lot more field guns but I suppose they didn't feel they could defeat the Malays and were afraid they might attack them and carry off the guns, so they took only a few. They should have taken more and made sure that they had enough men to defend them, then they could have bombarded the enemy and put them to flight. All they do is dither about like this! I'm damned if I know what this idiot from Songkhla is up to - it is absolutely disgusting!" His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "See how large a force we can raise in case of emergencies. Who can we send down? - we have men already mustered of course. In the meantime, find some officers and men for Chao Phaya Yomarat<sup>41</sup> - levy men from Phechaburi, Rachaburi, Prathum[thani], Non[thaburi] and Phanatnikhom and hold them in readiness. When [the Chancellor and Phaya Si Phipat] come back, we can discuss whether we should send them down there."

On the 2nd February, in the evening, Phra Narin informed His Majesty that Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent Nai Thongdet to see Mr. Bonham, the Governor of Singapore, with a request to purchase a small vessel to assist in the blockade of the Kedah river.<sup>42</sup> Mr. Bonham had given him identical letters to be delivered to the Treasurer, to Chao Phaya Nakhon and to [Mr.] Hunter,<sup>43</sup> to say that Mr. Bonham was aware of the situation in Kedah and had sent four vessels to assist in the blockade of the Kedah river, in which they had been engaged for a month now. Mr. Bonham was delighted to learn that Chao Phaya Nakhon had returned to Nakhon and Chao Phaya Nakhon should attack the Malays at the earliest opportunity. If he were to delay, British naval commitments [elsewhere] might involve a change of policy. He had issued a proclamation to all Malays residing in British territory, warning them that anyone taking part in the attack on Kedah should at once desist and return home; those failing to do so would be punished as though they had invaded British territory.<sup>44</sup>

His Majesty observed: "Very fine phrases - honeyed words indeed.<sup>45</sup> If he's really sincere about helping us and has four of his ships blockading the river, how is it the Malays are still attacking us? How can they carry on like this if their retreat were cut off? They had need to maintain a constant watch on both front and rear but as it is, they are not worried at all about their rear - in fact, they have advanced into Songkhla territory. Is this what he means by helping us? Is he really bringing any pressure to bear on the Malays? If so, how could the Malays fight us - their army would be forced to break up."

On the 3rd February, His Majesty made no mention of the situation in Kedah.

On the 4th February, in the evening, Your Excellency returned from Your Excellency's official duties in connection with the excavation of the canal. His Majesty asked Your Excellency whether Your Excellency had been to inspect the Bang Khanak works and Your Excellency replied in the affirmative. His Majesty said: "I sent you there because I wanted you to supervise the work but you will not be staying there - you thought you were going to amuse yourself with it, but you will not be able to. You will have to leave it for other business." His Majesty then informed Your Excellency about the situation in Kedah and asked Your Excellency to be good enough to go down there. His Majesty said: "These insolent Malays are really too much, invading Songkhla territory and destroying Chana and Thepha - all the Governor of Songkhla and his people can do is to dither about and let the Malays outwit them and occupy our territory. Why, the Malays are just 'small fry', and he lets them get away with this - it is quite disgusting. This idiot from Songkhla! If he was not a man who is served me well in the past, I would send you down there to bring back his head!"

His Majesty then ordered the Treasurer to hand over the official reports on the Kedah campaigns, both past and present, to Your Excellency, so that Your Excellency could examine them and become familiar with the situation; this would facilitate plans being drawn up. The Treasurer replied that he had already shown Your Excellency the documents but that Your Excellency had not yet perused them all. His Majesty then asked him where this had taken place and the Treasurer replied: "In the Hall of Justice, with the Chancellor present." His Majesty said: "You have not seen them all yet, so carry on reading them, a few every day." His Majesty told Your Excellency: "You should set off now while the winds are still favourable. The monsoon is later than usual this year. By Chinese reckoning there is an extra eighth month this year and if we take this into consideration, the 4th month is in effect the 3rd month, i.e. when the weather is good.<sup>46</sup> Choose the officers you want and take the seamen and other conscripts from whatever department you want. Choose able-bodied men with sea-faring experience and take a lot of them. Take the men from the Front Palace Watch as well and men from Nonthaburi, Phanatnikhom - they've had some campaigning experience - choose the men you want. And when you get there, get the Nakhon and Songkhla levies to join forces under your command so as to form one body. If you have occasion to detach any part of the force, make sure they understand how to rejoin the main body so that you can all move out together to attack the enemy and crush them. Bring all the prisoners up here and treat them like the grass that's cut as fodder for our elephants and horses - do not leave a single blade standing - it will serve them right for being such a thorn in our flesh. I have been too lenient with them - I was reluctant to send the army down in case innocent families should suffer, but now they have the impudence to attack us and invade Songkhla, you'll have to go down and wipe them out. If you think we should re-establish the state, make sure we have reliable people to run it. Hurry up

and finish off the job, so that you can return here by the first week in October. Make sure there is no waste of men and supplies. If you think the conditions allow you to send some of the troops back here, then do so." His Majesty then told the Chancellor and the Treasurer: "You must work together and get hold of a lot of able-bodied and experienced seamen to accompany the expedition - you must see to it right away - this will allow the army to return as soon as possible." His Majesty then told Your Excellency: "When you get down there, things will begin to improve. Once they know that an army from Bangkok has gone down, all the Malays they persuaded to join them will change their minds and come over to us. And if they do, then how will the rebels with their paltry two or three thousand men be able to hold out against us - they will probably all disperse."

On the 5th February, in the evening, His Majesty asked the Treasurer: "The troops under the command of Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin who were to be sent on ahead - have they been assembled? When will they leave? How many vessels are they taking?" The Treasurer replied that all the men had been assembled. There were 282 men in Phaya Wichitnarong's brigade and 509 men in Phra Racharin's brigade and that they were scheduled to take their leave of His Majesty on the 10th February. They would take four vessels, the *Klaeo Klang Samut*, the *Paklan* and two merchant vessels on loan. However, Phra Racharin had said that he would go down on the same vessels as Phaya Wichitnarong. His Majesty said: "Why? Why are they going down on the same ship?" Your Excellency explained that they had originally proposed to sail on the same vessel but then they had realised that if they were to do so, then if the men arrived first, they would have to wait for their commanders, and if the commanders arrived first, they would have to wait for their men, and would thus be split up. So now they had decided to sail, each commander in his own vessel. His Majesty said: "That is the idea. How could they travel apart from their troops and sail down together - the force would not be ready to move off on arrival." His Majesty then instructed the Treasurer and Your Excellency to supervise arrangements for the departure to see that the force could be deployed as soon as it arrived. His Majesty said: "Phaya Wichitnarong is a good chap and a man of rank - he is not likely to take advantage of his position or enter into rivalry with Phra Racharin, but Phra Racharin is rather temperamental and inclined to be a bit stubborn. Once he gets down there, these characteristics will manifest themselves. He might try to assert himself and not give his whole-hearted co-operation and this would ruin things. You will have to make matters quite clear to them. See that Phaya Wichitnarong is regarded as the senior officer of the force and make sure that everything is fully discussed. Do not let us have any rivalry between them."

On the 6th and 7th February, His Majesty made no mention of the situation in Kedah.

On the 8th February, in the morning, Khun Thep bade farewell to His Majesty on behalf of the detachments under Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin, saying that it had been arranged that they would set out for Songkhla on the 10th February. The force totalled 790 men, with 8 cannon as bow-chasers and stern-chasers, 22 cannon mounted on the ship's sides, 10 swivel-guns and 310 muskets. His Majesty said: "Good. I wish them all a safe voyage. They must go down and crush the Malays once and for all. They must take the Songkhla levies under their command to help them drive the enemy out of Songkhla territory. They should make sure that our territory is safe from attack and wait until the main army arrives. The Nakhon levies should be marching to the assistance of Songkhla." His Majesty told Phra Racharin: "When you get down there, see that you don't fall out with Phaya Wichitnarong, who is your senior officer; you should obey his instructions and discuss matters with him and not do anything to impair the success of the expedition." His Majesty told Your Excellency: "See that you keep an eye on them. You are the Commander-in-Chief and Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin are your subordinate officers and you must see that all goes well. Once down there they could be used to advantage in future operations." His Majesty then asked: "What sort of cannon are the bow-chasers and the stern-chasers?" Phra Narin replied that they were bronze cannon of the *yang sai*<sup>47</sup> type and His Majesty said: "It would be better to take heavy cannon of the *Protector of Buddhism* type."<sup>48</sup> In a campaign like this, even if we are inferior in numbers, we have a great many cannon and they shouldn't be able to attack us. If the enemy advances upon us, we can draw up our cannon in batteries and bombard them and they won't be able to stand up to our fire. They will not have all that many cannon - they have had to march overland, so the largest cannon they have can only have a calibre of two or three inches. How could they stand up to the fire of our heavy cannon - they are bound to run away."

In the evening Phaya Mahaamat<sup>49</sup> presented His Majesty with the list of men forming the main body of the expedition under Your Excellency; including the detachment under Phra Racharin, the total came to over 6,000 men. His Majesty asked: "Do you think these 6,000 men, plus the levies from Nakhon and Songkhla that will come under your command are enough to do the job?" Your Excellency replied: "If we take the provincial levies into consideration, this should be sufficient. His Majesty then asked Phra Narin: "How many men can be levied from Nakhon and Songkhla?" Phra Narin replied: "The Nakhon force totals over 3,000 men, the Songkhla force just over a thousand." His Majesty said: "Say 5,000 men for both forces, and then there are still the Phechaburi, Rachaburi, Chumphon, Prathio, Kui and Pran levies to join them." His Majesty then asked Phra Narin: "How many men have they been ordered to raise?" Phra Narin replied: "From Phechaburi over 900 men, from Rachaburi over 800 men, from Chumphon, Prathio, Kui and Pran [combined] over 800 men." His Majesty said: "That is getting on for 3,000 men and including the Chaiya levies, that makes about 5,000 men. Together



with the force already raised - 6,000 men - this makes a total of over 10,000 men - quite a lot. Provided Songkhla is safe, then this Bangkok force, along with all the provincial levies, should be enough. If they do not arrive in time to save Songkhla, then I shall see that strong reinforcements are sent to crush the Malays." His Majesty then asked Phaya Mahaamat: "Have you ever been to Songkhla?" Phaya Mahaamat replied: "Yes, Your Majesty." His Majesty said: "That's good, make sure you're ready to move out and if any emergency arises that requires us to send speedy reinforcements to Phaya Si Phiphat, you can take them down to help him crush the Malays."

His Majesty then asked Phaya Thep: "How is it that the recently formed Cambodian unit under the command of Phaya Phakdinarong has been called up, whereas the older unit, which has had some campaigning experience, is still here? Why have *they* not been sent? Is the new unit fit and strong enough? - they have had no experience of campaigning and they probably won't be much use. My idea was to send the older unit - why has not this been done?" Phaya Thep replied that the Treasurer had assumed that the older Cambodian unit had been sent to cut timber and that only the new unit was available. He had therefore ordered them to join the expedition. His Majesty said that if that was the case, Your Excellency might as well take them, but Your Excellency should look after them and use them with care, breaking them in gradually. His Majesty then asked: "Why have so few of the men liable for service with the Front Palace Watch been sent? Is that all we have?" The Chancellor replied: "They are relatively few in number, compared with those in the other Departments - some four or five men per company." His Majesty exclaimed: "So few," and told Your Excellency: "Just take what men are available. If Songkhla is in no danger, he should have enough men. If reinforcements are necessary I shall send you whatever men are required. Once you get down there and take the levies from Nakhon, Songkhla and Chaiya under your command, you should divide them into a naval force and a land force to attack the enemy from both land and sea and crush them. Anyway, before you set out, we should get some more information. Let's wait and see - if the situation doesn't require you to go down, you shouldn't go - it would only be a waste of men and supplies.

On the 9th, 10th and 11th of February His Majesty made no reference to the situation Kedah.

On the 12th and 13th of February, in the evening, His Majesty mentioned the situation in Kedah only to say that the wind was very favourable [so] why, [he asked], was there no news from Nakhon and Songkhla - not a word had been heard from either.

On the 14th February His Majesty made no reference to the situation in Kedah.

On the 15th February, in the evening, Phaya Thep presented His Majesty with the draft of the reply being sent to Songkhla concerning the situation in Kedah, which was to be sent down with the force under Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin. When His Majesty had heard it through, His Majesty said: "Right, send it off. Whatever we say will only be a waste of time on our part - we may as well save paper and ink. He should never have let himself be taken in by the Malays. When he wrote to me earlier saying that Tengku Mat Saad had written to him, I sent him back a letter setting out the reasons why he should not trust him [Tengku Mat Saad], as you all know, but he still allowed himself to be taken in. The Songkhla force was already in Had Yai, instead of drawing them up in formation and attacking, he sent Malays out to fight their fellow Malays. The rebels saw that there were no Siamese troops in support so they outflanked them and put them to flight. If the Governor had sent his troops to support them, with a proper vanguard and rearguard, and made sure they were on the alert, the rebels would never have been able to outflank the force. His Majesty then said to Krommaluang Rakronaret: "As far as I can make out [in previous campaigns] our commanders were not as careless as this in drawing up their forces and setting up camp. Whether making camp or marching or fighting, they always organised their army with an advance guard, a main body, a rear guard, a left flank and a right flank. It looked most formidable and was quite impregnable and it was always ready for action. They were not as negligent as this. But this chap is too careless and gullible and has allowed the situation to get out of hand. He seems to have believed, quite wrongly, that the rebels would not attack Songkhla, and so thought he could just send the Malays out against them, hoping that they could negotiate with them. It must be this that made him send out the Malays. The damned fool! If the Malays capture him, then good riddance - I shall find someone to take over from him."

His Majesty then expressed his desire for Your Excellency to undertake the campaign, saying: "I can't send anyone else. If I sent Chao Phaya Yomarat he would not be able to deal with the situation. There are only four people who can order Chao Phaya Nakhon and Phaya Songkhla around and take the necessary action - Chao Phaya Bodintradecha, the Treasurer, you (Phaya Si Phiphat) and Phaya Rachasuphawadi,<sup>51</sup> no one else can do it. Go down there, will you? There is no one else I can get because the other three are heavily engaged in Bangkok. You and I have been good friends and have made merit together; now that duty calls, be a good fellow and undertake the campaign, will you? If anyone vacillates or does not do his duty and defend our territory, get rid of him and find someone to take his place. Make sure you succeed. When you get down there, if things look like getting out hand, because our Malays<sup>52</sup> have joined forces with the Kedah rebels and captured Songkhla, I shall pour in reinforcements to enable you to restore the situation and recapture our territory." His Majesty then said to the Treasurer: "If the rebels are able to take Songkhla, it will be because our Malays have joined them. Do you

think they will be able to capture the town if our Malays remain loyal?" The Treasurer replied that if our Malays remained loyal, the rebels would not be able to take Songkhla. His Majesty [repeated] that if they did take Songkhla, it would only be because of the action taken by our Malays in going over to the enemy. His Majesty then ordered Your Excellency to set out saying that in any event Your Excellency should be sure to leave on the 7th March.

On the 16th, 17th and 18th February, His Majesty made no reference to the situation in Kedah.

On the 19th February, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat if there was any news. Phaya Phiphat replied that the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that the ships carrying Phaya Wichitnarong's force had set sail from Pak Nam on the 16th February while Phra Racharin had sailed on the 18th February. His Majesty asked how many ships had sailed and how many men there were in each ship. Phra Narin told His Majesty that there were four ships in all, there were some 100 men in Phaya Wichitnarong's vessel, 400 men in Phra Racharin's vessel, 80 men in the vessel of Nai Rit, the Adjutant [of the Corps of Pages]<sup>53</sup> and 80 men in the junk which Khun Phat [from] Songkhla had brought in from Songkhla. However, not all of the force raised under the command of Phra Racharin had arrived in time and some 30 men had been left behind, these had been told to follow overland. His Majesty exclaimed: "They're going to *march* down! They'll never get there in time. Have them wait and leave with the main body." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer if Your Excellency was going to take any elephants. The Treasurer said that Your Excellency was not. His Majesty said the elephants should be obtained from the provinces and then asked the Treasurer how many elephants there were in Nakhon and Songkhla. The Treasurer replied that there were not many elephants in Nakhon - there were only about ten or twenty elephants in service in Nakhon and Phthalung, but there were a good many in Kedah. There were 50 elephants in Songkhla but nowhere near as many as in the Malay states under Songkhla. His Majesty said that when Your Excellency went down there, Your Excellency would probably be able to find enough for Your Excellency's use. His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "When you went down there last time, how long was it before the elephants you took arrived there? The Treasurer replied that it had taken him two months. His Majesty then said: "If he takes elephants from Bangkok, he will have to wait until they arrive and this will cause too much delay. He'd better get the elephants locally."

On the 20th February, in the evening, the Treasurer presented His Majesty with the draft of the reply being sent to Nakhon, giving details of the army being sent down under the command of Your Excellency. His Majesty said: "Good, see that it is sent off. I have already issued instructions at some length, and however much we add, it will not improve the situation. However, I'd

just like to add a few words. Say that I am upset and distressed because the Governor of Songkhla has failed to discuss matters and co-ordinate plans and has consequently allowed the Malays to rebel and attack Songkhla. As for Chao Phaya Nakhon's request for 3,000 Bangkok troops, I could have sent them down under the command of Chao Phaya Yomarat, but I thought that 3,000 men would be too few and not enough to bring the matter to a successful conclusion. This is the second time that Kedah has been taken, I am sending down Chao Phaya Yomarat and Phaya Si Phiphat at the head of a large force to suppress the rising and crush these Malay rebels once and for all."

His Majesty then said to Krommaluang Rakronaret: "How many men could the Kedah Malays have in this present campaign? - no more than five or six thousand, and these are split up into detachments of two thousand here, a thousand there, or even fewer. We had some 5,000 men in Nakhon and 5,000 in Songkhla - some 10,000 men in all - enough to deal with the situation - but they failed to do so and allowed things to deteriorate to the point where it was necessary for an army to be sent down from Bangkok to deal with the situation. However serious the situation was, we still had enough men to deal with it - they should have talked things over and helped each other out. They should have concentrated upon the main problem and dealt with that first and the rebellion would have been crushed. But no, neither of them would discuss matters or co-operate with the other, and as a result, things have turned out like this. The Songkhla people persisted in acting on their own; they were deceived by the Malays, and advanced all the way to Thung Pho without any supporting force to back them up, allowing the rebels to outflank them and drive them off. As for Chana and Thepha, the Malays were able to capture both of them with a mere 300 men. [The Governor of Songkhla] asks Chao Phaya Nakhon to send a force to his assistance and Chao Phaya Nakhon sends the Governor of Saiburi to help them, whereupon Wan Mali and his men turn back and attack them and capture their food supplies at Setul. The Governor of Saiburi is then told to detach part of his force and send it to the help of Setul. The whole business seems very confused and a complete waste of time - making his men march to and fro like mad until their feet drop off, without achieving anything. Having them march up and down like that - they just cannot do anything right! The reports they send us are full of lies and excuses - the Malays have risen here or risen there - they are just scared! They seem to lack all pride in themselves - how shameful that they don't have the guts to tell us what's happened, whether its good or bad - all they do is dither about! Still, whatever I say to them would be a waste of time. Well, since they're not up to the job, I must send down the army to teach the rebels a lesson. They must stamp out the revolt, round up all the prisoners and put an end to the business."

His Majesty then ordered Your Excellency to do all in Your Excellency's power to comply with these instructions and when Your Excellency went down there not to act in the manner [His Majesty had been criticising], otherwise not even the entire man-power of the kingdom would be enough to redeem the situation. His Majesty then said: "I shall instruct you again just before you set out - we should have more news by then. For the time being, just see that the ships are ready to sail." The Treasurer then told His Majesty that Chao Phaya Nakhon, in his last letter, had also asked for powder and shot to be sent out; he had said that originally there had been 40 picul<sup>54</sup> of gunpowder available in Nakhon and Phthalung, but now there were only 10 picul left; not enough for the needs of the campaign. He still had enough saltpetre left but he humbly requested His Majesty to send him black powder and sulphur. His Majesty said: "Do not bother about it, he cannot do the job himself and we have had to send down an army, so let him wait until the expedition arrives to get what he wants." His Majesty then asked how much gunpowder Phra Racharin's troops had taken with them. Phra Narin replied that they had taken 37 picul. His Majesty said that he knew that they had actually taken 40 picul. When His Majesty was about to retire, he sent for Your Excellency to wait upon him besides the semi-circular glass screen<sup>55</sup> but I was not able to hear what matters His Majesty discussed with Your Excellency.<sup>56</sup>

On the 21st February, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Governor of Phechaburi<sup>57</sup> when he had arrived. The Governor told His Majesty that he had arrived the previous evening. His Majesty then said: "You have had some experience of the Malay States and have been down there, I'd like you to go down with the army and help them to finish off the business. We should not have had to waste men and supplies like this - they have enough men in the provinces to deal with the matter, but they're not up to it; they cannot even look after their own territory and secure its borders. The one is too clever while the other is too stupid and stubborn,<sup>58</sup> and between them they have allowed the enemy to invade our territory - it should never have happened but they have brought it about. It is shameful the way they have vacillated, each going his own way without any intention of consulting or co-operation with each other, just to try and out-do each other!" His Majesty then asked the Governor how many men had been raised from Phechaburi. The Governor replied: "900 men, Sire." His Majesty told him to go and see Your Excellency to discuss matters and decide between whatever arrangements were necessary in order to crush the Malays once and for all.

On the 22nd and 23rd February, His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah.

On the 24th February, in the morning, Phaya Thep asked His Majesty to grant leave to Khun Chamnong and Nai Thongdet to depart for Nakhon. His Majesty said: "Let them proceed. When they get there, have Chao Phaya

Nakhon send me a report about the situation without delay, to enable me to make plans for the future. I have set down my ideas on the subject in the letter which Khun Chamnong and Nai Thongdet are taking. As regards sending the army, I intend to wait until I hear more news from Songkhla. If I hear that they have engaged the rebels and think they can defeat them, then I shan't send the army. Instead, I will authorise the Governor of Pechaburi to take command of 3,000 men, to go down and assist them. Sending an army down would only be a waste of men and supplies. However, if it appears that they cannot defeat the rebels, then I shall have to send the army; I will also see that Phaya Mahaamat's brigade is ready, so that we have another force in reserve." His Majesty then said to the Governor of Pechaburi: "There are up to 5,000 men in Songkhla, altogether some 10,000 men - and they still cannot defeat some five or six thousand Malays! Anyone would think the Malays had some four or five pairs of hands each<sup>59</sup> - it makes me furious. They're so scared that all they can do is to dither about. How could they bungle things so - surely they could have trounced the Malays just this once? They can do nothing right! There should have been no need at all for them to involve the Bangkok army. They're unworthy of being appointed governors and guardians of a province and of the badges of rank bestowed upon them - whenever a crisis occurs, the Bangkok troops have to be called in. They are incapable of defending their territory and preserving their reputation and their good name. From now on, whenever a crisis occurs, let the Bangkok troops go down and deal with it - I can no longer rely upon the provincial levies as I used to." His Majesty then asked the Governor if he thought the Bangkok army, mustering over 6,000 men, together with the provincial troops, would be sufficient to achieve victory. The Governor replied that the 10,000 men should be more than sufficient. His Majesty then said: "They had quite enough men in the provinces to crush the rebellion - they just were not up to it - there should have been no need at all to involve the Bangkok army."

His Majesty went on to speak of other problems Bangkok had to deal with: in Kanchanaburi, a Mr. Richardson - an Englishman - had arrived<sup>60</sup> and then there was the business in Chumphon; in external matters, the Englishman Bonham was urging us to hurry up and despatch a force, saying that he was sending ships to help blockade the Kedah estuary, and that the matter could brook no delay.<sup>61</sup> His Majesty said: "Everything is so rushed - how can we do what he says? If he wants to help us, fine, if not, we'll manage by ourselves; it's not right to be dependant on other people."<sup>62</sup> We must answer his fine words with fine words of our own."

In the evening His Majesty asked Khun Phiphat whether there was any news. Khun Phiphat replied that no ship had put in. His Majesty said: "The winds are very fresh - why have we heard nothing? Nakhon and Songkhla have both failed to report. I have been waiting to hear from them, but so far I have heard nothing. What's up? Have they managed to drive off the rebels,

or have the rebels captured Songkhla or what - we have had no news at all. It makes me furious! This is always the way with these southern provinces - they are so dilatory in reporting to us." His Majesty asked how many days had passed since Khun Phat had arrived from Songkhla. Phra Narin replied that 23 days had passed. His Majesty said that we ought to have had news of them by now, but nothing had come in. His Majesty then said to Your Excellency: "Even if the rebels have captured Songkhla and our people have been too harassed to report to us, surely we would have heard rumours from elsewhere?" Your Excellency replied that if Songkhla had fallen, we would certainly have heard rumours of it by now. His Majesty said: "Yes, we would have heard, would we not? If the people in the town had been driven out, we should have rumours about it. The reason [for the silence] must be because in the past they sent us reports saying that the Malays had risen and were up to all sorts of tricks, and these reports later turned out to be quite untrue; many of the Malays who *had* become disaffected came back over to us. And then, take Nakhon - they told us that they were not going to wait for the Bangkok army but would attack straight away. They haven't done so - they have failed to keep their word and now they're too frightened to report. I suppose that this must be the reason why they haven't sent us any news. In fact, there was no need at all for them to panic. How could *all* the Malays have risen up against us? We've carried out quite a few campaigns there and they must surely have learnt their lesson by now. They [the provincial governors] have been up here and worried and I sent them home only the other day. The chiefs of Sai, Jering and Patani are still in Songkhla. How can they all be disloyal? - it can only be a small handful of people. Those whose families were carried off had no choice but to join the rebels. If they see that our troops are prepared to act firmly, they will be scared into the cause of the rebels and come back over to us. But here are our fellows in a panic - as though every Malay had four or five pairs of hands! They just mess around without accomplishing anything! The Malays didn't have all that many men - we had quite enough to deal with them. All they had to do was to co-operate and work together, but they were so jealous of each other, that they just marched up and down without doing anything. If they had really co-operated and worked together, the Nakhon troops could have advanced and blocked off the enemy's rear at Hin Lek Fai and they would have had no option but to disperse. They have not done a thing - it is just too bad! They've been quite unable to deal with the enemy and so they send us these paltry excuses - the Malays have so many men here, so many men there. When we tried to impress men, we were told there were only a few Malays in Kedah, but now we're told that there are great numbers of them and that we are being attacked by some four or five thousand. It is absolutely disgusting!"

His Majesty then said to Your Excellency: "These 6,000 men we are sending down, together with the Nakhon and Songkhla levies - I asked the Governor of Phechaburi this morning and he said that a force of 10,000 men

would be sufficient to deal with the enemy. Is it not right, Phaya Mahaamat, Phaya Thep, Phaya Phiphat - you were here too and you heard what he said, did you not?" Phaya Mahaamat replied: "Yes, Sire, we heard; the Governor said that such a force would be quite sufficient". His Majesty then told Your Excellency to ask the Governor for advice, as he was an experienced campaigner against the Malays and knew all about such matters. His Majesty then said to Krommaluang Rakronaret: "It seems that nowadays the southern provinces think of nothing else but making money - they seek only to further their own interests and enrich themselves - nothing else. Fighting the enemy, defending their territory, preserving their reputation and their good name - all this mean nothing to them. If matters go on like this, the art of war will be a forgotten skill. As one generation succeeds another, there'll be no one left who knows how to fight a war, and when a war does come, we shall seek in vain for men with the experience to fight it. There will not be a single man left who knows how to use firearms and if things reach this stage, how can the country continue to exist? The enemy will be able to crush us at will and carry us off to serve him."

His Majesty then reminded us of the accounts in the chronicles telling how the number of our fighting men had steadily diminished in each reign under the Ayuthaya dynasty until it eventually fell to the Burmese. The chronicles told how when the Burmese advanced and set up camp at Wat Mae Nang Pleum, there was no one left who knew how to fire a cannon against the Burmese - all our brave warriors were gone. The King ordered that the 'pakhao kwad' wat cannon<sup>61</sup> be set up at Hua Ro. Everybody was scared and stuffed their ears with cotton wool, in case the noise of the cannon should shatter their eardrums. They were told to use only a little gunpowder. They did so, but when the time came to fire the cannon, the ladies of the palace cried out and made a fuss, and stuffed their ears with cotton wool. The King then ordered that the amount of gunpowder used in the charge be reduced even further. Every time the firing was about to begin, it was held up, and the amount of gunpowder used was still further reduced. When it was considered that the gunpowder had been reduced enough, a slow match was lit, but held as far away as possible from the cannon, although the men firing the cannon still stuffed their ears with cotton wool in case their eardrums should be shattered. When the cannon was fired, there was only a soft popping sound and the shot did not reach the Burmese camp, it merely dropped into the river. His Majesty then asked Your Excellency if Your Excellency knew how far Wat Nang Pleum was from Hua Ro. Your Excellency replied that the camp at Wat Mae Nang Pleum was on the opposite side of the river to Hua Ro. His Majesty said: "This is what will happen if we do not have anyone with some experience of fighting or waging war."

On the 25th February, His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah.



On the 26th February, in the morning, His Majesty asked Khun Phiphat if there was any news. Khun Phiphat replied that no vessel had put in. His Majesty said: "It is very strange, this complete silence. I only want to hear a bit of news from Songkhla but there is nothing." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer if he had taken steps to fit out the ships - how many ships were being taken?" The Treasurer replied that they would take all the warships, although the arrangements had not yet been completed. His Majesty asked how many merchant vessels had been obtained on loan. Phaya Chodeuk replied: "Some twenty or twenty-one ships, Sire". His Majesty said: "I wonder if these warships and merchant ships are sufficient to carry all the men - where can we get hold of more ships?" Phaya Chodeuk replied that no more ships could be obtained on loan. His Majesty said: "It would be nice to have another small junk or two, to make sure we have enough vessels to transport all the men. We can take the *Nguan Seng* as one of them - why should we use something belonging to somebody else before using up our own resources?" Phaya Chodeuk replied that the only vessels left were some six or seven Hainanese ships, belonging to foreigners. His Majesty said: "How can we take them if they belong to foreigners?" The Treasurer told His Majesty that there were two warships from Samut[prakan] which were being brought up and fitted out and he thought that with the Nakhon warboats, the modified [European] pattern ships and the ships already mentioned, we should have enough vessels. However, the Pechaburi detachment had reported that 400 of their men had been unable to get on board and would come to Bangkok to embark. His Majesty then said: "Make arrangements accordingly; time is running out. The Governor of Pechaburi is embarking in the province, so see that he leaves right away. He can hurry the men up and get them to embark here. Do not let us sit around moping. Today is the 26th February. How many days have we got left? Before we can look around it will be the 27th and then the 28th and soon it will be the 7th March. If they have not gone by the 7th March, they will be held up by the new year and the oath of loyalty ceremonies and then will not be able to leave before the middle of April, but the wind will be stronger by then. They will have a difficult passage and they will not arrive in time. Get on with the arrangements. If the expedition is not ready to set out by the 7th March, then have the Governor's force go on ahead. It's essential he leaves on the 7th."

In the evening His Majesty asked Your Excellency if Your Excellency had arranged for the men to embark. Your Excellency replied that some of the men had embarked, but he was still waiting for the rest of the men, who had not yet arrived, to join the expedition - as soon as they arrived, arrangements would be made for them to embark. His Majesty said: "What are you waiting for? Make sure you have enough ships and then allocate so much space to so many men. When they arrive, just direct them to their places and that's that. If you wait for the men to arrive before making embarkation arrangements, the expedition will be delayed and you won't all be able to leave at the same

time." His Majesty then asked if the expedition was still short of anything. Your Excellency replied that the ships in the expedition were short of sailing masters and helmsmen. His Majesty said: "There are helmsmen and bosuns at Pak Nam - what about them?" Your Excellency replied that they had not been called up for service. His Majesty said: "You must not just sit there. Put in a requisition for their services. You are the man who's going down there - if you need anything, just ask for it, and have them send it to you. Who do you want to make the arrangements? Phra Narin? Phaya Thap? Phaya Phiphat?<sup>64</sup> They're all right here in front of you - who do you want? If you want one of them to make the arrangements, just say so." His Majesty went on: "Who else should do it - you would better do it yourself! Take whatever you want - no one's going to stop you!"

His Majesty then asked: "What about supplies of food - have they been embarked yet?" Your Excellency replied: "I have arranged for supplies to be loaded aboard the ships belonging to Luang Phimukmontri, Khun Saliphithak, Phra Thanyaboriban and Luang Krayaboribun. However, there is not a great deal of rice in Bangkok and I have sent for more from Ayuthaya. His Majesty then asked: "How much rice are you taking this time?" Your Excellency replied: "If it pleases Your Majesty, I shall be taking 500 [coyan]." His Majesty asked: "500 coyan?<sup>65</sup> Can these four ships carry 500 coyan? What's the capacity of each ship. How can they load all this rice?" Your Excellency replied: "If it pleases Your Majesty, I shall not be taking the whole 500 coyan with me, but only as much as the ships can carry, which is about 70 to 80 coyan per ship - this should be enough." His Majesty said: "That's all right then. It gave me quite a shock to hear that you were taking 500 coyan. I am not making a fuss about a mere 500 coyan of rice and I don't mind parting with it - I was just worried that you wouldn't be able to take it all. If you are going to take it bit by bit, as you suggest, then it will be all right. After you arrive, send the ships back for the rest of the rice." His Majesty then asked how many months the 500 coyan of rice would last. Your Excellency replied that Your Excellency expected it to last until about the beginning of October. His Majesty asked: "About the beginning of October? Are your estimates based solely on this 500 coyan of rice or have you taken into consideration the other supplies of food taken by the expedition?" Your Excellency replied that Your Excellency had taken these other supplies into consideration. His Majesty asked: "How much food, including rice, does each man have? How many months will it last?" Your Excellency replied that each man had an additional 100 litres;<sup>66</sup> if they consumed one litre a day,<sup>67</sup> their rations should last for 3 months. His Majesty then said: "Each ship can carry 70 to 80 coyan of rice, is there room for these additional supplies?" Your Excellency replied that these additional supplies of food only amounted to some two or three coyan. His Majesty then said: "There is no one from the Ministry of Lands here. I would like to know about the rice - have they started to load it yet, I wonder. They had to go to Ayuthaya for it - I wonder

when they will be back to load it. Today is the 26th, tomorrow will be the 27th and then it will be the 28th - soon it will be the 7th March. With all this shilly-shallying, when will the expedition sail?" His Majesty then asked Your Excellency: "Will you be able to sail by the 7th March or will you be delayed?" Your Excellency replied: "There will be no delay." His Majesty said: "I am not worried about the delay, the main thing is to attack the enemy as soon as you get there. If you leave in March or April, attack them in March or April; even if you do not set off before the middle of June, you can still attack as soon as you get there. However, you'll run into some difficulty. The wind will hold until about the middle of April, after that it will be against you and you won't have an easy passage."

His Majesty then asked how many guns Your Excellency was taking and what type. Your Excellency replied that with His Majesty's permission Your Excellency proposed to take 'elephant-back' guns,<sup>64</sup> along with about 30 pieces to be mounted along the ships' sides. His Majesty asked: "Why are you taking 'elephant-back' guns - are you going to mount them on elephants and bombard the Malay camp? That type of gun isn't very good - [the barrel] is too short, besides we haven't got many here. Better keep them here in the Bangkok area; there'll be quite enough artillery in the provinces, in Nakhon, Songkhla and Phthalung. Why do you want to take 30 or 40 pieces? If you must have them, just take enough for your own use. There are many different sorts of field pieces - make sure you choose the best. If they're going to be used to bombard the enemy's defences, I myself prefer long-barrelled pieces - they have longer range. If you're going to take 'elephant-back' guns, one or two will do, they're not so effective as the long-barrelled pieces. As for the guns to mount on the ships' sides, just take enough to keep off the pirates during the voyage - but I don't think the pirates will trouble you much on this expedition. If, after your arrival, you want to have guns set up on elephants, then I prefer the long-barrelled muskets we've just bought. You can mount them along the ship's sides too, and when you arrive there, you can mount them on the elephants and use them in the fighting on land. But when you're making arrangements to take these guns, you must be careful to see that the calibre of the barrel matches that of the shot, to get them best results. There are various types of cannon and no two are the same calibre, so watch out. If the calibre of the shot doesn't match that of the barrel, your shooting won't be effective and the range will be very limited, so be careful. The fate of an expedition like this depends for its success on the troops, their weapons and the commissariat, all combined."

On the 27th February, His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah.

On the 28th February, in the evening, the Governor of Songkhla's emissary, Khun Chitchairak, arrived in Bangkok with dispatches. Having been informed of this by members of the Corps of Pages, His Majesty mounted the throne

and asked the Treasurer what information was contained in the dispatches. The Treasurer reported that the Governor had sent Luang Chai Surin with 500 men and attacked the Malays at Pa Bon Taek and they were now engaged in hand-to-hand fighting in Ban Na. On the 8th February, a hundred Malays had burnt down the village of Ban Khamin and then swung around to attack Luang Chai Surin's force, which had retreated to Plak Raed. Che Mat Jiwa had brought up over a thousand men to reinforce the hundred Malays. The Governor had sent 500 Thai and Chinese reinforcements to help Luang Chai Surin and the latter had engaged the Malays at the junction of Hin Lek Fai and Phala.

The Governor of Songkhla had thought that the Malays would attack his rear and had consequently ordered the Governors of Sai and Jering and their men to pull back. Tengku Akip had followed them up with about one thousand men and the Governor of Sai's men had engaged the Malays, killing 30 of them and taking two prisoners. The Governors of Sai and Jering had set up defensive positions at Kao Seng Hill, Luk Chang Hill and Khlong Samrong. Luang Sawatphakdi, the Deputy Governor of Jering, had been sent to Songkhla to inform the Governor of Songkhla that the Kedah Malays, together with the Malays from Nongchik, Patani, Yala and Raman, numbering over one thousand men, had attacked Patani and Jering but the men from Jering, with the Governor of Rangae and Phra Phithak Thani from Sai, numbering some 3,000 men, had driven the Malays back to Prawan in Patani territory. The Governor of Rangae and Phra Phithak Thani had made plans to launch an attack upon the Malays on the 6th February. Full details of the report from Songkhla are given in the document copied by the Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson.

His Majesty said: "Quite useless! They can not fight the Malays so they just go back home." His Majesty asked how far from Songkhla were the defensive positions taken up. The Treasurer replied they were about 2 km from Songkhla. His Majesty asked: "What do you think? Are we going to lose Songkhla or not?" The Treasurer replied that Songkhla would not be lost unless the town was abandoned. His Majesty asked what sort of defences had been set up to protect the town. The Treasurer replied that they had built a stockade around the town as an inner line of defence and had constructed outworks extending some 1,200 metres from Tao It [Brick Kiln] to the river Samrong. His Majesty asked: "Do these outworks cover the approaches to the town or what? Depending upon where they start and finish, they might allow the enemy access to the town, might they not?" The Treasurer replied that the extent of the outworks allowed no access to the town. They began at Tao It on the banks of the Thale Sab [Songkhla lagoon] and ran as far as the banks of the Samrong river, thus completely blocking access to the town. His Majesty said: "The way the outworks have been set up, it looks as though they're spreading out their forces to try and block the enemy. It seems to

me that in setting up his defensive line he's gone about the business in a somewhat piecemeal fashion. He should have set up two or three concentric lines of outworks all around the town." His Majesty then asked how many men there were to man the outworks. The Treasurer replied that there were 2,000 men divided into four main defensive positions, one stockade on Khao Seng Hill, another at Plak Raed, another at Luk Chang Hill and another at Khlong Samrong covered by the outworks. His Majesty asked how far apart the four camps were and whether they could come to each other's help in case of emergency. The Treasurer replied that they were about 400 metres apart and that roads had been made linking the four camps so that in an emergency they could come to each other's relief. His Majesty asked: "Are the stockades built of bamboo or what?" The Treasurer replied: "They are made of timber, but the stakes in the stockade around Songkhla are bigger than those used in the outworks." His Majesty said: "Question the messengers closely as to how they intend to repel the enemy. Can they defend the town or not?" Phaya Thep replied: "They have set up cannon on gun towers." His Majesty said: "What is that - what sort of guns have they put on these towers? Have they set up heavy cannon on them - is that what he says? Phaya Phiphat, please interrogate the messenger and find out." Phaya Phiphat did so and reported that the Governor had made preparations to combat the enemy by mounting swivel-guns on gun towers and setting up batteries of cannon on the ground. He would make sure that the town held out.

His Majesty said: "What does the messenger himself think about it - can they hold out or not?" Khun Phiphat questioned the messenger and reported that if the Malays did not obtain reinforcements, Songkhla could probably hold out. His Majesty observed to Your Excellency: "They are just scared, the whole lot of them - they've got no heart for fighting. From what I hear they're still in a panic." His Majesty then asked Your Excellency: "Do you think they can hold out or not?" Your Excellency replied: "They *were* all scared, but now that they have built up a strong defensive position, they will lose their fear and calm down - I think they will be able to hold out." His Majesty asked: "If the Malays *do* reinforce their army - what route will they take? In blocking the road like that, won't they have set up abattis? Would the Malays be able to break through? Or is there some other way they can attack - what does he think? Will Songkhla be able to hold out?" Phaya Phiphat questioned the messenger and reported that they had erected an abattis in front of the stockades. However, there was one particular spot they were worried about in case the Malays should cross over and burn down the village at Khlong Samrong. They had built a stockade around the village and had 200 men defending it. His Majesty said: "What's this fellow talking about? He deserves a good flogging. You ask him a straight question and he hums and haws - it looks as though he hasn't yet got over his fright?" His Majesty then asked: "What about the town itself - why have they built stockades all over the place? I just can't understand it. How many men are there manning the town's

defences?" The Treasurer replied: "There are 2,000 men, Songkhla is situated on a tongue of land, with the lagoon on one side and the sea on the other while Ban Khlong Samrong is situated across the river not quite opposite Songkhla. Assuming Songkhla is situated where the palace is, Ban Khlong Samrong would be where Khlong Bang Luang is and the Malays would be encamped at Wat Liab." His Majesty said: "Just look how they go on - why can't they round up all the villagers and bring them inside the town? In this situation, they could collect them and have them stay inside just the one stockade. There's no point in setting up stockades all over the place. How can they defend a stockade manned by only 200 men?"

His Majesty then asked whether the men in the outer defences had used cannon against the enemy. The Treasurer replied that one cannon had been used on Luk Chang Hill and had killed a number of Malays. However, Che Mat Jiwa was bringing up reinforcements and Tengku Akip was inspecting the men at Nam Krachai. His Majesty asked why had they not used batteries of cannon. The Treasurer replied that Luk Chang Hill was only a knoll and there was only a narrow path leading up to it; the only level ground was just six feet wide - just wide enough to mount a single cannon. His Majesty exclaimed: "They have not even got the gumption to cut a few stone blocks or build a platform to set up a battery of cannon! It makes me furious! The Malays are only small fry but they still know how to dispose their forces, reinforcing them and keeping them together. Every time our men are attacked from the rear, they simply run away - they're too frightened of being outflanked to stand and fight! Not once have they tried to use the same tactics as the enemy, by setting an ambush and attacking from the rear and when they *do* retreat, that's *all* they do - there's no attempt to use a bit of strategy against the enemy. It's absolutely disgusting - I'm sick of talking to people who have no brains at all. As for Nakhon, they've twice been asked to send an army to help them but they say they're going to wait until Phra Senanuchit and Phra Wichitsorakrai [are ready], as they are short of food - this is how things go on. It's just not right. If only they'd co-operated by attacking the Malays in the rear, the enemy would never have been able to make a stand and would have run away and that would have been the end of the matter. But they just won't co-operate - everybody does only what he has to and nothing else. All this talk about marching off - they never march off anywhere! All they do is mess about without achieving anything!"

His Majesty then said: "From what I hear about Sai, Jering and Rangae, it seems as though they have some good, strong masters. They have succeeded in assembling a force of some two to three thousand men, and then attacked the Malays and driven them off. Moreover they have made plans to pursue the Malays and bring them to battle at Prawan. It looks as though they are much better than the Songkhla people. The only thing the Songkhla people are good at is ordering other people to fight. When it comes to *their* turn,

they just will not go out and fight like the others do. All they do is send the Malays out to fight. They have failed to send any high-ranking member of the provincial council to fight alongside our Malays. As matters stand at present, all the fighting that is taking place is being done by Malays. If the Malay chiefs continue to be loyal, the handful of Malays who have rebelled against us will give up when they see their masters take the field against them and they will come back over to us." His Majesty then asked: "When the Malays attacked, where did they get enough food from - did they build barns to store enough rice to feed themselves or what?" The Treasurer had Khun Chitchairak questioned and then informed His Majesty that they had built no storage barns - they had simply seized the rice from the villages they had captured, and had then distributed it among themselves. His Majesty said: "We were told that they had burnt down the villages - where did they get the rice from to distribute?" Phaya Phiphat questioned the messenger and then informed His Majesty that the Malays had seized the rice from the villages they had captured and shared it out before proceeding to burn down the houses. His Majesty asked: "What about the rice in the paddy-fields - is it still there?" Khun Phiphat replied that it had all been trampled down and destroyed by the elephants and the cattle with the force. His Majesty asked: "Was that amount of rice enough to feed them? Surely it was not enough to provision their entire force? They took Malay prisoners and interrogated them without asking about their food supplies! What I wanted to know was whether they had built storage barns or not?" The Treasurer then reported to His Majesty that there was a shortage of rice in Songkhla and that the messenger had come to ask His Majesty's permission to take away two ship-loads of rice. His Majesty exclaimed: "They want to take away two ship-loads of rice! They'd only waste it without having anything to show for it, I wouldn't wonder!"<sup>69</sup> His Majesty then asked the Treasurer and Your Excellency whether they thought the Songkhla people would abandon the town and if so, how would they ever get through [the enemy lines]. The Treasurer and Your Excellency replied that they thought the town would not be abandoned. His Majesty said: "Ask the messenger and see what he says. Will they abandon the town or not?" Khun Phiphat asked the messenger and reported that they would not abandon the town, they were intent on fighting to the death. His Majesty said: "Good, that's the idea. How can the rebels fight their way into the town? There are lots of cannon<sup>70</sup> - if the enemy attempt to storm the town, a single volley will be enough to make them all run away. With such determination, Songkhla will not fall."

On the 1st March, in the morning, His Majesty told the Chancellor what the despatches from Songkhla had reported and observed: "It is just not right, you know. The Nakhon forces have made no attempt at all to co-operate. If only they had tried to help out just once by attacking the enemy in the rear, the whole business would have been over by now. But this is the way they go on. Look at Songkhla, it was supposed to be attacking the enemy, but every time the rebels attacked them in the rear, they fled. Not once did they take

a leaf out of the enemy's book and attack them in the rear. What kind of men are they! All they do is mess about." His Majesty then gave orders to see if Your Excellency had arrived yet. Phaya Aphaironarit sent someone to enquire and then reported that Your Excellency had not yet arrived. His Majesty then said to the Treasurer that Your Excellency had not yet arrived and asked him would he mind standing in for Your Excellency? His Majesty asked: "What do you think? Some six thousand men are going down from Bangkok and there are supposed to be another five thousand men in Nakhon and Songkhla - can we really get this number?" The Treasurer replied that we ought to be able to raise three thousand men from Nakhon and two thousand men from Songkhla. His Majesty then asked the Governor of Phechaburi: "What do you think? You're going down there, can you take these men under your command? If you cannot, what are you going to say to your master?" The Governor replied that he thought he could manage it when he got there. If not, he would bring pressure to bear upon the local officials. His Majesty said: "What will you achieve by bringing pressure to bear upon local officials? That won't get you anywhere." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "When he [Phaya Si Phiphat] gets down there and takes command of the provincial levies, along with the force taken down that will make over ten thousand men. Is that enough?" The Treasurer replied that it was. His Majesty then asked: "In that case, can they defeat the enemy?" The Treasurer replied: "It appears that the Malay rebels have three thousand men, divided into only two detachments, one led by Tengku Akip and the other by Che Mat Jiwa. There are no other troops behind them except Tenku Mat Saad, in the fort at the mouth of the Kedah river. In these circumstances we should have enough men to defeat them."

His Majesty then asked the Governor of Phechaburi: "You've fought the Malays before and know all about it. Do you think we have enough men for the job or not?" The Governor replied that he did not know what the situation was like down there. His Majesty said: "That sort of answer will not get us much further. Based upon the reports that have come in, do you think we have enough men to deal with the situation or not?" The Governor replied: "I do not know how things are with the Malays in the Nine States.<sup>71</sup> If they have been won over to the rebels, then we need to give this some thought." His Majesty said: "Phaya Phechaburi, you're talking without any knowledge of the situation, since you haven't been in on our discussions. Last night it was reported that three thousand men from Sai, Jering, and Rangae had attacked the Kedah Malays and driven them back to an encampment at Prawan in the Patani area. They were planning to launch another attack upon them. It looks as though the chiefs in these states are loyal to us. But if you don't know anything about the situation, there is no point in discussing it with you."



His Majesty then said to the Treasurer: "Let us assume we are successful. Let us discuss what overall arrangements we should make. What shall we do after we have recaptured Kedah? Shall we abandon it, or shall we let people live there? Whatever we do, someone will go and live there, but we cannot have the same arrangements as before. We must send someone else there. Who can we have to look after it? We must settle things now once and for all." The Treasurer said to His Majesty: "The land in Kedah is very fertile. People are bound to want and go and live there. There's no possibility of it being left abandoned. If we're going to send someone to look after it, it must be a Malay." His Majesty said: "That is right. We'll send a Malay to look after it, but who?" The Treasurer told His Majesty: "With Your Majesty's permission, we should wait and see. If any one distinguishes himself in the present crisis, I venture to suggest that he is the man to send." His Majesty said: "It doesn't have to be any particular Malay as long as he's a Malay. He can be a Kedah Malay or a Malay from somewhere else just as long as he's someone we can rely upon. We can put him in charge and send him to govern the state. It would be better if it is someone who commands a good following." His Majesty then said: "We have given the matter a good deal of thought and we're nearly there now, let us go on until we've finished. Once we've got someone to govern the state, who shall we put him under? If we put him under someone, will they be prepared to help each other if an emergency arises?" The Treasurer said: "As for putting him under Nakhon, the Malays have already rebelled twice now and if we put them under Nakhon again, the Malays simply will not co-operate - there is too much ill feeling between them. If we put the man under Songkhla, he will not be able to look after the state, so let us put him directly under Bangkok." His Majesty said: "Yes, we can't put him under Nakhon or Songkhla, so he must come under Bangkok". His Majesty then mentioned Your Excellency, commenting that he had been waiting for Your Excellency to arrive but that he had not seen Your Excellency yet. His Majesty then told the Chancellor and the Treasurer to talk things over, to see whether the force going down from Bangkok, along with the Provincial levies, would be enough to finish off the business. If they thought that we did not have enough men, His Majesty would make sure that the number of men sent down would be sufficient to accomplish the task. His Majesty then told the Governor of Phechaburi not to set off right away but to stay and take part in the discussion until we had determined upon a course of action. His Majesty then asked where the retired Governor of Chaiya had got to. The Treasurer replied that he had taken command of the outworks. His Majesty asked: "Did the Governor of Songkhla go along there to stay with him?" Khun Phiphat replied that he had not, he had merely gone to inspect the position and had then returned to the defensive lines around Songkhla. His Majesty exclaimed: "What is all this about inspecting the position? He should have brought up his artillery to bombard the enemy for a change. He is just waiting until the army arrives, and then he will come up with all sorts of excuses. The Governor of Phechaburi is an old friend of the Governor

of Songkhla, who is a very wealthy man. He will go and see the Governor of Phechaburi and offer him any amount of money to go along with his ideas. The Governor of Phechaburi will then report back to his chief to get him to acquiesce, which would ruin all our plans - we'll achieve nothing."

In the evening, His Majesty asked the Treasurer what agreement had been reached as a result of the discussion. The Treasurer replied that he had discussed matters with the Chancellor,<sup>72</sup> Your Excellency and the Governor of Phechaburi; as regards the re-establishment of the state of Kedah, they were agreed that, subject to His Majesty's consent, they would wait until the campaign was over and then see if there was anyone suitable to be appointed to govern it. His Majesty exclaimed: "Just hang on, I want to talk to Krommaluang Rakronaret first." His Majesty went on: "This is quite indefensible! - if only the Nakhon force had co-operated, things would never have come to this pass. If you look at Songkhla on the map, it's in a very strong position - there's only one way the Malay can attack and that's from the front. If our men are determined to fight, they can hold out no matter how many men the Malays bring up. What I am afraid of is that they will not fight, in which case there's nothing we can do." His Majesty then told Khun Phiphat to take the map of Songkhla and give it Krommaluang Rakronaret. When he had done so, His Majesty told Your Excellency and Chao Phaya Yomarat to study it well so that they could make plans to combat the enemy. His Majesty said: "When you look at the map and see the lie of the land, there's nothing to be frightened of; no matter how many men the enemy bring up, they can't win."

His Majesty then addressed Your Excellency: "Think it over - you are the man who's going to undertake this campaign - what do you think? The provincial levies total five thousand men - when you get down there, can you incorporate them in your force?" Your Excellency replied: "If there *are* five thousand men there, I can." His Majesty said: "Don't talk like that, just assume that there *are* five thousand men there. What do you say, Treasurer. Can Nakhon and Songkhla between them not raise five thousand men?" The Treasurer replied that Nakhon ought to be able to raise 3,000 men and Songkhla 2,000 men. His Majesty then asked Your Excellency: "What do you say now? Can you incorporate them in your force or not?" Your Excellency replied that Your Excellency could. His Majesty then asked: "If you can't, what are you going to do? Let us discuss it now. You keep saying 'Yes, yes', but if, when you get there, you cannot do as you say, then what are you going to do? Will you report to me or what?" Your Excellency replied that if Your Excellency could not do it the easy way, Your Excellency would, with His Majesty's consent, have to use more forceful methods. His Majesty said: "If you take that approach, you should be all right. When you have taken the provincial levies under your command, will you have enough men or not?" Your Excellency replied: "I shall, Sire." His Majesty asked whether, now that Your Excellency had enough men, Your Excellency would be able to

recapture Kedah. Your Excellency replied: "The situation in the provinces is not yet clear. With Your Majesty's permission, I propose to go down there and size up the situation first." His Majesty said: "That is not the attitude I want to adopt. If you take that approach you won't achieve anything. If, when you get there, you have to spend some time in sizing up the situation, once you have got all the details, you'll have to report back to me before I can send you my orders, it involves at least a fortnight's journey there and back, - which is quite unnecessary. With the scene of operations being so far away, we must be sure that our plans are made quite clear in advance, if we are to succeed. What do you think, Treasurer? I'm the King and I must give the orders. The generals and officers are there to help me in looking after the country. If they don't succeed in their mission, who am I to blame? Naturally I shall be very annoyed with them."

The Treasurer told His Majesty: "The statements made under interrogation by the Malays taken prisoner say that there is no army behind the enemy's troops except at the mouth of the Kedah river, where Tengku Mat Saad is encamped." His Majesty asked: "How many men are guarding the place - they can't have more than one or two thousand men. What do you think, Governor? You're the man with experience, do you think our ten thousand men are enough to recapture Kedah?" The Governor of Pechaburi replied that the situation in the provinces was not clear. His Majesty exclaimed: "Clear or not, that's what the reports say. According to the reports, the Malays have a certain number of men and we have a certain number of men. Can we defeat them or not?" The Governor remained silent. His Majesty then said to Your Excellency: "We are not yet half way through our discussions - can you do the job or not?" Your Excellency replied: "Once I get there, I shall not waste a moment - I shall advance on Kedah right away. At the same time, I shall be studying the situation and I shall then report anything of importance." His Majesty said: "Yes, that's the right way to go about it. If you see any signs that the British might start something while you're engaged in the campaign, you must report to me - I'll have both you and your brother's army<sup>73</sup> sent down there to finish off the job."

His Majesty then asked what Your Excellency would do if Your Excellency was unable to put down the rebellion. Your Excellency replied: "With Your Majesty's permission, I shall engage the enemy and press home the attack until I am successful." His Majesty laughed and said: "And may good fortune go with you - that's the attitude to adopt. You've set my mind at rest. I've been thinking about this business so much that I couldn't sleep or eat, I was so annoyed. When you get down there, if anyone obstructs your missions, just chop his head off, no matter how powerful he might be. Make sure that you press home the attack until you are successful. I shall give you my full support. Keep up your determination like this and we'll get Kedah back and the business will be over." His Majesty then asked: "When we have recaptured

Kedah, shall we leave it to its own devices or shall we let people live there? Whatever happens, people are bound to go and live there; shall we station there or shall we have someone govern it? What I *do not* want is to have to have it under the same administration as before.<sup>74</sup> Let's make quite sure what we want so that we don't have people coming backwards and forwards for instructions." Your Excellency said: "Kedah is a fertile country. We must send someone to look after it but, with Your Majesty's permission, I suggest we appoint a Malay. However I shall endeavour to finish off the campaign first and then find some worthy person with a large following and arrange for him to take over." His Majesty said: "That is right, that's just what I thought. It does not matter if he's a Kedah Malay or a Malay from somewhere else, you just go ahead. Provided he's a Malay and you think he should be appointed to govern, then go ahead and appoint him. There's just a few more matters we shall discuss and then we will be finished."

His Majesty then asked: "When we've appointed him who shall we put him under? It will have to be someone with whom he can co-operate if an emergency crops up. There's no question of putting him directly under the supervision of Bangkok - there's no precedent for that. What do you senior ministers think, you're all here? Krommaluang Rakronaret, you speak first." Krommaluang Rakronaret said: "If we put him under Nakhon, the Malays will resent it. If we put him under Songkhla, things will be a lot easier, but they won't get much help if an emergency should crop up." His Majesty said: "How will things be easier if we put him under Songkhla? How can someone like that craven-hearted fool come to anyone's aid?" His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "Whom should Kedah be put under?" The Treasurer replied: "As for putting Kedah under Nakhon, it has already revolted twice now and there is bad feeling between them. If we put it under Songkhla, we cannot rely on Songkhla to defend it." His Majesty said: "If we do not put it under Nakhon or Songkhla, whom can we put it under - the only place left is Thalang - do you think we should put it under Thalang?" The Treasurer replied that Thalang was too far away; in case of emergency it would not be able to come to the aid of Kedah in time. His Majesty then said to Your Excellency: "Let us see what you have to say. Who shall we put it under?" Your Excellency replied: "It has already been under Nakhon and we cannot put it under Songkhla." His Majesty said: "If we cannot put it under Nakhon or Songkhla, who can we put it under? What do you say, Governor? Who do you feel it should be put under?" The Governor of Pechaburi replied: "As for putting it under Nakhon - we have done that and it has twice revolted - and we cannot put it under Songkhla. That leaves only Thalang, Chaiya and Chumphon." His Majesty exclaimed: "What are you talking about? Chumphon and Chaiya are both too far away - how can they come to its aid? If that is the way you think, I might as well put it under your own province of Pechaburi - I'm sure that would make you very happy!" His Majesty went on: "Nakhon and Songkhla are the only two possibilities. Which of the two shall it be?" The

Treasurer said: "In these circumstances, with Your Majesty's permission, I propose we let the man decide for himself." His Majesty said: "It is all very well to talk like that, but we can't leave it to the person concerned. It's a matter for me to decide and I must give the orders." His Majesty then went on: "Have you all run out of ideas? If we have to put him under someone, it had better be Nakhon, so let us put him under Nakhon. Do you understand why - let me explain. Kedah is only a small state whereas Nakhon is two or three times its size. If we should lose Kedah, Nakhon will remain unaffected and will be able to perform its usual role. If we put Kedah under someone else, Nakhon will feel hurt and estranged and become demoralized."

On the 2nd March, in the morning, the Treasurer informed His Majesty that fighting had broken out among the Kelantan Malays, but it was not known who was involved. His Majesty asked what was the cause of the outbreak. The Treasurer replied that it was a quarrel between rival claimants to the throne. His Majesty said: "I hardly think that Raja Banggul can be involved; it must be that Wan fellow,"<sup>73</sup> his father-in-law - he has a large following and if he wanted to, he could certainly start trouble." His Majesty then asked Your Excellency: "Why are you at court today? You'd better go and see that the ships are made ready to sail. Don't rush things - wait until everything is ready before sailing. If you think you won't be ready by the 7th March, then don't worry about it, put it off for a day or two - the main thing is that you all leave together. If you set out on an expedition like this without your men, you won't be able to achieve anything. You will be successful only if the force is at full strength. If you think you won't be able to land in Songkhla, then land in Nakhon. If you can't land in Nakhon, then land in Chaiya. You must see that the Malays don't get the better of you. When you get there, study the situation carefully and act accordingly and don't let your attention be diverted elsewhere. The Governor of Songkhla has no brains at all but he is a very wealthy man; don't let yourself be taken in too easily by him. If you want to make something for yourself, you'd better get it out of the Malays." His Majesty then ordered Your Excellency to see that the ships were properly fitted out, after which His Majesty would issue instructions. Phaya Thep then asked His Majesty for permission for the Governor of Pechaburi to return to Pechaburi. His Majesty said: "Right, tell him to have a good trip. When he gets there, if he wants to send the 400 men to embark in Bangkok, have him send them up right away." In the evening, His Majesty did not mention the situation in Kedah.

On the 3rd March, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Governors of Singhaburi and Sankhaburi if they had ever been down to Nakhon or Songkhla and was told that they had not. His Majesty observed to the Treasurer that if that was the case, they would certainly be seasick. The Treasurer replied that if the weather was stormy, they would still be sea-sick no matter how many campaigns they had been on. His Majesty said: "You will both be seasick

for quite a few days before you get there and it's not right that you should have to suffer like this. There are only two or three thousand Malays attacking us and if our people had helped each other against them, that would have been the end of the matter. But no, they would not help each other out - they had to let the Malays advance and occupy our territory, until things have become so serious that we have to send the army down to suffer the hardships of a campaign." His Majesty then said: "Go down and help crush the Malays once and for all. When you return, bring back the spoils of war with you; the cattle and buffaloes you can drive back overland."<sup>76</sup> His Majesty then told Chao Phaya Yomarat: "Tell Phaya Si Phiphat to find a ship for these gentlemen with quarters that are not too cramped. See that they are well-treated - they have never done any sailing, so look after them. The rank and file should be treated with the same care you would bestow upon a precious jewel. If they turn out to be useless, then chop their heads off. Always see that they are well treated; the men are the vehicle for the general and his officers to carry out their plans. If you treat them badly and allow them to be squeezed into overcrowded quarters, they will be fit for nothing when they arrive. They will go down with chills and fevers, and they will all get sick. Chao Phaya Yomarat, you're going on the expedition - make sure you take every care of the men and see that they're at full strength."

In the evening, the Treasurer told His Majesty: "Khun Kraitriphet, whom Chao Phaya Nakhon Rachasima<sup>77</sup> sent with a cargo of goods to sell in Thalang, has reported that he was unable to collect the money from [the] Luang Wang of Takua Pa. The Governor of Takua Pa told him he had to wait until the Governor of Chaiya arrived before the money could be collected. Khun Kraitriphet waited until the middle of January but the Governor had still not arrived. On his way there, Khun Kraitriphet saw 30 Malay vessels anchored off Ko Yao and on his way back he came up to the 30 Malay vessels and asked where they were bound. The Malays said they were bound for Thalang, but he saw them heading for Ko Yao. He also heard two or three shots fired. The local people were scared and various officials including the Commissioner and the Provincial administrative staff had gone down to the river mouth to await the arrival of the Malays. On his way back he heard that the Governor of Chaiya had arrived in Thalang on the 26th January. His Majesty asked: "When he says that he heard two or three shots fired and local people were scared, which town is he referring to?" The Treasurer replied that the letter did not say which town the people came from. The letter had given no further details. His Majesty exclaimed: "What kind of report is this! He doesn't even make it clear which town he's referring to! What's going on? Are they going to attack one of our towns or what? From what he says it appears that various officials including the Commissioner and the provincial administrative staff have gone down to the river mouth but we do not know whether he is talking about Thalang, Takua Thung, Takua Pa or Phangnga. As for the Governor of Chaiya, he left a time ago and it's most unlikely that he has not

arrived here yet - he must have arrived. He says that various officials were at the river mouth. They must be our officers who went down there." His Majesty then asked Phaya Krai(kosa):<sup>78</sup> "With regard to the towns at the Thalang, Phangnga, Takua Thung and Takua Pa estuaries - are any of them within range of gun-fire from ships? Phaya Krai replied that they were out of range - the towns were situated too far up river and the depth of the channels leading into the towns was not constant.

His Majesty asked what sort of ships the Malays had at Ko Yao. Phaya Krai replied that they were rayab. His Majesty said: "How can they attack our towns with only 30 rayab? We have up to a couple of thousand troops there waiting for them while the Malays can only put a limited number of men in a mere 30 vessels. If we cannot manage to defeat them, fate must really be against us. There's really nothing more we can do." His Majesty went on: "Could it be that the Chaiya relief force is coming down in one direction while the Malays are advancing in another direction so there is a possibility they might miss each other? What do you think, Krommaluang Rakronaret?" Krommaluang Rakronaret replied: "If our troops are going down there, I don't think they'll miss them." His Majesty said: "But let us discuss the possibility of their missing each other, because if they *do*, the result will be disastrous." His Majesty then asked Your Excellency: "What do you think, will they miss each other or not?" Your Excellency replied that the force coming down would have a lot of ships at its disposal - it should certainly find the enemy. His Majesty said: "If they don't miss the enemy then, whatever happens, we have made all the necessary arrangements to ensure their victory."

On the 4th March, in the morning, His Majesty [requested Phaya Thep] to ask Khun Chitchairak: "When you fought the Malays at Plak Raed, how did the Malays advance against us? How did you counter them? What did you capture?" Phaya Thep informed His Majesty that the Malays had attacked them from three sides. Luang Chaisurin's force had deployed in extended order and fired at the Malays. The Malays had returned the fire for a while and had then advanced to the attack, engaging us in hand-to-hand combat, but they had been driven off and had set up camp at Laem Kwian, some 'sen'<sup>79</sup> distant. Our force had captured two Malay swivel-guns. His Majesty said: "Why didn't they pursue them; why did they allow them to set up camp?" Phaya Thep replied that we did not have enough men and had therefore remained encamped at Plak Raed. His Majesty asked what had happened to the 500 reinforcements which Phaya Songkhla had sent. Phaya Thep replied that it had been decided to use them in strengthening the defences at Plak Raed; they had made no attempt to pursue the enemy. His Majesty exclaimed: "Have they never heard what people say about the best way to campaign? They say that to fight the Malays, you only need to make sure you have enough guns to get off two or three volleys. When the Malays advance to the attack, they will wait for you to fire at them when they are just out of musket-range. When

you fire at them the first time, they will lie on the ground to avoid the shots and they will all charge you. If you haven't made sure you can get off another two or three volleys at them, they will over-run your position. If you understand these tactics, you'll set up batteries of swivel-guns in front of your position and bombard them, then, when they charge, you will have your musket-men give them a volley or two. The Malays will very soon learn their lesson and won't attack you again. But in the present situation they can do what they like, because our men are frightened of them!"

In the evening, His Majesty asked Your Excellency: "When will be a propitious time for the departure of the expedition?" Your Excellency replied that Your Excellency proposed to take leave of His Majesty at 9.42 a.m. on the 7th March. His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat and Phaya Chodeuk: "What time does the morning tide go out on the 7th March?" They replied that the tide would start to go out just after 10 o'clock in the morning. His Majesty said: "Say about 11 o'clock. Phaya Si Phiphat, please wait there in your ship and I shall see you off at 11 o'clock." His Majesty asked how many ships had been fitted out for the expedition. Your Excellency replied that Your Excellency was not sure of the exact number, but Your Excellency had not been able to borrow enough vessels. His Majesty said: "Make sure you have enough ships. Don't have your troops crammed together - they will be completely exhausted. I sent Chao Phaya Yomarat to tell you this, did I not?" Your Excellency replied that this was so. The provincial levies from the north would all embark and go down on the larger vessels, although some of them would be sailing in the modified pattern, Nakhon-model ships. His Majesty said: "Good, see that you take good care of them - the men have never sailed before." His Majesty then asked whether all the men had now arrived. Your Excellency replied that only the Rachaburi contingent had not so far arrived. His Majesty asked if Phaya Phakdinarong was being taken along. Your Excellency replied that he was not, only his officers were being taken. His Majesty said: "Take him with you so that he can get some experience. See that you obtain enough ships, and then the men can all embark together as soon as they arrive. Wait until you're at full strength before you leave."

On the 5th March, in the morning, the Treasurer bade farewell to His Majesty on behalf of Your Excellency and the officers of the expedition. His Majesty said: "May good fortune attend them and may they achieve an easy victory over the enemy. Tell Phaya Si Phiphat not to underestimate the enemy and, while exercising due care, to act firmly and decisively; he should endeavour to act as the Chancellor would do." His Majesty then told Krommaluang Rakronaret to present Your Excellency and all the officers of the expedition with the insignia denoting their rank.

The Treasurer then reported to His Majesty that an old lady called Mrs. Nu, who had been a passenger on Khun Chitchairak's ship, had told him that



when the Songkhla force had retreated to their camp at Plak Raed in the fighting against the Malays, the inhabitants of Songkhla had been in a state of panic. This lady was a trader from Bangkok who had gone down there and been unable to get away. She had packed up her goods and loaded them on a ship ready to sail, but the Governor of Songkhla had prevented her from leaving. She had then taken passage on Khun Chitchairak's ship and came to Bangkok. She said that they were all crying and sobbing in the Governor's house. Three Mons - one of Phaya Rachasuphawadi's men and two followers of the Governor of Nakhon Khueankhan - had volunteered to drive away the Malays. The Governor had given them 50 men for the purpose but the Songkhla people had been driven off and had fled back. The Malays had surrounded the three Mons, but they had cut their way out. They had asked the Governor for a thousand men and money to the value of 4,000 baht to buy provisions for the force to attack the Malays again, but the Governor had refused. She said that the Governor was half out of his mind and had no intention of fighting the Malays. His Majesty said: "How can you believe what this old crone says? He refused to give her a ship to come here, which makes her annoyed with him, so out of spite she accuses him like this. If the story were true, how could Songkhla have held out until now. It must have fallen, and we should have heard rumours about it by now. The only part of the story that rings true is when she says that the people were in a state of panic."

In the evening, His Majesty said: "The ship in which Phaya Wichitnarong sailed looks like a European ship. If he arrives there first and the Songkhla people see the ship, they will probably get alarmed and think that it is a British ship coming to help the Malays. However, if Khun Phat's ship arrives there first, they'll know that it belongs to the relief force being sent down. If no one arrives there to let them know beforehand, they'll be scared and take it to be a British ship coming to attack them, and they'll abandon the town and if that happens, they'll be beyond our help. From all that I hear, they're in a state of panic and have no intention of fighting and defeating the enemy."

On the 6th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Treasurer how many ships there were in Songkhla and whether any of them were being forcibly held there. The Treasurer replied: "Two ships from Singapore which came to sell cannon, powder and shot have been detained. The Governor of Songkhla bought the cargo but refused to let them sail. All the other trading boats have been detained. Songkhla has two good warboats but the rest of their vessels need repair. There are another ten sampans with transom sterns built to carry stone." His Majesty asked whether the vessels had been fitted out yet and, if so, how? The Treasurer replied: "These sampans have had cannon mounted in their bows ready to fight against the Malays in case they try to attack across the river and burn down Ban Khlong Samrong. The two large vessels were still being fitted out."

His Majesty asked if the ships had their sails rigged. The Treasurer replied that they had. His Majesty said: "If that is the case, they must be contemplating abandoning the town and going to stay on one of the islands. What do you think, Treasurer? Will they run away?" The Treasurer replied: "I do not think so, Sire. I questioned the old lady [called] Nu. She said that all the monks in Songkhla had gone to see the Governor and volunteered to leave the monkhood to help fight the Malays. The Governor told them to wait and see how matters developed. The Bangkok army would soon arrive. If he thought that the situation was becoming serious, he would instruct them to leave the monkhood and rally around." His Majesty said: "That is the way. When the country's in danger they must give up the monkhood and help out. They must cease being monks and help us defeat the enemy."

His Majesty then asked if the ships that had been sent up here for rice had obtained it and loaded it aboard yet. The Treasurer replied that the rice had been bought and loaded aboard the ships. His Majesty told the Treasurer: "Tell Phaya Si Phiphat that when he gets down there, he should inform them that as regards the ships sent up here to obtain rice, I have been too busy making arrangements for the embarkation of the expeditionary force to see about sending down rice. The next time they send up here for rice, I'll see to the matter. However, I have supplied Phaya Si Phiphat with fish, herbs, chillies and salt for general distribution on his arrival, as the commanders of the provincial levies are short of food. The issue will improve their morale and make them into a force capable of beating the Malays."

In the evening, His Majesty asked Your Excellency how many ships Your Excellency planned to take on the expedition and whether all of the troops had arrived. Your Excellency replied that 400 men from Pechaburi and 500 men from Rachaburi had still to arrive. Twenty of the expedition's ships were on loan and these, together with the warships, both large and small, made up a fleet of 41 vessels. His Majesty said: "Still 900 men to come - a thousand men is quite a lot. What do you propose to do? Where are they going to embark and who'll be in charge of the arrangements?" Your Excellency replied that, with His Majesty's permission, Your Excellency would take leave of His Majesty and would wait off Wat Sampheng for two or three days. If they had not arrived by then, the Treasurer would supervise their embarkation. His Majesty said: "You must issue detailed instructions, otherwise, as soon as they have crossed the bar they'll all be drifting off, wasting their time catching shellfish and crabs, and all our efforts will have been in vain. In circumstances like these, the best policy is to mix the men up. Put our men with the provincial levies, to oversee them and give them instructions, otherwise they'll just waste their time enjoying themselves, and going fishing all the way down the coast. See that they're all told exactly what to do."

His Majesty then said to Your Excellency: "I'll tell you a story. When the Burmese besieged Chiang Mai, His Royal Highness<sup>80</sup> the Crown Prince led the main army up there but halted his advance without launching an attack. When the Burmese learnt that the royal army was advancing upon them, they became scared and broke off the siege so that the Siamese were faced with just the one Burmese camp. U Ba Kong was put in command and moved out to attack the Siamese. His Royal Highness sent Mom Lamduan and his Minister of War (Rachasena - Thong In) to attack U Ba Kong,<sup>82</sup> with the main body of the Siamese army in close support. U Ba Kong's force was routed and many of the Burmese commanders were taken prisoner and the Burmese subsequently abandoned Chiang Mai. Just bear that in mind during the present campaign. They say that once, when the Burmese attacked Thalang and were besieging the town, the Bangkok army advanced as far as Takua Thung and then halted. The Burmese heard the crashing of the waves, took it for the sound of cannon-fire and began to withdraw.<sup>83</sup> A fleet from Kedah arrived in time to co-operate with the Bangkok army in pursuing the enemy and capturing the Burmese commanders, after which our troops proceeded to occupy Thalang. At this juncture, four Burmese supply boats came in bringing provisions and, thinking that the Burmese were still in occupation of Thalang, approached close to the island. Our army sent a Burmese speaker to hail the boats. The Burmese believed that they were being hailed by their fellow countrymen and sailed into the harbour. Our fleet then put out and captured all four of the Burmese boats. You should bear these stories in mind - they bring out the point that you must never panic or become flustered, otherwise you will be defeated. In waging war you must always be on your guard and be fully prepared to deal with any eventuality."

[His Majesty went on:] "You must insist that the ships in the fleet sailing from the east coast never become separated from the main body or lag behind by themselves, or with only one other ship in company. They must keep track of the fleet and stay together. If [Phra] Racharin's force arrives first, the Malays will know that the Bangkok army is on its way down and they will abandon the field - they certainly will not stay to fight us. The Malays from Chana, Nongchik and Yala who have joined the Kedah Malays will all change their mind and come back over to us. All the East Coast Malays will be encouraged to rally to our cause and fight against the rebels with all their might. If you arrive too late to save Songkhla and cannot raise any men, you must report to me at once, no matter how bad the situation is, and I shall send you down sufficient reinforcements to enable you to bring the campaign to a successful conclusion. When you arrive there, you must impress upon your officers to be always on their guard and not to rely too much on first impressions and go dashing off only to be caught on the wrong foot - this would mean sacrificing our valuable troops. They must think very carefully and make quite sure before they act and then they will defeat the enemy. When you take prisoners and interrogate them, don't be too ready to believe what they tell you - flog them

until you get the information you want, but don't be too ready to believe it. Consider carefully how the information tallies with what you know about the situation and see if it rings true. If it does not, go on flogging them until you get the truth."

His Majesty went on: "There is another important thing I would like you to pay attention to. When you are fighting the enemy, you must not wage war and carry off prisoners at the same time - it will put too much of a strain on the resources of our men. If the Malays rise up, those who are disaffected may join in against us and matters will get quite out of hand. You must attack, with Kedah as your first priority. If you have to appoint someone to administer Kedah, then do so. You can see to the business of carrying off their families later. Treat them leniently and let things calm down first. If you have to settle them in a particular district, then do so. If you think the Malays aren't trustworthy enough to be settled anywhere, then bring them all up here. You must not leave behind anyone who might prove a threat to us in the future. In fighting the campaign, you must see that the rumour is spread that all the Malays, right down as far as Kelantan, will be joining the Bangkok army to crush the Kedah Malays. Even if we get only a hundred or two to join us, it will add fuel to the rumours and cause the enemy to believe that we have levied hosts of people from the region to help us. Just concentrate on attacking the enemy and putting them to flight. To try and invest Kedah the way Chao Phaya Nakhon did before with Tengku Din will only wear out our troops and will take too long - we shall not be able to achieve a quick victory. It is better to attack them and drive them away - never mind where - and this will quickly restore the situation." His Majesty went on: "I wonder how things are going in Songkhla? I wonder whether it's fallen or not? And in Thalang, we have no information as to Wan Mali's movements. There's no sign of the Nakhon people. I suppose the Malays in Setul have withdrawn in order to try and bar the way to the Nakhon troops coming to the assistance of Songkhla, so the Nakhon troops are unable to advance. The rebels have abandoned Setul, so there's nothing to report from there - they just say nothing - I suppose this is what's happened."

His Majesty's observations and the details in the Dispatches that His Majesty has graciously allowed me to note down are taken from the discussions that I was privileged to attend. I beg Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions of improprieties in my account.

Dispatched on the 6th March 1839.

## Notes

- 1 The phrase 'Thao Phra Karuna Chao' used in the dispatches [translated here as 'Your Excellency'] refers to Phaya Si Phiphat (Thad), who subsequently became 'Somdet Chao Phaya Borommahaphichaiyat' in the reign of Rama IV.
  - 2 i.e. Phaya Phiphattanakosa (Bun Si) [not to be confused with Phaya Si Phiphat] was originally in the service of His Royal Highness Prince Phithakmontri after whose death he entered the service of the future Rama III. He subsequently held the rank of Chao Meun Waiworanat [roughly 'Deputy Comptroller'] of the Corps of Pages and was a favourite of the King. He was in charge of the arrangements when His Majesty dined in the Antechamber on occasions when His Majesty had official business and did not retire to the inner palace. He also attended His Majesty when His Majesty was indisposed and under treatment from the physician. He continued to act in this capacity until His Majesty's death, despite holding the formal post of Deputy Rapporteur of the Department of Ports and Harbours [one of the Departments in the Treasury]. Under Rama IV he was promoted to 'Phaya Mahaammatt' and later to 'Chao Phaya Thammatikon'. He now [in the 5th Reign] holds the title of 'Chao Phaya Suthamamontri'.
- Phaya Phiphat's official duties were concerned with Malay affairs for two reasons. The Treasurer [Phaya Si Phiphat's elder brother] was also acting [permanently] as Minister of War and Southern Provinces, and Phaya Phiphat was thus fully conversant with what went on in both these ministries. Matters dealt with by the Department of Ports and Harbours included the reports from Samutprakan [Pak Nam] and Samutsakhon [Sakhonburi/Tha Chin] of the arrival and departure of ships, which it was the Department's duty to convey to His Majesty. It is for this reason that (as readers will observe) Phaya Phiphat frequently reports the arrival and departure of ships. However, as a result of [holding the post mentioned] in the first [paragraph], he often performs other duties.
- 3 Unknown. Answering queries on Chumphon was [obviously] part of his duties.
  - 4 Unknown. He had probably gone down to tattoo serfs.
  - 5 This was Phaya Chodeuk Rachasetthi (Thong Chin Kraireuk), the grandfather of Phaya Burut (Nop), a man well versed in government business. He built Fort Wichian Chodeuk at Samutsakhon (see 'Records of Buildings Constructed during the 3rd Reign' and 'Dynastic Annals of the 3rd Reign').
  - 6 Mom Kraison - one of Rama I's sons - was a senior member of the royal family. He never held any formal ministerial rank but was in charge of the Ministry of Palace Affairs (which at the time was in effect the 'Ministry of Justice') and his duties at court were mainly concerned with law-suits, ceremonies and the

judgement of inheritance cases, as well as with the Department of Monastic Affairs. Apart from this he also performed a number of duties in the Ministry of the Interior and other ministries because he frequently received orders from His Majesty on behalf of ministers absent from court. He was put in charge of constructing the fort at Nakhon Kheuan Khan and later, when Prince Sakdiphonlasep died, he went to supervise the construction of the fort at Chachoengsao. These two provinces therefore came under his authority and considerably increased his influence. He was appointed to the rank of 'Krommaluang Rakronaret' by Rama III [his nephew, who nevertheless had him put to death in 1847 on the charge of abusing his position - recent research suggests that he was involved in an attempted coup d'état].

- 7 I cannot identify the 'Phaya Chaiya' [Governor of Chiya] referred to. There appear to have been two of them. The man who was dismissed - the 'old' Governor - seems to have continued to serve the crown; the other was the current Governor. As far as I can recall, there always have been two 'Phaya Chaiya' right up to the present reign [Rama V]; and I know that this has been the case since the reign of Rama III.
- 8 Rama III's remarks on the strategic disposition of the Songkhla forces are echoed a century later by Field Marshall Wavell. Commentary on the disposition of the Italian forces at Sidi Barrani (prior to defeating them). Wavell noted that: "The enemy's defensive arrangements ... seemed to me thoroughly faulty. He was spread over a wide front in a series of fortified camps, which were not mutually supporting, and separated by wide distances." (see Lewin (1980) pp. 64-5.)
- 9 This 'Chao Phaya Nakhon' was called noi and had more power than any other holder of the office. His authority stretched right up to Chaiya and extended as far west as Thalang. His most important campaign was fought against Kedah. He exercised considerable power over the Malay states, who regarded him as 'second King' and he was authorised to conclude a treaty with the British. He was the possessor of a ceremonial 'Nine-metalled' lance, a niello-work dais, a palanquin, a spear and various other [marks of rank]. He was the maternal grandfather of Prince Chaloemwong, Krommakhun Sirithat and Krommameun Maruphong.
- 10 The 'Tengku Din' episode referred to occurred when the Siamese were governing [Kedah] and the [exiled] Kedah [Malay] royal family had taken up residence in Penang. Tengku Din, a member of the Kedah royal family, seized Kedah [Fort] and began to fortify himself there. The Nakhon forces besieged Kedah for some time until finally Tengku Din committed suicide in the fort and the Siamese reoccupied the state. [See however Low (1950) p. 360-366 who says that Tengku Din did not commit suicide but was killed in battle.] The present Malay attack upon Kedah was thus the second attack upon the state. Tengku Din was reputed to be a man of great ability.
- 11 Firstly because the Nakhon people called up to defend Kedah had been scattered [by the Malays and forced to] disperse into the jungle. In Nakhon itself, Chao Phaya Nakhon used a considerable number of the serfs available [on local, Nakhon business]. Phthalung was governed by [Chao Phaya Nakhon's son] 'Noi Yai'

who was obliged to defer to his father in all things [including furnishing him with men for use in Nakhon] while 'Noi Yai' himself had no compunction in exploiting the population of Phthalung [for his own purposes]. 'Noi Yai' later became Chao Phaya Mahasiritham, the official in charge of the capital, and father of Phaya Borirak and Phaya Si Sorarat (Nu).

- 12 British naval assistance in the blockade of the Kedah estuary was furnished in accordance with the provisions of the Burney treaty, in which the British had declared their willingness to prevent the adherents of the ex-Sultan attacking Kedah.
- 13 In the Thai text, these words are enclosed within brackets and are presumably inserted by Prince Damrong.
- 14 i.e. a distance of approximately 2 km.
- 15 'Chao Khun Ha Bon' [translated here as 'Treasurer'] means 'Chao Khun Ban Bon' [Lord of the Upper Residence], and refers to Chao Phaya Phra Khlang (Dit) who, at the time, also administered the Ministry of War and Southern Provinces and the Department of Ports and Harbours. In the 4th Reign he was promoted to the rank of 'Somdet Chao Phaya Borommahaprayurawong'. The 'Ha Bon' (in the phrase 'Chao Khun Ha Bon') is a colloquial expression equivalent to 'Ban Bon' [the upper residence]. The residence of the Treasurer is described as 'the upper residence' (in the same way that the Front Palace is referred to as 'the Upper Palace'), while that of his younger brother [Phaya Si Phiphat] is described as 'Ban Lang' [the lower residence]. 'Ha' has been in the language a long time; it is a colloquial word, used in familiar speech, cf. the way the sons of Rama IV used the term 'thun kramom ha bon' ['I humbly address Your Highness of the upper residence'] in addressing [their uncle] His Royal Highness Phra Pin Klao [the 'Second King' in the reign of Rama IV]. Luang Udomsombat was himself in the Department of Ports and Harbours and so uses the term when corresponding with the Treasurer's younger brother; he would not use it in correspondence with anyone else, and no one else would use it [in referring to the Treasurer].
- 16 Phra Wichitsorakrai [Hong na Nakhon] was the son of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi). It is believed that he administered Nakhon for a while after the death of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi Klang) during the 4th reign, but he was never appointed governor of the province.
- 17 At this time Trang was under Nakhon Si Thammarat. It was the place where Chao Phaya Nakhon had war-boats constructed.
- 18 At this time Thalang was the main settlement [on Phuket]. Thungkha [Tongkah], i.e. Phuket, was still of minor importance. Thalang was placed under Phuket at the end of the 4th Reign.
- 19 The provincial governors had apparently gone up to Bangkok to attend the cremation ceremony held in honour of the Queen Mother (Somdet Phra Si Sulalai).

- 20 The royal vessel 'Amonmaensan' [elsewhere spelt 'Amonmaensowan'] was a western-rigged sailing ship. Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) has constructed it for His Majesty for use as a warship. A good deal of care went into its construction and both interior and exterior were elaborately decorated but His Majesty never made any voyages in it and it was [thus] never used. When Phaya Si Phiphat was put in command of the expedition, His Majesty was graciously pleased to put it at his disposal - a signal mark of favour [see also Appendices].
- 21 Ko Yao is in the Thalang area, near Phuket [Island].
- 22 Phaya Thep Arachun cannot be identified with any certainty but a certain Phaya Thep Arachun was the Deputy Comptroller of the Household of Rama III, before the latter's accession (rather like Phaya Phiphatkosa) and it is probably he who is referred to here. I believe that his name was 'Bun Theung' and that he was the grandfather of Chao Phaya Si Wichaichanin ('Chom'), the founder of the Sunthrachun family.
- 23 His name was 'Sang'. He became Chao Phaya Songkhla in the reign of Rama IV.
- 24 This refers to the Malay ruler, the ex-Sultan [Tajuddin].
- 25 This is the father of Phaya Borirakphuthon (Kham). He was the son of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) and his name was 'Saeng'. He subsequently became 'Phaya Borirakphuthon' and Governor of Phangnga. Phra Senanuchit (Nut), the Deputy Governor, was also a son of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) and was subsequently promoted to the rank of 'Phaya Senanuchit' and Governor of Takua Pa. He was the father of Phra Isararittichai (Klin) and Phra Borisutthilohaphuminthrabodi (Klom), the Governor of Takua Thung.
- 26 The Thai is 'pen wannarok thi fi yeb'.
- 27 His name was 'Seng'.
- 28 It will be noticed that there is a gap of four months between this entry and the immediately preceding entry (dated 21 September 1838). Although the *Singapore Free Press* 'special correspondent' in Bangkok [probably Robert Hunter] reported in February 1839 that "... at the capital they still continued to take the Quedah affair very coolly ..." (*Singapore Free Press* 14 February 1839 - see Appendix C) it is difficult to believe that four months elapsed without the situation in the south being discussed by Rama III and his ministers. I can only conclude that one or more of the Thai 'black books' in which Luang Udomsombot's dispatches are recorded have been lost, possibly before the ms. was made available for publication. It is strange however that no Thai historian has commented on the 'missing' four months.
- 29 These Malays were mostly from the Patani region.
- 30 At this time Chana and Thepha did not yet form part of Songkhla. It is for this reason that the 'Dispatches' subsequently refer to 'the Malays from the Nine



States' and not 'the Malays from the Seven States', as they were referred to at a later period. At this time Songkhla territory only extended as far as the district of Chanee.

- 31 The expression 'New Town' simply refers to Singapore. The Malays had established a settlement on Singapore in former times, when they were still Buddhists. It was once a dependency of Johore. In 1818-1819 the British, having handed Java back to the Dutch, wanted to obtain an entrepot to compete with the Dutch and Sir Stamford Raffles thought that Singapore would be a suitable place. At this time the ruler of Johore had quarrelled with his younger brother, Tengku Husain, who established a settlement at Singapore, independent of his brother. Sir Stamford Raffles went to see him and agreed to back him. Tengku Husain consequently ceded Singapore to the British, who elevated him to the rank of Sultan. The chief administrator of Singapore was Crawford, who had formerly been the envoy to Siam, although his title was merely 'Resident', and we Siamese therefore referred to him as 'Karafad Rasadin'. After the death of Sultan Husain, the British took possession of Singapore. Its establishment as a city took place in the 3rd Reign, so the Siamese referred to it as 'New Town'.
- 32 The reason for both Chancellor and Treasurer discussing the arrangements for levying troops was that the arrangements involved raising both military and civil personnel [the Treasurer was also Minister of War while the Chancellor was the Minister of the Interior].
- 33 When Tengku Din had attacked Kedah [in 1831], the Treasurer had been put in command of the expedition to suppress the revolt.
- 34 His name was 'Chim'.
- 35 'Chao Khun Phu Yai' [translated here as 'Chancellor'] refers to Chao Phaya Bodin[thra]dech Sing. The expression is used of the [two] Senior Ministers, viz. the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of War [and Southern Provinces]. I have heard it explained as deriving from 'Chao Khun Mu Yai' [Head of a Senior Ministry] on account of the two Ministries being [formerly] divided into three 'Principal Ministries', viz. the Ministry of Northern Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of War. With the Ministry of Northern Affairs being reduced in importance vis-a-vis the other [two] Ministries, the Ministers of the latter came to be known as 'Chao Khun Phu Yai' [Chief Minister] and both expressions were used by the officials in the ministries concerned. However other government officials would use the term Chief Minister of only one of these Ministers, sometimes the Minister of the Interior [Chancellor], sometimes the Minister of War, depending upon which of the two had the most power. Chao Phaya Bodindecha was obviously the 'Chief Minister' [at this time] because there was no Minister of War, his functions being exercised by the Treasurer, who could not therefore be referred to as 'Chief Minister'. Two [subsequent] chancellors - Chao Phaya Nikonbodin and Chao Phaya Phutaraphai - were never addressed as 'Chief Minister'. Somdet Chao Phaya Borommahasisuriyawong, who was Minister of War, was so termed. The expression was used as an official form of address.

- 36 The canal His Majesty was asking the Chancellor about was the Khlong Bang Khanak, dug from Saen Saeb to Bang Prakong river.
- 37 His name was 'Khun Thong'; he became Phaya Phech[ra]pani in the reign of Rama IV.
- 38 Phaya Wichitnarong (Fak) became Phaya Phichaisongkhram under Rama IV. There is no information about Phra Racharin.
- 39 These were from Nakhon. Rama V gives no reason for saying this and the context would suggest that these crown serfs came from Bangkok.
- 40 These two 'Athmat' battalions were part of the 'Mon Division', i.e. a division recruited from Mon refugees and their descendants. It was commanded by Chao Phaya Mahayotha (himself a Mon nobleman), apparently under the direction of the Kalahom (the Ministry for War and Southern Provinces) which was at this time under the supervision of the Treasurer (Phaya Si Phiphat's elder brother). The Mon division appears to have been the elite fighting unit among the (semi-)professional military forces available to the crown.]
- 41 His name was 'Bunnak'. He was later known as 'Chao Phaya Yomarat [Minister for the Capital] who was run over' because he died as the result of being run over by a cart conveying the principal Buddha image of Wat Rachanadda.
- 42 This 'small vessel' may have been the "queer-looking brig" that joined the British vessels blockading the Kedah river round about this time. The brig had two captains "... the fighting captain a Siamese, the sailing one a Penang half-caste". It carried "at least half a dozen guns of different size and calibre" but, according to Midshipman Osborn, the only noteworthy feat it accomplished was to capture a Kedah Malay carrying a message under a flag of truce, see Osborn (1857) p. 152-153.
- 43 Mr. Hunter was a British merchant who had leased a brick building in front of the Treasurer's residence and established a store in Bangkok in the reign of Rama II in the year 1822. He subsequently moved the store to a brick building he had built by the side of Kati Chin [perhaps referring to the Chinese temple situated just south of the Memorial Bridge]. He was at one time employed by the crown.
- 44 The proclamation was issued on 7 December 1838. The text (as published on the front page of the 'Penang Gazette' of 15 December 1838) reads:

#### **Proclamation**

Whereas with the view of upholding the faith and treaties and of preserving our friendly relations with the government of Siam, it has become necessary to co-operate with that power in the recapture of Quedah, conformably with the British Article of the treaty of Bankok dated the 28th. June 1826. And whereas many British subjects have joined the present piratical attack upon that capital by TUANKU MAHOMED SAAD and TUANKU MAHOMED TAIB, and their folowers and associates. THIS IS GO GIVE NOTICE that such subjects

abovementioned, as do not peaceably return to their homes within ten days after the promulgation of the Proclamation will subject themselves to all the penalties attached to British subjects found in open arms against its own government and that of an Ally. AND IT IS HEREBY ALSO NOTIFIED that the whole coast of Quedah is hereby declared to be under effective Blockade and that any vessels or boats attempting to enter into those territories will after this 7th day of December be liable to detention unless provided with a pass from the authorities of Prince of Wales Island. AND in order that no one may hereafter plead ignorance of the circumstance under which Quedah has recently been captured by TUANKU MAHOMED SAAD and others, IT IS HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED that the former Rajah of Quedah has written to the Governor of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore, and Malacca a letter dated Malacca the 3rd. October last, disclaiming any participation in the capture of Quedah from the Siamese by those now in possession of that country.

(Signed) S.G. BONHAM.

*Governor of P. W. Island, Singapore and Malacca.*

- 45 Literally "He talks very sweetly - just like refined sugar".
- 46 The reason His Majesty was knowledgeable about weather matters was because the duties His Majesty had performed during the 2nd Reign involved fitting out junks.
- 47 The 'yang' here in the phrase 'yang sai' [jaang saj] may be the same word used by Captain Low who mentions a "pun kha nok yang" - "[a] short wall piece", quoted in Egerton (1880) p. 94. Low's spelling presumably reflect that Thai phrase [pyyn khaa nok jaang] - a 'heron's legs' gun, and may refer to the mounting of the gun. However one would perhaps expect to find a cannon of a heavier calibre than a 'wall-piece' (i.e. a swivel-gun) to be used as a bowchaser or sternchaser.
- 48 The 'Defender of the Faith' cannon was considered to be one of the best cannons of the 3rd reign. [There is a cannon on display on the lawn outside the Ministry of War in Bangkok called 'Phaya Raksa Phra Sasana', literally 'Lord Protector of Buddhism' which is said to have been cast on orders of Rama III. It is a heavy iron cannon with a calibre of 7" and probably fired a shot weighing between 40 and 50 lb, using a charge of just over 5 lb of gunpowder. The cannon is one of a pair of identical cannon, so that there is some evidence for the name being used as a 'type' name. See Sewell (1922) p. 13.
- 49 His name was 'Pom Amatyakun', the father of Phaya Bamroephak.
- 50 Literally 'wasting paper and crayon', the letters being written on 'khoi' paper with crayon.
- 51 Phaya Rachasuphawadi (To) became Chao Phaya Nikonbodin and Chancellor under Rama IV. He was the father of Chao Phaya Ratanabodin and the grandfather of Phaya Surasiwisitsak.

- 52 'Our Malays' refers to the Malays from the 'Nine States' [the Patani state together with Chana and Thepha].
- 53 'Mahadlek' is usually translated 'Corps of Royal Pages' but, composing as it did some thousand or more men, it was in effect the 'Civil Service' of the time. At its head was one or more 'Changwang' or 'Comptrollers'; below the Changwang were 'Hua Meun' or 'Deputy Comptrollers', each of whom had 'Nai Wen' or Adjutants under them. Below the 'Nai Wan' were the 'Cha' or Lieutenants and below them again the 'Hum Phrae' or Pages. A 'Nai Wen' would probably hold the rank of Phra.
- 54 The Thai 'hab' [haab] is the equivalent to the Malay pikul, i.e. one hundred catties (a catty is 1 1/2 lbs so that a pikul (anglice 'picul') is equivalent to 133 1/2 lbs. The metric hab/picul is 60 kg.]
- 55 Presumably a screen placed in front of the entrance to the hall. A contemporary account of an audience with Rama III tells how "The party, at length, were ordered into the presence of his majesty. Arriving at the door of the hall, there is, inside about two feet, a China painted glass-screen, past which one person only at a time can pass, the screen preventing persons outside from seeing the King.", see Moor (1968) p. 213. The 'semi-circular' shape of the screen perhaps reflects the Chinese preference for a 'half-moon' opening in a wall rather than a door proper.
- 56 I [Rama V] find this surprising and rather puzzling because I have never heard any reference to His Majesty acting in such a fashion.
- 57 His name was 'Suk'. He later became Chao Phaya Yomarat under Rama IV.
- 58 The 'clever one' is Chao Phaya Nakhon and the 'stupid one' is Chao Phaya Songkhla.
- 59 Literally 'As though the Malays each had nine or ten arms'. The reference is probably to Thotsakan (= Dasakantha = Ravana), the ten-headed demon king in the Ramakian (the Thai Ramayana). Strictly speaking a ten-headed demon should have *twenty* arms, but this does not stop the Thais referring to the 'ten-handed' Thotsakan. (In 1982, the former prime minister - General Kriangsak Chamanan - made a speech in which he declared: "Even if I had ten arms like Thotsakan the task would still be beyond me".)
- 60 [Dr.] Richardson was an Englishman sent by the Governor-General of India with a letter and gifts to present to the King [in Bangkok]. He had travelled overland from Moulmein and it was thought that the real purpose of his mission was to survey the route taken by Siamese and Burmese military expeditions. The British however claimed that the aim of the mission was to purchase cattle and buffaloes from Siam, following an outbreak of cattle disease in Martaban, Tavoy and Tenassarim (which the British had captured from the Burmese). One of the points that aroused suspicion was the fact that Richardson brought more than a hundred Burmese and Mons with him as servants and bearers.

- 61 Mr. Samuel George Bonham was the Resident of Singapore. The help referred to was indeed sent, because the Kedah Malays had taken to piracy and were attacking merchant ships in these waters.
- 62 The King uses the Thai proverbial expression "To make use of someone else's nose in order to breath", see e.g. Peltier (1980) p. 21 (No. 25).
- 63 A free translation of the Thai expression would be something like 'the cleaner-up', 'the mopper-up' which would be in line with the grimly humorous names given to pieces of cannon.
- 64 Rama III tends to treat Phra Narin and Phaya Thep as buffoons and it is possible that the King's remarks here are sarcastic.
- 65 Thai 'kwian', a cart or cartload. Equivalent to the Malay 'koyan' (Anglice 'coyan), roughly equivalent to 20 picul or a ton. Now standardized at 2 kilolitres.
- 66 Literally "5 thang". A 'thang' is a bucket, the capacity of the 'bucket' being reckoned at about 20 litres.
- 67 Literally 'one coconut-shell', roughly equivalent to a litre.
- 68 i.e. swivel-guns, able to be mounted on elephants.
- 69 Literally "They will load it aboard a ship and go off for a holiday on some island".
- 70 In line with His Majesty's interest [in artillery and musketry] there was a firing range in the palace for the officials to take part in regular shooting practice and His Majesty would frequently come out to watch.
- 71 The 'Malays from the Nine States' refers to Malays from the seven Patani Districts together with those from Kelantan and Trengganu, i.e. the Malays in the southern border region. [This note - compiled by Prince Damrong - appears to contradict Rama V's note 3; the text here suggests that the King's explanation is more likely.]
- 72 Chao Phaya Bodinth[ra]decha (Sing Singhaseni), the ancestor of the Singhaseni family.
- 73 The reference here to 'you and your brother's army' presumably means that if Phaya Si Phiphat ran into trouble, His Majesty would send the Treasurer down with another army (as the latter had commanded the earlier expedition against Tengku Din). It also shows that, as was customary, His Majesty had taken steps to see that the Treasurer had another force in readiness should things go wrong. [As acting Minister of War, the Treasurer would also supervise the bulk of the military forces that did not come directly under the King.
- 74 This refers to the administration of Chao Phaya Nakhon's son as governor of Kedah.

- 75 The reference is here probably to '[Tu]wan Kota', alias 'Engku Kota', the elder brother of Raja Banggul and the uncle of the Raja of Kelantan.
- 76 As regards carrying off families [as prisoner-of-war], see Appendix B.
- 77 His name was 'Thong-in na Rachasima'.
- 78 His name was 'Thet Phumirat'.
- 79 A number is missing here; it could not possibly be a single 'sen' [about 40 metres]. Presumably the number of sen read out was not heard properly; the scribe decided to leave it blank and ask later, but forgot. The person copying the dispatch did not realize that a gap had been left and joined the words together, so as to read simply '[a] sen'.
- 80 Krommaphra Rachawangbowon Mahasurasinghanat [brother and] heir-apparent of Rama I.
- 81 The son of the above.
- 82 U Ba Kong was taken prisoner during this campaign [other versions say that he was killed or escaped, see Wenk (1968), p. 81-84 who gives reasons for dating the campaign in 1797 (-1798) rather than in 1795 (-1796).
- 83 The story - from the Thalang (Phuket) campaign of 1809-1810 - is accepted as true by Prince Damrong but not by the official historian of the Thai Navy (see Chaen (1966) p. 253-254). It seems much more likely that, with provisions running short and a numerically superior enemy approaching, the Burmese wisely decided to withdraw while the going was good. I wonder whether the persistence of the story has something to do with the popularity of the old melody 'khleun krathob fang' (waves breaking on the shore).

# *The Second Dispatch*

14 March 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat, addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. My previous dispatch, in which I gave details of what has occurred, was completed on the 6th March 1839.

To resume, on the 7th March, in the morning, when His Majesty went to the royal landing stage to bid farewell to the expedition under Your Excellency's command, His Majesty commented favourably on the turnout of the expedition and said that Your Excellency had done a fine job in fitting out the ships. When Your Excellency's vessel came alongside the royal landing-stage to take leave of His Majesty, His Majesty smiled and said: "You make a brave show - off you go now. When the enemy learn of your arrival they will all give up. If you think you cannot raise enough men from the provinces, just send word and I will send you sufficient reinforcements to finish off the business." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "See that another four thousand men are held in readiness. Take Phaya Rachawangsan and the Mons - if anything untoward occurs, we can send them down as reinforcements to cope with the situation."

In the evening, His Majesty asked Chameun Chaiphusa whether Your Excellency had eaten the oranges His Majesty had sent Your Excellency. Chameun Chaiphusa replied that he had. His Majesty asked: "Was everything all right when he sailed? Was the vessel involved in a collision? Did it run into any of the ships or houses moored [along the bank]?" Chameun Chaiphusa replied that everything had gone off all right, and that there had been no collisions. His Majesty asked where it had anchored and what it was doing. Chameun Chaiphusa replied that the ship had anchored in front of the Sapan Wood Hall<sup>1</sup> and was still taking on cargo. His Majesty asked if Your Excellency intended to sleep on board or at home. Chameun Chaiphusa replied that Your Excellency would not return home, but with His Majesty's permission, would sleep on board. His Majesty exclaimed: "Why is he sleeping on board? Let him go home and get a good sleep<sup>2</sup> and he can go on board when the expedition sets off."

On the 8th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked whether anyone had visited the ship to see Your Excellency the previous night. Phra S[u]riyaphakdi<sup>1</sup> replied that, with His Majesty's permission, he had been to see Your Excellency. His Majesty asked if Your Excellency was well and what Your Excellency was doing. Phra S[u]riyaphakdi replied that Your Excellency was well and was supervising the loading, which had not yet been completed. His Majesty said: "It must be very hot being cooped up in the ships like that."

In the evening, during the session with the Royal Pages, His Majesty asked Phra Nai<sup>4</sup> about Your Excellency, saying that His Majesty had heard that Your Excellency had come ashore. Phra Nai replied that Your Excellency had visited the Treasurer's house. His Majesty remarked that Your Excellency had probably gone to discuss matters with the Treasurer before coming to court. His Majesty then took his seat upon the throne and listened to the statement made by the Annamese captured at Siam Rab<sup>5</sup>. As soon as Your Excellency arrived at court, His Majesty said: "I was just asking about you and here you are. Let me hear this statement first, and then we can discuss matters." When the statement had been read out to His Majesty, His Majesty asked Your Excellency if all the men were assembled yet. Your Excellency replied that the Phechaburi people had arrived but not the Rachaburi people. His Majesty asked whom the Governor of Rachaburi had appointed to supervise the contingent. Your Excellency replied that he had arranged for the men to be put under the command of the Assistant Governor. The latter had arrived but had been sent back to speed up the departure of his men.

His Majesty asked whether Your Excellency had been able to obtain enough vessels and how many ships were taking part in the expedition. Your Excellency replied that there were fifteen warships along with twenty-one vessels on loan, but that these were not yet enough. His Majesty asked Your Excellency: "Well, what are you doing about it? When will you be able to sail?" Your Excellency replied that Your Excellency proposed to take leave of His Majesty on the 10th March. The Treasurer and Phaya Chodeuk would take care of the vessels still to be dispatched.

His Majesty said: "We had better have our own men take command on the voyage, otherwise there will be too much delay and time wasting." His Majesty added: "Still no news at all from Nakhon and Songkhla. If only I could hear from them just once - but they send us no reports at all. What is going on down there? I wonder if Songkhla's fallen? If everything is all right we should hear from them but if things are going badly, they naturally would not report. As regards Chaiya, there's no news either - I wonder if Wan Mali will attack there? It was reported that thirty Malay ships had been seen at Ko Yao. Here I am waiting for news but so far I have heard nothing - no one sends in any reports. What is going on? Will the Malays pull out



of Setul and move on to attack Thalang or will they detach part of their force to block the route taken by the Nakhon force in going to the aid of Songkhla? Could this be the reason that we have had no reports at all from the Nakhon troops?"

In my earlier letter to Your Excellency there were two items omitted which occurred on the 6th March. First, His Majesty asked Your Excellency: "When you get down there, will you take the Nakhon levies under your command to help you fight the campaign and will Chao Phaya Nakhon accompany you or will he plead sickness and send his sons instead?" Your Excellency replied: "If Chao Phaya Nakhon is not ill, I think he will go with us. He likes to keep in the rear but if someone else is there to lead the troops, I think he will go along with us. His Majesty smiled and said: "You are right. Provided he has got someone to lead the way, he will go along. That is the reason he asked for those three thousand men - he wanted to have them as his advance-guard. He thought he would have them entirely at his disposal to put down the rebellion as he saw fit - this is why he wanted them - but now that the army's going down there, he will just take to his bed and say he's not well." His Majesty added: "Even if Chao Phaya Nakhon does not go along, he has many sons - you can take them along with you to officer the supporting force. Well, if there is anything you are worried about, just let me know." Your Excellency told His Majesty that Your Excellency had quite enough men to settle the Kedah business but that Your Excellency was afraid someone<sup>6</sup> might interfere with Your Excellency's plans to carry off the Malay families. His Majesty said: "Why should you be afraid of them? If they try to stop you, pay no attention to them. We are not going to be beholden to them. If they remonstrate with you in what appears to be a spirit of friendship, then you can make some small concessions, where appropriate, so as to maintain friendly relations and show them that we appreciate their interest, but do not let them take any part in deciding what is to be done or they will use it as an excuse to take over. If you think the situation there cannot be brought under control, then round up all [the Malays] and bring them up here." This is all I have to report about the two missing items.

On the 8th March, His Majesty said to Your Excellency: "There is nothing else to discuss and I have given you my instructions, so off you go. You must see that you keep the situation constantly under review. Always be on your guard and then you will be able to defeat our enemies." Your Excellency then requested His Majesty's permission to take along twenty-two Burmese, some of whom had been [taken prisoner] a long time back and some of whom [had been captured] recently. His Majesty asked: "Why - do you want them as shantymen? Take them and let them sing the Malays to sleep, but make sure you bring them back."

On the 9th March His Majesty discussed other business and did not mention the situation in Kedah.

On the 10th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Treasurer: "Is Phaya Si Phiphat sailing today?" The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency had intended to bid farewell to His Majesty and set sail that evening but the Governor of Samutprakan had sent word that there was a strong headwind blowing into the river. His Majesty exclaimed: "If only it would rain, things would improve. As it is, if it stays like this until the end of the month, it will be the middle of March before he can get away."

His Majesty then said: "There is still no news at all from Nakhon and Songkhla. As regards Chaiya, they must have got back there some time ago, but they still have not sent us word. I wonder what is happening there? Has the enemy left Setul to go and cause trouble in Thalang, or not? What do you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied that they would have left Setul and gone to Thalang, because Wan Mali was well acquainted with the Malays on Thalang and would probably try to persuade them to join him. His Majesty said: "Our army is on its way down there. Could the people down there have not managed to look after the place and make it safe against attack? With matters as they are, they should have taken every precaution." His Majesty then asked Phaya Krai: "Do these Malays possess any articles of value?" Do they have any elephants, cows or buffaloes?" Phaya Krai replied that they did not own very much, all they had was just enough to live on; they had no elephants or cattle, only small fishing boats to bring them in something to eat from the bay. His Majesty said: "As they do not own anything of value, they will probably abandon the place. If they owned elephants or cows or buffaloes for farming the land, they would be attached to their homesteads and would not contemplate leaving them behind. I wonder what will happen. Why could not our forces just blockade the place and stop them from leaving? As it is, we will simply have to seize their boats, so that they cannot go anywhere. If they go anywhere, it will have to be by boat, they cannot go by land."

In the evening His Majesty merely observed that no news of any kind had been received from Nakhon or Songkhla despite his desire to hear from them again.

On the 11th March, in the morning, His Majesty said to Phra Narin: "The expedition has now sailed, how many ships were in it?" Phra Narin replied that there were 16 warships and 21 vessels on loan. His Majesty asked whether any more ships had been obtained to make up the shortage. Phra Narin replied that he did not know. His Majesty exclaimed: "You see - he cannot say anything except 'I do not know'! Oh well, forget it!"

In the evening His Majesty asked where Phaya Thep had got to. Phra Narin replied that Phaya Thep had gone to supervise the embarkation of the Cambodians from Rachaburi. His Majesty asked if he knew when the Treasurer was going down to see them off. Phra Narin replied that he would wait upon His Majesty to take his leave the next day. His Majesty told Phra Narin: "Tell the Treasurer to have some ships go along to deliver fresh water. The water is becoming more brackish every day and by anchoring there without moving, they are only using up their supplies of fresh water. If they have not got sufficient fresh water for the voyage they will have to put in somewhere on the way down to take on fresh supplies and this will delay them a day or so and they won't get there as quickly as we want them to. Tell the Treasurer to make sure to supply them with enough fresh water so that they can sail down there without calling in anywhere en route."

On the 12th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phra Narin whether he had seen the Treasurer and passed on His Majesty's instructions to supply the expedition with fresh water. Phra Narin replied that he had done so. His Majesty asked him if he knew how the supply was to be arranged. Phra Narin replied that he did not know. His Majesty exclaimed: "All the chap can say is 'I do not know'!" His Majesty then asked whether the troops had embarked and set sail yet. Phra Narin replied that they had. His Majesty asked when the ships of the Pechaburi and Rachaburi people would sail. Phra Narin replied that Phaya Thep was still supervising the embarkation. His Majesty then gave orders for Phaya Thep to speed up the embarkation and dispatch them as soon as possible so that they could catch up with the main body, otherwise they would take their time in getting down there.

In the evening His Majesty asked Phaya Thep where he had been. Phaya Thep replied that he had been arranging for the embarkation of the Cambodians. His Majesty asked: "How many ships have we got for them?" Phaya Thep replied that eight ships had been allotted to carry both the Pechaburi and the Rachaburi contingents but they were still one ship short. His Majesty asked: "Still one short? Where will you get it from?" Phaya Thep replied that Phaya Chodeuk was sending them another one to make the number up. His Majesty said that the men must all be sent off right away so that they could catch up with the main body. His Majesty then asked whether the ships that had set off on the 7th March had all left. Phaya Thep replied that they had. His Majesty said: "The remaining ships must be sent off right away, otherwise when the expedition arrives down there, it will have to wait for them; every day they wait means using up their water supply."

His Majesty then said: "I do wish I could hear some news, but nothing at all has come in." Just after midnight, when His Majesty was about to retire, His Majesty caught sight of the Treasurer, who had just come back from Pak Nam. His Majesty asked him where he had been, coming in so late; had

someone arrived or what? The Treasurer replied that no one had arrived. His Majesty then asked why he had called in and what did he have to report. The Treasurer told His Majesty that Phaya Yomarat's ship had sailed as far as Bang Na, when the sails had caught the wind full on. The main mast had broken and fallen into the water along with the sails; the break had occurred at the bottom of the mast which had split right down. His Majesty asked: "How on earth could that happen? Did they not check the mast when the ship was being fitted out?" Phaya Chodeuk replied that they had; they had chipped a piece off with an axe and had found nothing wrong. His Majesty said: "Then how could it break? The wind on the river is never very strong, but when the sails caught this gentle breeze, it was enough to break the mast! How could this possibly happen?" The Treasurer replied that he had inspected the mast and found that the wood in the mast was good only to a depth of about two inches, but the inner part was rotten. His Majesty exclaimed: "No one has taken any trouble to look after the ships! When they need them, they just take them, without bothering to see what shape they are in, so naturally they are always leaking and the masts are always breaking! When the mast broke, did it hit anyone?" The Treasurer replied that no one had been hurt; the broken-off part of the mast had been twisted out of the well and had fallen into the water along with the sails.

His Majesty said: "Here am I building sailing ships of every size and description but when they are needed, they cannot be used - the big ones are too big and the small ones are too small. If we keep them [in dock], they go rotten. From now on we must try to use them a bit more - if we leave them in the dockyard, they will only rot away." His Majesty then asked what the Treasurer was going to do - was he going to replace the mast or what? The Treasurer replied that he would try to find a new mast and send it down. His Majesty said: "Are you sure? Which would be quicker - to change the mast or to get another ship?" The Treasurer replied: "It would probably be quicker to get another ship rather than change the mast." His Majesty said: "If that's the case, then take the *Nguan Seng* instead, so that they can leave without wasting any time. Well, can you get hold of the *Nguan Seng*?" The Treasurer replied that he could. His Majesty said: "If you can, then ginger them up into getting it off right away. If you need a crew or a steersman, have Phaya Chodeuk make arrangements to send them down. Let them have some money; get that chap Luang Phimonphanit in to help out with the preparations so that a replacement vessel is sent down right way. If there is too much delay, they will never catch up with the main body."

His Majesty then asked how far Your Excellency had sailed. The Treasurer replied that when he left to wait on His Majesty, Your Excellency had got as far as the Triphet Fort. His Majesty asked: "What is he up to?" The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency had no intention of waiting but that as soon as the sails were hoisted on the *Amonmaensan*, either because the mast

had been set wrongly or because something was wrong with the ship itself, it had barely begun to get under way when it had headed straight for the bank. When they attempted to re-set the sails they had run into trouble and had to drop anchor. Your Excellency and Phaya Surasena planned to deal with the matter by tilting the mast towards the stern. His Majesty asked: "Will that rectify the fault? How will they do it?" The Treasurer replied that they proposed to insert a wooden wedge at the base of the mast. His Majesty asked: "Is there enough clearance at the base to drive a wedge in, and if so, are they sure the mast will be secured firmly enough?" The Treasurer replied that the mast went through the deck and was fixed in a well below-decks. Where it passed through the deck it was secured by battens. After the wedge had been driven in, it would be made fast by a steel clasp and this would secure it. His Majesty asked the Treasurer how many ships had reached Pak Nam. The Treasurer replied that five ships had reached Pak Nam and the rest were following them down. His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Go and inspect the *Nguan Seng* tomorrow. If we can use it, then see about getting a crew aboard to take it down right away to replace the other vessel so that it can catch up with the main body."

On the 13th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked if anyone knew what arrangements had been made about the *Nguan Seng* being sent as a replacement - was it available to us or not? Phaya Thep and Khun Phiphat just sat there without saying anything. His Majesty asked Phra Narin if he knew anything about it. Phra Narin replied that he did not. His Majesty exclaimed: "You *never* know anything, you wretch!" His Majesty then asked Luang Anurak whether he knew anything. Luang Anurak replied that the Treasurer and Phaya Chodeuk had taken Luang Phimonphanit with them and gone down to see about the ship's departure. His Majesty said: "Luang Anurak is a damned sight better than the rest of you who just sit there and say nothing, at least he knows *something* when I ask him." His Majesty then asked him: "How is it you know that they're getting ready to send it off?" Luang Anurak replied that he had been to the Treasurer's house and had seen them go off to make arrangements to dispatch the *Nguan Seng*. His Majesty asked: "Where did they get a crew from? Who's going to take them down there?" Luang Anurak replied that Phaya Chodeuk was still making arrangements. His Majesty asked: "When do they propose to have it sail?" Luang Anurak replied that he did not know. His Majesty exclaimed: "You are the man who knows what's going on, but there are still things even you cannot tell us!" His Majesty then asked about Songkhla and whether it might have fallen. His Majesty said: "I have been waiting in vain to hear some news - this complete silence is most perplexing. No news from Nakhon, no news from Chaiya - no one sends us any news at all!"

Phaya Thep then informed His Majesty that Meun Chomphunut had found a gold nugget weighing one tamleung<sup>9</sup> and had come in to present it to His Majesty. His Majesty asked about the Phechaburi contingent and whether, on his way here, Meun Chomphunut had seen it leave. Phaya Thep replied that when Meun Chomphunut had arrived in Phechaburi he had seen that they were embarking; they were supposed to be sailing on the 7th March. His Majesty said: "That is good, they can catch up with the others. I am longing to hear some news again, but I can get no information at all about what's going on."

In the evening, His Majesty asked Phaya Chodeuk how he had been getting on with fitting out the *Nguan Seng* - could it be taken down yet? Phaya Chodeuk replied that he thought it could, although the main mast, which was made of chamcha<sup>9</sup> wood, had been in use for four or five years and could not be relied upon. He was thinking about reinforcing it. His Majesty asked: "This type of mast is usually replaced after how many years?" Phaya Chodeuk replied that it was normally replaced after six years of service. His Majesty said: "This mast has been in service for five years, in another year it will be due for replacement; if you do not think you can rely upon it, you had better reinforce it; if you brace it in sections it should last the voyage." His Majesty then asked if he had obtained a crew and a master. Phaya Chodeuk replied that arrangements were still being made. All except four of the original crew had left the ship and it needed another ten or eleven men before the ship could sail. His Majesty said: "Let them have some money and see that the ship gets off right away."

On the 14th March the Treasurer told His Majesty the Governor of Chaiya and the Governor of Takua Thung had sent Meun Phakdi up with a letter. The letter stated that they had sent Khun Sudin to investigate the situation in Kedah and it had been learnt that Wan Mali had put Wan Chi Kanam, his brother-in-law, and Che Saman in command of a fleet of 35 vessels of various sizes. Every ship had a cannon mounted in the bows and [swivel] guns mounted along the sides. Wan Chi Kanam's ship had two cannons as a bow-chaser. Wan Chi Kanam and Che Saman had arrived in Krabi Bay in Nakhon territory on the 15th January. Wan Chi Kanam sent two ships into Krabi Bay to see the Malay headman of the village there, telling him that he wanted to see him to appoint him as Governor of Langu. The headman told the men that he would go later. Wan Chi Kanam's men then went ashore and carried off the Malays - a dozen people, men, women and children - from the settlement, along with 13 boats, although the headman managed to escape, taking his family with him. Wan Chi Kanam had carried off the families and left them on Langkawi and had sailed on, to anchor off Ko Yao. Wan Chi Kanam's fleet, including the boats captured, now numbered between 40 and 50 vessels, and was lying in wait for ships sailing in the area. They had met up with a Malay vessel with a crew of some 6 or 7 men; they had captured the vessel and sailed it back to Ko Chanak and Ko Boi. On the 6th February, on his way back,

Khun Sudin reached Ko Boi, which lies off Takua Thung, and came across a Malay called La whom he took to Takua Thung. Upon being interrogated the man stated that he lived in a village in the Takua Thung district and had gone to build a boat in the village in Krabi Bay where he had been captured by Wan Chi Kanam's men. He had overheard the men saying that Wan Mali in Perlis had told them that if they were short of food and opium they should go and ask the Governor of Thalang for it. Wan Chi Kanam's men had taken a letter to Thalang requesting food and opium but he did not know whether the Governor had supplied them or not. Wan Chi Kanam's had put in at Ko Boi to repair their ships and he had escaped in a small boat during the night, when they were asleep.

It was also reported that an agent had been sent to investigate the situation in Penang. Phra Sakhonphanit had reported that the Governor of Singapore had sent four European ships to blockade the Kedah river and had issued a proclamation calling upon the Kedah Malays to return home; if they failed to do so, he would attack them. But the Kedah Malays had not returned home, instead they had proceeded to attack Setul and Trang. The Siamese forces had attacked the Malays and forced them to retreat. However, in the Songkhla area the Malays had attacked and burnt down the villages between Chana and the Kedah border. The Siamese forces had taken the buffaloes and rice to give to the Malays saying that, having captured Kedah, they should halt their advance. The Malays duly halted and made arrangements with the Patani Malays for the latter to undertake the campaign against Nakhon, Phthalung and Songkhla while the Kedah Malays would remain on the defensive in Kedah, Perlis and Setul, to deal with any counter-attack from the Bangkok army. There was no sign of the English attacking the Kedah Malays as stated in their proclamation. Wan Mali had built a stockade at Perlis and, if the situation eased, was proposing to spend a few days with his family on Langkawi and then return to the camp. The Malays were sending men to purchase powder and shot, and supplies of food from the Malays in Penang. It was reported that Tengku Abdullah, Tengku Mat Saad and Tengku Akip were quarrelling among themselves as to who should lead the Malays. It was also reported that once Luang Narenthrawangsa, Khun Surin and Meun Sakda - whom the former Governor of Thalang had appointed as headmen of the Malays - had learnt that the Malays were advancing, they had become disaffected and had taken their families away by boat to join Wan Chi Kanam. The Governor of Takua Thung had sent a force in pursuit but had only managed to catch up with Luang Narenthra and his family; Khun Surin and Meun Sakda and their families had got away. The Governor had placed Luang Narenthra under arrest. When Khun Surin and Meun Sakda learnt that Phaya Chaiya had been appointed as commander of a force to protect Phangnga, they had been worried in case they and their families, who were with Wan Chi Kanam, might not be safe from attack from the Siamese forces, so they had brought their families back to Thalang. The Governor of Chaiya had detached part of his force to

assist in the defence of Thalang, Takua Thung and Takua Pa, sending one to two hundred men to defend each of the three provinces, and had himself undertaken the defence of Phangnga. He had also raised some 300 men from Thalang, Takua Thung, Takua Pa and Phangnga and assembled a fleet of thirty warboats of various sizes, under the command of Luang Phiphitphakdi, to patrol the waters in the area so as to intercept the enemy and obtain information as to his movements.

His Majesty exclaimed: "What utter nonsense! It is impossible that the Governor of Thalang<sup>11</sup> should have sided with the Malays by supplying them with food. He is a Siamese, and a relation of the Treasurer to boot - it is quite beyond belief that he would side with the Malays. What do you think, Treasurer - is it possible that the report is correct?" The Treasurer replied that it must be wrong. His Majesty said: "This is simply an attempt to blacken the Governor's character. After all, the Governor of Chaiya sent a hundred men to assist in the defence of Thalang; if the Governor of Thalang had acted as the report says, I very much doubt if these men would have assisted him - they certainly would not have stayed on there. They would surely have gone home. They are very free with their accusations - it is very bad. The reports are totally inconsistent and seem quite far-fetched. That's how they go on all the time!"

His Majesty then asked Chao Phaya Thamma and Chao Phaya Phonlathep<sup>12</sup> if the reports about the Governor of Thalang could possibly be true. They replied that it was not possible. His Majesty exclaimed: "How could it possibly be true? It is all nonsense. Let us hear what the Governor has to say first. Whatever the situation may be, we will then have some facts to go on." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer whether he had completed the arrangements for the *Nguan Seng* to sail. The Treasurer replied that he had, and that it would sail that same day. His Majesty asked who he was getting to take it down and whether the ship had a crew and a sailing-master. The Treasurer replied that Phaya Chodeuk had put a crew and a sailing-master on board under the command of Khun Bowonwanit who had been instructed to take it all the way down to Songkhla.

His Majesty said: "I am glad we've got Khun Bowonwanit to take the ship down - he is a clever chap with lots of experience. He should be able to sail it there and back without too much trouble." His Majesty then said: "He has to get down [to the ship] first before he can transfer the cargo, so when will he eventually leave?" The Treasurer replied: "They will set off down-river today and get there by tomorrow. They will anchor there and transfer everything from the other vessel and change the rigging, which will take about two days. They should be able to set sail and leave round about the 17th March.



His Majesty asked when the Treasurer would go down to see the expedition off. The Treasurer replied that he would take leave of His Majesty that same day. His Majesty said: "Why all the hurry? You have still got two or three days more before they leave - if you leave now you will just be wasting your time." The Treasurer said that Your Excellency was waiting to hoist sail and leave that very same day, so with His Majesty's permission he would set off. His Majesty said: "If that is the case, then off you go and see them off. Give them my good wishes and my prayers for victory over our enemies. When you set off, see that the ships make good speed and keep up with each other - do not let them go off on their own or dawdle behind - they must all arrive together."

In the evening, the dispatches from the Governors of Chaiya and Takua Thung were read out, together with a report on the situation. His Majesty observed to Phaya Mahaamat and Phaya Phiphat: "Just listen to this. Although the Governor of Takua Thung's report is virtually an indictment of the Governor of Thalang it does not appear to contain anything of substance. He gives only a few details, saying that the Governor of Chaiya has sent him reinforcements and has raised a fleet of thirty vessels to patrol the area - this is all he has to say - the rest is nothing but padding!" His Majesty then asked: "When did the Governor of Chaiya reach Phangnga and what measures has he taken?" Phaya Thep replied that the Governor had reached Phangnga in the last half of December and had set up defences there. His Majesty asked whether he had met the Governor of Thalang and discussed what measures should be taken. Phaya Thep replied that the Governor of Chaiya had sent for the Governor of Thalang, who had not come but had sent his deputy instead. His Majesty exclaimed: "You hear that? He is really more concerned with accusing the Governor of Thalang. The Governor of Thalang cannot just leave the province - he has to look after it, so he sends his deputy up to see the Governor of Chaiya." His Majesty then asked: "This Deputy Governor who has gone to see him - what did the Governor of Chaiya discuss with him? Is he going to evacuate the families on the islands off Thalang, Takua Thung and Phangnga and the outlying areas?" Phra Narin replied that Meun Phakdi did not know what was discussed when the Deputy Governor of Thalang went to see the Governor of Chaiya, but there was no sign of these families being evacuated. His Majesty said: "They have accomplished nothing; the situation being what it is, he should have evacuated the families." His Majesty then asked: "The Malay ships which are prowling about and holding up other vessels and taking off men - haven't they attacked these islands and carried off the people on them?" Phra Narin replied that they had not. His Majesty then said: "If they have not done so, then these Malays must be in sympathy with the rebels, otherwise they would certainly have attacked them."

His Majesty then asked: "How are our people in the area - are they scared?" Phra Narin replied: "Before the arrival of the Governor of Chaiya's force they were scared, Sire, but after the Governor and his men arrived there, their fear abated and they calmed down; people are trading as usual and life is going on normally." His Majesty exclaimed: "They are all so scared of the Malays! What has the Governor done since arriving there - has he got a fleet together?" Phra Narin replied: "He has assembled a fleet of fourteen or fifteen vessels, Sire." His Majesty went on: "So he has collected together a fleet, now what action does he propose to take in order to attack the enemy? Is he going to build more ships?" Phra Narin replied that he had not yet done so, and that the fleet he had assembled was not yet ready for action. His Majesty exclaimed: "He hasn't really got *any* plans for attacking the enemy - it is just empty talk! All this about the Malay headmen - Luang Narenthra, Khun Surin and Meun Sakda - taking their families and running away is rubbish - there is not a word of truth in it. Where would they run to? He's been harassing them so they went to see the Governor of Thalang; the Governor [of Takua Thung] wants to get hold of them but he cannot, so to protect himself, he accuses them of deserting - it looks as though he wants to get hold of these Malays for himself. They live in the province of Thalang and were appointed to office by the previous Governor of Thalang, and now that he is dead, the Governor of Takua Thung wants to get hold of them. He cannot do so, so he accuses them of disloyalty. This must be what's happened. And this statement from the Malay, La, who managed to get away from Wan Chi Kanam - they must have put him up to it. He is one of the Governor of Takua Thung's men and will say anything he tells him to. See what the Chaiya report said - it made no mention of the Governor of Thalang giving the enemy food or opium, nor is there any mention of Luang Narenthra taking his family and making off - that comes only in the Governor of Takua Thung's dispatch. It is all rubbish and does not make any sense! They have no idea at all of cooperating - all they do is accuse each other - it is so disappointing and it makes me furious! They never think of helping each other to fight the enemy. And the Governor of Chaiya just does nothing! He arrived back there a long time ago but his report makes no mention of the situation in Thalang - he just lets the Governor of Takua Thung send in a long rigmarole!"

His Majesty then asked Phaya Mahaamat: "You have had some experience of commanding troops - what is the correct procedure? When the commander has sent in his report, are the subordinate commanders allowed to send in reports as well?" Phaya Mahaamat replied: "Certainly not, Sire." His Majesty said: "This is very bad and a most improper procedure - they do just as they like - this is how they are always going on! They make no attempt to defend their province by gathering an army to fight the enemy. If this is the way they behave, then the situation is hopeless."

His Majesty then said to Phaya Thep: "Keep in mind all the points I have made so that you can tell the Treasurer, who has not been able to give the matter any serious consideration. When he returns from Pak Nam, appraise him of the facts, so that he can study them and form an opinion. Meun Phakdi, the man who brought the dispatches here, is to be kept here; don't let him go back just yet - wait until we have had a report from Thalang and then we can see who is telling the truth and who is not." His Majesty went on: "It is quite wrong for them to allow matters to get into such a state, to quarrel and level accusations at each other at such a time of crisis - they should be cooperating with each other to see what joint action they can take to defend the country and fight the enemy and beat him."

His Majesty's observations and the details of the letters received that His Majesty has graciously allowed me to note down in this dispatch have been taken from the discussions that I was privileged to attend. I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties.

Dispatched on Thursday, 14th March 1839.

## Notes

- 1 I take the Thai [roo faa khaam], literally "sapan wood hall/shed across [the river]", to refer to a hall made of sapan wood (or a shed for storing sapan wood?) situated on the Thonburi side of the river, where there would normally be a ferry connecting it to the Bangkok side of the river.
- 2 In former times, when an expedition left and was seen off by His Majesty, it was customary for its departure to be scheduled for a time deemed propitious, even though all the vessels might not be ready to sail. The commander would therefore still have time to return home and wait upon His Majesty.
- 3 This was Nai Sanit, Phaya Si Phiphat's son, who held the position of Phra Suriyaphakdi.
- 4 i.e. Chameun Waiworanarot (Chuang), the son of the Treasurer (Dit). He later became Phaya Si Suriyawong, Comptroller of the Corps of Pages. Under Rama IV he became Chao Phaya Si Suriyawong, and Minister of War. Under Rama V he became Somdet Chao Phaya Borommaha Si Suriyawong.
- 5 Siam had long regarded Cambodia as its vassal but after the reunification of Annam at the beginning of the 19th century, Siam's overlordship of Cambodia was challenged by the Annamese. Both Siam and Annam gave military support to rival claimants for the Cambodian throne and a series of campaigns were fought, with Cambodia suffering as 'the man in the middle'. 'Siam Rab' is the Thai version of 'Siem Reap', the town situated to the north of Angkor Wat.
- 6 Referring to the British.
- 7 Presumably referring to such valuable items as jewellery etc.
- 8 Approximately one ounce.
- 9 The text has [chamchaa], presumably referring to [chamchaa], which McFarland identifies as *Kleinhovia hospita* (a type of fir tree or conifer).
- 10 i.e. Mr. Bonham, the British Governor of Singapore.
- 11 This is probably the maternal grandfather of Chao Chom Chab.
- 12 Chao Phaya Thamma was the 'Minister of the Palace' and Chao Phaya Phonlathep was the 'Minister of Lands'.

# The Third Dispatch

23 March 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat, addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. My previous dispatch, in which I gave details of what has occurred, was entrusted to Chameun Inthrasena and sent on the 14th March.

On the 15th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat<sup>1</sup> if there was any news. Phaya Phiphat replied that no ship of any kind had arrived but that Phaya Surasena, the Governor of Samutprakan, had reported that on the 14th March, Your Excellency's vessel and the ships of the other officers had set sail from Pak Nam - 14 warships and 9 vessels on loan, in all 23 ships with over 2,000 men. His Majesty said that His Majesty had heard that they were waiting for the Treasurer - had the latter arrived in time to see them off or not? Phaya Phiphat replied that the Treasurer had gone out in a sailing boat and had caught up with them on the other side of the mudbank; he had then gone aboard Your Excellency's vessel and had sailed as far as Ko Sichang. His Majesty asked: "Was the ship sailing all right?" Phaya Phiphat assured His Majesty that it was. His Majesty said: "When it was still in the river, we heard that it did not seem to be sailing well, and they had to repair the mast - have they done so or not?" Phaya Phiphat replied that they had. His Majesty observed: "In that case, it will be sailing much better." His Majesty then asked: "Have all the ships in the expedition reached Pak Nam yet?" Phaya Phiphat replied that some dozen or so ships had arrived there - only the 5 vessels from Phechaburi and Rachaburi had yet to arrive. His Majesty then gave orders to Phaya Thep to make sure that the ships set off as quickly as possible; they were not to hang about - they should hoist sail and set off one after another.

On the 16th March, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that Phaya Surasena, the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that on the 15th March, some more of the ships in the expedition had sailed from Pak Nam, i.e. four vessels obtained on loan. He had also reported seeing a two-masted ship anchored in deep water, but he did not know where it had come from. His Majesty said: "That will probably be the *Klaeo Klang Samut* arriving back. If you work out the time it has been gone, it will be due just about now. It left on the 16th February, did it not? - how many days is that?"

Phaya Phiphat replied: "Twenty-seven days, Sire." His Majesty said: "It's now the South-East Monsoon - the right time for the '*Klaeo Klang Samut*' to arrive back. I wonder what's up; the Treasurer is out there and should have heard the details but so far he has not reported to me as quickly as I would have liked him to. I'm longing to hear news of Songkhla. If it is the *Klaeo Klang Samut* arriving back, then it looks as though nothing has happened to Songkhla. If Songkhla had fallen, then it would have arrived back appreciably later, as it would not be able to land at Songkhla and would have to go back to Nakhon, where it would have to wait, and it would take another nine or ten days for it to get here. The Treasurer will know by now. We will wait till this evening and we should get a report by then." Phaya Chodeuk then bade farewell to His Majesty on behalf of Khun Bowonwanit who was taking Chao Phaya Yomarat down to Songkhla in the junk, the *Nguan Seng*. His Majesty said: "Off you go to Songkhla, and then bring the vessel back here as soon as possible - you're one of our best commanders and know all the tricks of the trade - you can cross the gulf straight to Songkhla."

In the evening Khun Phra Nai Waiworanat arrived back from Pak Nam and waited upon His Majesty. His Majesty asked him about his seeing Your Excellency off - where had the Treasurer caught up with Your Excellency? Khun Phra Nai Waiworanat replied that the Treasurer had caught up with Your Excellency in the blue water on the other side of the sand-bank. His Majesty asked whether Your Excellency appeared to be in good health. Khun Phra Nai Waiworanat replied that Your Excellency was in good health. His Majesty asked whether the *Amonmaensan* was sailing well when it had put out to sea. Khun Phra Nai Waiworanat replied that it was. His Majesty then asked how far the Treasurer had sailed with the fleet and how many ships were in company. Khun Phra Nai Waiworanat replied that there were five ships in company and that the Treasurer had sailed as far as Ko Sichang, where he had boarded a sailing boat and proceeded to Chonburi. His Majesty asked: "Why has he gone to Chonburi?" Khun Phra Nai Waiworanat replied that when seeing Your Excellency off, the Treasurer had seen a two-masted ship making for Chonburi. The Treasurer had gone to see the Deputy Governor of Chonburi and had learnt that the ship was an opium-trader. The Chinese in Chonburi had come down to buy the opium but had not been able to agree on a price and so had not purchased any opium. His Majesty said: "I thought it was the *Klaeo Klang Samut* coming back but lo and behold it's a ship sailing around selling opium! It's these Chinese<sup>2</sup> of ours - if none of them bought any opium, there would be no one to sell it to." His Majesty then took his place upon the throne. His Majesty told Phaya Phiphat: "It was not the *Klaeo Klang Samut* - it was a trader selling opium to our Chinese in Chonburi." His Majesty then talked about the opium trade and gave orders that any Chinese buying opium to sell should be arrested. His Majesty continued until just past midnight and then retired.

On the 17th March, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that another five ships in the expedition had sailed, and that the Treasurer had reported that he had escorted Your Excellency as far as Ko Sichang. Your Excellency had decided to sail to Chantaburi, where Your Excellency would wait for the vessels in the expedition to assemble, and then sail across to Chumphon. Upon leaving Chumphon, Your Excellency would send the warships on ahead, with the merchant vessels on loan bringing up the rear. The Treasurer also reported that he had seen a two-masted brig which had turned out to be an opium-trader. Upon his return, the Treasurer had ordered Phaya Narong Ritthikosa and Phaya Wisetsakda to take six ships and 170 men and patrol the bay, to intercept any Chinese who might come down to buy the opium and dispose of it in the bay. His Majesty took up the subject of opium and said: "We must take steps to haul in a few of these chaps and see who they are. They're troublesome rogues, who are ruining the country." His Majesty then spoke about Your Excellency saying, "It's a good idea of his to concentrate the fleet so as to prevent our men being taken by surprise." His Majesty then asked whether they had transferred the cargo from Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship yet and when Khun Bowonwanit would leave. Khun Phiphat replied that the cargo had been transferred and that Khun Bowonwanit would sail for Pak Nam that same evening. His Majesty observed: "I thought he'd sailed on the day he took his leave - but I see he hasn't gone yet. Make sure he gets a sailing master and a crew on board and gets down there right away - the expedition will be waiting for him."

In the evening the Treasurer returned from Pak Nam and waited upon His Majesty. His Majesty asked whether Your Excellency appeared to be in good spirits. The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency was in good spirits. His Majesty laughed and asked: "Was he seasick at all?" The Treasurer replied: "No, Sire". His Majesty observed that during the last three days the wind had changed and become very favourable, and the expedition would have a northerly wind to speed it on its way and ensure that they had a good, comfortable passage. His Majesty then went on to talk about the confiscation of the opium and insisted with some asperity that any Chinese who landed the opium and tried to sell it must be arrested. His Majesty continued on this theme until retiring.

On the 18 March, in the morning, Khun Phiphat informed His Majesty that the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that another two vessels in the expedition had sailed from Pak Nam - this made a total of 34 ships with some 3,900 men. His Majesty asked: "How many vessels are there in all taking part in the expedition?" Phra Narin replied that there were 48. His Majesty said: "Only 34 ships have sailed - that makes how many still to sail?" Phra Narin replied: "14 ships". His Majesty said: "Write that down and cross off the ships as they leave until they've all gone." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "When will Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship leave?" The Treasurer

replied: "It will go down to Samutprakan today. Phaya Chodeuk will wait upon Your Majesty to take his leave to go down and make arrangements for the departure." His Majesty said: "Good, just make sure he does; it will be tomorrow before the ship gets down there. When he goes down, make sure that any ship that has yet to sail is dispatched without delay - don't let them hang about."

In the evening Phaya Thep informed His Majesty that the Deputy Governor of Phechaburi had reported that the Governor of Phechaburi together with his officers had left Phechaburi on the 7th March. On the 11th March they had sailed from the Phechaburi river - 6 [Nakhon-] type vessels, 1 Annamese vessel and 2 vessels on loan - in all 9 vessels, with 599 officers and men, with another 12 men with three horses travelling overland, making a grand total of 611 officers and men. Cannon mounted in the bows and in the sterns and along the sides of the vessels, along with swivel-guns, totalled 48 pieces; they also had 270 muskets and 10 picul of gunpowder. His Majesty said: "I wish them all a safe journey and a safe return. My blessing goes with them - may they have a calm sea and favourable winds and enjoy a comfortable passage. His Majesty then asked: "The man who brought up the message - did he go down and see them sail off - what was the wind like?" Phaya Thep replied: "He did, Sire. The day they sailed there was a light south-westerly breeze. Two or three days after their departure, the wind turned northerly and they sailed off over the horizon." His Majesty observed: "Surely they would have been able to make Chumphon by now? If the wind continues favourable, it looks as though the Governor at Phechaburi will get to Songkhla before the Bangkok force does." His Majesty then asked: "The cannons, muskets and powder they took - did they get them from Bangkok or Phechaburi?" Phaya Thep replied that they had taken them from Phechaburi's provincial store of weapons. His Majesty then asked: "How many ships, cannon and men does that leave to defend the province? Have they reported to us how many men are left to defend the province?" Phaya Thep replied that they had not done so but enquiries revealed that they still had five 'pirate-chaser' boats and there was also one [Nakhon-] model vessel which was unserviceable. They had five cannon, mounted in the bows [of the boats], and there were 20 muskets in the arsenal. His Majesty exclaimed: "What is all this about being in the arsenal - cannot they just say 'in the province'? The five cannon they have - what type are they?" Phaya Thep replied: "They are 3" calibre brass cannon." His Majesty said: "That must be a mistake. Have someone check them to make sure - brass cannon are difficult to get hold of and worth quite a bit - they should be used for the defence of the realm. For chasing pirates, iron cannon are good enough." Phaya Thep then told His Majesty: "As regards the damaged vessel, the Deputy Governor has requested 3,000 iron nails, so that he can have the planking changed and repair it. He has sent someone to buy the planks from Chonburi." His Majesty said: "See that they're sent to him and have him take what men are required from those left in the town,



to help repair the ship as soon as possible and make it fit for service."

On the 19th March, His Majesty did not discuss Kedah but talked about Mr. Richardson, an English gentleman, and about the necessity of arresting the Chinese selling opium in the bay. Mr. Richardson had left Bangkok for Nakhon Chaisi and was going on to Chiang Mai on the 19th March.

On the 20th March, in the evening, His Majesty was informed by the Royal Pages of a dispatch from Nakhon, brought by Meun Phithaknawa. After His Majesty had mounted the throne [in the Council Chamber] His Majesty asked the Treasurer: "What's the news from Nakhon?" The Treasurer replied: "Chao Phaya Nakhon reports that he had ordered the Governor of Saiburi, Phra Senanuchit, Phra Wichitsorakrai, Phra Narongchnonlathi, the Deputy Governor of Saiburi,<sup>3</sup> to take a force of 3,995 men through Ban Sadao and hasten on to Thung Pho and force their way through to Kubang Pasu in Kedah. Tengku Abdullah and Tengku Akip have set up camp at Tapan Chang with some five to six hundred men, and Chao Phaya Nakhon has ordered his men to attack them and march on to Kedah. When the Malays who were attacking Songkhla learnt of this they will probably run away. On the 1st March, the Governor of Saiburi's force had arrived at Sadao. Some of the Malays left behind had taken their families - some 12 families in all - and sought refuge with the Governor's force. They said that Tengku Mat Saad had set up camp at Ban Sadao but when he learnt of the Governor's advance, he had taken his force of about 500 men and retreated towards Kedah. The 500 men had dispersed and taken to the jungle. Tengku Mat Saad had only 50 men with him but his whereabouts were not known."

His Majesty then observed to the Treasurer: "Judging by this report it looks as though Chao Phaya Nakhon is determined to take Kedah. He simply ignores what's going on in Songkhla and makes a detour to avoid helping it. They deliberately avoid each other - they're just like creatures living in two different worlds.<sup>4</sup> They simply cannot get along with each other - each turns his back on the other. Why on earth doesn't he make some effort to go to the help of Songkhla? The Governor of Saiburi's force advances but it won't go to Hadyai by the Songkhla route. What do you think about that, Treasurer?" The Treasurer answered: "They had to go through Hadyai to get to Sadao." His Majesty said: "They passed through Hadyai, which is in Songkhla territory, but then they veered off towards Sadao. I just do not understand what they are up to! Can you work it out, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied: "Songkhla lies in relation to Kedah as Bangkok does to Pak Nam, and Sadao is where Nakhon Kheuan Khan would be." His Majesty said: "The Governor of Saiburi's force is advancing along the enemy's rear; if only he had attacked them and come to the help of Songkhla, the whole business would have been over, but no, they just will not help each other out. Why is it they are so set on outsmarting each other - is there so much ill-feeling between them that they

refuse to cooperate?" The Treasurer replied: "Not really, what ill-feeling there is is because of the Governor of Songkhla's attempts to conciliate the Malays." His Majesty said: "That sort of thinking is just not right. Listening to reports like this is just wasting our time. If this is the way they think, how can they accomplish anything? The Governor of Saiburi has only some three to four thousand men; if they Malays withdraw from Songkhla it will simply be a manoeuvre in order to converge upon him and he will be caught between them without being able to do anything about it - the Malays will make mincemeat of him."

His Majesty went on: "I would like to hear that report, have it read out, will you?" After it had been read out, His Majesty said: "Treasurer, Phaya Mahaamat, just listen to that. That bit about advancing on Thung Pho and going on to Kubang Pasu and invading Kedah are just proposals for future action - mere empty words. We don't know *when* he's going to advance - that is, if he *does* advance. It is clear that he is going to Sadao and there is no point in our asking any more questions. Phaya Thep - ask this fellow, will you, when did he leave and had Songkhla fallen or not?" Phaya Thep questioned Meun Phithaknawa and then reported to His Majesty. "He delivered some rice at the mouth of the Phathalung river and heard that on the 28th February Songkhla was still holding out against the Malays and that the Bangkok army was coming to its assistance. He left on the 8th March." His Majesty said: "So he left on the 8th March? The force under Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin left on the 16th and the 18th February. Let's see, that would be some 18 or 20 days before his departure. If Songkhla *had* fallen, then everybody would know about it. He must know whether the Bangkok army has arrived and whether Songkhla has fallen. Ask him whether the army had arrived or not and whether Songkhla was still holding out against the Malays. Have the Malays overrun them or are they still holding out in the town?"

Phaya Thep turned to ask Phra Narin but His Majesty exclaimed: "Why do you have to ask him - getting an answer out of him is like trying to get blood out of a stone.<sup>5</sup> Can't you ask the man yourself?" Phaya Thep did so and informed His Majesty that the Songkhla forces were in action against the Malays at Wang Kradan and Luk Chang Hill. His Majesty exclaimed: "Yes, we know that already. What I meant was, have they been overrun or have the enemy made any further advance - how can you be so tiresome, Phaya Thep? Phaya Phiphat, see if you can ask the fellow and find out." Phaya Phiphat questioned the man for some time and His Majesty said: "It is getting late and I'd like to hear something about this opium business - well, what did you learn from him?" Phaya Phiphat reported that Meun Phithaknawa had only heard that the Songkhla forces were fighting the Malays at Wang Kradan and Luk Chang Hill; he had not heard whether the Malays had advanced any further or whether the Bangkok army had arrived or what. His Majesty exclaimed: "How is it that he does not know anything? With Nakhon and

Songkhla being so close to each other, surely he must have heard rumours about the fighting and about the arrival of the Bangkok army. What does the fellow mean - he is bound to know all about it - everybody would be talking about it. He said he left on the 8th March. How many days has it taken him to get here?" Phaya Thep replied: "Twelve days". His Majesty said: "That is too long. At this time of the year the wind is always favourable. Twelve or thirteen days is nonsense. Obviously he must have left round about the 11th or 12th March but he's added on a day or so to his voyage and put back the date of his departure so that he could have an excuse for saying that he doesn't know what had happened when he left. The fact is, he knows all about it but he's been told not to open his mouth, so he will not say anything, because he's scared of saying more than his master told him to.<sup>6</sup> Ask him again and see if we can get the truth this time."

Phaya Thep did so and reported to His Majesty that Meun Phithaknawa had stated that he lived in Bandon and had brought a cargo of rice to the mouth of the Phathalung river; he had told all that he heard and did not know about anything else. His Majesty exclaimed: "Why does he not know? He's been sent here with instructions not to say anything so he just will not tell us. I am most anxious to know if the Bangkok army has arrived or not, but he refuses to say - it makes me furious." The Treasurer said: "This fellow Meun Phithaknawa is simply employed by Chao Phaya Nakhon as the master of a vessel that takes rice to the mouth of the Phathalung river; immediately upon his return to Nakhon, he was given a letter to deliver to Bangkok. The regular messengers have all been sent to obtain reports from Phaya Saiburi's force and there was no one else to send, so Meun Phithaknawa was sent."

His Majesty exclaimed: "They had to send someone who knows nothing - it is always the way! We must just wait till we hear from the Bangkok army. Once it arrives there, it will send in reports and we shall know exactly what the situation is down there. As regards the Nakhon advance on Kedah, if they really mean it, and can carry it out, all well and good; it will make things easier for the main army, but I am afraid that if it doesn't succeed, they will be caught in a trap and cut to pieces. This idea of advancing on Kedah suggests that they've adopted the attitude 'Never mind if Songkhla falls', we will make sure we capture Kedah'. They think that as the Malays have brought up so many men to invest Songkhla, there will be only a few left in Kedah, which they can capture without too much trouble, and thus avoid helping Songkhla. They propose to sacrifice the one to gain the other, hence their idea of invading Kedah. Is this how matters stand, do you think? Or is it because they know that once the Bangkok army gets down there, the Malays will all withdraw and Songkhla will be safe and sound. They think they can take advantage of the situation by advancing slowly, keeping well clear of Songkhla and then take part in the capture of Kedah, all the time pretending not to know what's going on elsewhere. If they were to say that they knew that the army had

arrived and had gone to the aid of Songkhla and so on and so forth, it would look as though they'd just been waiting around doing nothing, so as to take advantage of the situation. This must be what's happened and this is why they didn't send any help."

His Majesty then said: "Now that the Bangkok army's gone down to help Songkhla, I suppose they will all be disappointed. Ask him and see." Phaya Thep told His Majesty that the messenger had not heard anything about this. His Majesty then said: "This is how it is all the time - they just ignore each other. Each goes his own way and refuses to help the other. Things have reached a pretty pass indeed. If they persist in adopting this attitude, when the army has succeeded in its task, I will order them to fight each other, to teach them a lesson."

His Majesty then asked: "Has Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship left yet - when will it sail?" Khun Phiphat replied: "It has left Samutprakan today, Sire, and will be towed out tomorrow. His Majesty said: "Phaya Chodeuk is staying down there to see them off. See that instructions are sent to him, telling him to get them off as quickly as possible so that they can catch up with the rest of the expedition." His Majesty then spoke of Your Excellency and asked whether Your Excellency had arrived in Chantaburi yet. The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency would probably have arrived there by now.

His Majesty then asked the Treasurer what had happened about Phaya Narong Ritthikosa going out to arrest the opium traders - how many had been taken?" The Treasurer replied: "We captured a ship and 25 Chinese in Bang Hia bay and seized 23 chests<sup>8</sup> of opium, 4,000 baht in money, and other merchandise in the ship, viz. white cloth, red cloth and 30 picul of iron bars. Interrogation revealed that a Chinese merchant from Singapore had fitted out the ship and sent it to trade here. There were 31 Chinese in the crew. The four ships commanded by Phaya Narong, Phaya Wisetsakda, Luang Ritthikhamron and Luang At intercepted them in Bang Hia bay and fired two shots at them. Our ships then closed in and boarded the Chinese vessel to arrest the crew. The Chinese were armed and resisted arrest. Luang At attacked them and seven Chinese were killed, some being cut down and others falling victim to our musket fire. 25 others were captured, including a Chinese called Keu from Ban Laem who was acting as the intermediary in the transaction.<sup>9</sup> His Majesty asked: "Had they sold any opium in Ban Laem?" The Treasurer replied: "Originally they had brought 32 chests, one of which was sold in Kelantan. The Kelantan people told them that there was a civil war going on. The three sons of Phaya Banthale [Raja Kampong Laut] were fighting Tuan Senik for the throne and had set up camp on opposite sides of the river. Seeing that it would be difficult to sell the opium there, the master of the ship had then put in to Songkhla. He learned that the Malays had advanced right up to the city wall. The [local] Chinese and the Songkhla people had, between

them, driven the Malays back to Patani. Having seen that the city was in a state of disorder, the master then came on to Ban Laem and succeeded in selling eight chests of opium. His Majesty said: "That was a lot of opium to bring. I wonder if they have learnt their lesson, being caught like this. Why can they not come and sell other goods, without any trouble? They know very well that opium has been forbidden for a long time now, but they still try to smuggle it in and sell it." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Send Phra Mathathep<sup>10</sup> off to Phechaburi right away to arrest anyone found dealing in the opium from the eight chests that were landed. That statement about the fighting going on in Kelantan and Songkhla was obtained at second hand and cannot be taken as reliable." His Majesty continued to ask about the opium suppression campaign until past one o'clock in the morning before eventually retiring.

On the 21st March, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat reported to His Majesty that arrangements had been made for Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship to be towed out in seven relays; the first relay had been completed leaving another six to go. Eight more of the expedition's ships had reached Samutprakan. His Majesty asked whether there were any remaining. Phaya Thep replied that there were two more ships. His Majesty asked: "What are they waiting for - why have they not left?" Phaya Thep replied that they were still waiting for a master, which Phaya Chodeuk's clerk would see to. His Majesty said: "Phaya Chodeuk has gone off to Pak Nam, so there is not anyone to look after things - Phra Sirisombat is no use - he has not been in to help with the arrangements." His Majesty then told Phaya Thep to send someone to supervise matters and make sure they left right away so as to catch up with the rest of the fleet.

On the 22nd March His Majesty made no mention of the Kedah business. His Majesty merely asked about Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship and the ships in the expedition that had yet to sail, saying that every effort must be made to send them off as soon as possible so as to catch up with Your Excellency. His Majesty then discussed the opium-suppression campaign, ordering that the Chinese master of the opium-trader and his crew who had been arrested were to be interrogated separately, to find out who their accomplices were. His Majesty then ordered Phaya Narong and Phaya Wisetsakda to go out again and patrol the area to arrest the Chinese ships selling opium in the bay.

In the evening His Majesty spoke about the force under Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin saying: "They should have arrived in Songkhla by now. They should have got there two or three days or so before Meun Phithaknawa left Nakhon for Bangkok. I suppose everybody must know about the arrival of the Bangkok army but they've kept quiet about it and sent in no reports - the messenger was told not to tell us anything and he's done just that." His Majesty went on: "All I want to know is whether the Bangkok army has arrived or not, but he just will not tell me." His Majesty then asked: "When he left,

did he know whether Phaya Saiburi's force had advanced from Sadao?" Phaya Thep reported that the man did not know. His Majesty said: "All he can say is 'I do not know' - don't ask him any more questions." His Majesty went on to discuss the opium-suppression campaign until retiring.

Subsequently at two o'clock that same night, there was an earthquake and the buildings were shaken more than on previous occasions. The tremor lasted for six minutes and was felt all over [the capital]. The ground was rocking so much from north to south, that people staggered and were unable to stand upright. Some households were scared and thought that burglars had broken in while others thought there was a fire - every house felt the tremor.

On the 23rd March, in the morning, His Majesty laughed and said to the Treasurer: "That was a bad earthquake last night. It was much worse than on previous occasions, so much so that you couldn't stand upright. I held up a plumbline and could see it swinging from north to south." The Treasurer told His Majesty that the tremor was so severe that when he came out of his house he staggered; he saw the lantern hanging there swaying so much that it was almost extinguished. His Majesty asked: "Why didn't you get a plumbline and watch it swing?"<sup>12</sup>

His Majesty then asked Phaya Phiphat if there was any news. Phaya Phiphat replied that the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that a vessel with an Annamese-type bow had arrived. The master, a Chinese called Chu, had reported that Long Chang Wang<sup>13</sup> had sent him to trade in Nakhon, which he had left on the 18th March, taking five days to reach the mouth of the Bangkok river. His Majesty asked: "What news has he brought?" The Treasurer replied that with His Majesty's permission he had interrogated the master and learnt that when he had visited the market in Nakhon, he heard people say that Phaya Narong Chonlathi and the Nakhon force had attacked the Malays encamped at Tapan Chang. The Malays had fled in disorder; they had been unable to embark at the mouth of the Kedah river because [European] ships were blockading it. The Malays had then taken their families and fled overland. His Majesty asked: "So they fled overland - which way would they go?" The Treasurer replied that they might go in the direction of Perai.<sup>14</sup> His Majesty said: "They will not be able to take all their families with them, particularly if they're travelling overland - they will only be able to take a few of them."

His Majesty then asked: "And what else did he say?" The Treasurer said that Phaya Narong Chonlathi's force had occupied Kedah. His Majesty said: "In that case they must have taken an empty town! What did he say about Songkhla?" The Treasurer reported that Chu had gone to see his Chinese friend called Mi in Nakhon market and had been told that on the 4th or 5th of March, three men from the Bangkok army had come to buy opium from Mi's shop. He had asked the men where they had come from and they replied

that they had come from the vessel commanded by Phaya Wichitnarong, the officer from Bangkok, whose ship was anchored at the mouth of Nakhon river. Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent an elephant to pick up Phaya Wichitnarong and bring him to Nakhon, although he did not know what discussions had taken place between Phaya Wichitnarong and Chao Phaya Nakhon. Mi had seen the ship anchored at the mouth of the Nakhon river for two to three days, after which Phaya Wichitnarong had sailed for Songkhla. When the Malays had learnt that the Bangkok army had arrived, they had fled. Mi had heard it said that when the Malays were still attacking Songkhla, the Governor of Songkhla had sent a letter to Chao Phaya Nakhon asking for troops to be sent to his assistance but Chao Phaya Nakhon had simply laughed and refused to say whether he would send help. Chu eventually left on the 18th March, he had met up with another ship, under the command of Khun Phonlaphikhat, at the mouth of the Nakhon river. He had hailed it and been told that Khun Phonlaphikhat would land at Nakhon and march overland to Songkhla.

His Majesty said: "The Nakhon people ought not be dawdling about like this, trying to take advantage of the situation to score over Songkhla - if they'd gone to its help and cooperated with it, the business could have been brought to a successful conclusion a long time ago. It's not right to allow so much effort and so many resources to be wasted like this. Can you imagine it? Meun Phithaknawa comes here and we ask him about the Bangkok army but he will not tell us anything, he keeps his mouth shut - he is so scared of his master. I wonder what he has to say now? Where has he got to? Question him again. That Chinese fellow Chu said that Phaya Wichitnarong's ship arrived at the mouth of the Nakhon river on the 4th or 5th of March; Meun Phithaknawa said that he left on the 8th of March - ask him did he know about it." Phaya Thep informed His Majesty that Meun Phithaknawa had not reported in yet. His Majesty said to the Treasurer: "From the moment he arrived, I felt sure that if the Bangkok army had arrived, everybody would know about it, but the Nakhon people were set on keeping it quiet, so they gave him strict orders not to say anything about it. It is not right - there was no reason for them to play such tricks. Why should they try to keep such an important matter from us?" His Majesty then told Phaya Thep: "Go and fetch Meun Phithaknawa and interrogate him - let us hear him tell the truth for once. Phra Narin, you ask him too - beg him to be kind enough to tell us whether he knew about Phaya Wichitnarong's ship anchoring at the mouth of the Nakhon river and whether Phra Racharin's ship and the other two vessels have arrived. Try and get the truth out of him. And question Chu again, more rigourously. He arrived later and he might know something else. He is a trader, travelling around on business - do you think Chao Phaya Nakhon would go so far as to order the traders to keep their mouths shut, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied that he did not think so. His Majesty said: "Even if he *has* done so, he cannot hush things up for ever. Keep asking the man, and everything's bound to come out."

In the evening His Majesty asked Phaya Thep what was the result of the interrogation. Phaya Thep replied: "Phaya Krai has questioned him, Sire," and then moved off, still crouching respectfully, to fetch a candle. His Majesty exclaimed: "I asked you what was the result of the interrogation and you go crawling away to fetch a candle before telling me! How could you! Phaya Krai, you tell me." Phaya Krai began: "The Chinese named Chu states that he sailed to Nakhon to trade in the 8th month of the year of the dog, the last of the decade ...." before His Majesty broke in: "Don't go on, just tell us the part about the arrival of ships in the expedition." Phaya Krai told His Majesty that the part of the statement dealing with what Mi had told Chu was the same as the Treasurer had reported in the morning. His Majesty asked: "What did he say about Phra Racharin's ship?" Phaya Thep told His Majesty that he had asked Chu who had said that he had not heard anyone say anything about it. His Majesty said: "I'd like to talk this over with someone but there's no one here who knows anything about sailing except the Treasurer. Neither you, Phaya Thep, nor you Phaya Phiphat know anything about sailing. The Treasurer said that he saw the ships of Khun Phat, Phra Racharin and Nai Rit, one of the Palace adjutants, in Chong Samet, but that Khun Phat's ship had a broken rudder. After repairing the rudder the ships planned to sail across the gulf, on the 25th February. The voyage would only take them two or three days - not all that different from [the time taken] by Phaya Wichitnarong's ship. If you work out the time, they must have arrived by now. How can the fellow say he does not know? Even if he hasn't seen it with his own eyes, he must have heard something. Did you question him on these lines?" Phaya Thep replied that he had not. His Majesty exclaimed: "What sort of questions did you ask him?" Phaya Thep said that he had asked him whether he had seen Phra Racharin's ship and that the man had replied that he had not. His Majesty exclaimed: "Phaya Thep and Phra Narin are really getting along famously since being in the same Department - very sparing with their words, are they not? The only thing they are good for is crawling off to fetch candles! If you carry on like this, you will end up fit for nothing!"

His Majesty then asked Phra Sirisombat: "Well, did the man you questioned know nothing too?" Phra Sirisombat replied that he had learnt nothing except that only two vessels had arrived in Nakhon, the other three ships were said to be following. His Majesty exclaimed: "All I want to know is what's happened to Phra Racharin, but I cannot find out anything. Has he arrived in Songkhla yet, I wonder? What did Meun Phithaknawa say when you questioned him?" Phaya Thep replied that Meun Phithaknawa had said that when he had left the Nakhon estuary on the 9th March he had seen a ship anchored at the river mouth, but did not know where it had come from. He had sailed from the Nakhon river on the 10th March. His Majesty exclaimed: "Why didn't he say so when he was first interrogated?" Phaya Thep replied that Meun Phithaknawa had assumed that he was being asked about the European ships which had come to help in the blockade of the Kedah river and so he



had said that he did not know anything about them. His Majesty exclaimed: "Who asked him anything about the European ships? He was asked whether the Bangkok ships had arrived yet - *this* is what he was asked but he makes out that he was being asked about the foreign ships - quite absurd! In fact Nakhon knows quite well what's going on in Songkhla and vice versa - their spies are constantly sending in reports, and yet they make out they don't know what's going on! Nakhon would know quite well whether the Bangkok army had arrived and what Songkhla plans to do but he just won't tell us! They keep it a secret and order their man not to say anything, so of course he will not tell us."

His Majesty then told Krommaluang Rakronaret of the account sent by Chao Phaya Nakhon and said: "I'm very annoyed with Chao Phaya Nakhon - it's not right for him to conceal the facts in a matter such as this!<sup>15</sup> Why was it so important for him to conceal the arrival of the Bangkok army from us? All I wanted to know was whether Phra Racharin has arrived or not but he won't tell us anything. If you work out how many days have elapsed since Phra Racharin sailed on the 18th February, he must have arrived in Songkhla by now, do not you think, Krommaluang Rakronaret?" Krommaluang Rakronaret said that he agreed. His Majesty said: "I am sure Phra Racharin wouldn't call at Nakhon - he dislikes Chao Phaya Nakhon so he would go straight on to Songkhla. This is what I wanted to find out from Meun Phithaknawa and I even had Phra Narin beg him to tell us, but he would not - he refused to tell us. Is it too much to ask that we be informed whether the Bangkok army has arrived or whether it's got lost somewhere? It is quite absurd! It is just not right for him to conceal the facts. Have I not got every reason to want to know? Phra Racharin is our servant so naturally I am anxious about him - I feel an affection for all my servants - but I cannot find out whether he has arrived down there or what's happened to him. Nai Rit, too, is a protege of mine and I have promoted him to the rank of Adjutant - I ask about him but they tell me nothing - makes me feel very worried!" His Majesty then said to Phaya Phiphat: "It doesn't seem likely that Phra Racharin's ship could have drifted off course in the direction of Annam, does it? The trade winds are now setting in and the wind is from the south. If they have been driven off course, the only direction they could go would be towards the north, do you not think so, Phaya Phiphat?" Phaya Phiphat agreed that they certainly would not have gone in the direction of Annam. His Majesty said: "How could they change course with the wind the way it is? It seems very strange - all I want to know is whether they have arrived or not, but I just cannot get the information! What do you think has happened? They couldn't have been lost, because there are three ships in company - how could all three ships get lost? They must have reached Songkhla all right, don't you think, Krommaluang Rakronaret?" Krommaluang Rakronaret answered that it was highly unlikely that the vessels would have been lost; they must have reached Songkhla. His Majesty said: "Yes, I think so, but I *would* like to have some confirmation

to ease my mind, and I just cannot get it. Phaya Wichitnarong's force, which arrived in Songkhla earlier, has not sent in any report. I suppose they're waiting for Phra Racharin to arrive before reporting. It is unlikely they would wait for the main body to arrive before reporting. What am I to do? Can't anyone find out and let me know for certain whether Phra Racharin's ship has arrived or not or what's happened to him - this would cheer me up and put an end to my worries. It would be such a weight off my mind." His Majesty then told Phra Sirisombat: "See that every member of Chu's crew is brought in for detailed questioning so as to extract every bit of information from them. They probably know something more, so see that you subject them to a rigorous interrogation."

His Majesty's observations and the details of dispatches received which His Majesty has graciously allowed me to note down in this dispatch have been based upon the discussions that I was privileged to attend. I crave Your Excellency's pardon should my account contain any errors, omissions or improprieties.

Dispatched on Saturday, 23rd March 1839.

## Notes

- 1 The Phaya Phiphatkosa of the 'Dispatches' is presumably Phaya Phiphat (Bun Si). In the reign of Rama IV he became Phaya Mahaammatt and built Wat Buranasiri. He later became Chao Phaya Thamma [Minister for Palace Affairs] and in the 5th Reign he was promoted to Chao Phaya Suthammamontri. He was the ancestor of the Buranasiri family
- 2 The Thai expression used here (and a few lines below) is a somewhat derogatory way of referring to Chinese.
- 3 There seems to be some mistake here; the Deputy Governor of Saiburi was Phra Senanuchit. Perhaps 'Assistant Governor' is here intended.
- 4 Literally [like two animals] one living in Udonkaro and the other in Amonkhoyane' presumably referring to the Buddhist cosmology as expounded? in the 'Traiphun' [Three Worlds]. 'Udonkaro' (Skt. 'Uttarakuru' is the northern continent) and Anonkhoyane (Skt. 'Amaragoyana') is the western continent, see Gerini (1970), p. 65-68.
- 5 Literally: "getting blood from a chest".
- 6 His Majesty's remarks here are an accurate reflection of the character of the Nakhon people, and are true even today [1915].
- 7 Ever since the reign of Rama I, the Governors of Nakhon had never got on well with the Governor of Songkhla. His Majesty suspects that it is this hostility that causes Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) to decide not to help the Governor of Songkhla (Seng).
- 8 The word 'pak' [translated here as 'chest'] is believed to be a corruption of the word 'pack'. A 'pack' contained about 80 kg.
- 9 The *Singapore Free Press* of 13 June 1839 reported indignantly that "The Sampan Pukat with 23 chests of opium, of which the seizure is referred to in the Edict, was from this port, and had also on board a quantity of piece goods, and about 6,000 Tecals in cash. The cloth and cash were shared among the captors, the opium burned and the Chinese belonging to the vessel imprisoned." In the same issue, the newspaper printed Rama III's 'Edict' against the sale of opium (the 'Edict' is also quoted - not entirely accurately - in Bowring (1969), vol. 2, p. 368-377). In its issue of 11 July 1838 the same newspaper commented that "... the assertion that the Chinese [in the Samutprakan] fired on the guard first ... looks very like a tale got up to excuse the treatment to which the *Pukat* people have been subjected."

- 10 His name was 'Thong Pan'. He was later promoted to the rank of 'Phaya'. [This is presumably the author of the well-known 'Raden Landai' - a parody of the elaborate Thai versions of the Panji stories that were popular at the court of Rama II.
- 11 A 'bat nalika' [the expression used in the text] was equivalent to 6 minutes.
- 12 This is referred to in the Thipakorawong (1961), vol. 2, p. 1-2.
- 13 The words 'Chang Wang' here are apparently a name and not the Thai title 'Changwang' - Comptroller.
- 14 Perai [spelt 'Paerai' in the text] is the coastal strip on the mainland opposite Penang, leased by the British from the Sultan of Kedah. The British call it 'Province Wellesley'. Its name is 'Prai' but the people in the provinces cannot pronounce the consonant cluster and call it 'Perai' in their dialect.
- 15 The extreme secretiveness of [people from] Nakhon is a trait that has aroused misgivings, right up to the present [5th Reign].

# *The Fourth Dispatch*

29 March 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat, addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. My previous dispatch, in which I gave details of what has occurred, was entrusted to the Assistant Collector of Pechaburi and sent on the 23rd March.

On 24th March, in the morning, the Treasurer told His Majesty that Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent Nai Duang and Nai Phae up with a report, details of which are as follows. On the 3rd March, the forces of the Governor of Saiburi, Phra Senanuchit, Phra Wichitsorakrai and Phra Narongchonlathi attacked the Malays at Kubang Pasu [first] firing at them and then engaging them with cold steel. The fire from the Governor Saiburi's force resulted in the death of the commander - Tengku Said Husain, a son of the ruler of Acheh - and seven of the Malay chiefs. In all, eight chiefs and seven of their followers were killed, a total of 15 men. The Nakhon force had one man killed as the result of cannon fire. The Malays were driven from the field and pursued as far as Tapan Chang. On the 5th March, the Governor of Saiburi's force divided into sections and advanced to attack the Malay camp at Tapan Chang. When the Malays encamped there heard that Tengku Said Husain (whom Tengku Mat Saad had appointed as commander of the defences of Kubang Pasu) had been shot dead, they lost heart and fled. Wan Che La Muda, a resident of Thung Ban Nok, came in to the Governor's camp and reported that when Tengku Abdullah learnt that the Governor's force had driven off the Malays at Kubang Pasu, he had fled overland towards Kuala Muda, intending to board a ship at Lo Sata [Alor Setar]<sup>1</sup> but it was reported that British ships were blockading the river. The Governor of Saiburi had sent his men to pursue Tengku Abdullah.

His Majesty said: "The situation should never have been allowed to reach this point and cause us to expend so much effort on it. If only they would have co-operated from the beginning, it would have been all over by now. Instead, they hang about trying to gain some advantage for themselves, causing general confusion, until the Malays wreak havoc in Songkhla.<sup>2</sup> And even now they won't help each other! They had to let matters get to such a pass that the army has had to be sent down. They have managed to use up our time, our man-power and our supplies of food, all to no purpose. At first I thought I'd hang on and not be too hasty about sending the army down but when I

saw how matters were shaping I decided that, based upon our previous experience, the army would have to go down. Now it has gone down there things turn out like this. As for recalling Chao Phaya Yomarat, well, the main army has already left and it would feel let down. Anyway, the army has already set off." His Majesty spoke of Your Excellency saying that Your Excellency had never been down to the southern provinces so His Majesty might as well send Your Excellency down there to see what it was like.

Then His Majesty asked if the messenger knew whether the ships with Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin's troops had arrived in Songkhla. The Treasurer replied: "Phaya Wichitnarong's ship arrived at mouth of the Nakhon river on the 9th March. Phaya Wichitnarong went ashore to see Chao Phaya Nakhon who made arrangements to send him off to Songkhla. As for Phra Racharin's ship, Nai Duang and Nai Phae met it at the mouth of the Nakhon river on 16th March and had seen it set sail for Songkhla.

His Majesty said: "That is all I wanted to know. I asked Meun Phithaknawa but at first he wouldn't say anything. Then, when that Chinese fellow Chu came in and said that Phaya Wichitnarong's ship had put in to see Chao Phaya Nakhon, Meun Phithaknawa tried to get out of it by saying that on his way out, he had seen a brig anchored in the Nakhon estuary, but that he did not know who it belonged to. I even asked Nai Rit, [one of my] Adjutants, but *he* wouldn't say anything. We had to wait until Nai Duang and Nai Phae arrived and told us that Phaya Wichitnarong's ship had arrived in the Nakhon river on the 9th March. The whole business is quite absurd! Everybody knew about it but they did all they could to hide the facts! Good gracious me, he acts as though he's going to live for ever! When death comes, it comes quickly - it is all over in a matter of days - and yet he goes on like this!" His Majesty went on: "It is all because of this swine that the situation has become as serious as it is! They say the Governor of Songkhla is dead<sup>3</sup> - ask the men if they are happy now." Phaya Thep duly put the question and reported that the man said he did not know. His Majesty exclaimed: "Why do they not know? - the news should make them very happy." His Majesty then ordered the Treasurer to write a letter to Your Excellency, to be delivered by Chao Phaya Yomarat, to inform Your Excellency that the Nakhon people claimed to have taken Kedah, but that Your Excellency should not put too much reliance on the claim until it had been confirmed. Your Excellency should take every possible precaution in dealing with the situation. The rest of His Majesty's remarks are included in the letter the Treasurer has written to Your Excellency.

In the evening, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat is there was anything to report. Phaya Phiphat replied that no vessel had put in. His Majesty asked whether Chao Phaya Yomarat had sailed yet. Phaya Phiphat replied that he had not yet got over the bar but should be able to do so and set sail the following

day. His Majesty said: "I do wish he'd leave right away!" His Majesty then ordered Phaya Thep to ask the Nakhon people whether they felt that the benefit to be obtained by the Governor of Saiburi's capture of Kedah would outweigh the loss of Songkhla to the Malays. Phaya Thep asked Nai Duang and Nai Phae and reported that they did not know. His Majesty asked whether they knew if Songkhla was still holding out or had been taken by the Malays. Phaya Thep reported that they did not know. His Majesty said: "That is what I thought - none of them know anything - they just will not let on."

On the 25th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat: "What's the matter with Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship? It does not seem to be making any progress. Phaya Chodeuk went down to help see it off on the 18th March and that was several days ago. This means a waste of time and effort and all to no purpose. What are they up to, taking so long to warp a ship as small as that over the bar? What do you think, Phaya Phiphat?" Phaya Phiphat replied: "From 21st to 23rd March there were strong south-westerlies which grew even stronger in the afternoon and prevented any warping being done. With these continued interruptions, they were only able to warp it some 40 to 80 metres on each occasion. They say they have only some 40 metres to go and it should get over the bar today." His Majesty exclaimed: "What are they up to, warping the ship like this? It looks as though they're not used to handling junks. I have seen how warping is done - you warp the ship only in the early morning, when the wind is still. You can make some 80 to 120 metres each time and it takes you only three to four days to cross the bar. What are these people up to - all this time and they still have not been able to get it over the bar!"

His Majesty then asked whether the remaining ships in the expedition had now left. Phaya Phiphat replied that eight ships had arrived at Samutprakan; with the vessels that had already left, the expedition mustered 44 ships and over 4,000 men. His Majesty asked Phaya Thep how many ships were still to sail. Phaya Thep replied: "Three, Sire." His Majesty exclaimed: "Why are they being allowed to dawdle about like this? Why weren't they made to hurry up so that they could leave with the rest of the fleet? Whose ships are they and why have they taken as long as this?" Phra Narin told His Majesty that the three ships were those of the Deputy Governor of Ang Thong, Phra Thanyaboriban and Luang Intharasombat. His Majesty said: "See to it that they set off right away, so that they can catch up with the rest of the expedition." His Majesty then said to the Treasurer: "Phra Racharin must have arrived in Songkhla by now. They had no right to try and conceal the fact and cause me such anxiety. If they had reported this to me at the very beginning I would not have been so worried."

In the evening, His Majesty observed that by this time Your Excellency should be sailing across the bay from Chantaburi. His Majesty then asked

Phaya Phiphat if there was any further news. Phaya Phiphat replied that the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that Your Excellency had sent Khun Ritthironakrai, the Lieutenant of the Annamese unit, up to the capital in a pirate-chaser vessel with a letter containing instructions to speed up the departure of the remaining vessels. The report also said that Your Excellency's ship had sailed in to Chantaburi on the 18th March and on the 21st March the main body of the expedition had left Chantaburi to sail across the gulf. There were 14 warships and 4 on loan, making 18 ships in all. His Majesty asked if the man sent up to speed the departure of the remaining ships was one of those summoned for service in the campaign. Phaya Phiphat replied that he was. His Majesty asked whether, when the man left, he would go back down there. Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty that the person concerned, Khun Ritthironakrai, was on his way up to the capital and that the Governor of Samutprakan had sent in his report in advance to Khun Ritthironakrai's arrival. His Majesty said: "Ask him, when he leaves, will he be sailing back down there?" Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty that Your Excellency had sent Khun Ritthironakrai up to Bangkok with dispatches; he was still on his way and had not yet arrived and the Governor of Samutprakan had sent in his report first. His Majesty exclaimed: "Of course he has to come to Bangkok first; what I meant was, when he leaves here, will he be sailing back there or not? Ask him this, will you. You do not seem to understand me at all!" Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty that he had not yet met Khun Ritthironakrai. His Majesty said: "Well why did you not say so in the first place? - making me ask you so many times!" His Majesty went on: "Bring the report and have it read out." Phaya Phiphat then had the report from Pak Nam read out. His Majesty said: "So it was the report from Pak Nam? I thought it was the dispatch brought by Khun Ritthironakrai which the Governor of Samutprakan had sent up." Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty that Your Excellency's letter was still with Khun Ritthironakrai, who had not yet arrived in Bangkok. His Majesty said: "Where has he got to? Why has he not arrived yet? Hearing what the dispatch says would make me feel a bit easier, but he hasn't got here yet." His Majesty then spoke about Your Excellency saying: "They sailed south from Chantaburi on the 21st March so they should have arrived in Nakhon by now. It's just my bad luck to have this annoying business of Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship being held up and seemingly not being able to get over the bar. All the rest have arrived at their destination and *he* cannot even get out to sea!"

On the 26th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat if anything had come in. Phaya Phiphat replied that no ship had put in except that of Khun Ritthironakrai, the Lieutenant of the Annamese unit who had brought a letter from Your Excellency. His Majesty smiled and said: "Good, bring it in to have it read out. I've been waiting to hear it to set my mind at rest." Phaya Phiphat told the page, Nai Niam, who had accompanied him with the letter, to read it out. The report began: "Your Majesty's humble servant, Phaya Si Phiphat Ratanarachakosa, craves Your Majesty's permission



to report ...' His Majesty laughed and asked the Treasurer whether the letter mentioned to whom it was addressed. The Treasurer replied that it was addressed to Phaya Phiphat. His Majesty said: "Go on with the reading." When the report came to the part about Your Excellency ordering the ship to anchor and let the men sleep and relax, His Majesty laughed and said: "They usually just report that they anchored at such and such a place but he says that he anchored and then went off to bed. Once a ship has anchored, it doesn't matter *what* they get up to. But if the ship's anchored with everyone fast asleep and a gang of pirates were to find out, they could bide their time and make off with the expedition's food supplies, and then they had have nothing to eat during the voyage."

His Majesty then said: "I feel much better now that I have heard the report. Read on." When the report came to the part about the ships of Phaya Wichitnarong, Phra Racharin and Khun Phat from Songkhla reinforcing the mast[s] and having new rudders made and all five ships sailing south in company, His Majesty said: "I thought at first that the brig *Klaeo Klang Samut* with Phaya Wichitnarong on board, along with the ships on loan that were carrying his men, would get down there before Phra Racharin's *Paklan*, and this caused me some anxiety. I kept asking about Phra Racharin's ship but no one would tell me anything. I did not know that the five ships had sailed down there together - that is excellent." His Majesty then spoke about Your Excellency, saying: "I know it now because he has sent Khun Ritthironakrai up with dispatches giving me definite news of what is going on. The Governor of Chantaburi<sup>4</sup> was on the spot - he knew all about the ships calling in there reinforcing their masts and making new rudders, but he made no report when the ships sailed south, he just kept quiet, the rotten swine!" His Majesty then told them to go on with the letter. When the reading had been completed, His Majesty said: "Now I have heard the report, I feel much better - my worries are over. The *Amonmaensan* sailed from Bangkok river on the 14th March and arrived in Chantaburi on the 18th March - that was very quick, the voyage took them only four or five days. And on the 21st March the entire expedition sailed south from Chantaburi. The ships seem to be sailing well - they should have arrived in Nakhon by now."

His Majesty then asked: "Has Khun Ritthironakrai come in? Have him shift up closer so that I can get a look at him - perhaps I know him. I used to have the Annamese in my service. I wonder if he is one of the new bunch or one of the old?" I [Luang Udomsombat] was in the audience hall close to Khun Ritthironakrai, listening to His Majesty, and I told him to shift up closer. His Majesty saw him and said that he did not know him. His Majesty then asked him if he was one of the new people or one of the old. Khun Ritthironakrai told His Majesty that he had previously been in the service of Krommakhun Isaranurak<sup>5</sup> but that after His Highness' death he had moved to the Annamese unit. His Majesty said: "In that case, you must be one of

the new men. I don't know you. I knew a lot of the old people." His Majesty asked him with a smile whether Your Excellency had been sea-sick after leaving the Bangkok river. Khun Ritthironakrai replied: "No, Sire." His Majesty said: "So he was not? Just wait until he sails south and gets out to sea - he will be so sea-sick he will not be able to eat a thing - he will have a fine old time." The Treasurer told His Majesty that if Your Excellency had sailed so far and had not yet been sea-sick, Your Excellency never would be sea-sick, even when Your Excellency sailed south and met rough weather. His Majesty asked Khun Ritthironakrai whether Your Excellency had a good appetite on the voyage. Khun Ritthironakrai replied that Your Excellency was eating well. His Majesty said: "They say that anyone who is not sea-sick has a good appetite. Do you know whether the officers who have never been to sea before were sea-sick or not?" Khun Ritthironakrai replied that only a few were sea-sick. His Majesty then asked whether Your Excellency had been in good health on his arrival in Chantaburi. Khun Ritthironakrai replied that Your Excellency seemed to be in good health. His Majesty said: "Good, I hope he continues in good health. I shall pray for him every day and I shall give to charity and perform deeds of merit that the benefit from them may accrue to him." His Majesty then asked Khun Ritthironakrai whether the officers and men were all well and in good spirits. Khun Ritthironakrai replied that they were. His Majesty asked Khun Ritthironakrai: "When you leave, are you going down there?" Khun Ritthironakrai replied that he was. His Majesty asked: "Can you get down there all right - where will you sail from?" Khun Ritthironakrai replied that he would be able to get down there from Chantaburi. His Majesty observed to the Treasurer: "The pirate-chaser is only a small vessel - can it really sail all the way down from Chantaburi?" The Treasurer replied that the pirate-chaser should be able to manage it without any difficulty. His Majesty then asked: "They took two pirate-chasers down with them; Khun Ritthironakrai has brought one here - did they send the other one back or did they take it along with them?" The Treasurer replied that they had taken it along with them. His Majesty said: "In that case it must be able to make the distance or they would not have taken it along." His Majesty then told Khun Ritthironakrai: "Do not hang around here too long. Get back quickly so that your master can have the benefit of your services down there. You are a sturdy fellow and your taking part in the campaign means an act of merit in the service of your country."

His Majesty then said to the Treasurer with a smile: "On the 22nd March when there was an earthquake, the ships at sea wouldn't have been affected very much. The ships would have rocked a bit but only for a short while, because the sea is such a vast expanse. The tremor would not have been as severe as on land." His Majesty then went on to speak about Your Excellency's ship, saying: "When they were sailing south that day, I wonder what sort of time they had and how much the ship rocked - still, if they were well out to sea, the effect of the tremor would have been much less, the sea being so vast and the ship so far from the land - it wouldn't be anywhere near as strong

as if the ship had been close to the land." His Majesty then said: "They must have arrived at Nakhon by now, don't you think, Treasurer? Before they left, they were saying that they could make the voyage to Nakhon in only two or three days. Surely they must have arrived by now?" The Treasurer replied that they must have reached Nakhon. His Majesty said: "There's no reason why they should not have arrived - the vessels are good for sailing - they must have arrived by now. We should have news of their arrival by the end of March or the first week in April."

In the evening, His Majesty asked Phaya Chodeuk whether Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship had got out to sea. Phaya Chodeuk replied that it had. His Majesty asked when it would sail. Phaya Chodeuk told His Majesty that it was only waiting to take on some more water from the supply vessel before sailing. His Majesty said: "If it is not one thing it is the other - is he never going to leave? He's been held up day after day." His Majesty then told Phaya Phiphat to make a note of the date, the number of ships and the number of men as stated in the dispatch brought in by Khun Ritthironakrai and make sure to remember them, so that he would have no difficulty in answering His Majesty's questions on the subject. His Majesty then talked about the opium campaign until retiring.

On the 27th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat whether Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship had taken on its water supply. Phaya Phiphat replied that no one had come in yet. His Majesty asked if the tally of the ships in the expedition that had set off down river was now complete. Phaya Phiphat replied that it was: the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that a total of 44 ships had sailed leaving three ships unaccounted for. His Majesty asked who was missing and where they had got to. Phaya Phiphat replied that every single one of the the ships [from Bangkok] had left, there was no one left behind. His Majesty ordered that someone be sent down to check up on the situation and see that all the ships got off without any further delay.

In the evening His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat if anything had come in. Phaya Phiphat replied that no ship had come in but the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that at 9 o'clock that morning one of the vessels that was on loan that had sailed earlier had put back in to Samutprakan. The captain of the ship was Luang Wisetsongkhram, the Superintendent of the Song Dam<sup>6</sup> contingent, and he had reported that, after sailing, the ship had run into rough weather and sprung a leak and had had to return. There were 20 Siamese from Phechaburi and 100 Song Dam people - altogether 120 men - on board the vessel, which was carrying 14 coyan of rice from the royal granaries, five coyan of which had been spoiled by the sea getting in. His Majesty then asked: "What is being done about it - which ship is being sent down as a replacement?" Phaya Phiphat replied that the Treasurer had ordered Phaya Chodeuk to obtain

the loan of a trading vessel as a replacement. His Majesty then told Phaya Chodeuk: "See if you can borrow a ship to replace the damaged vessel and have the rice transferred as quickly as possible so that they can sail back there. Even when they *do* leave they sail back again, with a leaking ship - so much messing about, day after day - it will take them several days before they can get off." His Majesty ordered Phaya Thep to send Khun Meun down to supervise the transfer so that they could leave as soon as possible without any further delay.

His Majesty then spoke about Your Excellency, saying: "He must have arrived by now. He sailed south on the 21st March; that was six or seven days ago. Do you think he's arrived yet?" Phaya Chodeuk told His Majesty that he thought Your Excellency should have got as far as Nakhon but not Songkhla. His Majesty said: "Naturally I meant Nakhon - arriving at Nakhon is as good as arriving in Songkhla. What I was afraid of was that, on the way down there, the wind would have been too strong forcing them back and delaying the arrival for a day or two. Is that possible?" Phaya Chodeuk replied that once they had left Chantaburi to sail across the bay they were bound to arrive in Nakhon it was unlikely that the wind would force them back and hold them up for a day or two. His Majesty said: "In that case he must have arrived in Nakhon by now and have discussed matters. Perhaps Chao Phaya Nakhon came down to see him or perhaps he would go up to see Chao Phaya Nakhon to discuss matters and plan the campaign. He might stay in Nakhon for four or five days before going to Songkhla. I wonder what's happened? There is no news at all from Songkhla. Is it asking too much to expect them to send in a report once in a while? Are they not going to send me a report, or do I have to wait for the dispatches sent by the Bangkok expedition's force? Why this continued silence? From the dispatch brought by Khun Ritthironakrai it seems quite certain that Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin sailed south with all five of the vessels in their fleet. Is it possible that they have not arrived in Songkhla yet, hence the silence and the absence of any reports?" His Majesty then asked on what day Phaya Wichitnarong had sailed south along with Phra Racharin, according to the dispatch brought by Khun Ritthironakrai. Phaya Phiphat and Phaya Thep started to search through the files for the dispatches. His Majesty exclaimed: "You have both forgotten all about it, have you? Can you not remember anything? I expressly told you to write it down but when I ask you, you cannot tell me. Can I not get someone with a good memory, who I can make my official 'Memoriser' and keep on hand to remember things?" His Majesty then asked: "Have you found the letter stating what day they sailed down?" Phaya Phiphat replied: "Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin sailed south on the 1st March." His Majesty said: "So they left on the 1st March. The Nakhon people reported that Phaya Wichitnarong's ship arrived there on the 9th March. We asked Nai Duang and Nai Phae about Phra Racharin's ship and they said that they had seen it at the mouth of the Nakhon river on the 16th March - that would be about

a week later than Phaya Wichitnarong. What do you think, Phaya Chodeuk? Could it have been blown back, to make it lag behind like that?" Phaya Chodeuk replied: "It looks like it, Sire. Although the *Klaeo Klang Samut* and the *Paklan* sailed south together, the *Klaeo Klang Samut* sails better than the other ship which would probably not have been able to keep up with her." His Majesty asked: "In the letter, where did it say they'd sailed south from?" Phaya Phiphat replied: "From Ko Chang". His Majesty said: "From the day Phra Racharin's ship sailed south, to the 16th March is 15 days - I wonder if they've arrived in Songkhla by now? We've had no news at all. If I could just hear from Songkhla once more, instead of this silence. What do you think, Phaya Chodeuk?" Phaya Chodeuk told His Majesty that he thought they would have arrived in Songkhla by now. If they had sailed across from Koh Kong [and not from Ko Chang], they would certainly have made it to Songkhla.

His Majesty then asked if anyone from Nakhon had arrived. Phaya Thep replied that no one had come in. His Majesty asked: "When did the letter say Khun Phonlaphikhat's ship had arrived in Nakhon?" Phaya Thep was silent. His Majesty exclaimed: "Can you not remember a single thing! The letter said that Phaya Wichitnarong arrived on the 9th and Khun Phonlaphikhat got there on such and such a date - it is all in the letter! You do not remember anything! When I hear something, I can remember the main details, but I have so many matters to deal with that I cannot remember the actual dates - I think it was the 17th March or thereabouts. When Nai Duang and Nai Phae came in last time they said they had seen it. They said they'd left Nakhon on the 17th March. But according to the statement made by Chu, the Chinese trader, Chu said he had left Nakhon on the 18th March and Chao Phaya Nakhon was still drafting the letter which was to be sent - that's what Chu said. When I hear what Nai Duang and Nai Phae say, it just does not tally - it's all lies. When I asked them, they tried to cover up the facts and would not tell the truth. This is what makes me so worried - wondering whether the expedition has reached its destination or not. What have I done to deserve this? They had no right to try and do each other down just to gain some personal advantage - even hiding the facts from us. If only they'd been prepared to help each other and work together, the whole business would have been over long ago! It's not as though the Malays had all that many men! The Nakhon people reported that they [Nakhon] were advancing with just under four thousand men, and there were two thousand men in Songkhla. If only they had combined forces to help each other and really applied themselves to the business in hand, there was no way the Malays could have achieved so much success. But no, they just sat still and let the Malays wreak havoc. And it's all due to this one man, this wretch - he could not even fight a handful of Malays!"

His Majesty went on: "I have been lying awake at nights thinking about Mr. Bonham - I'm worried in case he's playing a double game. The master of the brig *Racharit* reported that the ships helping to blockade the mouth

of the Kedah river had withdrawn as soon as they learnt that the Bangkok army was on its way.<sup>7</sup> He also said that Mr. Bonham had gone up to Penang - I wonder why? Could it be that he wants to obtain a share of the families from Trang and Setul whom the Malays carried off and deposited on Langkawi? It seems very strange to me. The Nakhon people reported that they had asked the British ships to help with the blockade of the Kedah river for a month or two. The Malays who attacked Songkhla are still hard at it. The Nakhon people however report that they have advanced and put the Malays to flight somewhere or other and even captured Kedah - it all seems just too easy. Haven't the Malays got any artillery or muskets, and cannot they put up any real resistance? It seems as though we only have to advance on Kedah to capture it - very strange! If the Nakhon people have captured Kedah, how could the Malays continue to fight Songkhla - they'd have had to retreat. If they haven't retreated, but are still hammering away at Songkhla like this, it looks as though Bonham wants them to attack Songkhla and told them that if the Bangkok army goes down there, they should carry off the families and the livestock in the area - elephants, horses and cattle - and make their way overland through Raman to Kuala Muda and cross over into Perai. It looks as though he doesn't want them to make for Kuala Kedah, that's why he has his ships carry out a blockade of the river mouth there. To transport the families and livestock by sea is no easy matter, far more difficult than moving them overland, where they can take them a few at a time and eventually carry off the whole lot. I wonder if this is what he's up to?"

His Majesty then asked whether Phaya Krai had come in yet. Phaya Thep replied that he had not. His Majesty then asked Phaya Chodeuk: "How many days' journey is it from Kuala Muda to Perai - do you know?" Phaya Chodeuk replied that from Kuala Muda it would take just one day to get into Perai territory. From Perai they could get across to Penang. His Majesty said: "By now the Malays would have taken all the families across to Penang. They would have left only a handful of able-bodied men behind to look after the families who were too tired to keep up. If it looks as though they cannot hold out any longer, they will make off in the direction of Raman and down to Kuala Muda. Even if we take Kedah it will be empty - we shall get nothing. Chu, the Chinese trader, stated that they had burnt down Kedah and fled overland. It's not right to cause our people so much trouble - what a waste and a shame that our army has to go down there and get nothing for its trouble! Could they not at least have waited for the army to arrive before commencing operations? If they had got there in time to attack them, even if they'd taken flight and made off, we could have hit them hard and scattered them; we could have captured some of them and found out whose men they were; as it is we have gone down there for nothing, wasting our time and manpower and using up our supplies to no purpose."

His Majesty then spoke about Your Excellency, saying: "When he gets there and finds that all the Kedah people have fled beyond his reach and he cannot carry them off, I suppose he will take the people from Chana, Thepha and Nongchik and from Katong Karam, Setul and Langu or wherever. The Nakhon force reports that when the Governor of Saiburi entered the district of Sadao, a dozen of the Malay families left behind came over to him and admitted that when Tengku Mat Saad first came to attack Songkhla, they had joined him. When Tengku Mat Saad retreated, he originally had a following of some four to five hundred men, but this had dwindled to a mere fifty men, the rest having dispersed. They also reported that after the Governor's force had captured Kubang Pasu, Wan Che La Muda had come over to him but it was not stated how many people he had brought with him. The Governor of Saiburi's force persists in thinking that it does not matter if the Malays attack Songkhla, provided they don't attack Nakhon. Am I supposed to give him credit for these Malays who have come over to us and keep them supplied with food? If the Nakhon people and Phaya Saiburi are going to treat the Malay rebels from Kedah - who have now come over to them only because they weren't able to get away in time - as [innocent] people, the whole business will become a farce and we shan't be able to lay our hands on a single Kedah rebel - they will all be 'innocent' Malays! I'm still waiting to hear from Songkhla - I wonder what has happened? We have heard nothing - they have not sent in a single report. Anyway I am just waiting to get a report from the army; when it gets down there and finds out what has happened, it will report to us." His Majesty then asked whether anyone had come in with news of Chao Phaya Yomarat. Phaya Phiphat replied that no one had come in. His Majesty said: "I wonder if the water supply ship has delivered its water. Once the water has been delivered, the ship can sail."

On the 28th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat if anything had come in. Phaya Phiphat replied that no ship had put in. His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "See what you can do about transferring the cargo from the ship that sprang a leak so that it can be sent down. Five coyan of rice had been soaked; have someone go down there and speed up the transfer of the cargo and get it off right away, don't let them hang about. When it first sailed, no one bothered to check up, so when it got out to sea, it started to leak and has had to put back." His Majesty then asked Phaya Chodeuk what ship would be sent down as a replacement. Phaya Chodeuk replied: "I shall get two vessels on loan to replace her, as she was a big ship. When we first obtained it, it was sent to Phaya Si Phiphat who had it recalled. It must have sprung a leak where the barnacles had eaten away the bottom." His Majesty said: "Make sure the ship is replaced as soon as possible, will you? If I keep the ship here and don't send it out, it might be said that I kept the expedition short of men. If the situation required the Governor of Phechaburi to be sent off on a mission, he won't have heard about the delay and will be waiting for it to arrive. If he learns that the ship is detained here, he will not

be too happy that I've sent out the master but kept back the servants. Make arrangements to send it off quickly." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer whether Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship had set sail yet. The Treasurer replied that it was now taking on a further supply of water, after which it would set sail.

In the evening, His Majesty again asked Phaya Phiphat about Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship but Phaya Phiphat replied in the same fashion as the Treasurer had done earlier that day. His Majesty said: "I wonder if the wind is too strong. Once it's got its water and set sail, if the wind is too strong, as soon as the sails are hoisted it will be blown back on to the bar. If it catches the southwest monsoon it won't be able to make any headway. If it does get out, and then catches the southwest monsoon, it will have great difficulty in making any way, and it might take a week or more. It might even have to come back here again. But the southwest monsoon only sets in towards the end of May; if they're sailing before the middle of April we still have the Trade Wind,<sup>8</sup> so they should be able to make satisfactory progress."

On the 29th March, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat whether anything had come in. Phaya Phiphat replied that the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that the junk, *Nguan Seng*, on which Chao Phaya Yomarat had sailed, had taken on its supply of water and had sailed out to sea on the 28th March of the 5th month and had got as far Sam Roi Yod. Khun Si, one of the local officials, had watched it disappear over the horizon. His Majesty said: "Good, it has gone, and with it all our trouble. I though it might have been held up by contrary winds. I'm glad it's sailed and I hope it has a safe voyage." His Majesty then spoke about Your Excellency saying: "By now he will be waiting for news of Chao Phaya Yomarat. When he get down there, he will be able to help in planning the campaign and take whatever measures are necessary to deal with the situation."

His Majesty's observations and details of dispatches received are based upon the discussions that His Majesty has graciously allowed me to attend on a regular basis. The details His Majesty graciously allowed me to record, cover all that has occurred up to the 28th and the early part of the 29th March. I crave Your Excellency's pardon should me account contain any errors, omissions or improprieties.

Dispatched on the 29th March 1839.



## Notes

- 1 Alor Setar (Alor Star) is the present-day capital of Kedah. At this time, the capital was at the mouth of the Kedah river [i.e. at the fort at Kuala Kedah].
- 2 Some of Rama's fear for Songkhla may have been the result of hearing rumours such as those published in the *Penang Gazette* and the *Singapore Free Press*. On 2 February 1839, the former newspaper informed its readers (with evident satisfaction) that "... Sangora [i.e. Songkhla], the renowned Sangora, is now but a heap of ashes having been burned to the ground by the Malays. The same report appeared in the *Singapore Free Press* a fortnight later and (although in its issue 11 April 1839 the latter newspaper was reported that "... a large body of Malays were threatening Sangora".
- 3 Letters had to be addressed to a minister or a departmental head for transmission to His Majesty. When the letters were copied out for transmission, the name of the addressee was sometimes omitted for the sake of brevity. However, certain members of the royal family or senior officials who enjoyed His Majesty's favour sometimes left out the name of the addressee and communicated directly with His Majesty. His Majesty was curious to know to whom the letter was addressed and was informed that it was addressed to Phaya Phiphat, i.e. by-passing official protocol, which required it to be delivered to the officer on duty and then reported to the minister concerned. Phaya Phiphat, who was one of His Majesty's confidantes, was not an official in the Ministry of War (then under the Treasurer), but the Deputy Rapporteur of the Department of Ports and Harbours (under Phaya Si Phiphat). Phaya Si Phiphat was thus able to 'put one over' the Treasurer (his elder brother) because Phaya Phiphat could act as his official Rapporteur and the letter - being addressed to the department - could in fact be communicated directly to His Majesty - an irregular but highly successful way of circumventing royal protocol (with His Majesty's acquiescence, of course, as is shown by the fact that His Majesty smiled when making the enquiry).
- 4 Under Rama IV, Phaya Chantaburi (Song Meuang) became Phaya Kraikosa. He was the father of Phaya Samosonsapphakan (Phad), the ancestor of the Sirisamphan family.
- 5 Prince Isaranurak's original name was 'Ket'. He was the son of Krommaphra Si Sudarak and died in B.E. 2373 [1830-31].
- 6 Presumably referring to a Lao contingent.

- 7 The King is doing less than justice to the efforts of the navy, see e.g. Osborn (1857).
- 8 Literally 'The Junk Wind', i.e. the North-East Monsoon.

# The Fifth Dispatch

26 April 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat, addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. My previous dispatch, in which I gave details of what has occurred, was entrusted to Khun Ritthironakrai and sent on the 29th March.

On the 30th March, in the morning, the Treasurer informed His Majesty that a boat belonging to Khun Ramaphakdi of the tin collection unit<sup>1</sup> for the Chaiya district had arrived from Lang Suan travelling via the Sakhonburi estuary. It was learnt that Khun Ramaphakdi had sailed on the 22nd March and had met up with a fleet of 6 warships at Kliao in Khao Daeng Bay.<sup>2</sup> The Mons engaged in cutting sappan-wood at Khao Daeng had met Khun Ramaphakdi when they brought the wood down to the jetty and had pointed out to him a big warship with canvas sails which they said was the ship belonging to Your Excellency, the commander of the army going down to Songkhla. Khun Ramaphakdi had continued his voyage up to the capital without meeting up with any other ship. His Majesty said: "He must be wrong. What he said cannot be true. They must be the ships of Phaya Phechaburi's force that went down there. It must be these ships he saw. The other ships sailed across on the 21st March. They sailed from Chantaburi and made straight for Nakhon. They couldn't be as far north as Kliao, could they?" The Treasurer replied that they could not be at Kliao, he must have seen Phaya Phechaburi's ships.

His Majesty said: "Yes, it must be Phaya Phechaburi's ships; what he said was quite wrong." His Majesty then asked how many ships were in Phaya Phechaburi's force. Phra Narin told His Majesty that there were six warships, one Annamese ship and two vessels on loan, altogether nine vessels. His Majesty said: "He must have seen the six warships. How could the idiot take them for the Commander-in-Chief's ships!"

On the 31st March, in the evening, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat if anything had come in. Phaya Phiphat replied that no Chinese vessel had arrived. His Majesty asked the Treasurer why he had called. The Treasurer replied that he had come to bring His Majesty the draft of the answer to be sent to Nakhon. His Majesty told him to read it out. The Treasurer had the letter read out and the contents were as follows. Chao Phaya Nakhon had

sent Meun Phithaknawa and then Nai Duang and Nai Phae up with dispatches reporting that he had ordered the Governor of Saiburi to take 3,995 men and attack the Malays. This force had driven off the Malays at Kubang Pasu and Tapan Chang and had easily captured Kedah, thus performing its duty to the crown. However, His Majesty was of the opinion that the capture of Kedah could not compensate for the loss of the province of Songkhla to the Malays, who did not have all that many men. The 5,000 men in Nakhon and 3,000 men in Songkhla, were quite enough to fight the Malays, but they had made no attempt to cooperate, so as to finish off the business quickly. The Malays had attacked on the 9th November and fighting had been going on for the last four months without their being able to resolve the matter. The Malays had been allowed to advance as far as the outskirts of Songkhla - a quite unnecessary blemish on our reputation, which had thus been lowered in the eyes of Malays and Europeans alike. His Majesty was prepared to comply with Chao Phaya Nakhon's request for an army of 3,000 men to be sent down but His Majesty could not feel too sanguine about the outcome because Songkhla had also asked for an army to be sent down to its aid. His Majesty was worried that 3,000 men might not be enough to save Songkhla and prevent it from falling into the hands of the Malays thus adding further to the disgrace they had already incurred. His Majesty had been delaying a decision on the matter until receiving further information but for some time now Nakhon had failed to send in any reports and His Majesty had decided to send down the Bangkok army to finish off the business once and for all. Only after the departure of the main army had Chao Phaya Nakhon reported the capture of Kedah, which had shown that [the information upon which His Majesty had based] His Majesty's assumptions about the situation had been incorrect. It was quite unjustified to have to waste men and supplies like this. When the army got down there, there would be no Malays to fight with and all that would be left for them to do would be to restore order in the area. His Majesty wished Chao Phaya Nakhon to discuss matters with the Bangkok army. When the reading was over His Majesty said: "Good, that will do."

The Treasurer then told His Majesty that Your Excellency had sent a servant of Phaya Senaphubet's up from Kalok Sisa Phi<sup>3</sup> with a letter for him. The details were the same as in Your Excellency's letter. When the Treasurer reached the point where it said that Your Excellency's ship had sailed throughout the night and when dawn broke had just caught sight of Sam Roi Yod, His Majesty broke in and asked: "Where was his ship?" The Treasurer replied that it had anchored off Kalok Sisa Phi on the 23rd March. His Majesty said: "This makes me worried. That boat from Lang Suan that claimed to have seen a ship sailing toward Kliao earlier - I suppose it's not the same ship? It must be one of the Phechaburi ships." The Treasurer replied that it was not the same ship. The boat from Lang Suan had seen six ships altogether. His Majesty then asked if everything was all right and were there any other ships in company. The Treasurer replied that everything was all right. While

crossing the bay, the ships had run into bad weather and forced to separate. Only Your Excellency's ship had arrived at Kalok Sisa Phi. It had med up with 'Kim Tai' and a pirate-chaser and had also seen two of the adapted 'Garuda'- prowed vessels in Pran Bay. His Majesty said: "What could have happened to take them so far off course? Could it be a southerly or what?" The Treasurer replied that it was a southerly wind which the local people referred to as the 'Phathaya wind'. His Majesty made no comment whereupon the Treasurer gave His Majesty all the details contained in Your Excellency's letter. His Majesty said: "Fetch the letter and read it out." When it had been read out His Majesty remained silent for some time and then said: "What a pity that they should have had to experience such difficulties. It really distresses me and makes me feel quite out of sorts. It's all because of that damned swine that they have had to go down there and put up with such hardships. It should never had happened if they had not tried to out-do each other in this stupid fashion. If only they had helped each other out, the whole business would have been over well before now and they would not have had to put up with these hardships!"

His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "I would like to add something to the letter to be sent in reply to Chao Phaya Nakhon. If I do not say something, now he's taken Kedah, he will make out that there is no point in the Bangkok army going down there and say that his earlier request for me to send him 3,000 troops was only made to comply with my wishes. This will be the attitude he will adopt, so make sure you add something to make the point more explicit and don't let him construe things his way. Add something like this: "I have always been prepared to send down the army, however, before Chao Phaya Nakhon went back, I had the Treasurer take the Governors of Songkhla and Chaiya to see him to talk over matters to ensure cooperation and prevent ill-feeling between them. If he considered that he hadn't enough local men to accomplish the task and wished to have the help of some 3,000 Bangkok troops, in brigades of 500 men, then, as Chao Phaya Nakhon knows quite well, I was prepared to grant his request. However, from what we hear, after his return home, everything seems to have gone wrong - there seems to have been no idea of helping each other out in order to deal with the situation. Chao Phaya Nakhon asked us for 3,000 of our men, but Songkhla also asked for our help, reporting that the Malays had advanced to the very outskirts of the town. From Nakhon, I heard only what Chao Phaya Nakhon chose to report - I was told only as much as he wanted me to know. He gave me no idea of what was going on in Kedah and Songkhla, and when I was contemplating sending down a force of 3,000 men to help Nakhon, I received a request for help from Songkhla, so that I was faced with a multiplicity of requests. If I hadn't sent a force down, Chao Phaya Nakhon would be waiting in vain, but if Songkhla should fall into the hands of the Malays, our prestige would suffer even more. Eventually I decided to send down the army, but no sooner had the army left than Chao Phaya Nakhon reports that he has captured

Kedah, making my earlier assumptions appear incorrect. When you revise the letter, Treasurer, make sure he has no basis for arguing the matter his way."

His Majesty then said: "As for the capture of Kedah by Chao Phaya Nakhon, I suppose he must have thought that the Malays had employed so many men in their attack upon Songkhla that there would be very few left to stop him taking Kedah, so he orders his men to cut across and make straight for Kedah, on the assumption that if Kedah fell, the Malays attacking Songkhla would disperse. This must be the reason for his attack upon Kedah." The Treasurer observed that this was what his dispatches had said, i.e. that to capture Kedah was the same as helping Songkhla. His Majesty said: "Always the same idea! - if he had gone to Songkhla's help from the very first, the Malays would surely have retreated. It is deplorable to see him stand idly by and let the Malays wreak havoc with our territory, all because of their trying to outdo each other! They have concealed matters which should not have been kept from us. I tried my best to find out whether the Bangkok army had arrived or not - that's all - but they just would not tell me. He may be at daggers drawn with Songkhla but that is no reason at all for him to get annoyed with other people and try to do them down by concealing the facts, venting his annoyance upon all and sundry! If he thinks Songkhla is up to no good and has done something wrong, why couldn't he complain to me instead of acting like this. It's quite deplorable - such things should never have happened! It makes me very upset!"

On the 1st April, in the morning, the Treasurer informed His Majesty that the Governor of Songkhla, Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin had sent up Meun Chongsorasi of the Watch and Khun Phithaksongkham, a provincial counsellor, with a dispatch, details of which were as follows. On the 10th March, the Governor of Songkhla had gone over to the attack. He had put the Governors of Chaiya, Sai and Yiring [Jering], Luang Chaisurin, Luang Rayamuda [Raja Muda], Khun Tangta and Nai Chang of the Corps of Pages in charge of detachments to make attacks on different sectors of the Malay force encamped near Bang Kradan, Khao Kao Seng, Khao Luk Chang, Plak Raed and Nam Krachai. The attackers had set up a battery of five cannon to bombard the Malay positions. They destroyed five gun towers and killed some five or six Malays in the stockades. Our troops had then set fire to the stockades, hurled fire-balls into them and on the 14th March had driven the Malays out of all their nine stockades. The Malays in the stockades at Bang Kradan, Khao Luk Chang and Nam Krachai had fled through [Katong] Karam in the direction of Kedah. Those encamped at Khao Kao Seng and Plak Raed had fled in the direction of Chana. At Karam the Governor of Songkhla had sent his provincial counsellor Khun Tangta to pursue the Malays and he had captured two of them, called Salam and Salae [Saleh]. On being interrogated, they revealed that they had fought with Tengku Akip against the Songkhla people at Hin Lek Fai, when the Songkhla force had been put to flight. Tengku

Akip had pursued them and fighting had taken place at Khao Luk Chang and Nam Krachai, fighting in which Salam and Saleh had taken part. Tengku Mat Saad had bought powder and shot from three brigs anchored off the mouth of the Kedah river but when the people in the brigs found out that the Malays had attacked Kedah, they refused to sell them any more powder or shot. When the Governor of Songkhla had gone over to the attack, the Malays' supply of ammunition was running low. Tengku Akip had gone down to Kedah to obtain more ammunition, promising to send it up within four or five days but he did not appear to have done so. After two or three days of fighting, they had heard that the Kedah people had written to say that the Governor of Saiburi's force had captured Kubang Pasu, and that they were to retreat to Kedah. The Governor of Songkhla's force has used heavy cannon against their stockades, destroying their gun towers and causing many deaths, and the Malays had been put to flight. Those escaping by way of Chana were being pursued by Luang Chai Surin and Nai Chang of the Corps of Pages, whom the Governor of Songkhla had sent after them; two Siamese, one from Phathalung and one from Chana, had been captured. The Governor requested His Majesty's permission to hold them for further interrogation. The Malays, Salam and Saleh, had been placed in the custody of Meun Chongsorasit and Khun Phithaksongkhram, to be taken up to Bangkok. The forces of the Governors of Sai and Yiring had been sent out to attack the Malays encamped in Patani but had not yet reported back. Phaya Wichitnarong had arrived at the channel leading to Songkhla on the 12th March but had not been able to get in because of stormy weather. Eventually, on the 15th March, the weather had improved and the Governor of Songkhla had sent down boats to pick up Phaya Wichitnarong and bring him to Songkhla. Phra Racharin's ship had arrived at the mouth of the Maying [river] in Nakhon territory, where he had obtained two small boats and, together with 35 men, had reached the check point in the Songkhla channel on the 14th March. The Governor of Songkhla had sent ten elephants to fetch them and they arrived in Songkhla on the 15th March. Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin were planning to set off in pursuit of the Malays in the direction of Chana and Thepha on the 26th March.

His Majesty said: "Good, that has cheered me up. Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin arrived just one day too late. They very nearly go there in time. What a pity! Otherwise they would have been able to join in the attack upon the Malays." His Majesty then said: "The Governor of Songkhla's report about attacking the Malay camp is all nonsense. How could this contemptible nincompoop fight anyone! The Malays must obviously have retreated of their own accord. Why did he not attack before and then report to us?" His Majesty then asked: "Now that he's put the Malays to flight, has he captured anything of any significance?" Meun Chongsorasit replied that he had captured two muskets, two swivel-guns and ten Malay spears. His Majesty exclaimed [sarcastically]: "What a tremendous haul! That is only the stuff they left behind - was anything else captured?" Meun Chongsorasit

replied that they had captured two Siamese and two Malays. His Majesty exclaimed: "They were just the sick and infirm who were left behind and couldn't keep up with the main body. What a lot of nonsense! What a contemptible fellow he is - he can do nothing right, the scoundrel!"

His Majesty then asked if everything was all right with them. Meun Chongsorasit replied that when he arrived at Ko Nu, the weather was bad and he had had to anchor there for two days. His Majesty said: "What's the fellow going on about? I asked if everything was all right and he goes on about the weather! Phaya Thep duly asked and then reported to His Majesty that everything was alright. His Majesty then asked whether the five ships had all arrived in Songkhla. Meun Chongsorasit replied that only Khun Phonlaphikhat's ship had yet to arrive. His Majesty asked how the Athmat [regiment] was getting on. Meun Chongsorasit replied that they were getting on all right. His Majesty said: "You don't say anything about how they've behaved to the local people?" Meun Chongsorasit replied that Phra Racharin had kept them well under control; they had done nothing that could be taken exception to. His Majesty said: "That is good. I was afraid they might start plundering the local people, who are in a bad way and starving, and that would exacerbate the situation." His Majesty then asked: "Do you have any idea how many families the Malays have carried off, or perhaps they have carried them all off? Are there any left?" Meun Chongsorasit replied that the Malays had only carried off a few families. There were still lots of them hiding in the forest. His Majesty said: "Why should they hide? Once they know our forces have arrived they will all come out and join them. "His Majesty then told Phaya Rachawangsan to speed up the arrangements being made to fit out the *'Macchanu'*, so that the ship could be loaded with a cargo of rice and sent off; the people down there must be starved to death." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Hurry up with the loading of the rice on the ship that came up here and send that down." The Treasurer replied that the ship had been sent up to buy rice and take it down. His Majesty said: "If they can buy the rice and get it on board, that's fine, but make sure they do it quickly. If they haven't been able to buy enough rice and there's still room on board, let them have some of the Crown's stock. See that the ship has a full load and send it off."

In the evening, the Treasurer presented His Majesty with the draft of the letter being sent in reply to Nakhon, to which His Majesty had asked for additions to be made. When it came to the part which said that if His Majesty had not sent the three thousand men requested, Chao Phaya Nakhon would have been waiting in vain, His Majesty said: "I would like to put in a bit more. Say that if I had not sent the force and Chao Phaya Nakhon had failed to put down the rising, he would have claimed that he had been waiting for the Bangkok army to arrive." After the revisions had been made the letter was read out to His Majesty who said: "That sounds good, have it sent off".



Phaya Si<sup>4</sup> then presented His Majesty with the draft of the letter being sent in reply to Phaya Rachasuphawadi. When it came to the part about Phaya Rachasuphawadi starting to build a wall to defend the city of Siem Reap - which had reached a height of one to one and a half metres - and about him trying to speed up work on the fortifications so as to complete them before the middle of April in order to return to the capital in time for the rice-planting season, His Majesty said: "Make a few changes so as to impress upon him the importance of not treating the matter too lightly. If they cannot finish before the season starts and they have to come back here, the whole thing will be a waste of time. Put in details of what happened at Songkhla to make the point clearer. Tell him that although I approved the Governor of Songkhla's proposal to strengthen [the defences of] Songkhla [some time ago], he's been working on them for two or three years now, he still hasn't completed the works. During the recent Malay attack on the town, its defences were not good enough for its citizens to feel safe and they all took fright. He must not follow the Governor of Songkhla's example. If he returns here before finishing the work and leaves instructions for the garrison to complete the task, he will be doing what the Governor of Songkhla did. He must see that the work is finished before coming back."

Phaya Si amended the letter to include the part about Songkhla and then continued until he came to the part where it was stated that as a result of the Nakhon forces capturing Kubang Pasu and invading Kedah, the Malays attacking Songkhla had retreated, otherwise Songkhla would have fallen into the hands of the Malays. When this was read out to His Majesty, His Majesty interrupted: "No, no. Don't mention anything about Nakhon. Leave that bit out. Just put in the part about Songkhla." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Write to Phaya Si Phiphat and tell him to force the Songkhla people to finish off the city's defences. They've been working on them for two or three years now - that's far too long - and they still haven't finished. If we don't force them to finish the job now, they could go on like this for another ten years and they still wouldn't have got any further. Since he's going down there anyway, he may as well compel them to finish the job. But he's not to use the men of the expeditionary force to do the work; he is to take the men from the local troops who performed so badly and make them finish it off instead."

His Majesty then asked Meun Chongsorasit: "Do you know how much rice there is left in the Songkhla district?" Meun Chongsorasit replied that there was still some rice in the paddy fields and in the villages in the district that had not been burnt by the Malays, and that this would be sufficient. His Majesty exclaimed: "How can it be sufficient? Didn't the Malays take a lot away and burn a lot more, and yet there is still enough to feed them? How can he say such a thing? How much *can* be left? How can what's left be sufficient to feed them - there's the whole of Songkhla and a large expeditionary force, and they say there are a lot of people still in the forest. When they

come out, will they be able to manage on what little rice is left? This fellow deserves a good hiding for making such a statement!" His Majesty then asked about the vessels Songkhla had detained - how many of them had a cargo of rice and what was the price that had been negotiated. Meun Chongsorasit replied that there was apparently only one ship carrying rice and the price had not yet been fixed. His Majesty then asked Phaya Thep how much rice Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin's forces had taken with them. Phaya Thep replied that they had taken down 60 coyan. His Majesty said: "It should be all right then when the army arrives. There should be enough to share out before the army gets its supplies ashore."

His Majesty then asked Meun Chongsorasit: "When you came up here, had anybody else managed to get to [Songkhla]?" Meun Chongsorasit replied that he heard that ten other people had reached [Songkhla] including the Yokrabat of Chana who had managed to get away, although the Deputy Governor had been captured by the Malays. His Majesty asked: "The Yokrabat who got away and got [to Songkhla], where's his family? Did he come by himself or did he bring his family with him?" Meun Chongsorasit replied that he [the Yokrabat] had come by himself, his family was still hiding from the Malays, in the jungle. His Majesty said: "In that case they will all come out and join us. Where else can they go? If the Malays have not separated their families, they will stay put. It is unlikely that they will abandon their homes. As yet, only a few of the army have arrived but when the main body of the army gets down there, they all have enough men to send out parties to track them down and persuade them all to return home." His Majesty then asked about the Malays from the nine provinces whom the Kedah Malays had used to defend Patani. Meun Chongsorasit replied that he did not know anything about them. His Majesty then ordered Phaya Krai to take the two Malays brought up by Meun Chongsorasit and interrogate them again so as to get the truth out of them.

On the 2nd April, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat if there was any news. Phaya Phiphat replied: "A ship has arrived from Tha Thong<sup>5</sup> under the command of Nai Mak, one of the Treasurer's men. When asked about the expedition, he informed us that on the 27th March, he came across Phaya Si Phiphat's ship off Cape Thong Lang.<sup>6</sup> Upon being hailed, he had told [Phaya Si Phiphat] that he was on his way to Bangkok. Nai Mak had subsequently seen one of the standard type vessels at Sam Roi Yod but did not know whose ship it was. His Majesty asked how many ships altogether had the earlier report said had been seen off Cape Thong Lang. Phaya Phiphat replied: "Altogether six ships." His Majesty then spoke to the Treasurer about the vessel Your Excellency was sailing in, saying: "It looks as though the weather's improving. Now that he's left Sam Roi Yod, let's hope he gets down there safely. It really distresses me that he should have to contend with such bad weather during the voyage."

On the 3rd April, in the evening, Phaya Krai brought His Majesty the statement made by the Malays whom His Majesty had ordered to be re-interrogated. After it had been read out, His Majesty said: "When they carried off the families, they took them as far as Perai. But how could they take them all? - a lot of them must be hiding in the jungle. It seems unlikely that they'd all be willing to join them and go off with them. They probably just stayed with their families and when their families were carried off, they couldn't leave them - they had to go with them, although I suppose some of them may have gone along willingly; the fact that they are of the same race and the same religion as the rebels would probably make them go along with them." His Majesty then told Phaya Krai: "Your interrogation yielded very little information. The families taken away must be those carried off earlier and these two Malays should know how many there were. To carry off people on this scale would have them all talking about just how many were taken away, but these two have told us very little. Interrogate them once again and see that you get a lot more information out of them!"

On the 4th April, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat if anything had come in. Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty that Nai Kao's ship had arrived from Chumphon and he had informed us that on the 27th March, he had met ten of the expedition's ships leaving Sam Roi Yod and changing course so as to head for Chumphon. Subsequently he met another eight vessels approaching Sam Roi Yod - both warships and [merchant] ships on loan, but he did not know whose ships they were. His Majesty said: "It couldn't be the *Amonmaensan* at Sam Roi Yod. The Treasurer's man came in the day before yesterday and said he had seen the ships off Cape Thong Lang on the 27th March. Why should they still hang around at Sam Roi Yod? Perhaps a strong headwind blew them back, but that's unlikely. They must be ships that are following the main body down. The ships that sailed first must have arrived at Chumphon by now - some would probably have got even further." Then His Majesty asked: "Did the chap know whether Phaya Senaphubet and the Chumphon people had left Chumphon?" Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that he had learned that the date fixed for their departure was the 26th March. His Majesty said: "In that case, they should almost have arrived at Nakhon by now."

On the 5th April, in the morning, the Treasurer told His Majesty that the Governor of Takua Thung had sent Khun Phithakyotha up with a report, stating that Luang Narong who had been sent down to Singapore to obtain information, had learnt from a Chinese named Baba In that between the middle of November and the middle of January, when the British ships had not begun their blockade of the Kedah river, Baba In had taken salt and tobacco<sup>7</sup> to sell in Kedah and had seen Tengku Mat Saad and Tengku Akip occupy the town of Kedah. They had rounded up the Malay peasants and set up an iron foundry to make spears, krisses and other weapons. Four Englishmen from Penang

along with seven Chinese and one Indian had joined the Malays and supplied them with guns, powder and shot and food. Tengku Mat Saad had established himself in fortifications at the mouth of the Kedah river and had sent Tengku Akip, his younger brother, to erect a stockade at Tapan Chang, after which they had then sent a letter to Tengku Abdullah reporting that they had captured Kedah. Tengku Abdullah had then brought his men and set up camp at Alor Setar. In [Kuala] Kedah there were some 40 Siamese in chains and 60 others not in chains; the former were said to be men from Nakhon, Phthalung and Kedah who had been captured by the Malays, the latter were men from Trang who had joined the Malays.<sup>8</sup> Half of the latter had been put to work with the local Malays, to round up cattle (including buffaloes) to be sent to Penang. At Perlis, Wan Mali [Wan Mat Ali] and Wan Mahmud were in command. They had carried off about a hundred or so people from Setul and were keeping them on Langkawi. Tengku Abdullah, Tengku Mat Saad and Tengku Akip, who were encamped at Alor Setar and Tapan Chang, had about 4000 men with them. Tengku Mat Saad had sent a letter to the Governor of Songkhla saying that he wished to send the gold and silver flowers up to His Majesty. The Governor had sent a Malay to see Tengku Mat Saad at Tapan Chang offering to negotiate in the matter, but saying that Tengku Mat Saad must come and see the Governor. Tengku Mat Saad had not gone fearing that it might be a trick on the Governor's part so as to capture him.

Luang Narong had then questioned the Chinese merchant Lim Hua in Singapore and found out that the Kedah Malays had obtained some 40 cannon, both iron and brass, and 60 muskets. The Malays took only the brass cannon and muskets into battle at Thung Pho, keeping the iron cannon for the defence of the camp at Tapan Chang. However the British had sent three of their vessels to blockade the Kedah river. The Governor of Singapore had subsequently gone to stay in Penang, being concerned in case, after their capture of Kedah, the Malays would go on the offensive and attack Perak and Perai. Another possibility was that the Malays would be unable to resist the Siamese troops and would flee and the Siamese would then pursue them and invade British territory. The Governor of Singapore had issued a proclamation warning the Malays and the merchants who were under the jurisdiction of the British not to assist the Kedah Malays. Lim Hua had said that he could not say very much more except that the British appetite for conquest was insatiable.

His Majesty said: "This tells us nothing we did not already know - we cannot attach any importance to it. Phaya Chaiya has arrived down there but [the Governor of Takua Thung] doesn't tell him anything and reports to us only when he feels like it. The fellow behaves in a totally uncivilised manner and shows no respect at all for his master. And as for Phaya Chaiya, he goes down there and then does absolutely nothing and makes no attempt to report to us what the position is in Thalang - the way they're going on, they seem to be trying to out-do each other rather than helping each other! This has

happened once before - I am fed up with hearing about it!" His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "This report tells us nothing - it's only use is to confirm certain facts. The bit about the Governor of Singapore going to Penang as a precautionary measure in case the Malays attack British territory seems unlikely, but he says that the Governor's keeping an eye on *our* troops in case they pursue the enemy into British territory, that's probably true - he's right there. The people and the cattle that the rebels carried off from Kedah - Chao Phaya Nakhon must know all about it, but he just will not tell me anything. Is that not right, Treasurer?" The Treasurer agreed that Chao Phaya Nakhon must know all about it. His Majesty went on: "Even when he does know something, he won't tell me - I'm at a loss to know how to deal with all this covering up." His Majesty then asked: "On his way up here, did the messenger meet with the *Amonmaensan* anywhere?" The Treasurer replied that he had met up with it off Krut<sup>9</sup> on the 1st April. His Majesty said: "Once it gets down to Krut, the weather will improve and they will be able to relax a bit. Anyway, I hope the weather is favourable so that they can have a good passage and arrive safely."

In the evening, the Treasurer told His Majesty that Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent Nai Chuai up with a report, which stated that when the Governor of Saiburi's force captured Tapan Chang, Tengku Mat Saad was still encamped in the fort at Kuala Kedah. Tengku Mat Saad had sent a Malay force to set up camp at Ban Khwang. The Governor had ordered Luang Phakdisongkhram, Luang Chanphonlatob and Luang Detnawa to attack the camp and 29 Malays had been killed and the rest had fled. Che Lang had brought 32 Malays out [of the jungle] to see the Governor. The Governor had then ordered his troops to besiege the fort in the same way that Tengku Din had been besieged. His Majesty said: "Why are they using the same strategy that was employed against Tengku Din? Why should the Malays wait there to be destroyed? I'm afraid our people will leave it too late and let them get away. When they learn that the main army is on its way they will probably all run away. If they *are* still there as he says, then just wait till our army gets down there it will set to work with a will to make sure it gets something for its trouble and really do for the Malays! Even if the Malays manage to get away, they're bound to suffer heavy losses." His Majesty then asked whether Nai Chuai had met Your Excellency's ship anywhere. Nai Chuai told His Majesty that on 1st April he had met four ships with canvas sails sailing into Mae Rampheung Bay<sup>10</sup> in stormy conditions. He did not know whose ships they were but he had observed that one vessel had a bowsprit. His Majesty was silent for a while and then said that if she had a bowsprit, it must be the *Amonmaensan*. His Majesty then asked whether the ships were making headway against the storm or whether they had dropped anchor to weather it out. Nai Chuai replied that the ships were making headway and sailing well. His Majesty then spoke about Your Excellency, saying: "It's most regrettable that he should have had to put up with such hardships on the voyage for so many days. I hope he

gets there soon so that I can set my mind at rest. When I hear about them being still at sea under these conditions it makes me feel anxious." His Majesty then asked Nai Chuai when he had left. Nai Chuai replied that he had left Nakhon on the 30th March. His Majesty exclaimed: "Whenever I mention the *Amonmaensan*, I begin to feel nervous. I keep asking about it every day only to be told that it was seen somewhere at sea. The only time I have heard something definite about it was when he sent me a report to say it had only got as far as Sam Roi Yod. Since then I have had no reports to tell me how it is bearing up against the weather!"

On the 6th April, Phaya Phiphat reported to His Majesty that a ship belonging to Krommaneun Matayaphithak<sup>11</sup> had come in from Chantaburi. It had been learnt that on the 1st April it had met up with Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship off Bang Lamung Bay. The wind had been too strong to allow it to proceed, so it had anchored in Bang Lamung Bay. His Majesty exclaimed: "They cannot make any progress - they are just hanging around! Before they get down there the others will have all come back!" His Majesty then asked about the Phechaburi vessel which the Pak Nam people had reported had sprung a leak and had to put back - had it left yet? Phaya Phiphat replied that it had not. The first time it had set sail the rudder brace had snapped and it had had to put back. Phaya Chodeuk had had another rudder casing made and sent it down. His Majesty exclaimed: "What on earth's the matter - if it is not one thing, it is the other. If the ship doesn't spring a leak, the mast breaks or the rudder brace snaps. At this rate, it will never sail. Before it can set off, the expedition will be back home!" His Majesty then ordered the Treasurer to send someone down to speed up the ship's departure. The Treasurer replied that he had sent Luang Thep Sena down.

Phaya Thep told His Majesty that Phra Mahathep had sent word from Samutsongkhram that he had arrested 30 opium-dealers and had confiscated 315 cakes of raw opium and some 4 chang<sup>12</sup> of prepared opium and was continuing the campaign. His Majesty said: "Send him instructions to speed up the campaign and arrest the opium dealers and confiscate their opium and then hurry back to Bangkok and arrest the dealer here." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Send Phaya Si Phiphat a letter asking him to see that all the opium dealers in Songkhla are rounded up. He should question the Governor of Songkhla closely and see whether he's engaged in opium dealing and whether he knows who the dealers are. After all, I've treated him with every consideration even appointing him Governor of Songkhla. He knows what the law lays down; see that he gives you the details and tells the truth - and have him swear out a statement to this effect. Get hold of the Governor and the opium dealers and make them swear a solemn oath so as to frighten them off from any future dealings in the stuff. Songkhla is in a bad way at present; just see that all the opium is confiscated and send the opium dealers up here. I am prepared to waive the fines they should pay for breaking the law but

let them be summoned to give an undertaking under no circumstances will they engage in any further dealing in opium."

On the 7th April, His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah. On the 8th April, in the morning, His Majesty enquired if there was any news. Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that a vessel belonging to a Chinese called Chae had arrived from Trad with a cargo of pepper. On being questioned he had stated that on the 1st April he had met with 11 ships from the expedition, among which was Phra Ratnakosa's vessel, putting in for water off Ko Chang point. Chae had spoken to Phra Ratnakosa who had told him that he would sail across the bay on the 2nd April. Chae had also met Chao Phaya Yomarat's vessel off Ko Seua on the 2nd April. His Majesty broke in: "Where's Ko Seua?" The Treasurer replied that it was just before reaching Ko Khram, before entering the Saem San Straits. His Majesty asked: "When did Phra Ratnakosa's ship say it would be leaving?" Phaya Phiphat replied: "On the 2nd April." His Majesty said: "It will be quite a few days behind the *Amonmaensan*. These cargo ships do not seem to be as good at sailing as the warships, do they?" The Treasurer agreed that the cargo ships could not sail as fast as the warships. His Majesty then talked about Your Excellency's ship, saying: "I wonder if it is arrived in Nakhon by now? I hope he arrives safely and gets some respite from the bad weather on the voyage."

In the evening, the Treasurer presented His Majesty with the draft of the letter being sent in reply to the Governor of Songkhla. When it had been read out, His Majesty said: "I thought you were going to put in a bit about the Malays withdrawing without being brought to battle - you did not? Oh well, never mind, that will be all right." The letter to Your Excellency including the oath that was to be taken by the Songkhla people in connection with the opium suppression campaign was read out. His Majesty said: "Fine, that will do, except that the part about rebuilding [the defences of] Songkhla has been left out. You've forgotten to put that in, Treasurer. See that it goes in and make sure that the Songkhla people are made to finish off the work so that we have no need to worry about its security. And these Malays in the nine states - I do not know anything about them yet. I asked Meun Chongsorasi when he came up but I could not get anything out of him. They said before that it was only some of the peasants in Chana, Thepha and Patani who had joined the Kedah Malays against us and not their chiefs, but how could that be? The Malay prisoners sent up here said that they were from Yala [Jala]. When the Governor of Songkhla questioned them, they said that they'd joined the Kedah Malays in fighting against us. When Phaya Krai questioned them here in Bangkok, they said that their chiefs in Jala had called them out to take part in the fighting along with the Governor of Sai; when the Governor was defeated they were captured by the Kedah Malays and forced to join them in fighting against us - that is what they said. I am not sure whether they took the view that they had no option but to join the Kedah rebels or perhaps

they wanted to vent their resentment against their chiefs, by joining the rebels of their own free will? I do not know which states are involved or how many people or what - but I know that I cannot trust them - if they are unreliable, then any time we experience a set-back, they are bound to join in against us. They have apparently carried off the people from Kedah and taken them to Perai crowding in more and more people every day, and Perai is right next to Raman in our territory. As for the people from Trang and Setul - Wan Mali has carried them off to Langkawi. They are poised to attack us; [they are as close to us as the nose on our face] with Langkawi ready to plug up our left nostril and Perai ready to plug our right nostril - they're just waiting for a chance to stop us breathing. If we don't do a thorough job this time, then as soon as the army comes back here, they will attack us again. They just will not let us live in peace!"

His Majesty then asked the Treasurer how many years it had been since Tengku Din's revolt. The Treasurer replied that Tengku Din had attacked during the year of the Tiger and the year of the Rabbit<sup>13</sup>, which would be about seven or eight years ago. His Majesty said: "That is not very long ago, just seven or eight years, and here they are at it again! These points I have been considering are important ones, Treasurer, so you'd better give some thought to writing him another letter with all the details. Tell him that although I've sent down the army, it will arrive too late to take part in putting down the Kedah rebellion, because Chao Phaya Nakhon has already retaken Kedah. The only thing that remains to be done is the job of resettling the people and re-establishing the state. Tell him he is to give the matter very thorough consideration. As regards the Malays in the nine states, if he thinks any of the states are disaffected, it would be a good idea to find someone whose loyalty we can rely upon and set him up in Raman so that he can persuade the families carried off to Perai to come back. Perai is right next to Raman; if we cannot manage to get them back and they continue to carry off more and more people, one day, when their numbers have swollen, they will turn on us, don't you think so, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied: "The Perai district is not all that big and if the number of families staying there keeps on increasing it won't be able to hold them, and they will start thinking about attacking us again. Perai and Raman are so close to each other that we cannot afford to take any chances. And Wan Mali has carried off a lot of people to Langkawi, which is close to Kedah. If we can devise some means of getting all these people back from Langkawi before they can establish themselves there, then we can see about re-establishing Kedah." His Majesty said: "I do not care whether it's re-established or not, so long as we make sure they don't cause us any more trouble like this. Or if they do, let us make sure it doesn't happen for a long time, or at least, no so frequently. We must deal severely with anyone whose loyalty is suspect and make sure that the situation is fully under control. As for the families on Langkawi, we must use force to get them back. If it does not cause any deterioration in the situation, he should use force to get



them all back. If he thinks the use of force might make matters worse, then he should try persuasion - it's up to him to deal with the situation in the manner he thinks best."

"As regards Kedah, the Governor of Saiburi has now recaptured it. The army will propose to resettle the people here or there but the Governor will request that they be resettled somewhere else. If the army does not agree, Chao Phaya Nakhon will send a letter putting forward proposals in conformity with his ideas to which the army will reply proposing something else. If they go on writing letters to each other and arguing like this, we shall never get anywhere. If Chao Phaya Nakhon cannot agree with the army and cannot have things his way, he will take to his bed and say he is sick and refuse to cooperate - he will try and get the British to interfere. When the army see that the British are intervening it will not be able to proceed with the re-establishment of the state and will just be stuck down there. However, if the army sets about the task in a way that Chao Phaya Nakhon approves of, then he will be prepared to discuss matters and co-operate. What I have just said is very important, Treasurer, so write to your brother telling him to give the matter the fullest consideration. If the situation changes, then it's up to him to decide the best way to deal with it and to act accordingly. He must not let the situation get out of hand but must act with firmness to ensure that everything is under control or at least, if there *is* any recurrence, let it be only after a good deal of time has gone by - don't let it keep breaking out as frequently as it has done in the past. Now that we have finally sent the army down, let it act decisively and bring everything under control so that the country can enjoy a long period of peace. If we cannot manage to do this, then as soon as the army comes back, they will rise up again and cause us great embarrassment."

On the 9th April in the evening, the Treasurer presented to His Majesty the draft of the letter being sent to Your Excellency. When it had been read out to His Majesty, His Majesty said: "I would like to add a little bit more. Tell him that as regards the Kedah business, when Chao Phaya Nakhon learnt that the army was going down there, he promptly sent his men in to recapture Kedah, which means that the army will arrive there too late to take any part in the campaign. When they set about re-establishing the state, if they act in a way that accords with Chao Phaya Nakhon's wishes, he will be happy to come and discuss matters with them, but if they don't, he will say he's sick and matters won't proceed smoothly - he will just send his sons to take part in the discussions, that's all. Put in something like that, will you?" The Treasurer thereupon added these details and then read it out to His Majesty. His Majesty said: "Good, have it sent off right away. Who's going to take it down, or is someone going back who we can give it to?" The Treasurer replied that he would entrust it to Meun Chongsorasit of the Palace Watch, who had come up from Songkhla. His Majesty exclaimed: "Good, he's one

of our people, he can take it down there without delay." His Majesty then asked Nai Chuai whether he thought that Chao Phaya Nakhon would go and see the army. Nai Chuai replied that he had not heard anything about this. His Majesty asked: "About this Kedah business, now that the Governor of Saiburi has recaptured the place, is Chao Phaya Nakhon sending him back there as before?" Nai Chuai replied that he had not heard this mentioned. His Majesty exclaimed: "The fellow never hears anyone say anything - it drives me to despair!"

On the 10th April, in the morning, the Treasurer informed His Majesty that a vessel belonging to the Chumphon people had arrived from Chumphon. Questioning revealed that it had left Chumphon on the 31st March and had met ten of the expedition's ships in Chumphon Bay, which they said were Your Excellency's ships, on the 1st April, as they were leaving the bay, they had passed another six vessels. They had subsequently met up with Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship off Chao Lai<sup>14</sup> on the 2nd April. His Majesty said: "They say that it was the *Amonmaensan* in Chumphon Bay on the 31st March but that Nai Chuai fellow from Nakhon said that he met a ship with a bowsprit weathering a storm in Mae Rampheung Bay on the 1st April. How can they say they met it in Chumphon Bay on the 31st March? Chancellor, would you please ascertain whether it was in Mae Rampheung Bay or Chumphon Bay?" The Chancellor remained silent and the Treasurer told His Majesty that the Chumphon people had seen as many as ten ships in Chumphon Bay and had later seen another six ships; the first ten ships must be Your Excellency's ships. His Majesty said: "Very well, let's assume they've arrived in Chumphon Bay. They were seen in Chumphon Bay on the 31st March; if they sail on, would they have arrived in Nakhon by now or not?" The Treasurer replied that they should have arrived in Nakhon. His Majesty said: "I hope they have - it will certainly ease my mind. When I hear that they are still on the high seas, I cannot help feeling worried; I feel most concerned about them."

The Treasurer then told His Majesty that they had been informed that Songkhla had allowed Khun Thon's vessel to sail up to Bangkok. In its passage from Songkhla it had sailed well out to sea and had not met any of the ships in the expedition apart from one of the standard-type vessels that it had seen off Sam Roi Yod. His Majesty said: "Never mind what he says about meeting other ships; they don't really matter compared to the *Amonmaensan*. The only thing I'd really like to know is whether anyone has seen the flagship, but I cannot seem to get any definite information." The Treasurer then told His Majesty that he had questioned Khun Thon who had come in from Songkhla and learnt that on the day that the Malays attacking the stockade on Luk Chang Khiu had fled, the Malays on their gun-tower had seen the mast of a ship-rigged vessel anchored off Ko Nu. They had shouted to the Songkhla force that Malay ship with reinforcements had arrived and was anchored off Ko Nu - they could see the mast. They urged the people to leave the town. The Songkhla force

had shouted back that they were not Malay ships, but ships of the Bangkok expeditionary force sent down to assist Songkhla against the Malays. The Malays eventually found out the truth of the matter and when night fell they abandoned the siege and made off. In addition, the Kedah Malays had abandoned the positions they had occupied the nine states and had withdrawn. The Governor of Songkhla had sent the Governors of Sai and Jering in pursuit. However Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin had not advanced against Chana and Thepha on the 26th March, as planned, but on the 1st April. His Majesty said: "What I would like to know is whether the Malays in the Nine States have remained loyal to us or whether the situation is as bad as it was painted - so far I have not been able to obtain any information." His Majesty then asked: "About the ship they allowed to come up here - Khun Thon's ship - is he the father-in-law of a certain Nai Chan?" The Treasurer replied that he was. His Majesty said: "They are relations - that is why he was allowed to leave; if it had been somebody else's ship, he certainly would not have allowed him to leave." The Treasurer then told His Majesty that he had asked about the rice situation in Songkhla and had been told that there was no great shortage. There was still some rice in the fields and when the families who had fled came out of the jungle, they had taken the rice in the fields to eat. Moreover there was still a good deal of rice at Laem Son, which the Malays had not reached, so there were abundant supplies of rice available. His Majesty said: "I was worried about the rice situation. I was afraid there would not be enough to eat and they would all be on their last legs. If there is enough rice to distribute and feed them, then everything will be all right." The Treasurer told His Majesty that in Songkhla the Assistant Governor was arranging to send an additional ship up to Bangkok to purchase a cargo of rice and take it back. Preparations were now being made and the vessel would sail later. His Majesty said: "When it arrives, we can find out something about the situation in the Nine States. I still do not know how matters stand there."

On the 11th April His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah.

On the 12th April, in the morning the Treasurer reported to His Majesty that Your Excellency had sent Luang Laksamana up with a letter saying that he had sailed from Sam Roi Yod on the 26th March, encountering south-westerly and southerly gales on his way down to Khao Wiang. He had been blown back to Khao Wiang and had been unable to get past Pathio Point<sup>15</sup>. On the 29th March, before dawn, a gentle southerly breeze blew up which had enabled him to make good speed and get within sight of Chumphon Bay. But at 9 o'clock in the morning, the wind changed and a strong southerly gale blew up with heavy squalls of rain and he had been forced to anchor for two days. He had then sailed on for a few days and on the 4th April finally entered the Chumphon river. His Majesty exclaimed: "He has had a very hard time! Is everything all right? Are the ships all right?" The Treasurer replied that everything was all right and that nothing had happened to Your Excellency's

ship. However the two vessels commanded by Luang Phitak and Phra Intharaksa had broken the iron casing on their rudders but Your Excellency had them replaced. Off Pathio Point Your Excellency had met up with five of the Governor of Pechaburi's ships, which had reached there two days earlier. Your Excellency's seven ships and these five, making twelve ships in all, were reported to have sailed from Chumphon on the 7th April. His Majesty smiled and said: "Good, I hope they arrive safely. Do you think they've reached Nakhon by now or perhaps Songkhla?" The Treasurer replied that he doubted whether they had reached Songkhla yet but they would probably have arrived at Nakhon. His Majesty said: "Well, Nakhon will do. Once they left Chumphon the weather would have improved, don't you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied that after leaving Chumphon, the further south they sailed, the better the weather would become and nothing serious could happen to them. His Majesty asked whether Phaya Senaphubet and the Chumphon people had left yet. The Treasurer replied that Phaya Senaphubet had sailed from Chumphon on the 26th March. His Majesty asked Luang Laksamana how Your Excellency was, saying: "Is Phaya Si Phiphat well?" Luang Laksamana replied that Your Excellency was in good health. His Majesty smiled and said: "Was he sea-sick?" Luang Laksamana replied that Your Excellency was not sea-sick. His Majesty then asked: "Is he looking any thinner?" Luang Laksamana replied that Your Excellency had not lost any weight and was looking just as usual. His Majesty then asked: "Is his skin any darker?" Luang Laksamana replied that Your Excellency had not become much darker at which His Majesty laughed and said: "Not much darker - how dark do you want him to get? Sailing the seas like this he must have got a bit darker. Anyway, I hope he gets there safely." His Majesty then called for the letter to be brought and read out. When it was read out to His Majesty, His Majesty was amused by the part at the end of the letter which said that Your Excellency had learnt that it had been the people on the birds-nests islands who had arrested the ten Annamese but that Phangan<sup>16</sup> was claiming the credit for it. His Majesty exclaimed: "What's all this about, Treasurer? Just settle the matter, will you?", after which His Majesty discussed the opium campaign until retiring.

On the 13th April His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah.

On the 14th April, in the evening, Phra Narin informed His Majesty that the Governor of Songkhla had sent a Chinese called Man up with a letter saying that Luang Phonlaphikhat had arrived in Songkhla, travelling overland, on the 25th March but that Khun Atnarong's ship had still not arrived. His Majesty exclaimed: "Where could it have got to? Did you question him about it or not?" Phra Narin turned to question the man but His Majesty burst in: "You are completely useless! You did not make any attempt to question him! It is only when I ask questions that you start to question him in here? Talking to you, Phra Narin, is just a waste of time!" Phra Narin informed His Majesty that Khun Atnarong's ship had reached Ko Nu where Man said he had brought

him out fresh water and firewood. His Majesty exclaimed: "You see? - the ship's only off Ko Nu - you did not question him at all - you just took the first words he said and came in here to tell me and make me very worried!"

His Majesty then called for Phaya Phiphat saying: "You know how to question people - ask him how the situation is in Chana, Thepha, Nongchik and Patani - how many joined the Malays and went along with them and how many remained behind? How many people did they take to attack the positions on Luk Chang Hill and Bang Kradam? Have all the Kedah Malays who set up camp at Prawan in Patani pulled out yet? How many men did the Malays carry off to Katong Karam and were any left behind?" Phaya Phiphat put the questions and then informed His Majesty that, of the people in Chana, Thepha, Nongchik and Patani, about a third or a quarter had joined the Malays, the remainder had fled into the jungle. It appears that those who had joined the Malays had done so in order to stay with their families, but those whose families were not involved had made off into the jungle. In the attack upon Songkhla, the Malays had used a good many people from Chana and Patani but only some ten or twenty men from Thepha and Nongchik had taken part; in all some 500 men had been used in the attack. It was reported that the Kedah Malays who had set up camp in the Patani area had all made off. The Malays had carried off a few families from Katong Karam but most of them had fled into the jungle. His Majesty observed: "Those who joined the Malays only did so because they wanted to stay with their families. If the Malays hadn't got hold of their families, there's no way they would have gone along with them. Those that have taken to the jungle are bound to come over to us. But this report about four or five hundred of them fighting with the Kedah Malays is nonsense - they would not have more than a score or so and only then of people whose families they'd carried off - this is just alarmist talk!"

His Majesty then asked: "What news is there about the gold and silver flowers [sent as tribute] from Trengganu? What is the situation in Kelantan - does he have any news?" Phaya Phiphat replied that the report said that the gold and silver flowers from Trengganu had already been sent up to Songkhla; only the accompanying gifts had yet to be sent. The Governor of Songkhla had sent a man down to remind them about it but he had not yet returned. As regards Kelantan, it was reported that the brothers were about to fight each for the throne but it was not known who would take whose side or when the fighting would start. His Majesty asked: "Where did the information about Kelantan come from or did they get it from the sampan pukut arriving in Songkhla?" Phaya Phiphat replied that the information had been received from Patani; no sampan pukut had been reported as calling at Songkhla. His Majesty then asked: "The powder and shot that the Governor bought in the town the other day - which ships did he buy them from?" Phaya Phiphat questioned the Chinese and then told His Majesty that Man now admitted that the sampan pukut had in fact called at Songkhla. His Majesty exclaimed:

"What did I tell you! Make him swear an oath to tell the truth - if he does not tell the truth, I hope the Malays chop his head off, as fast as you like! Ask him whether the Governor of Songkhla bought any opium. Did he bring any opium with him when he came up here?" Phaya Phiphat made the man swear an oath and then reported that he had not brought any opium with him and he did not know whether the Governor had bought any opium. His Majesty exclaimed: "Rubbish! All lies! Make the rascal hold his tongue! One of these days I will teach him a lesson by giving him a flogging - and let him take his stripes back to show to his master!"

On the 15th April, in the evening, the Treasurer told His Majesty that the Governor of Chaiya had sent Luang Rachaborirak up with a letter reporting that Tengku Mat Saad and Wan Mali had sent their men to Thalang to see the Governor of Thalang. His Majesty was duly informed of the contents of the letter. I asked Luang [Racha]borirak who told me that the details contained in the he Governor of Chaiya's letter had been reported to Your Excellency, who had had a copy made of it. When the Treasurer had finished reading out the report His Majesty said: "From what we've heard this Tengku Mat Saad is a cunning fellow. He's sent someone to see the Governor of Songkhla - he's going to deal with Thalang in the same way that he dealt with Songkhla. Thalang can hold all the discussions it likes provided it does not let itself be attacked. And the Governor of Chaiya is a cunning fellow too - he says that he was going to take a fleet down to help in the attack on Kedah but was worried in case the Malays should make a sudden attack upon Thalang, Phangnga, Takua Thung and Thakua Pa, so in view of the uncertainty of the situation he set about building stockades and sending his ships out on patrol to bring in information - all this is just an excuse! He seems to lack the stomach for a fight - he is just a coward. What's the matter with him? Kedah has been captured - where on earth could the Malays come from? It doesn't enter his head to send ships to co-operate in an attack upon Langkawi - he just stays there doing nothing!" His Majesty then asked Luang Rachaborirak whether he happened to have seen Your Excellency. Luang Rachaborirak replied that he had seen Your Excellency at Chumphon on the 6th April. His Majesty asked when Your Excellency would leave Chumphon and whether Your Excellency had heard the news about Songkhla. Luang Rachaborirak replied that Your Excellency had heard about the Malays retreating from Songkhla and proposed to leave on the 7th April. His Majesty said: "I wish he had arrived there so that he could send me a report on the situation."

On the 16th April, His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah but talked about the opium campaign. Luang Anurak said that Luang Bamrung had sent some Chinese to buy 35 chests of opium from the opium trader that was in the gulf. Upon being questioned, Luang Bamrung admitted that he had bought the opium for future sale. His Majesty became angry and said: "I have already told him to own up and hand over any opium and be forgiven,

but he has not, instead he tries to conceal the matter and hangs on to the opium." His Majesty went on about the opium campaign until retiring.

On the 17th April, in the morning, the Treasurer told His Majesty that Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent Nai Sikhong up with a letter saying that the Governor of Saiburi's force had stormed the fort at Kuala Kedah and captured the town. Tengku Mat Saad had fled. The Malays who had fled from Songkhla had gone back home to Kedah and had been fighting against the Governor of Saiburi for a week. Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent a letter asking the Governor of Songkhla, Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin to send troops to assist him. Details are contained in the copy sent down to Your Excellency. When this had been reported to His Majesty, His Majesty exclaimed: "The Malays certainly will not hang about there - they must have all made off! Even if Kedah is recaptured, it will be deserted - we shall gain no benefit from our victory." His Majesty then observed to the Treasurer: "Now that he's had this success, he sends us one report after another. Why did he not act like this earlier?" Then His Majesty laughed and said: "He asks for the Governor of Songkhla's force to come and back up the Governor of Saiburi - why? All this time he's been annoyed with him [the Governor of Songkhla] and would not send him any help. Now he's in a fix, he asks him to send troops to help *him* out and acts as though they were on good terms with each other - it's absolutely ridiculous!" His Majesty then asked whether the messenger had met up with Your Excellency's ships. Phra Narin told His Majesty that Nai Si Khong had seen nine ships in the Ang Thong straits on the 11th April, one of which had a bowsprit mast. On the 14th April he had seen Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship and Phaya Aphaiphiphit's ship off Pathio Point. His Majesty spoke about Your Excellency saying that by now Your Excellency should have arrived in Nakhon and called in to see Chao Phaya Nakhon.

On the 18th and 19th April His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah.

On the 20th April, in the evening, His Majesty mentioned Your Excellency only to say that His Majesty had been waiting for news but no one had come in and His Majesty did not know whether Your Excellency had reached Songkhla yet.

On the 21st April the Treasurer told His Majesty that Phaya Senaphubet and the Governor of Chumphon had reported that they had left Chumphon with a force of 1,216 men on the 26th March. They also reported that Your Excellency had left on the 3rd April. His Majesty said: "I wish he would get down there so that I can find out exactly what's happening. I have had no news about the position in the Nine States and I still cannot get any definite information as to how many Kedah families went along with the Malays and how many remained behind."

On the 22nd April His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah.

On the 23rd April His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat if there was any news. Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that Nai Phun's ship had arrived from Songkhla. Nai Phun had stated that he was a servant of the former Governor of Chaïya, who had charged him to take his son, Nai Noi, and some other servants of his who had been ill, up to Bangkok. Upon being questioned he had stated that the Malays who had attacked Songkhla had all withdrawn on the 13th April. The Governor of Songkhla and Phra Racharin had pursued them in the direction of [Pa]tani but Phaya Wichitnarong had advanced toward Chana. On the voyage here Nai Phun had met the ships in Your Excellency's fleet in the Ang Thong straits on the 12th April. He had subsequently met with two of Chao Phaya Yomarat's ships off Samui. His Majesty exclaimed: "How could Chao Phaya Yomarat's ships arrive at Samui before the rest of the fleet?" Phaya Phiphat apologized and said that he had made a mistake - Nai Phun had actually seen Chao Phaya Yomarat's ships at Phangan. His Majesty said: "Chao Phaya Yomarat's ships are making good speed - they can catch up with the rest of the fleet because they are big ships. They sail well out to sea and can cut across without coasting around the bays - that's why they can catch up." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer about Your Excellency saying: "Do you think he has arrived yet?" The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency had probably not yet arrived in Songkhla but would very likely have arrived in Nakhon. His Majesty said: "Arriving in Nakhon is the same as arriving in Songkhla. He will probably stop off for two or three days to discuss matters with Chao Phaya Nakhon before continuing the voyage. Anyway, let's wait until we hear from the army. When it gets there, it will find out what happened and report everything."

On the 24th April His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah.

On the 25th April, Phra Narin asked His Majesty's permission for Meun Chongsorasit and Khun Phithaksongkhram to go back. His Majesty said: "I thought they had gone - have they not gone yet? Well, see that they go back right away. My instructions are all contained in the letter they are taking. Would you like to tell them something in addition to the letter, Treasurer?" His Majesty then told Meun Chongsorasit and Khun Phithaksongkhram: "When you get down there, there probably won't be much to do, so make sure you settle the opium business. Close down all the opium shops and round up all the opium dealers along with the opium smokers. Seize all the opium, the opium pans, the pipes and all the other utensils, and send everything up here. Let us put an end to the business - it would be really splendid! If you can arrange for ships to lie in wait and capture one or two of the sampan pukut that come here to sell opium in the provinces and send them up here, that would be splendid. If we can see that news travels down to Singapore and Penang, that should teach them a lesson and make them desist."



On the 26th April, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that Yi, the master of Phra Prasoetwanit's ship that had taken Phra Racharin down to Songkhla, had returned. It had been learnt that Phra Racharin had arrived in Songkhla on the 12th. The Malays who had attacked Songkhla had abandoned the siege on the 11th April. The Governor of Songkhla, Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin had pursued the Malays as far as [Pa]tani. Yi had left Songkhla on the 18th April and had met Your Excellency and the rest of the fleet at Thung Ranod on the 19th April. Your Excellency had asked him to deliver a letter saying that everyone had been in good health since the expedition's departure. Your Excellency had heard nothing about the situation in Songkhla since sailing from Bangkok. It was only after arriving in Thung Ranod, in Phthalung province, on the 19th April and meeting Yi's ship that Your Excellency had learnt that the Malays who had attacked Songkhla had abandoned the siege and made off. Yi had met another two ships off Nakhon. His Majesty said: "I hope they reach their destination soon so that they can disembark and recuperate. They have had to put up with so many hardships during these last few weeks. When Luang Laksamana and Luang Rachaborirak came in, I questioned them and was told that they had learnt about the Malays fleeing from Songkhla when they met them at Chumphon. In fact they only heard about it at Thung Ranod. It looks as though he didn't call in at Nakhon but sailed straight on and so only found out what had happened at Thung Ranod." The Treasurer told His Majesty that he did not think Your Excellency had called in at Nakhon. His Majesty said: "By now he must have arrived safely at Songkhla. When Your Excellency's letter had been read out to His Majesty, His Majesty said: "Who was it who came in and said that he learnt about the situation in Songkhla at Chumphon? - I cannot remember the name." His Majesty then asked when the *Klaeo Klang Samut* would arrive. The Treasurer replied that Phaya Songkhla would have the ship wait for Your Excellency's arrival, so that he could embark the families implicated in the rebellion who had been collected and held in custody. His Majesty said: "See that the rice is despatched as quickly as possible, will you? Get the Songkhla people from the two ships sent up here and put them to work with our men in loading the rice and sending it off."

As for the situation at home, I was privileged to have the opportunity to call on [my] father and it appears that the entire household is in good health and not suffering from any form of illness. As regards the letter sent in reply to Nakhon and the report from Nakhon brought up by Nai Chuai, the Treasurer has had them copied and sent down along with His Majesty's official reply to Songkhla. Khun Phra Si Saorak<sup>17</sup> has had copies made of the last two letters from Nakhon brought up by Nai Si Khong and has sent them down as well. Luang Rachasetthi has had a copy made of the statement made by the Malay prisoners brought up here in the custody of Meun Chongsorasit who were interrogated on His Majesty's orders and this will be taken down by Meun Chongsorasit and Khun Phithaksongkhram. His Majesty's observations and

the other details in the dispatches which I had the privilege of submitting to Your Excellency were entrusted first of all to Chameun Inthrasena, then to the Assistant Collector of Phechaburi, then to Khun Ritthironakrai the Annamese and finally to Meun Chongsorasit and Khun Phithaksongkhram, making four dispatches in all. As regards the first three dispatches that were sent off to Your Excellency, I have enquired of all the ships arriving here but have not so far heard whether Your Excellency has received them or not.

His Majesty has graciously allowed me to attend on every occasion on which His Majesty discussed affairs of the state. I crave Your Excellency's pardon should my account contain any errors, omissions or improprieties in the details recorded in the dispatches.

Dispatched on Friday, the 26th April 1839.

## Notes

- 1 Literally 'the unit dealing with the tin suai'. 'Suai' refers to that part of the population engaged in the mining of certain desirable commodities such as tin, and who were exempted from corvée duties in return for paying the crown or its representatives a percentage of the produce.
- 2 Khao Daeng is in the district of Kui, to the south of the Sam Roi Yod range.
- 3 The village of Kalok Sisa Phi is in the district of Pran, a little to the north of the Sam Roi Yod range.
- 4 i.e. Phaya Si Sahathep (Phen), the father of Phaya Mahaamat (Run Si Phen).
- 5 Tha Thong is at the mouth of the bay into which the Luang river flows. It was subsequently raised to the status of a district, called Kanchanadit.
- 6 Near Bang Saphan.
- 7 The Thai text mentions two types of tobacco, viz. 'ya daeng' (literally 'reel tobacco') and 'ya sein' (literally 'twist tobacco'). The first is apparently a milder blended type and the second is apparently a coarse shag.
- 8 One of these Siamese, called 'Thaen', later returned and became a Magistrate on the Trang Provincial administration. During the 5th reign, when Somdet Chao Phaya Borommaha Si Suriyawong went down to stamp out banditry, he learnt that Thaen was consorting with bandits, found out about his past and had him put to death.
- 9 Krut lies to the north of Bang Saphan.
- 10 Mae Rampheung Bay lies to the north of Bang Saphan.
- 11 Prince Siriwong was a son of Rama III. He was appointed to the rank of Krommameun Matyaphitak in B.E. 2381 [1838-39].
- 12 The Thai 'chang' is equivalent to the Malay 'kati' (Anglice: catty), i.e. 1 1/3 lbs. Four chang is therefore just on 5 lbs or just under 2 1/2 kg.
- 13 The year of the Tiger ran from April 1830 to March 1831, the year of the Rabbit from April 1831 to March 1832.
- 14 Chao Lai is in the Phechaburi area, to the north of Hua Hin.

- 15 Cape Pathio is north of Chumphon.
- 16 The island of Phangan. At this time it was a district under Chaiya.
- 17 This apparently refers to Chameun Si Sorarak ('Iam'), the ancestor of the Chuto family. In the 4th reign he was appointed Chao Phaya Phonlathep.

# *The Sixth Dispatch*

5 May 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant Luang Udomsombat addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. My previous dispatch, in which I gave details of what has occurred, was entrusted to Meun Chongsorasit of the Right Outer Division of the Palace Watch and Khun Phithaksongkham, a member of the Songkhla provincial council and sent on the 26th of April. Along with the dispatches previously sent with Chameun Inthrasena, the Assistant Collector of Pechaburi and Khun Ritthironakrai the Annamese, this makes four<sup>1</sup> dispatches that have been sent to date.

On the 27th, 28th and 29th April His Majesty did not mention the situation in Kedah but discussed the opium suppression campaign. His Majesty appointed the Treasurer to head the team charged with the task of searching the cells allotted to the monks in the Royal palace. As regards the opium involved in the case of Luang Bamrung - who had bought 35 chests from the vessel selling opium - seven chests had been seized and sent up to the capital. Luang Bamrung had sent a Chinese called Lian to peddle 22 chests of opium around the gulf and Khun Yan had been ordered to go after him. The six chests remaining with Khun Bamrung were [being sent up to the capital] with all speed. Every day, tax farmers were taking advantage of the amnesty to hand over the opium in their possession. His Majesty had sent Phaya Mahaamat and Phaya Wisut<sup>2</sup> to deal with [the opium traders] in Chachoengsao, Nakhon Nayok, Pachim, Chonburi, Lamung and Rayong; Chao Phaya Phonlathep and Phra Mathathep had gone down to supervise the campaign in Sakhonburi, Samutsongkhram, Pechaburi and Nakhon Chaisi; Chameun Rachamat<sup>3</sup> and Luang Thepseni had gone down to deal with Chumphon, and orders had been sent to Phaya Chaiya to supervise the campaign in Thalang, Takua Thung, Takua Pa and Phangnga. Over 72 chests of opium had already been confiscated and sent here, both from the capital and the provinces. His Majesty had ordered a furnace to be set up on the Phra Men field and on the 30th April, when the opium was burnt, a 'Wishing Tree'<sup>4</sup> had been set up, hung with vouchers, bearing the names of wealthy Chinese merchants engaged in the opium trade, and coins to the value of 10 tamleung. His Majesty had graciously ordained that the people who obtained the vouchers could collect the amount specified from the Chinese concerned, viz from Luang Bamrung, one tamleung; from Khun Yan, two baht; from Chang Wang Long, two baht. Besides this His Majesty had ordered the officers of the Department of Ports and Harbours

to have all ships calling in at Bangkok that belonged to the tax farmers search for opium, irrespective of the size of the vessel. However, European or Indian ships were exempted from inspection because although it was desirable to find any opium that might be concealed on the vessels we would be put to considerable embarrassment if no opium were found on the European vessels and others from foreign countries. The officials should wait until they [the foreigners] attempted to deal in opium, whereupon they were to be arrested and their opium confiscated and burnt, according to the provisions of the treaty. His Majesty also gave orders that the tax farmers were to be rounded up and made to swear an oath not to engage in any further traffic in opium; they were to inform the opium suppression teams of the names of all those they knew to be engaged in the opium trade, concealing nothing. The tax farmers were also ordered to assist the campaign by taking on supervisory duties and they were formed into teams with specific responsibilities in the Chachoengsao, Pak Nam and Samutsongkhram areas. In this way, if any case arose that involved trading in opium, the guilty parties could easily be arrested. His Majesty is now taking vigorous action to suppress opium smoking and makes detailed inquiries every day into the progress of the campaign. As regards Songkhla, His Majesty has already sent orders for the suppression of opium there but in Nakhon it appears that, unlike Songkhla, there is no trade in opium being carried on. However, His Majesty insists that all the opium is to be seized and sent up to the capital; the trade must not be allowed to continue.

On the 30th April, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that Your Excellency had sent up Meun Nikon, the Annameese from Chantaburi, with a letter, saying that after Your Excellency had anchored off Ko Nang Prasong,<sup>5</sup> Your Excellency had sent a party ashore to see the Deputy Governor of Chaiya, to arrange for fresh water to be brought out to the fleet, but the Deputy Governor had not come out. Your Excellency remained at anchor, waiting for another three or four days but the Deputy Governor had still not shown up and it was not until Your Excellency had sent Luang Thip Akson, Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, ashore to seek out the Deputy Governor that the latter eventually came out and fresh water was supplied. At Tha Thong, Your Excellency had sent Phra Pran ashore to tell Luang Chaiphannya to come and see Your Excellency and arrange for the fleet to be supplied with fresh water but neither Luang Chaiphannya nor the fresh water had shown up. Your Excellency had remained there at anchor waiting for another four to five days and the water began to run out so that Your Excellency had had to order the water to be rationed. Those on board the ships had had to put up with a good deal of hardship and two or three men had gone down with sickness. Your Excellency had sent up copies of the letters Your Excellency had sent to Chao Phaya Nakhon and to Phaya Chaiya. His Majesty asked the Treasurer: "Why are these chaps so exasperating? Can they not do *anything*?" The Treasurer replied: "It was just the same when I went down there before.<sup>6</sup> It's very difficult to get hold of anyone or to obtain anything in the way of supplies."

His Majesty said: "Why's that - they seem to be frightened and try to keep out of your way - is that what it is?" The Treasurer replied: "That seems to be the case; they will hardly ever come and see you." His Majesty said: "Chao Phaya Nakhon's men are completely subservient to him and take orders only from him. Unless he gives them instructions to do so, they won't say anything or do anything - the only man they obey is their master." His Majesty then asked: "I suppose Phaya Si Phiphat is in good health?" The Treasurer replied: "He is, Sire." His Majesty said: "By now he should have arrived safely in Songkhla and gone ashore to have a rest." His Majesty then ordered the letter to be brought and read out and Meun Nara did so. His Majesty sat there listening but said nothing until the reading was finished, when he exclaimed: "Once he had got the Deputy Governor of Chaiya to go and see him, I wonder why he didn't order him to be given a dozen or so lashes - apparently his anger evaporated as soon as the Deputy Governor stepped on board." Then the copy of the letter that Your Excellency had sent to Phaya Chaiya was read out, after which His Majesty said: "By now the Malays will have all withdrawn and the Governor of Saiburi's forces will have occupied Kedah - who is there left for them to fight? Still, it is just as well to send him instructions on these lines as a precautionary measure. If an emergency should crop up, the army can be sent in to deal with the matter without delay. Sending him a letter to tell him to be on his guard is the right thing to do and can only benefit our cause." Then the letter to Chao Phaya Nakhon was read out to His Majesty who smilingly observed: "I wondered whether he was going to complain but no, he has not. He was annoyed and might well have given vent to his anger by complaining about Luang Chaiphannya, but he hasn't. In fact just the reverse, he speaks well of him." His Majesty asked the Treasurer who it was whom Your Excellency had sent to deliver the letter to Chao Phaya Nakhon and the Treasurer replied that it was Phra Pran, who had formerly been known as Luang Chan Chonlamak. His Majesty said: "Oh, I thought he would say something about how annoyed he was, but instead he writes in this vein. It seems that although he was annoyed with the Deputy Governor of Chaiya, once he got over his anger, that was the end of the matter?" The Treasurer replied that, from Your Excellency's letter, Your Excellency's anger seemed to be directed against Chao Phaya Nakhon over the Kedah business. Although Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent his troops to recapture Kedah, Your Excellency had got as far as Chumphon and even Tha Thong without Chao Phaya Nakhon letting Your Excellency know what had happened. Nor did Your Excellency yet know what had happened to Songkhla, which is why Your Excellency had sailed straight on to Songkhla without calling in at Nakhon. His Majesty smiled and said: "Yes, I thought he had say something to show his displeasure, but he has not. Instead he is sent Phra Pran to call upon him with a letter as a gesture of good will." The Treasurer said that Phra Pran was on board Your Excellency's ship and would be well aware of Your Excellency's resentment; when he saw Chao Phaya Nakhon the latter would undoubtedly be informed of Your Excellency's feelings. His Majesty exclaimed:

"These Nakhon people scarcely ever tell you anything - they are all the same, even down to the humblest among them. Unless their master orders them to do so, you can ask all you like but they won't tell you anything - they are so scared of him." His Majesty went on with a laugh: "Well, well, he [Phaya Si Phiphat] must be annoyed but he says nothing about it, he merely complains about having to sail down there in a large vessel without being able to go ashore and about his men being cooped up in stuffy quarters until they fall sick - this is how he expresses his feelings." His Majesty said jokingly to the Treasurer: "If he cannot give vent to his feelings he will end up by blaming you, Treasurer - you had better be careful!" His Majesty went on: "Let us hope he will calm down. Once he gets down there, all he will have to do is to make arrangements for the re-establishment of the state and the resettlement of the people. If he is going to quarrel with anyone, then let him do so when he's busy with these activities. I have already sent him instructions as to how this should be accomplished and he can take whatever measures he wishes to carry out my plans. His Majesty went on: "By now he will have landed and gone ashore and I am sure his anger will have cooled down." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "See that you send him another letter with these instructions; it can be sent down with Meun Nikon's ship, that came up here. The Songkhla ships in port are not to be detained - let them get back as quickly as possible; the Governor will find out what was in the letter sent to Chao Phaya Nakhon. In the meantime, let him study the situation. If we do not send him another letter he will make a fuss about it and it will not be long before he will start complaining about you, Treasurer, for not sending him the necessary directions. See that you have a copy made of the drafts of the letters sent earlier in reply to Nakhon and include it in your letter, then add a bit more and sent it off with Meun Nikon."

In the evening, the Treasurer told His Majesty that Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar had both sent up a letter with the master of the *Withayakhom*. Raja Kelantan's letter stated that Tengku Besar, the son of Phaya Ban Thale [Raja Kampung Laut], had sent a messenger to tell Raja Kelantan that the British had brought the Kedah Malays back to Kedah and had already captured it. The Kedah Malays had then moved on to besiege Songkhla, and they had also invested Nakhon. The British had entered Bangkok, which was in a state of confusion, so that the Bangkok army was unable to come to the help of Nakhon and Songkhla. Tengku Besar had requested permission to build a stockade around his residence to prevent his enemies setting fire to it and had then erected the stockade during the night. Phaya Bangoi [Raja Banggul] and Wan Long Muhamad had set up camp by the river mouth. The son of Tengku S(er)i Putera Maharaja had set up another camp at Muket [Bukit (Marak)], so that there were now three armed camps. Raja Kelantan had sent his men to erect stockades to counter them and fighting had broken out.



Tengku Besar's letter stated that Wan Kakab [Tuan Seni Gagap] had taken over his [Tengku Besar's] ricefields, so he had sent a messenger to complain to Raja Kelantan who had said that he would clear up the matter but had failed to do so. Then in the second month [mid-December to mid-January], the Kedah Malays sent a letter urging Raja Kelantan to join them and the latter had agreed to do so. Raja Kelantan had sent a letter to Tengku Ok asking him to negotiate with the British on Raja Kelantan's behalf concerning his desire to become their vassal. A copy of these two letters has been sent down with His Majesty's letter.

Having been informed of the contents of the letters His Majesty said: "This all comes about as the result of Chao Phaya Nakhon letting Raja Banggul go free. As soon as he gets back home he starts to incite them to revolt again." His Majesty then asked: "This son of Tengku Seri Putera Maharaja who is encamped at Bukit, where's his father from?" The Treasurer replied that he was the son of the former Governor of Sai, who lived in Bukit. His Majesty said: "They have won over enough men to form three or four armies and make their districts into armed camps; they seem to have laid their plans well. It should never have happened. This is what comes of listening to Chao Phaya Nakhon! From the very first, I had my doubts about the matter. I didn't want to let Raja Banggul go back - I wanted to keep him here in Bangkok. If I had done so, things would never have turned out like this. I asked Chao Phaya Nakhon, but he assured me that everything would be all right, so I let him go. After I let him go back, he lets them stir up all this trouble. What a disaster!" After Raja Kelantan's letter had been read out to His Majesty, His Majesty asked: "What about this Maharaja fellow whose son is said to be encamped at Bukit - why did Raja Kelantan go and discuss matters with him as if he were on his side?" The Treasurer replied that the Maharaja with whom Raja Kelantan had discussed matters was not the Tengku S[er]i Putera Maharaja whose son was encamped at Bukit but the person upon whom Raja Kelantan had asked His Majesty's permission to confer the title of Tengku Winaputra Maharaja and who has now been made Comptroller-General of the state. His Majesty said: "I thought it was the Maharaja whose son is encamped at Bukit." After Tengku Besar's letter had been read out to His Majesty, His Majesty said: "His letter goes on at great length whereas Raja Kelantan's letter is very brief, and does not say anything about what sort of help he would like from us. Has someone asked the ship's master - he spoke to Raja Kelantan? - did Raja Kelantan give him any message to pass on?" The Treasurer replied: "With Your Majesty's permission, I questioned him and he said that Raja Kelantan had given them no message. However Tengku Besar gave him a letter with two rings to deliver to Luang Kocha Ishak asking the latter to oblige him by presenting a letter of complaint to the Minister and saying how grateful he would be if he could get his land back.

His Majesty said: "Kelantan is in a state of turmoil but Raja Kelantan hasn't said anything about what he would like us to do. The ship's master spoke to him - did he hear him say anything about how he proposes to fight them?" The Treasurer replied that he had not yet asked him. His Majesty said: "Take him and have him questioned - he must know something. As regards the letters they have sent, we cannot yet be sure which of them is telling the truth - they both accuse each other. We cannot make up our mind because the facts are not yet clear. I do not know what to make of it - I would like more definite information but the place is too far away." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Send Phaya Si Phiphat a letter asking him to deal with this matter as well. He is in Songkhla, which is close to Kelantan. Ask him to confer with Chao Phaya Nakhon to get him to co-operate in ensuring the arrest of Raja Banggul. If we cannot get our hands on him, he will go to the British in Singapore and make plans to go back and capture Kelantan, as happened in the case of Kedah. We must stamp out this menace before it spreads, and prevent Kelantan being destroyed. The parties involved in the quarrel have now come to blows and people are being killed. I do not know how the Malays might go about admonishing the parties concerned and reconciling them, but if things reached this point with Siamese, there would be no question of the two parties settling their quarrel and living in peace. If there were, then Chao Lam Duan and Chao Inthaphat<sup>7</sup> would have been allowed to live. In order to ensure peace, one side or the other must be eliminated. Still, this Tengku Besar is a relation of Raja Kelantan, so if there is some way that Malay custom will allow Phaya Si Phiphat to reconcile them and make them live together like members of the same family, it is up to him to arrange it and see that things are put right. He must not allow any trouble-maker to ruin Kelantan - there's no possibility of getting Raja Banggul to behave himself, so he should make sure he's arrested."

On the 1st May, in the morning, His Majesty said to Phaya Phiphat: "Tell the Treasurer to take the master of the *Withayakom* to Phaya Krai for further questioning to find out a bit more about Kelantan. The letter Raja Kelantan sent was very brief. The matter is a complicated one and I still do not know which of them is telling the truth."

On the 2nd May, in the evening, the Treasurer presented His Majesty with the draft of the letter about Kelantan that was being sent to Your Excellency. Details of this, along with His Majesty's observations, are in the letter sent to Your Excellency by His Majesty. After the draft had been read out to His Majesty, His Majesty said: "That bit about making arrangements to prevent Kelantan going to rack and ruin - I would like to add a little bit more there. The rest is fine. Tell him not to allow Kelantan to be ravaged or to fall into alien hands." The Treasurer had the draft amended accordingly and read it out to His Majesty. His Majesty smiled and said: "That is good. That will do - send the man down with it right away; he can then act decisively

by arresting Raja Banggul and taking steps to bring the situation under control without delay." Phaya Krai Kosa then presented to His Majesty the statements made by Luang Sunthonwari, Nai Kao of the Corps of Pages and the master of the *Withayakhom*. Details are in the copy of the statements sent to Your Excellency along with the text of the letters from Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar which are mentioned in the statements. After the statements had been read out to His Majesty, His Majesty said: "From these statements it seems as though Raja Kelantan is the one to believe - his conversation with the ship's master was quite circumstantial. As for Tengku Besar, he said nothing of substance - it was all vague and meaningless. It does not have the ring of truth - as though he's trying to pull the wool over our eyes." His Majesty then asked: "What do you think? If one were to judge from the way Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar talked to the ship's master which of the two received him with the most civility?" The Treasurer replied: "When the master went to see Raja Kelantan, he was asked to sit down on the same level and invited to dine. From the hospitality shown him and the polite way he was received, he was obviously treated with more respect than when he went to see Tengku Besar. Tengku Besar did not ask him to sit down on the same level but on an intermediate level, with Tengku Besar seated above him. Nor was he treated with the same politeness. When the master was talking to him, Tengku Besar sat there with a long machete in his lap; all the time he was talking he kept waving the machete in the air, examining it and then laying it back in his lap. And when he was about to sail, Tengku Besar only presented him with one lot of supplies." His Majesty said: "The fellow seems to have shown scant respect - it looks as though he's trying to take us in. Talking to the master with a machete in his lap - is that the proper thing to do when someone from the capital calls upon him? Such unseemly behaviour - is the fellow out of his mind?" The Treasurer replied: "From what the master say, he seems to be unbalanced and behaves in an outlandish fashion, as though he's not quite normal." His Majesty then spoke of Your Excellency, ordering the Treasurer to send Meun Nikon off with the dispatches right away so that Your Excellency might be informed of how matters stood and make plans to arrest Raja Banggul and restore order without any loss of time.

From the 3rd to the 5th of May His Majesty made no mention of the situation in Kedah or Kelantan, but talked about the opium campaign. Phra Mahathep reported that 13 chests of opium had been seized from a boat belonging to a Chinese collector of firewood at the mouth of the Sakonburi river. This opium which Luang Chamroen had bought from the sampan pukat was being sent up to Bangkok, along with the Chinese firewood merchant. His Majesty ordered the investigations to be carried out in order to wipe out opium-smoking and seek out those involved. Since Your Excellency's departure from Bangkok at the head of the army, His Majesty has spent far more time on crown business than was previously the case. His Majesty has graciously permitted me to attend the discussions and where matters concerning the southern

provinces were discussed, His Majesty has displayed the keenest attention, listening to every detail. I have entrusted this dispatch to Meun Nikon, the Annamese from Chantaburi to deliver. Including the dispatches already sent, this makes five [six] dispatches that I have sent Your Excellency.

I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties in my account of His Majesty's deliberations.

Dispatched on Sunday, 5th May 1839.

## Notes

- 1 In fact *five* dispatches, but one of the earlier dispatches had been taken down [with Phaya Si Phiphat], so in fact only four dispatches were sent off.
- 2 Phaya Wisutkosa (On Siriathanakun).
- 3 His name was 'Kham Bunnak'; he later became Chao Phaya Thiphakorawong.
- 4 Thai: 'ton kanlapaphrik' - one of the five trees in Indra's heaven whose fruits were believed to contain whatever one might desire. The expression came to be used for a sort of (Buddhist) 'Christmas tree' with the presents, usually in the form of limes into which coins or ticket vouchers, had been inserted. The limes would be thrown to the crowd, by way of charity, see e.g. Gerini (1976) p. 33. (10 tamleung was equivalent to 40 baht.)
- 5 Investigation reveals only a *Mount Prasong* on the coast north of Chaiya.
- 6 He had gone down to fight Tengku Din in Kedah.
- 7 Sons of Krommaphra Rachawangbowon [the brother and viceroy of] Rama I. After the death of their father (in 1803) they were arrested and executed.

# *The Seventh Dispatch*

15 May 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. I have already sent Your Excellency five [sic] dispatches containing details of what has occurred, viz one sent with Chameun Intharasena on the 14th March, another sent with the Assistant Collector of Phechaburi on the 23rd March, another sent with Khun Ritthironakrai, the Annamese, on the 29th March, another sent with Meun Chongsorasit of the Palace Watch and Khun Phithaksongkhram from Songkhla on the 26th April and another sent with Meun Nikon, the Annamese from Chantaburi, on the 5th May.

On the 6th May His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah or Kelantan. On the 7th May, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat reported to His Majesty that a ship belonging to the Chinese albino had arrived. Your Excellency had sent him up with a letter saying that Your Excellency had arrived in Songkhla on the 21st April and that the ships of the other officers had arrived on the 22nd and 23rd April, to the number of 15 ships and 1557 men. On the 25th April Your Excellency had given the Chinese albino a letter to bring up. Sailing from Songkhla, he had met Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship at the mouth of the Chumphon river on the 4th May and Chao Phaya Yomarat had given him a letter for the Treasurer. His Majesty said: "Good, I am relieved to hear that he is arrived in Songkhla. I can stop worrying now. Is Phaya Si Phiphat keeping well?" The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency was in good health. His Majesty smiled and said: "I wonder what sort of mood he is in? Now that he is arrived in Songkhla I suppose he will have got over his annoyance and will not be feeling so hot and bothered?" The Treasurer replied that the Chinese albino had said that Your Excellency seemed to be in good spirits. His Majesty laughed and said: "Now he has arrived safe and sound, he will not be feeling so annoyed." His Majesty then asked if there were any other details in the letters. The Treasurer replied that there was nothing except the arrival of the 15 ships. His Majesty asked: "When did the man leave - had any other ship in the expedition arrived by then?" Phra Narin turned round to call for the letter to be brought so that he could see, whereupon His Majesty exclaimed: "Do you not know anything, Phra Narin? Can't you even write down the day he left, whose ships had arrived and the day of their arrival? Phaya Phiphat, ask the man and find out, will you?" Phaya Phiphat

did so and then reported that the Chinese albino had left Songkhla on 26th April and had not seen any other ships in the expedition arrive there. His Majesty exclaimed: "Why are they arriving in dribs and drabs - they're taking their time getting here? They should have arrived one after the other, on successive days."

His Majesty then ordered the letter be read out. When Nai Boriban, who was reading it out, began: "Your Majesty's humble servant, Phaya Si Phiphat Ratanakosa, craves permission to inform Your Majesty", His Majesty laughed and asked the Treasurer: "Is he addressing me directly this time?"<sup>1</sup> The Treasurer replied: "Yes, Sire." When the letter reached the part about Phaya Phechaburi's ship arriving in Songkhla, His Majesty said: "Phaya Phechaburi's ship left before the others did - I thought he would be the first to arrive in Songkhla; but instead he's arrived after the others. Did any of the ships which left earlier arrive before him?" The Treasurer replied: "No, Sire. The first to arrive was the *Amonmaensan* which overtook and passed the ships which left two or three days earlier. His Majesty smiled and said: "The ship is good and sails fast - why has he not said something good about it instead of grumbling about it being so big and having such stuffy quarters?" His Majesty then ordered the reading to continue. When the reading was over, His Majesty commented on the part which said that Your Excellency was setting off to settle matters in Kedah, saying: "No, he must not! Where's he off to? He hasn't seen Chao Phaya Nakhon yet. He must see Chao Phaya Nakhon and discuss matters with him first. What do you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer told His Majesty: "When the Chinese albino left Songkhla on the 26th April, he met some people collecting birds nests on a vessel that was returning to Songkhla after taking Phra Pran to his destination. They told him that Phra Pran and Chao Phaya Nakhon had left Nakhon four days ago and were travelling overland to Songkhla." His Majesty laughed and said: "So Chao Phaya Nakhon is going to see him [Phaya Siphapaht]? And why not? Even if he were ill, he should still go, but if it was to see Phaya Songkhla, I'm pretty sure he wouldn't go."

Subsequently Chao Phaya Yomarat's letter was read out to His Majesty. The letter said that Chao Phaya Yomarat had left the Bangkok river on 28th March and had arrived at Ko Si Chang on 30th March. He had made attempts to sail from Ko Si Chang on the 31st March and the 1st April but as the winds were either south-westerlies or southerlies, he had been unable to reach Ko Khram, and had had to return and anchor off Ko Si Chang. On the 2nd April, there was heavy rain but in the afternoon the wind came round to the southwest and he had been able to leave Ko Si Chang. After two days sailing he had arrived at Chao Lai on the 4th April, after which he sailed to Pran. He had put in for water at Pran and subsequently at Mae Rampheung. On the 29th April he had arrived in Chumphon and had sailed for Songkhla on the 1st May. When the letter had been read out, His Majesty exclaimed: "He only reached Chumphon on the 29th April - when will he ever get to Songkhla!

Those Chinese ships that Songkhla sent up here to buy rice - they said they met him at Phangan a day after meeting the *Amonmaensan*. I thought they'd be able to arrive close behind each other but no, they're widely separated." His Majesty then asked: "Did he meet Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship - at Chumphon - or did he meet any other ships along the way?" Phaya Phiphat replied: "He only met Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship at Chumphon; on the way here he met two of the standard-type vessels off Pathio but he did not know whose ships they were." His Majesty said: "They are scattered about all over the place - and still a long way from reaching their destination! Just when my worries about the expedition were at an end, I now have this worry about Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship!" His Majesty then said: "Ask the Chinese albino whether Phaya Phiphat was well." Phaya Phiphat did so and reported that Your Excellency was in good health. His Majesty asked: "Has he lost any weight?" Phaya Phiphat reported that Your Excellency had not lost any weight but seemed to be quite the same. His Majesty asked: "Is he getting enough to eat or is he short of anything?" Phaya Phiphat replied: "Not really, Sire." His Majesty asked: "Is he eating well?" Phaya Phiphat said that he was. His Majesty laughed and said: "On a voyage like that, if you're not seasick, you will have a good appetite. Even if you don't get much to eat, the food tastes good. When I went on a voyage I always ate well and the food tasted really good. His Majesty went on: "Now that he has landed in Songkhla, where has he set up his headquarters - has he built himself proper quarters?" The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency's headquarters had been set up in three buildings on the seashore on the road leading to Kao Seng Hill. His Majesty observed: "Once he gets ashore and has a roof over his head, he will soon be all right." His Majesty then asked about the other ships in the expedition that had arrived - was everything all right with them? Phaya Phiphat replied that all was well. His Majesty said: "Now that they've arrived, I feel much happier about the situation." His Majesty then asked when the *Klaeo Klang Samut* would be sent back to Bangkok. The Treasurer replied that all arrangements had been completed but they were waiting for Phaya Songkhla, Phaya Wichitnarong and Phra Racharin to come back and interrogate the rebels, who would be sent up to Bangkok on the *Klaeo Klang Samut*. His Majesty said with a smile: "Good, that is the way." His Majesty then said: "Ask the Chinese albino when he got to Songkhla and went around the town, did he by any chance find out how much the opium was selling for?" Phra Narin did so and then reported that the market price for opium in Songkhla was five baht for a catty of raw opium and three saleung for an ounce of processed opium. His Majesty said to the Treasurer: "That is very cheap, is it not? Phaya Phiphat, question him would you, to see whether he's brought any opium with him - make sure he tells the truth and doesn't lie." Phaya Phiphat duly questioned him and reported that he had not brought any. His Majesty said: "What about his crew? They must have brought some for their own use." Phaya Phiphat reported that the crew had said that they had brought an ounce of processed opium with them but they had smoked it all. His Majesty said to Phra Narin: "See that they

are questioned a bit more, will you, to check whether they did in fact only bring an ounce of opium or whether they brought a lot. If they've brought a lot, see that it's confiscated, every bit of it."

On the 8th May His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah or Kelantan, but talked only about the opium campaign. His Majesty said: "Opium is cheap in Songkhla - they must have a lot of it. We can pretty well clean it up in Bangkok but we still cannot wipe it out in Songkhla. Nevertheless we shall carry on until we have succeeded in doing so. The best possible thing that Phaya Si Phiphat could bring us back would be their complete stock of opium. It would be splendid if the *Amonmaensan* could sail back loaded with opium."

On the 9th and 10th May His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 11th May, in the morning, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat if there was any news. Phaya Phiphat replied that Khun Ritthironakrai had sailed in from Songkhla, bearing a letter from Your Excellency. His Majesty laughed and asked: "What has he got to report now - he's only just arrived there!" The Treasurer replied: "It concerns Kelantan. He reports that Raja Kelantan has written asking for military assistance, saying that Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul and their men have set up stockades so as to encircle [the town of] Kelantan and he asks the army to come to his help before the middle of May, otherwise Kelantan will be destroyed." His Majesty said: "The letter from Raja Kelantan asking for help and the letter that came up on the *Withayakhom* - which was sent first? Can you remember, Phra Narin?" Phra Narin remained silent. His Majesty said: "You made no effort to write it down - you forgot all about it!" Phra Narin told His Majesty that Raja Kelantan's letter was with the Department of Ports and Harbours. His Majesty then asked Phaya Phiphat, who replied that he was not quite sure - he could not remember. His Majesty said: "You cannot remember a thing, any of you! The Ministry of War also has a copy of the report made by the master of the brig, but you didn't think to take down the details - none of you can remember a thing!" His Majesty went on: "The letter from Raja Kelantan that came up on the brig was sent on the 21st or 22nd April or thereabouts. I wonder if the one asking for a force to be sent to his aid was sent at the same time or earlier or later." The Treasurer replied: "I am not sure about Raja Kelantan's letter sent up on the brig. If it was not dated the 21st April, then it must have been the 22nd. The letter asking for help was dated the 21st April but was sent off from Kelantan on the 22nd." His Majesty said: "It must be about the same time as the one sent up on the brig - there cannot be more than a day or two between them. But the one asking for military help sounded more urgent than the one that came up by the brig. It is quite intolerable - all this has happened because Chao Phaya Nakhon let that fellow Raja Banggul go free!" The Treasurer



told His Majesty: "Besides this letter, Raja Kelantan has also sent a letter to Chao Phaya Nakhon saying that, as Chao Phaya Nakhon would know, he has already sent him a letter and is still waiting for an answer, but so far he has heard nothing. Phaya Si Phiphat realises that the situation in Kelantan is very complicated and requires us to be constantly on guard so he has sent Luang Sonseni with an interpreter, Khun Wichitwathi, and 80 men in the *Klaeo Klang Samut* to carry out a preliminary investigation. He is prepared to send troops but wishes to hear Your Majesty's intentions. He has therefore sent Khun Ritthironakrai up here with dispatches, to enquire what instructions Your Majesty has for him." His Majesty said: "What does he want to discuss at this stage? Even if I *do* give him instructions, they won't get there in time - it's too far away. In a situation like this, it's up to the discretion of the commander-in-chief to take prompt action to deal with the matter - the main thing is not to let the situation get out of hand." His Majesty then asked: "This Luang Sonseni who was sent to Kelantan - is he the son of Phaya Rachawangsan and did he formerly hold the rank of Luang Narong in the Front Palace?"<sup>2</sup> Now that he's gone to Kelantan, do you think Tengku Besar would not dare to attack a Siamese?" The Treasurer replied: "Tengku Besar would but if he should run into Raja Banggul, the latter might not take any notice of him. This Luang Sonseni is the adopted son of Phaya Rachawangsan and was formerly Luang Narong in the Front Palace. I am afraid that when he gets there he may not be quite up to dealing with the situation; he may consider that he has too few men to tackle the matter." His Majesty exclaimed: "Why were so few men sent - the best thing would have been to send some three ships and about three hundred men. It was a good idea to send Luang Sonseni - it was the right thing to do. He is Phaya Rachawangsan's adopted son and some of the Malays down there will probably know him and respect him. If Tengku Besar won't dare to attack him, then Raja Banggul certainly won't do so on his own - if Tengku Besar won't act, neither will Raja Banggul. It's unlikely that they will attack the Siamese. If they had any thoughts of doing so, the presence of the Bangkok army in the area would deter them. How can they fight the Siamese army? I am sure they will not dare to attack."

His Majesty then ordered the letter to be read out. When it came to the part about Your Excellency asking Phra Sanehamontri<sup>3</sup> to deliver a message to Chao Phaya Nakhon, His Majesty said: "I thought he would ask [him] about the Kelantan business - since he speaks about Raja Kelantan sending Chao Phaya Nakhon a letter - and what Chao Phaya Nakhon intends to do about it. I suppose he does not know - why did he not ask him? All he has done is to tell [Phra Sanehamontri] that he is sending Phra Phromthiban to deliver a letter. That is Phaya Si Phiphat for you - he just will not extract the information we need." His Majesty then ordered the reading to continue and when it was concluded, His Majesty exclaimed: "It is quite intolerable! I feel most annoyed with Chao Phaya Nakhon. Anyone would think he's Raja Banggul's guardian angel! Right from the beginning I was reluctant to allow

him to take Raja Banggul back with him but because he assured me that everything would be all right and that he wanted to take him back to help fight the Kedah Malays, I let him go. Once I let him go, Chao Phaya Nakhon lets him get away taking his family with him to stir up trouble again in Kelantan. Raja Kelantan writes to Chao Phaya Nakhon, but he takes no steps to deal with the matter or send him help - he does nothing at all. Why does he go on like this?" His Majesty then ordered Raja Kelantan's letter to be read out. His Majesty said: "From what he says, he seems to be under great pressure because the tone is very deferential. In the other letter he sent up by the *Withayakhom*, he was content merely to say what was going on there. This must be because they have attacked him and driven him back; he does not think he can hold out so he has asked for our troops to go to his aid."

After this, a copy of the letter which Luang Sonseni was taking to Raja Kelantan was read out to His Majesty. When it came to the part about Raja Banggul being unwilling to accept the position [offered him] in Kelantan and proposing to go on a pilgrimage<sup>4</sup> and devote himself to good works, His Majesty said: "He gives us only the end of the story - there's no mention of the previous quarrel and fighting, when Raja Banggul should have been put in his place and made to see the error of his ways." His Majesty ordered the reading to continue and when it was finished, His Majesty said: "That's all he says - nothing else." After this, a copy of the letter sent to Kelantan containing [Phaya Si Phiphat's] instructions was read out to His Majesty. When it came to the part about Raja Banggul proposing to go on a pilgrimage and devote himself to good works, His Majesty said: "He [Phaya Si Phiphat] keeps going on about him making the pilgrimage and referring to the late Ruler [of Kelantan]. Why has Luang Thip Akson, his Clerk of the Seal, said nothing about what's going on in Kelantan? He must know the full story but his letter fails to explain the matter clearly." When the reading of the letter was completed, His Majesty said: "Why does he keep going on about the late ruler of Kelantan? If any of them had any respect for the memory of the late ruler, they would not have acted like this. It's because they have not got any real respect for him that things have turned out like this. The letter should have adopted a more peremptory tone, to get them to desist, asking what has happened to cause brother to quarrel with brother and who was to blame to make them see the error of their ways. The letter should have pointed that Raja Banggul started hostilities once before but that I refrained from punishing him and let him go so that he could serve the crown, but instead he tries to stir up trouble again. Raja Banggul should not be allowed to get away scot free. Whatever the cause of the quarrel may have been, they should have complained to me and let me know. This would have been the best way to write to them."

Subsequently the letter giving the number of Malays from the Nine States who had joined the rebels was read out to His Majesty. His Majesty asked the Treasurer whether the whole of Raman had been affected. The Treasurer

replied: "The Governor of Songkhla reports that it has, Sire." His Majesty said: "They could not all have been affected. What probably happened is that they refused to go to the help of Songkhla, and just stayed put. What about Chana, Thepha, Nong Chik and [Pa]tani - are they back to normal?" The Treasurer replied: "They are, Sire; some of the people have already returned home. But in [Pa]tani, Phaya Songkhla reports that the men from the Athmat [regiment]<sup>5</sup> carried off some Malay women and seized their belongings, which frightened the villagers and made them run away." His Majesty said: "Whatever has happened, it's not an important matter. The people involved are still there - whatever crime they've committed, we can have them flogged or executed - there's no need to waste too much time on such a trivial matter." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer if it was intended to send someone to deal with the Nine States. The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency planned to send Phaya Phechaburi to take up quarters in Sai, to persuade the people to return home. However, Phaya Wichitnarong, Phra Racharin and Phaya Chaiya had been told to return [to Songkhla] as he wanted to take them along to Kedah with him. His Majesty said: "Sending Phaya Phechaburi to stay in Sai is a good move - it will make Kelantan feel apprehensive. But he shouldn't rush the resettlement of the people in Kedah and the Nine States. He should settle the Kelantan business first and he can attend to the other later. If order has not been restored in Kelantan, the resettlement will cause considerable disturbance and there will be no end of trouble."

His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "The letter that Raja Kelantan sent to Chao Phaya Nakhon, Chao Phaya Nakhon has said absolutely nothing about it - I wonder why?" The Treasurer replied: "I would think that it is because his earlier calculations proved to be incorrect; being as yet unable to do anything about it, he simply says nothing and adopts a 'wait and see' attitude." His Majesty said: "It looks as though now that his calculations have proved to be quite wrong, he is waiting to see what develops so that he can back the winning side. Treasurer, please write [to Phaya Si Phiphat] to persuade Chao Phaya Nakhon to go down to Songkhla and help draw up plans. Chao Phaya Nakhon is the man in charge there and it's not right for him to stay away and do nothing. Instructions on how to deal with the Kelantan business were set out in the despatch taken down by Meun Nikon, the Annamese from Chantaburi. See that our latest letter follows the same line as the earlier one; just add a bit here and there and then give the man the letter and send him back down there as quickly as possible." His Majesty then asked Khun Ritthironakrai how many days it had taken him to get to Songkhla before. Khun Ritthironakrai replied that it had taken him 24 days. His Majesty said [sarcastically]: "That was quick. This time, see that you make better speed than last time. How many days will it take you to get to Songkhla? What's the wind like?" Khun Ritthironakrai replied that the winds were westerlies and that he could reach Songkhla in 17 days. His Majesty ordered the Treasurer to see the letter was written and to send him off at once.

In the evening, His Majesty said to the Treasurer: "I've been thinking. As regards sending someone to Kelantan, he probably had no one to spare, so just send Luang Sonseni down. As for asking Phra Sanehamontri about the letter from Kelantan sent [to Chao Phaya Nakhon] earlier - he must have done so but without obtaining any information, that is why there is no mention of it in his report." His Majesty then said: "Bring it here and continue the reading." When the reading completed, His Majesty said: "It's all the fault of Chao Phaya Nakhon and Nai Ritthi.<sup>6</sup> I've a good mind not to speak to Nai Ritthi any more. I discussed matters with him at the very beginning and he assured me that everything would be all right. Now when something happens, he does nothing. And Chao Phaya Nakhon doesn't make any move to settle the business or call them to order. Is it right for him to remain idle and make no attempt to go down and help deal with the matter? What do you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied: "Chao Phaya Nakhon has sent Phra Sanehamontri [down to Songkhla]. I do not think that he will go himself - he will say that he is ill. If he gets a letter asking him to help in planning the measures we are to adopt, he will probably go, but by then it will be too late." His Majesty exclaimed: "How can he act like this? Kelantan is Chao Phaya Nakhon's responsibility - he must know all that goes on there. See that he is told that no matter how sick he may be, he must come and help plan what measures we should adopt - he can recuperate in Songkhla. Whether the situation requires him to act firmly and tell them off or to adopt a more roundabout approach and try to conciliate them - the important thing is to make sure that Kelantan doesn't fall into alien hands. If he can settle things, he will have done well." His Majesty then said to Krommaluang Rakronaret: "The responsibility for all this rests with Chao Phaya Nakhon. What possible justification could there be for his failing to come and help draw up plans?" Krommaluang Rakronaret replied that there could be no justification for such a refusal. His Majesty said: "If he *does* refuse, he will be quite clearly in the wrong."

After this [Your Excellency's] letter to the Treasurer was read out to His Majesty. His Majesty smiled and said: "Well, he was in Bangkok when we first had news from Kelantan and he knows quite well that the situation was not at all clear. How can he complain about not receiving any instructions?" The Treasurer then presented to His Majesty the draft of the letter being sent in reply [to Your Excellency], which was to be delivered by Khun Ritthironakrai. When it had been read out to him His Majesty said: "It is rather short. Add a bit more, will you. Say that sending Phaya Pechaburi to stay in Sai was a good idea - he can keep an eye on the Nine States and send us regular reports. But see that the story gets about that Phaya Pechaburi's taking up residence in Sai is because of the Kelantan business. Let them hear about it in Kelantan - it will make them feel worried." After the draft had been amended and read out to His Majesty, His Majesty said: "Ah, that's good. But send him another letter - a personal letter - telling him that in dealing with the [Malay] families

he is on no account to give priority to seeing that the troops are rewarded for their efforts. See that the Kelantan business is settled first and then see about dealing with the families. As for the Nine States, he must try and persuade them all to come back home. The bad elements must be rooted out before they can affect the rest. He must not upset things by being too greedy. If he wants to do anything like that then let him get it out of Kedah." His Majesty then remarked to Krommaluang Rakronaret: "This Kelantan trouble should never have happened - it is all Chao Phaya Nakhon's fault. He took Raja Banggul back and then let him get away to go and start an uprising. When trouble breaks out and Raja Kelantan sends to him for help, he does nothing - he won't even say anything! How could he go on like this - it absolutely amazes me! And now the army sends Luang Sonseni there with a letter which only mentions recent events - there's no attempt to call them to account [for their past misdeeds] - the matter's being treated far too lightly." Krommaluang Rakronaret replied: "I suppose he sent someone to Kelantan because he was uncertain as to what course of action Your Majesty wished to be followed." At this His Majesty laughed and said: "How can he claim that he doesn't know what my wishes are? When he was still in Bangkok, all we knew was that something had happened in Kelantan - we did not know who was fighting who. Now that he has got down to Songkhla and has found out all about the situation, it is up to him to deal with the matter as he sees fit - that is what he should do." His Majesty observed: "It was a good idea to send Luang Sonseni down there. When he gets there, the fighting will ease off a bit, and this will give us time to organize further measures. All this is due to Raja Banggul and no one else. If we can manage to catch him, that will put an end to the matter." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Send the man back down there right away. Let him have some money to buy provisions on the way. Give him some ten or twenty baht, depending upon how many men he has with him, so that he can get off right away." His Majesty's observations and the details of the Treasurer's letter are in the documents dispatched.

On the 12th May His Majesty told the Treasurer: "Add something about Trengganu to the letter which Khun Ritthironakrai is taking down. Be sure and stress that in dealing with Kelantan every precaution must be taken with regard to Trengganu and Kemaman; he must always be on the alert and exercise the utmost vigilance." His Majesty then ordered the letter to be written right away and given to the messenger to be sent off without delay.

On the 13th May, His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kelantan or Kedah. His Majesty talked about the opium on the vessel which had brought Meun Chongsorasi and Khun Phithaksongkhram up as the bearers of dispatches from Songkhla. The Chinese master of the vessel, when interrogated, had only handed over four cakes of opium but he had already disposed of a good deal more. His Majesty had desired the dispatch to be brought up [as soon as possible] but because of the time spent on collecting the money for the opium,

he had been very tardy in arriving. His Majesty had ordered him to be arrested at Paknam and duly punished but he was not to be found. It was learnt that he had left on the 11th May.

On the 14th May, in the morning, His Majesty told the Treasurer that because every ship that came in from Songkhla probably had opium in it, he should check them all and confiscate the opium. The Treasurer said that if Your Excellency had not yet received the dispatches, every ship putting in from Songkhla would probably have opium on board. If the contents of the dispatch were known and ships still came in from Songkhla with opium, then Phaya Songkhla could not disclaim responsibility. His Majesty said that if we were going to blame him it could only be after he had received knowledge of the instructions in the dispatches.

His Majesty instructed Krommaluang Rakronaret to tell me to write to Your Excellency, to tell Your Excellency that Your Excellency's letters have been received by His Majesty and that His Majesty has already sent details as to what course of action His Majesty wishes to be followed in Kelantan. It is not yet clear whether Tuan Seni is acting in good faith. His Majesty appointed him as Ruler of Kelantan on the assumption that he was an honest man who enjoyed the respect of his relations. If this is in fact the case, then Your Excellency must help and protect him. If this is not so, and there is someone whom Your Excellency considers to be an honest and widely-respected figure, then it is up to Your Excellency to adopt such alternative measures as Your Excellency deems appropriate, to safeguard the interests of the crown, in line with His Majesty's wishes. The next time Your Excellency reports, Your Excellency should see that the letter comes from Phra Ratnakosa and is addressed to the Head of the Department - Your Excellency should not write directly. The Head of the Department will then send a reply. One further point: Khun Ritthironakrai brought up seven cakes of opium to Bangkok and the Treasurer is investigating the matter. Details are in Khun Phra Nai's letter which has been sent to Your Excellency.

This dispatch, which contains details of His Majesty's observations, I have endeavoured to send off as quickly as possible. Along with the previous letters this makes six [sic] dispatches that I have sent down. I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties.

Dispatched on the 15th May 1839.

## Notes

- 1 See other Dispatch.
- 2 The 'Front Palace' was the establishment of the 'Uparat' (Viceroy) and although no Uparat had been appointed after the death of Prince Mahasahdipharlaseph in 1832, the Front Palace administration was still in operation.
- 3 His name was 'Noi Klang' ['Middle' Noi]. He was the son of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) and later became Phaya Nakhon. Later still, in the 4th reign, he was appointed 'Chao Phaya'.
- 4 The Thai here (and subsequently) uses the phrase "to go to Kabinlaphad". 'Kabinlaphad' is the Thai pronunciation of 'Kapilavastu' (the birth place of the Buddha) and a place of pilgrimage for Buddhists and the phrase is obviously used here with the meaning 'to go on a pilgrimage' (in this case, to Mecca). The phrase continued to be used by Thai Muslims well into the reign of Rama IV, see e.g. Chumnum Phra Borommarachathibai nai Phra Bat Somdet Phra Chom Klao (Notes on queries raised by His Majesty Rama IV, Bangkok 1914, p. 119-120).
- 5 The two battalions ('Right' and 'Left') of the Ac[h]mat regiment were enlisted from Mons and were apparently the best fighting units at the disposal of the Siamese Crown.
- 6 Luang Ritthi, an officer in the Corps of Pages, was the son of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) and the younger brother of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi Klang). He subsequently became Phra Sanehamontri and then (probably in the 4th reign) Phaya Sanehamontri.





# *The Eighth Dispatch*

22 May 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat, addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. I have now sent Your Excellency six [seven] dispatches with details of what has occurred, viz. one dispatch sent with Chameun Intharasena on the 14th March; another sent with the Assistant Collector of Pechaburi on 23rd March; another sent with Khun Ritthironakrai on the 29th March; another sent with Meun Chongsorasit and Khun Phithaksongkhram on the 26th April; another sent with Meun Nikon, the Annamese, on the 5th May; and another sent with Nai To, the supervisor of the Annamese unit, on the 15th May.

From the 16th to the 18th May His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah and Kelantan. However on the 17th March, in the early morning, His Highness Krommameun Matayaphithak was attacked by the same disease that Prince Lakkhana<sup>1</sup> suffered from and died the next day, at four o'clock in the afternoon.

On the 19th May, in the evening, the Treasurer told His Majesty that Your Excellency had sent a report up with the Superintendent of the Annamese from Chantaburi. It said that Raja Kelantan had sent Che Yapa [Jaafar] and Che Sulaiman up to Chao Phaya Nakhon with a letter. The envoys had called in at the Songkhla river and when Your Excellency learnt of their arrival, Your Excellency sent for them, had them questioned, and was informed that Raja Kelantan had sent a letter to Chao Phaya Nakhon asking for 6,000 men to be sent to his aid before the middle of May; and that when Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent Che Nud and Nai Sang down to Kelantan with a letter ordering a cease fire, Tengku Besar had refused to obey, saying that he would ignore any such missive, even if it were written in gold ink. The report also said that Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar had each sent a letter to the Governor of Sai. Raja Kelantan's letter claimed that Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul had planned to send Raja Banggul's son, Wan Tu Nga [Tuan Tengah] to advance towards Rangae in order to attack Raja Kelantan from the rear - would the Governor of Sai stop them? The contents of Tengku Besar's letter were the same as those in the letter he had sent up to Bangkok earlier. His Majesty then asked: "How many men does Tengku Besar have, to justify Raja Kelantan's request for six thousand men from Chao Phaya Nakhon?" The Treasurer replied:

"Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul's party have nine thousand men, Sire." His Majesty exclaimed: "Where would they get so many men from? They must be exaggerating; the two of them together could only raise some four to five thousand men. When the envoy left, did he by any chance know whether Luang Soseni's ship had arrived?" The Treasurer replied that he had heard nothing about its arrival. His Majesty said: "It must still be on its way. Did he meet any ships on his way up here?" The Treasurer replied that he had not. His Majesty asked: "What does he [Phaya Si Phiphat] propose to do?" The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency was waiting for Luang Soseni to return, to ascertain what the situation was. His Majesty said: "Even if I were to send him detailed instructions, it's too far from Bangkok for them to reach there in time. The only purpose *his* dispatches can serve is to keep me happy."

His Majesty then ordered the letter to be brought and read out. When Luang Surinthamat began: "Your Majesty's humble servant, Phaya Si Phiphat, craves Your Majesty's permission to inform Your Majesty ...", His Majesty broke in to ask: "Has Chao Phaya Yomarat not arrived yet?" The Treasurer replied that he had not. His Majesty asked whether the messenger had seen him anywhere. The Treasurer replied that when the Superintendent had sailed from Songkhla, he had seen eight of the expedition's ships approaching the Songkhla river on the 8th May; one of them appeared to be a junk. His Majesty said: "If it was a junk he saw, it must be Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship; it must have arrived there several days ago. Did he meet any more ships on his way here?" The Treasurer replied that he had seen another ship off Pran - it was Meun Chongsorasit's ship taking dispatches from Bangkok. His Majesty asked how many of the expedition's ships were still to arrive. Phra Narin informed His Majesty that there were still 31 ships that had not yet arrived. His Majesty exclaimed: "Where have they got to - they do not seem to be making much effort to get down there?" and ordered the reading to continue. When the letter came to the part about Luang Wichan marching his men down, His Majesty exclaimed: "What on earth's the point of marching them down - the men will be exhausted! Could not they have gone by sea?" The Treasurer replied that the ship that had been obtained on loan had rotten timbers and had had to be beached for repairs. Khun Si Sanghan would take the ship down later. The reading of the letter continued and when it had concluded His Majesty said: "This will accomplish nothing. He [Phaya Si Phiphat] should have taken steps to send someone down there to intimidate them and make them feel worried about the consequences. He is acting in too leisurely a fashion. By the time he decides to do something about the matter, it will be too late." The Treasurer said: "When the Adjutant sailed, Phaya Si Phiphat had arranged for the Governor of Sai to go back to Sai to keep an eye upon Kelantan and round up the people who had joined the rebels from Kedah. He was also going to send the Governor of Phechaburi down as well. His Majesty said: "If he can send someone down in time to intimidate them and put a bit of a scare into them, they won't dare to take up arms against the Bangkok troops." His Majesty then asked: "When

did Che Jaafar and Che Sulaiman leave Songkhla for Nakhon?" The Treasurer replied: "Five days before the Superintendent left." His Majesty said: "Matters in Kelantan should never have reached this point - it's all because of Chao Phaya Nakhon!"

His Majesty then said: "What's that you have brought in and fussing over? What are you going to read out now?" The Treasurer replied that it was the statement along with the interrogation report. His Majesty said: "Read it out then." When it came to the part about Raja Kelantan possessing cannon, muskets and gunpowder, His Majesty exclaimed: "If he's got such stocks of arms and ammunition, they won't be able to defeat him - they certainly won't be able to finish off Kelantan quickly." His Majesty then asked: "How many men does Raja Kelantan have?" The Treasurer replied: "He has five thousand men, Sire." His Majesty observed: "He's probably only got the people living in the capital - that's why he has so few. Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul probably have so many men because they've got the people living outside the capital - they must have rounded up everyone in the countryside and made them join them."

His Majesty then said to the the Treasurer: "Well, he's the man who's gone down there as the commanding general - I don't know whether he is assuming that he only has to make arrangements for dealing with Kedah, and that as regards the Kelantan business, he merely has to wait for my instructions - but the distance involved rules this out. In a situation like this it is entirely up to the commander on the spot. Whatever happens, he must try to deal with it right away - that's what he should do." When the statement and the interrogation report had been read out, His Majesty said: "It's quite intolerable! I feel very annoyed with Chao Phaya Nakhon for letting Raja Banggul get away and allowing things to reach such a pitch!" His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Send him a reply instructing him to write to Chao Phaya Nakhon telling him he must not plead sickness but must, without fail, go and help him plan the measures to be adopted. The Kelantan business is Chao Phaya Nakhon's responsibility. It's up to Phaya Si Phiphat and Chao Phaya Nakhon to decide what course of action is to be followed - the important thing is not to lose Kelantan. There is simply no time for me to issue detailed instructions - the distance is too great and they would never get there in time - all I can do is to keep in touch with him. If he doesn't succeed in dealing with the situation in time and Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul inflict a decisive defeat upon Raja Kelantan and seize the state, then Raja Banggul will throw off his allegiance and set himself up as ruler, seeking foreign backing. If matters reach such a pitch, then send the army in to crush them once and for all; if there is anyone he thinks is suitable to be appointed to look after Kelantan, he should let me know. The important thing is not to lose Kelantan. What do you think, Treasurer - if things reach such a pitch, surely we can send the army in to deal with them?" The Treasurer replied: "We can, Sire, no matter how bad

the situation was. Excluding the Nakhon people, if we take only the Songkhla people and the men from the Nine States, together with the expeditionary force from the capital, this will give us enough men to attack and defeat them." His Majesty exclaimed: "That is right! We must not include the Nakhon people [in our calculations] - let them continue their task of looking after Kedah. If trouble breaks out again, let them stay there and fight and face up to their responsibility of looking after the state. Discuss the matter [with your brother] and sound him out; see if he thinks he has enough men to defeat Kelantan; if he has not, then let him inform me and I shall arrange to send him sufficient reinforcements to enable him to deal with the situation." His Majesty then told Phraya Rachasuphawadi about the Kelantan affair, saying: "The present trouble in Kelantan is the result of my relying too much on Chao Phaya Nakhon. He told me that everything would be all right and he took Raja Banggul back with him, only to let him get away and allow matters to come to such a pass. Well, Phraya Rachasuphawadi, do you know all about the situation?" Phraya Rachasuphawadi said that he had only just that day heard about the situation. His Majesty said: "If you don't know, then you can ask people and find out." That evening the reading of the dispatches, statements and interrogation reports went on until midnight and His Majesty discussed them until just after one o'clock in the morning before retiring. His Majesty did not get around to reading the copies of the letters sent to the Governor of Sai by Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar.

On the 20th May, in the evening, the Treasurer presented to His Majesty the draft of the letter being sent in reply to Your Excellency, which was to be delivered by the Superintendent [of the Annamese unit]. His Majesty said: "That is very quick - let's hear what it says." After it had been read out, His Majesty said: "Good, that will do. The letters we sent down to be delivered by Meun Nikon, the Annamese from Chantaburi, and by Nai To, the Supervisor of the Annamese unit, have already mentioned a number of points. We can't give him precise orders - all we can do is to keep in touch with him. See that the letter goes out right away." His Majesty then asked: "Who is going to take the letter?" The Treasurer replied: "It is to be taken back by the Superintendent [of the] Annamese from Chantaburi, the man who brought the dispatches up." His Majesty said: "Good. See that he leaves right away. Give him some money to buy provisions - that will encourage him to get down there as quickly as possible. His Majesty then asked: "The Annamese detachment that was given orders to set off the other day - when did they leave?" The Treasurer replied: "They were originally going on the 14th May but were delayed as the result of Khun Ritthironakrai bringing in the opium, so we only sent off the supervisor, who sailed from Bangkok on the 15th May.

Khun Ritthironakrai was detained for further questioning in conformity with Your Majesty's wishes. He says he has no more opium - all he had were the seven cakes. I propose to ask Your Majesty to be kind enough to let him

go back right away, with the Superintendent." His Majesty said: "Very well, let him go back. Why should we punish him? All we're interested in is seizing the opium. If he really does not have any, then send him back so that he can be usefully employed. There is still a good deal to be done." His Majesty then asked: "What about [the crew of] the ship the Annamese Superintendent came up on - have they been questioned to see whether they brought any opium in with them?" The Treasurer replied that they had been questioned and had denied bringing any opium with them. His Majesty said: "See that they get off right away - they must be waiting to hear from us down there." Full details of His Majesty's observations on the situation in Kelantan are contained in the letter sent in reply to Your Excellency.

From my attendance at the discussions held in connection with Your Excellency's command of the expedition sent down to restore order in the southern provinces, I have been privileged to observe that His Majesty has shown increased interest in all matters concerned with the situation in the south and entertains high hopes of a successful outcome. His Majesty observed that, as commander of the army sent down there, it was up to Your Excellency to deal with any matter that might crop up, whether great or small, promptly and efficiently, in the best interests of the crown. Your Excellency's two dispatches about the situation in Kelantan brought up by Khun Ritthironakrai and the Superintendent of the Annamese from Chantaburi respectively caused His Majesty serious concern and His Majesty kept dwelling on Chao Phaya Nakhon's behaviour and saying how worried His Majesty was by the situation in Kelantan, which looks like getting out of hand. If Your Excellency could devise means to deal with the matter before it is too late and restore order, it would be a great relief to His Majesty.

On the 21st and 22nd May, His Majesty did not mention the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

Your humble servant has recorded the details of His Majesty's discussions and deliberations and sent them off to Your Excellency in the present dispatch, the seventh [sic] to be sent down to Your Excellency and I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties.

Dispatched on Wednesday the 22nd May 1839.

## Notes

The following table shows the results of the experiments conducted on the effect of the concentration of the solution on the rate of reaction. The concentration of the solution was varied from 0.1 M to 0.5 M, and the rate of reaction was measured by the time taken for the reaction to complete. The results show that the rate of reaction increases with increasing concentration of the solution.

Concentration of Solution (M)	Time taken for reaction to complete (s)
0.1	120
0.2	60
0.3	40
0.4	30
0.5	24

The results of the experiments show that the rate of reaction increases with increasing concentration of the solution. This is because a higher concentration of the solution means there are more particles of the reactants in a given volume, which increases the chance of collisions between the particles and thus increases the rate of reaction.

The following table shows the results of the experiments conducted on the effect of the temperature of the solution on the rate of reaction. The temperature of the solution was varied from 20°C to 40°C, and the rate of reaction was measured by the time taken for the reaction to complete. The results show that the rate of reaction increases with increasing temperature of the solution.

Temperature of Solution (°C)	Time taken for reaction to complete (s)
20	120
30	60
40	30

The results of the experiments show that the rate of reaction increases with increasing temperature of the solution. This is because a higher temperature means the particles have more kinetic energy, which increases the chance of collisions between the particles and thus increases the rate of reaction.

# The Ninth Dispatch

2 June 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat, addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. I have now sent Your Excellency seven [sic] dispatches with details of what has occurred, viz one dispatch sent with Chameun Inthrasena on the 14th March, another with the Assistant Collector of Pechaburi on the 23rd March; another with Khun Ritthironakrai, the Annamese, on the 29th March; another with Meun Chongsorasi of the Palace Watch on the 26th April; another with Meun Nikon, the Annamese, on the 5th May; another with Nai To, the officer in the Annamese unit, on the 15th May and another with Khun Ritthironakrai, the Annamese, on the 22nd May.

On the 23rd and 24th May His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah and Kelantan.

On the 25th May, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty that Your Excellency had sent up Khun Thep Aya, an official in the Songkhla administration, with a letter reporting that between the 21st and the 25th April another fourteen of the expedition's ships had arrived, making a total of 40 ships and 3409 men. Your Excellency had also instructed Khun Thep Aya to bring up to Bangkok some of the Malays who had joined the rebels, along with their families, in all 105 people, men, women and children. His Majesty asked if there was anything else in the report. The Treasurer replied that there was not. His Majesty said: "Up to now, not all the ships in the expedition have arrived. Tell me, has Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship arrived?" The Treasurer replied that it had not. His Majesty asked: "Did he meet any other ship on his way up here?" The Treasurer replied that Khun Thep Aya had sailed well out to sea and had not met any of the ships in the expedition. He had said that when he had arrived off Chumphon Bay he had met up with a long boat which was probably Chameun Rachamat's ship sailing back. His Majesty said: "I do not know *why* they have not all arrived yet - where could they have got to?"

His Majesty then asked if Your Excellency was all right. The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency was in good health. His Majesty asked: "The people brought up here - where are they from?" The Treasurer replied that some were from Chana, some from Thepha, some from [Pa]tani and also some

from Kedah. His Majesty exclaimed: "Have they got some from Kedah too - how many are there from Kedah - did they send up a list giving details?" The Treasurer replied that no list had been sent. He had asked Khun Thep Aya who had said that some of the people brought up were from Kedah although he did not know how many. His Majesty said: "Have the letter read out." The Treasurer told the reader to omit the beginning of the letter, which contained a report on the situation in Kelantan identical with that in the earlier letter brought up by the Superintendent. As a result Luang Thip Akson, the Clerk of the Seal of the Defence Department of the Front Palace, merely read out: "The previous report brought up by the Superintendent contained details of how Raja Kelantan had sent Che Jaafar and Che Sulaiman to ask Chao Phaya Nakhon for military assistance; in addition, translations of Raja Kelantan's letter and the two letters sent to the Governor of Sai were also sent up to Bangkok. After the Superintendent had been sent off with the dispatches more of the expedition's ships arrived." He then read out details of the ships that had arrived. When he mentioned the arrival of the vessels of Phaya Aphaiphithit and Phra Ratanakosa, His Majesty said: "Have they only just arrived? I thought they had arrived earlier." When the reading had concluded, His Majesty asked: "The families brought up here - were they all right on the voyage?" The Treasurer replied that some had fallen ill and died on the voyage, in all 19 able-bodied men and five other people, men and women. His Majesty asked: "What did they die of? Was it perhaps a lack of opium?" The Treasurer replied: "They fell ill because of a shortage of opium. Apparently many of them are opium-addicts." His Majesty said: "They come from a district which is crawling with opium - they are not likely to take notice of anything we say."

His Majesty then asked if any course of action had been decided upon. The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency was still waiting for Chao Phaya Yomarat and would proceed to Kedah as soon as Chao Phaya Yomarat had arrived. His Majesty exclaimed: "Where is he off to? He must finish the Kelantan business before he goes anywhere. How can he just ignore the Kelantan business?" His Majesty then asked how Your Excellency proposed to deal with the Kelantan situation. The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency was still waiting for His Majesty's instructions. His Majesty said: "Waiting for instruction from so far away? How can he possibly receive instructions in time to enable him to deal with the situation? Those ships we sent down there with the letters we sent about the situation in Kelantan - have any of them not arrived yet?" The Treasurer replied that he had asked Khun Thep Aya who had told him that as yet none of them had arrived. His Majesty said: "I sent letters dealing with the situation in Kelantan on three separate occasions, one to be delivered by Meun Nikon, the Annamese; another sent with Nai To, and supervisor of the Annamese unit; and another sent with the Superintendent. Haven't any of these arrived yet?" The Treasurer replied that they might have arrived by now. His Majesty asked Khun Thep Aya whether the officers who had arrived were all right. Phra Narin informed



His Majesty that they were all in good health. His Majesty asked if they had sufficient supplies of food. Phra Narin replied that their supply of rice would last them for 5 months, but that betel-leaves were fetching one saleung for three bunches. His Majesty laughed and said to the Treasurer: "Betel leaves are expensive in the provinces but he still sends us some as presents." His Majesty then asked how the people of the district were, and whether they had all returned to their homes. Phra Narin told His Majesty that only one in three had returned. His Majesty asked if they were Malays or Siamese. Phra Narin replied that they were people from the district. His Majesty said: "What are you talking about! I asked whether they were Malays or Siamese; what do you mean - 'people from the district'? "Phra Narin told His Majesty that they were Siamese. His Majesty said: "Why have they all gone back home? I suppose they are afraid that they will be drafted into the army, so they're still hiding in the jungle. What about the Malays - have they all gone back home?" Phra Narin replied that only one in three of them had returned home. His Majesty said: "What are they still frightened of? Even now they are reluctant to go back home. They will all starve to death in the jungle!"

His Majesty then asked what news there was of the gold and silver trees from Trengganu. Phra Narin replied that the gold and silver trees had been sent up to Songkhla. As for the accompanying gifts, an envoy had been sent down to draw the matter to their attention but he had not yet returned. His Majesty said: "All this time - what is the delay?" His Majesty then told Phaya Rachasupawadi: "See that the Malays who have been brought up here are handed over to Phaya Rachawangsan - let him find them somewhere comfortable to stay for the time being. There is no one else we can give them to. No matter how many are brought up here, just hand them all over to Phaya Rachawangsan to use as he thinks fit." His Majesty then told Phaya Rachawangsan: "The mosque is big enough to accommodate them, so put them in there for the time being and see that they're comfortable."

Phaya Rachawangsan told His Majesty that the mosque on the Nang Hong canal had plenty of room for them to stay. His Majesty said: "Good, let them stay there for the time being. If any of them are ill, get a doctor to look after them. Phaya Thap and Phaya Rachawangsan - make sure they're well treated. Draw a supply of food for them and do not let them starve. If a lot more of them are sent up here we will settle them all outside the city, at Saen Saeb.

On the 26th May His Majesty asked Phaya Rachawangsan if he had taken the Malays to the place where they were to stay. Phaya Rachawangsan replied: "I have seen them settled in, Sire. There are 33 able-bodied men along with 48 women and children - altogether, 81 people. 24 of them - 19 men and 5 women and children - died on the voyage." His Majesty asked: "Are any of them still sick?" Phaya Rachawangsan replied that some of them were. His Majesty said: "Treat them well and see that they have a doctor to attend

them; don't let them die. If they are ill, it is because they are opium-smokers who have had to go without opium, get some opium dross and mix them up some medicine - that should cure them." His Majesty then asked: "How many of them are from Kedah?" Phaya Rachawangsan replied: "20 to 15 men and 5 women and children. There are 45 from Chana - 10 men and 35 women and children - and 16 from [Pa]tani - 8 men and 8 women and children. Altogether there are 81 people - 33 men and 48 women and children." His Majesty said: "Look after them well. If they send up a lot more of them, we will settle them outside the city."

From the 27th to the 29th May, His Majesty did not mention the situation in Kedah and Kelantan.

On the 30th May, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat reported that Your Excellency had sent a Chinese called Thok, up with a letter. His Majesty asked: "What is the letter about?" The Treasurer replied that it was about the situation in Kelantan. His Majesty said: "The ships we sent down there with letters about Kelantan - have none of them arrived yet?" The Treasurer replied that none of them had arrived so far. His Majesty asked: "What does he have to report?" The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency had reported that Raja Kelantan had sent Che Yalan (?) to Chao Phaya Nakhon with a further request for military assistance. He had mentioned the name of Tuan Long Ali a cousin of Raja Kelantan and the son-in-law of Raja Banggul who had sided with Raja Kelantan during the earlier dispute between Raja Banggul and Raja Kelantan. When the present dispute broke out, Raja Kelantan had sent him to defend the mouth of the Kelantan river, but he and his men had gone over to Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul, who had thus been able to seize control of the river mouth. When Che Yalan had left Kelantan, he had been compelled to avoid the river mouth and had embarked at Bang Nam Khem. He added that Luang Sonseni's ship had arrived in the river on the 8th May and he had observed that Raja Kelantan had sent someone down to receive the official letter with all due ceremony. However he did not know what was discussed, as he had left on the 9th May. His Majesty exclaimed: "He missed him by so little - otherwise he would have had all the details!" The Treasurer then told His Majesty that Phra Phromthiban, who had gone to see Chao Phaya Nakhon, had already returned, reporting that Chao Phaya Nakhon had told him that he had interrogated Raja Kelantan's envoy as to the situation in Kelantan and the envoy had said that they had five thousand men - a statement that did not tally with the details given in Raja Kelantan's letter. [Chao Phaya Nakhon had said] that people from Nakhon had already gone down there and if matters became serious, they would inform him, but it did not appear that Raja Banggul and Tengku Besar would be able to defeat Raja Kelantan.

If the army were to be sent in to help Raja Kelantan, this might cause Raja Banggul to lose his head and flee into British territory, which would not be to our advantage, so we should wait to hear what Luang Sonseni had to report on his return before deciding how to act. Your Excellency realised that Raja Kelantan was in a tight corner and might prove unreliable so Your Excellency had arranged to send the Governor of Phechaburi with 700 men, along with Luang Anurakphubet and 300 Songkhla men, down to Sai and Jering to find out what the situation was in Kelantan. He would see that the Governor of Sai sent letters admonishing the contending parties and telling them to stop fighting. He would also deal with the Malays from Chana, Thepha and [Paltani] who had gone over to the rebels. His Majesty asked: "When will Phaya Phechaburi be sent down?" The Treasurer replied that he had not said when. His Majesty commented: "As regards sending them down to Sai and Jering - that is still some distance away from Kelantan - it will take them a day and a night to get there - that is too far. It would have been much better to station them a bit nearer so that the news could have spread quicker, and if anything serious occurred, they would be able to deal with it right away." The Treasurer said: "Once the Governor of Phechaburi gets down to Sai, the news will soon reach Kelantan - the Kelantan people are always going backwards and forwards between the two places." His Majesty said: "Once the rumours reach them, they will be scared - it will make them pause for a while." The Treasurer then told His Majesty: "As regards Kedah, the Governor of Saiburi reports that he has sent boats to attack Langkawi. His men burnt the boats in Wan Mali's fleet but Wan Mali fled with four vessels to the other side of the island, while Tengku Mat Saad fled to Perak." His Majesty asked: "What about the families on the island - did he [the Governor] get them back or not?" The Treasurer replied that the Governor had not said. His Majesty complained: "He does not report the important things! Tell me, has Chao Phaya Nakhon gone to see him [Phaya Si Phiphat] in Songkhla yet?" The Treasurer replied: "He has sent Phra Saneha Montri to see Phaya Si Phiphat. He arrived on the same day as Phra Phromthiban. The Governor of Phthalung<sup>1</sup> sent a letter after him to [Phra Sanehamontri] to report that Chao Phaya Nakhon was very ill, vomiting thick mucus which was causing him pain in the chest and making him pant and utter harsh wheezing noises. From the 9th May till the 12th May his hands and feet had been icy-cold and he had still not recovered. Phra Sanehamontri has now returned to Nakhon." His Majesty commented: "His illness is aggravated by his anger - he is furious about the letter that said even if his instructions were written in gold ink, they would still be ignored. If he's as ill as this, how can he possibly go? From the way the discussions with Phra Phromthiban went, it looks as though the whole business has been taken far too lightly. All this is because, right at the beginning, he made the mistake of letting Raja Banggul get away - that was a bad mistake." His Majesty then said: "Have the letter read out." When Luang Surinthamat came to the part about Your Excellency sending the Governor of Phechaburi with the 700 men of the Phechaburi contingent who had reached [Songkhla], along with

Luang Anurakphubet with 300 Songkhla men down to Sai, His Majesty asked: "Has Chao Phaya Yomarat arrived yet?" The Treasurer replied that he had not. His Majesty exclaimed: "This is most perplexing! Where on earth could he have got to? Nearly every other ship has arrived, but not Chao Phaya Yomarat's. What about the Chinese, Thok - did he perhaps meet any other vessel anywhere on his way up here?" The Treasurer replied: "He sailed well out to sea and did not pass any other ship." His Majesty exclaimed: "It seems quite incredible!" His Majesty then asked: "Have they reported the number of ships that have arrived?" The Treasurer replied that they had not. His Majesty said: "In the day or two before Thok left, did any ships arrive?" The Treasurer replied that no vessel had arrived. His Majesty said: "So Chao Phaya Yomarat's ship has not arrived? There is Chao Phaya Nakhon, who is very ill, Chao Phaya Yomarat, who has not arrived, and the Kelantan business becoming really serious like this - it looks as though he will have his work cut out in dealing with anything that might crop up!" When the reading of the letter had been completed, His Majesty asked: "When Luang Sonseni's ship arrives, will Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul dare to attack the Siamese?" The Treasurer replied: "They will not attack him Sire, but they probably will attack Raja Kelantan. Even though Luang Sonseni will admonish them, I doubt if they will listen to him." His Majesty said: "The ship bringing Che Yalan with Raja Kelantan's letter left too soon - if it had left a bit later, he would have known exactly what had happened. I wonder what will happen? If he can persuade them to calm down long enough for the Governor of Phechaburi's force to reach Sai, everything will be all right." After Luang Rachametha's letter had been read out, His Majesty said: "Chao Phaya Nakhon's handling of the matter has been careless and dilatory. If he had thought about sending down four or five hundred troops at the very beginning, it would have been possible to contain the situation and scare them enough to make them hold back. As it is, we have no time to do anything. If Luang Sonseni can persuade them to calm down, everything will be all right, but if they won't listen to him, then it will be too late to send our troops down." After Raja Kelantan's letter had been read out, His Majesty said that it sounded as if he was half out of his mind. After the statement had been read out, His Majesty said: "Raja Kelantan has only his four close relations supporting him - how can he fight the other side? It looks as though he's in a really tight corner. We were hoping that Chao Phaya Nakhon would come to his aid but he has fallen ill." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Send out a letter right away putting the matter in the hands of the army - it is up to them to ensure that Kelantan does not fall into alien hands. If it looks as though we cannot pacify them or persuade them and Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul defeat Raja Kelantan and seize the state, then if Tengku Besar or perhaps one of his relations assumes the throne and makes an approach to us, we must be nice to him and bring him up here for me to appoint as the new ruler. If the family set up Raja Banggul as their ruler, in view of his past offences against us he will probably do his best to seek protection from an outside party and won't make an approach

to us. If he persists in this attitude, then we must send the army in to reconquer Kelantan. If the Malays in Besut<sup>2</sup> and Trengganu come to their help and oppose us, then the army should advance and take Trengganu as well. He should get the Malays from the nine states and the Songkhla levies to assist him by linking up and crushing the enemy. If it looks as though he has not enough men to attack, then he should just hold on and consolidate his position and let me know immediately so that I can send him more reinforcements. As for Kedah, let the Nakhon and Phthalung levies take care of it and secure its safety - the trouble must not spread any further. Some of the Bangkok troops may already have gone into Kedah - we do not know where Phaya Senaphubet has got to - and it may be necessary to withdraw them. Anyway it is up to him to see that we are victorious on both fronts." Phaya Rachasupawadi said to His Majesty: "As regards Kelantan, Sire, we must send the army in. If they will not obey us, the army must attack. But I think, that if Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul do succeed in capturing Kelantan, they will not be anxious to leave it again and will probably make approaches to us." His Majesty said: "I think so too. If they do not, we will attack them. What do you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer said: "If they do not come over to us, it will be much easier if we attack them before they have had time to establish themselves. But Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul will probably come over to us. It looks as though Raja Banggul is convinced that in their previous struggle for the throne, Raja Kelantan won because he had more men and so was appointed as ruler; this time, Raja Banggul has more men so *he* should win." His Majesty said: "If they do make approaches to us, we must deal with the situation on its merits; if they do not we will attack them before they have had time to consolidate and we should defeat them pretty quickly. Where would they get hold of the powder and shot to fight us? They've already been fighting for some time - surely their ammunition must be running low?" His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Whatever plans I may have, it's too far away for them to reach there in time. Just send off a letter on these lines right away. Discuss the matters with the Chancellor and make whatever arrangements seem appropriate."

On the 31st May in the evening, the Treasurer presented to His Majesty the draft of the letter. When the reader, Nai Boriban, came to the part about Chao Phaya Nakhon falling ill and his condition becoming worse, His Majesty said: "Add a bit more, will you? Say that I am very worried about Chao Phaya Nakhon's condition. He hasn't told me how bad his condition is. He has all my sympathy and I'm anxious to hear how he is." After the draft had been amended, His Majesty ordered the part about Kedah be read out again. When this had been done, His Majesty said to the Treasurer: "I have not given my views on the Kedah situation. I have been thinking - the situation there is still uncertain; Tengku Mat Saad has escaped and has collected a number of people at Perai and we still have not made arrangements to deal with the Kedah Malays. They know that the main army has gone down there and intends to

deal with their families. When Tengku Mat Saad learns that the army is going down to Kelantan, he will send someone to incite them to rebellion and the trouble will break out again. We cannot afford to be careless in dealing with the situation. If they rebel again, we shall really be up against it. We cannot rely too much on the Nakhon levies - Chao Phaya Nakhon is very ill and I do not know whether he is going to recover or not. If his condition gets much worse, we will only have those sons of his and if trouble breaks out again, they certainly won't be able to hold them down and ensure the security of the area. They will all turn against each other and we shall have a hard time settling their quarrels. Put in something more about Kedah, will you? He will have his hands full dealing with the two situations, but that's just bad luck - he must do his best to see that we are victorious on both fronts - say something like that. What do you think, Treasurer? Should we put some of the Bangkok troops in with the Nakhon and Phthalung levies, so as to ensure Kedah's security?" The Treasurer replied that it should be all right. His Majesty said: "Well, that seems to be agreed, so let us write to him to see what he thinks. It does not matter whether he puts Phaya Senaphubet in charge or someone else, the main thing is to make sure our position is unassailable. As for Kelantan, we should be able to send the Governor of Phechaburi in to capture it without any trouble. Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul will not have had time to establish themselves and their men will be exhausted, as they've been fighting for a long time. How much can they have in the way of cannon and muskets, powder and shot, and supplies of food? They must be running short. Even if they can collect all those people and make them fight, they will not be fully prepared. If the army moves in quickly, they will have no trouble in dealing with them. Put in something on these lines and re-draft the letter." His Majesty then asked what was the outcome of the discussions with the Chancellor. The Treasurer replied: "The Chancellor says that the business is very complicated - we must make plans to deal with both contingencies, as we cannot take anything for granted." His Majesty said: "I agree. Kedah is important and we must make sure it is secure. I have been thinking of having no more than five hundred men from the army stationed in Songkhla to keep an eye on the situation in both states. If anything occurs in one or the other, they can be rushed in to help restore the situation. Do you think that's a good idea, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied that it was; it would ensure that the situation in Kedah did not get out of hand. His Majesty said: "In that case, tell him what we have been discussing. It's up to him to adopt what measures the situation demands. If we take the men from Nakhon, Phthalung, Songkhla and the Nine States, along with the Bangkok troops and divides them into two armies - will that be enough? If not, let him inform me right away so that I can send him reinforcements." His Majesty then ordered Phaya Phiphat to wait upon Krommakhun Isaretrangsarn<sup>3</sup> to remind His Majesty to hurry up the men fitting out the *Phutha Amnat* and the *Racharit*, so that reinforcements could embark and go down to assist in the attack upon Kelantan from both sea and land. His Majesty said: "With our navy blocking the river

mouth and our army attacking strength overland, how can they resist us? They must make sure that Raja Banggul is taken prisoner and then the whole affair will be over."

On the 1st June in the morning, His Majesty said to the Chancellor: "Chao Phaya Nakhon's report on Kelantan that was delivered by Phra Phromthiban could have resulted in our underestimating the danger of the situation but Phaya Si Phiphat took the matter seriously, realized the danger and sent Luang Sonseni down; so the situation might not turn out too badly. He did the right thing by sending down the Governor of Pechaburi and his men and sending Luang Phithaknathi after them by sea, but I do not know how long it will take them to get there. If they can get down there quickly, things will not be too bad. To take Kelantan is easier than taking Kedah, because in Kelantan they have not yet consolidated their position, so it will not be difficult for our troops. What do you think, Chancellor?" The Chancellor replied: "The present situation is like trying to cure two boils - on one, the head has only just developed and if we can treat it before it gets any larger, it will heal quickly. The other boil has been badly infected for a long time and is difficult to cure." His Majesty smiled and said: "You are right, it is. The Kedah business is the most serious and needs constant attention to ensure its safety. In Kelantan, if we act decisively and promptly to secure it; it should be easier to deal with than Kedah. Even if Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul defeat Raja Kelantan and make themselves the rulers, and refuse to take our side, there are still at least four people on Raja Kelantan's side. Raja Kelantan or one of the four should be able to escape and if he does so and joins us, we can take him back along with the army. The members of the State Council and his relations will all come over to us and we can easily capture the place."

His Majesty then asked Phaya Phiphat if he had been down to speed up the refitting of the ships. Phaya Phiphat replied that he had; it appeared that the *Phutha Amnat* would not be finished in time, only the *Racharit*. His Majesty told the Treasurer: "Make arrangements to take the *Racharit* and three or four other vessels. Discuss matters with the Chancellor and Phaya Rachasuphawadi to see who is to be sent down and see the men are put in a state of readiness." His Majesty then said: "Put Phaya Rachawangsan in charge of the supporting force - there is no one else we can send. Find him some men and see that supplies of food for the expedition are loaded on to the ship and send down with them." The Treasurer said: "With Your Majesty's permission, I propose to take 700 Mons and 300 of the Asa Cham brigade and embark them on the *Racharit*; the *Withyakhom* and the *Macchanu* - three vessels in all." His Majesty said: "Hurry up with the arrangements so that they can sail down to reinforce the expedition as soon as possible." His Majesty then said: "You'd better send Luang Kocha Ishak down there first so that Phaya Si Phiphat can use him to help out. He knows a good many Malays in Kelantan and the Kelantan people respect him. He can be useful in future negotiations with them. Send

him down first, on the boat belonging to the Songkhla people."

In the evening, the Treasurer presented His Majesty with the amended draft of the letter that was to be taken down by the Superintendent. It was read out to His Majesty and when it came to the part about His Majesty saying that Chao Phaya Nakhon's ideas on the subject could well have caused us to underestimate the seriousness of the situation - he should have said something about sending the army down, which would have lessened the urgency of the situation, His Majesty smiled and said that the letter seemed to be very well drafted. As the reading proceeded, His Majesty made only a few minor additions, without making any substantial alterations. When the reading had concluded, His Majesty ordered it to be read out again and when this had been done His Majesty said: "Excellent. That is very good. See that it is sent off at once." The details of His Majesty's instructions with regard to the situation in Kedah and Kelantan are in the official dispatch being sent out. When the draft had been presented to His Majesty, His Majesty asked who was to deliver the letter. The Treasurer replied that the Annamese Superintendent from Chantaburi, who had brought dispatches up to Bangkok, would take the letter back with him. Luang Kocha Ishak would sail on the Songkhla vessel leaving on the 6th June. His Majesty said: "See that the Superintendent takes the letter down there right away - it will enable him to draw up plans without any unnecessary delay. His Majesty then told Phaya Phiphat: "Get some tunics for Luang Kocha Ishak and the Superintendent; the Superintendent seems a diligent fellow - this will encourage him to make good speed on his return."

On the 2nd June in the morning, the Treasurer ordered Phra Narin to take the Superintendent to bid farewell to His Majesty. After presenting him with the tunic, His Majesty said: "Tell him to be sure and get down as quickly as possible." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer how long the Superintendent thought it would take him to get to Songkhla. The Treasurer replied that he [the Superintendent] had said that he would get to Songkhla in 13 days. His Majesty said: "Good. See that he does so." Then His Majesty asked Luang Kocha Ishak when he could leave. Luang Kocha Ishak replied that he would be able to wait upon His Majesty to take his leave on the 6th June. His Majesty said: "You know a lot about Kelantan and the Kelantan people respect you. Go down there so that if the situation involves any discussion, Phaya Si Phiphat can make use of your services."

With His Majesty's permission I have recorded His Majesty's observations along with the details from the reports and conveyed them in my dispatches, of which this is the eighth [sic] to be sent. I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties in this record of His Majesty's discussions, all of which His Majesty has graciously allowed me to attend.

Dispatched on the 2nd June 1839.



## Notes

- 1 This was the eldest son of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi). He was subsequently brought up to Bangkok as Phaya Uthaitam. In the 4th reign he was promoted to the rank of Chao Phaya Mahasirittham, the Governor of Ayuthaya.
- 2 The Malays also call it 'Besut'; it is in Trengganu.
- 3 i.e. His Royal Highness Phra Pinklao [half-brother of Rama III; full (younger) brother of Rama IV].



# *The Tenth Dispatch*

5 June 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant Luang Udomsombat addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. I have now sent Your Excellency eight [sic] dispatches giving details of what has occurred, viz; one sent with Chameun Inthrasena on the 14th March; one with the Assistant Collector of Phechaburi on the 23rd March; one with Khun Ritthironakrai on the 29th March; one with Meun Chongsorasit on the 26th April; one with Meun Nikon, the Annamese; on the 5th May, one with Nai To, the company commander of the Annamese unit; on the 15th May, one with Khun Ritthironakrai on the 22nd May, and one with the Superintendent of the Annamese [from Chantaburi] on the 2nd June.

On the 3rd June, in the morning, His Majesty said: "The situation in Kelantan should never have been allowed to reach the point where the dispute between the parties required us to send in the army - it has all come about because Chao Phaya Nakhon let Raja Banggul get away. Chao Phaya Nakhon is now seriously ill and in no state to deal with the matter. It is most unfair that the army should be put to the trouble of having to deal with [not one] but two or three problems." His Majesty then asked Luang Kocha Ishak when he would leave. He replied that he would take leave of His Majesty and depart on the 6th June. His Majesty said: "Good. Go down and help with the negotiations, so as to finish the business. You know the lie of the land down there and you know who is who and which side they are on - there is no one else who could be sent down. Go down there and if the situation requires someone to go and talk to the Malays, he can send you." Phaya Thap then told His Majesty that Chameun Rachamat, who had gone down to Chumphon to suppress the opium trade there, had reported that he had so far seized 1050 cakes of opium and was continuing the task. When he had confiscated all the opium belonging to the leading merchants [in Chumphon] he proposed, with His Majesty's permission, to go down to Chaiya to confiscate the opium there. His Majesty commented: "Before he is finished confiscating the opium in Chumphon, the news will have reached Chaiya, and before he gets to Chaiya they will have had time to hide all their opium. He has got far too few men to deal with the situation in Chumphon so he will not be able to detach any of them to go to Chaiya." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "Send two more

officials down to confiscate opium, one to Nakhon and one to Tha Thong and tell them to act so as to converge on each other: take Chameun Rakphiman and Nai Saneraksa. From Nakhon they should act so as to converge on the army - if anyone tries to hide the opium, have him flogged and seize all his opium."

On the 4th June, in the morning, His Majesty said: "It is very strange about the ship that went to Trengganu - I wonder why we have not heard anything about it. No one has arrived from there. I would like to hear some news about the gold and silver flowers - I do not know when they're going to send them up." His Majesty then asked Phaya Chodeuk if he had heard whether the ships held up in Trengganu were being used to send up the gold and silver flowers. Phaya Chodeuk replied that his enquiries had revealed that arrangements had been made to send up a ship on the 24th April but he did not know whose ship it was. His Majesty said: "When it gets here we will know what the situation is - I have been waiting to hear for some time but no one has arrived from there." Phaya Chodeuk then told His Majesty that one of the Trengganu ships that had previously brought up the gold and silver flowers had been detained in the capital in connection with smuggling women out of Bangkok; he would find someone to take the man concerned down there to clear up the matter and bring the women back. His Majesty said: "I would like to hear something about the situation [in Trengganu] - do not send him back just yet. Wait until someone arrives from there so we can find out something about the situation, and *then* send him back." The situation in Kelantan has become quite serious and we do not yet know what the situation is in Trengganu."

On the 5th June, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat bade farewell to His Majesty on behalf of Phra Anurakyotha and Nai Noi of the Corps of Pages, who were sailing on the *Thepkosin* with a cargo of goods to sell in Singapore and Penang, and also on behalf of Luang Kocha Ishak and four minor officials who were going as interpreters. His Majesty told Phra Anurakyotha: "Make sure you sell the cargo at a profit and get back here as soon as you can. Try to find out all you can about the situation there - what troop dispositions they are making etc - and let us know." His Majesty then said to Luang Kocha Ishak: "Have a safe voyage. When you get down there, if the situation requires you to go and talk to the Malays and calm them down, then see that you do so. If it appears that diplomacy is not effective, then we must use force and send the army to crush them. How the army is to proceed is detailed in the dispatch taken down by the Superintendent." His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "If any further instructions with regard to the expedition need to be sent down, then see to it." The Treasurer replied: "Full details as to how the army should be deployed were contained in Your Majesty's earlier letter. I venture to suggest that we have a copy made of Your Majesty's earlier letter and sent down there." His Majesty said: "Good idea, send it down. I have already told them exactly

how the army is to proceed. If anything further remains to be added, see that this goes in a separate letter."

The details of His Majesty's deliberations that I have recorded are based upon the discussions that I was privileged to attend. The present despatch is the ninth [sic] that I have sent Your Excellency. Apart from the dispatch delivered by Khun Ritthironakrai, I do not know whether these dispatches have reached Your Excellency and their contents communicated to Your Excellency. I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties.

Dispatched on the 5th June 1839.



# *The Eleventh Dispatch*

*7 June 1839*

Your Excellency's humble servant Luang Udomsombat addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. On the 5th June I sent Your Excellency another dispatch, entrusted to Luang Kocha Ishak.

On the 7th June, in the morning, Luang Kocha Ishak came back to Bangkok, bringing with him Che Madtafa [?Mustafa], a trader from Trengganu. Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that Che Mustafa's ship had left Trengganu on the 19th May and had called in at Kelantan on the 23rd May. It had stayed in Kelantan for two days before sailing, taking 13 days to make the voyage to the Bangkok river. His Majesty exclaimed: "Good! I've been waiting to hear about the situation there. What news does he have?" The Treasurer replied: "When he was in Trengganu he learnt that Raja Banggul and Tengku Besar were fighting against Raja Kelantan. Tengku Besar's men had set up camp at the river mouth while Raja Banggul had set up camp upstream of the capital. They were thus preventing Raja Kelantan's followers in the up-river region from coming to his assistance, while Tengku Besar's men were preventing help reaching him from the river mouth. Raja Kelantan was said to have only a few men and would probably not be able to hold out against Raja Banggul and Tengku Besar. Che Mustafa had added that some people from Besut who had come to buy cattle in the town had been detained by Raja Banggul and forced to fight for him. Raja Banggul had sent a letter to Raja Trengganu requesting him to come and help him in his struggle against Raja Kelantan but the Trengganu ruler had refused. His Majesty exclaimed: "These Besut people he says came to buy cattle - what sort of cattle would they be buying at this time? With fighting going on and the state being in general disorder, how could they come and buy cattle - it is all nonsense. The bit about getting help must refer to these people from Besut. It seems unlikely that the Ruler of Trengganu would send him any help - if he had, then he certainly would not have sent a ship up here to trade. What do you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied that it seemed unlikely that the Ruler of Trengganu would send help to Raja Banggul.

His Majesty then asked: "When he called at Kelantan did he learn whether the vessel from the Bangkok army had arrived there and whether fighting was still going on - did he hear the sound of gunfire?" The Treasurer replied that

when Che Mustafa arrived in Kelantan he saw a brig anchored in the estuary; he had heard no gunfire and said that everything was quiet. His Majesty asked: "Did he hear whether the envoy sent down by the army had arrived to tell them to stop fighting and whether they had complied?" The Treasurer replied: "He says he does not know whether the envoy told them to stop fighting; what he did hear was that the fighting would break out again." His Majesty said: "That is just bluff on their part - if they were not scared of us, things certainly would not be quiet. They must be frightened, that is why they are keeping quiet. If they do not obey orders to break off the fighting, they'll have to face up to our army, which has now taken up a position at Songkhla. They are bound to be scared and once Phaya Phechaburi's force takes up its position in Sai they'll call a halt to their quarrel." His Majesty then asked Phaya Rachasuphawadi: "How do you foresee things will turn out - if we tell them to stop, will they obey?" Phaya Rachasuphawadi replied: "The number of men on Raja Kelantan's side has gone down, so if Raja Banggul and Tengku Besar had not obeyed, but kept on fighting, they would have defeated him by now. It looks as though they have obeyed orders and so the situation has quietened down." His Majesty said: "You are right, how could they possibly refuse to obey our instructions? The letter from the army told them quite clearly that they must without fail stop fighting, otherwise we would send in the army. They are bound to be too scared to fight the army! If they remain defiant and ignore our orders, they will suffer total destruction. With disaster staring them in the face, they will surely be scared - they're bound to quieten down. What do you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied: "I agree, Sire. Once Phaya Phechaburi arrives in Sai and gets the Governor of Sai to write and tell them off, things should quieten down. When Che Mustafa left, he met up with an open bowed [junk] with Luang Phithaknathi on board, sent down by Phaya Si Phiphat. It had already passed the Kelantan border and was approaching the river mouth." His Majesty said: "That was a very good idea to send some ships down; if he can send another two or three ships down there to accompany Luang Sonseni, that would be splendid - the more troops from the army that are down there, the more they'll be cowed."

His Majesty then told Luang Kocha Ishak to go and ask Che Mustafa if he had heard any talk in Kelantan of the army setting up camp in Songkhla and whether they were frightened that the army would be sent down to help Raja Kelantan - did the gossip reveal any signs of panic, or what. Luang Kocha Ishak went out to ask and returned to inform His Majesty: "Che Mustafa heard members of the State Council saying that an envoy from the army had arrived and told them to cease fire and that they obeyed his orders and stopped fighting." His Majesty asked: "Did he hear whether they'd heard the rumours and had become scared that the army would come to Raja Kelantan's aid?" Luang Kocha Ishak replied: "I asked him, Sire, but he said that he had not heard any such rumours." His Majesty said: "He left too soon - how would he hear anything on a visit lasting only two days. What he says about them obeying



orders and stopping the fighting is probably because they became scared and so quietened down. If they remain quiet until Phaya Phechaburi's force pushes on to Sai, we should be able to get them to obey orders without too much trouble. Anyway, let us hope that we can persuade them to see reason; this will afford the army some relief and allow them to concentrate on dealing with Kedah. If they have to deal with a multiplicity of matters like this, they will have their work cut out, as they have never been down there before." His Majesty then told Luang Kocha Ishak: "Try to find out as much as you can and let us know. When you get down there, tell the army to send down some of its biggest ships and to send a brigade of troops to march down there as quickly as possible so that the necessary instructions are issued in time to get them to stop fighting. Then they [the army] will not have their hands full and will only have to deal with Kedah."

The Treasurer then told His Majesty that he had enquired about the gold and silver flowers and been told that arrangements had been made to load the offerings on to a ship from Trengganu but he did not know the date fixed for its departure. His Majesty said: "Do not believe them! It's all lies! How can they sail so late in the season? They certainly will not come. Naturally all the people on the trading vessels say the same thing, that they are coming, but how can you believe them?"

The details of His Majesty's deliberations that I have recorded here and which are based upon the discussions that I was privileged to attend, I am sending down will all speed. I have also enclosed a copy of Che Mustafa's statement. I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties.

Dispatched on Friday, the 7th June 1839.

THE HISTORY OF THE CITY OF BOSTON

FROM THE FIRST SETTLEMENT IN 1630  
TO THE PRESENT TIME  
BY  
JOHN H. COLEMAN  
OF THE  
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

BOSTON  
PUBLISHED BY  
THE BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY  
AT THE CORNER OF CORNHILL AND NASSAU STREETS  
1891

THE BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY  
CORNHILL AND NASSAU STREETS  
BOSTON  
1891

# The Twelfth Dispatch

14 June 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat, addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. I have previously sent Your Excellency ten [sic] dispatches containing details of what has occurred, viz. one dispatch sent with Chameun Inthrasena on the 14th March; another with the Assistant Collector of Phechaburi on the 23rd March; two others with Khun Ritthironakrai, on the 29th March; and the 22nd May, another with Meun Chongsorasit on the 26th April, another with Meun Nikon, the Annamese, on the 5th May, another with Nai To, the Supervisor of the Annamese unit on the 15th May, another with the Superintendent [of the Annamese] on the 2nd June and two others with Luang Kocha Ishak on the 5th and 7th June.

On the 7th June, in the evening, Phaya Phiphat presented to His Majesty the statement made by Che Mustafa, the trader from Trengganu. His Majesty asked whether a copy of the statement had been sent down with Luang Kocha Ishak. Phaya Phiphat replied that it had. His Majesty said: "Good, see that he takes it down. Anyway, they probably know more about the situation there than we do." His Majesty then told Phaya Phiphat: "There is a little more I would like you to ask him. What sort of stockades have been erected around Raja Kelantan's compound and Tengku Besar's compound, and whereabouts. Which of the two is more popular with the people there? Take the master and the crew and interrogate them. They have been to Kelantan so they should know something."

On the 8th June, in the evening, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat what he had learnt from his interrogation of the Trengganu people. Phaya Phiphat replied: "The only thing at all different was that the local people have considerable affection for Raja Kelantan, but are afraid of Tengku Besar's men, with the result that many of them have been forced to join Tengku Besar's side. They [the people questioned] did not know which of the two was favoured by the members of their family. They report that the Kelantan estuary is rather narrow with shifting sands on both sides, tending to silt up. The entrance is only wide enough to allow entry to one vessel at time and is nowhere more than a fathom deep; vessels using the channel have to transfer their cargo [to boats of shallower draught]. However they do not know anything about the stockades constructed by Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar - Che Mustafa did

not go and see them." His Majesty said: "There is some truth in what they say. Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul have a lot of people with them and they live outside the capital and can do what they like. The local people would naturally be afraid of them and have to join them. Still, just wait until the army gets there. When they know the army is coming to the help of Raja Kelantan, they will all turn against them. Have three or four large vessels blockade the river mouth - even though the river is too shallow for large ships to sail up it, they can anchor in the estuary and guard the approach by sea. When the army has marched down there, we should be able to get them to see reason all right."

On the 9th June, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat reported to His Majesty that Your Excellency sent Meun Phimon, the Annamese, up with a letter, together with a letter from Raja Kelantan and its translation. Your Excellency had also sent up a report from Meun Thep and a letter for the Treasurer, along with a report that Chao Phaya Nakhon had passed away on the 12th May. His Majesty asked: "What was Chao Phaya Nakhon suffering from? He did not even tell me what was wrong with him - what was the illness that brought about his death." The Treasurer replied that even Phaya Phathalung's letter to Your Excellency, which had been sent up here had not stated what the illness was. His Majesty said: "Why did not the army people question the man who came to see them?" The Treasurer told His Majesty that he had asked Meun Phimon Kamchon about this but he had said that he did not know. His Majesty exclaimed: "I was waiting to hear what was wrong with Chao Phaya Nakhon but he would not tell me."

His Majesty then asked whether things had quietened down in Kelantan. The Treasurer replied: "As soon as Luang Sonseni arrived, the fighting stopped. It is reported that Tengku Besar is sending someone to see Phaya Si Phiphat. Tengku Besar says that it is too much to ask him to take orders from Raja Kelantan. Before Raja Kelantan was appointed as ruler, Tengku Besar spoke up on his behalf and helped to secure his accession but, to his mortification, he received nothing in return. After Raja Kelantan became ruler his attempts to browbeat his relations caused fighting to break out and in these circumstances Tengku Besar claims he is quite justified in resorting to force. If Phaya Si Phiphat would be so kind, Tengku Besar wishes merely to be granted possession of the land on that side of the river in which his compound is situated, from upstream down to the river mouth, to enable him to continue to perform his duty to the crown. He will send up tribute to His Majesty on the same scale as the offerings made by Raja Kelantan." His Majesty said: "They live cheek by jowl, in the same town, in the same state how can we divide it up into two states? It would not be long before they would start quarrelling again - do you not think so, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied: "Phaya Si Phiphat has written to say that it would be extremely difficult to make such arrangements. Even if arrangements were made along the lines suggested, they would remain

at peace only as long the army is down there. If the troops are withdrawn, the trouble will probably break out again." His Majesty said: "They certainly would not follow our instructions and if the country is divided up into two or three territories like this, the trouble will start all over again. In a situation like this, we must eliminate one side or the other - we cannot have two rulers in one and the same state." His Majesty went on to ask: "When is Tengku Besar sending someone up to see Phaya Si Phiphat?" The Treasurer replied: "In four or five days, Sire". His Majesty asked: "Where did the messenger meet the open-bowed vessel which was taking Luang Phitaknathi down - has it arrived there yet?" The Treasurer replied that it had not yet arrived, nor had Meun Thep seen it on his voyage back [to Songkhla]. His Majesty said: "As soon as the *dolphin* and Phaya Phechaburi get down there, they will become scared and quieten down." The Treasurer said: "As regards sending Phaya Phechaburi down there, Phaya Si Phiphat is waiting until he hears what Tengku Besar's envoy has to say. If he were to send someone down there right away, they would become scared and all take flight, along with their families. Even now, so it is said, they have evacuated some of their people to Besut." His Majesty said: "That is right - we must hear what he has to say first."

His Majesty then said: "Bring the letter and read it out." When Luang Surinthamat, who was reading it out, came to the part about Luang Soraseni sending Khun In, Meun Thep and Meun Saccha to see Raja Kelantan to tell him to come and receive the letter from Phaya Si Phiphat, His Majesty laughed and said: "When Raja Kelantan learnt of their arrival, he must have been overjoyed as though some divinity had granted all his wishes!" When the letter came to the part about Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar asking the envoys Khun In and Meun Thep to spend the night with them, His Majesty said: "It appears as though they want to keep them there as witnesses, as neither of them trusts the other." The letter then came to the part where Raja Kelantan had told Luang Sonseni that now that he had arrived, he must see that the security of His Majesty's domains was safeguarded - if he would just send down three thousand troops, they could carry off every one of the rebels; he wished to keep with him only those who had taken his side. He also said that, as His Majesty had already appointed him as ruler of Kelantan, what did he have to gain by taking up arms against his relations? His Majesty laughed and said: "Raja Kelantan is a very smart chap and argues very well - he makes out that it's up to the envoy to help *him* defend the state, and he wants the army to go down there and seize the rebels. The way he talks, it would seem as though he's at the end of his resources, and wants the army to step in." The letter then came to the part about Tengku Besar wanting to see the letter sent to Raja Kelantan. It had been proposed to show him a copy of the letter but Tengku Besar had rejected this. At this, His Majesty exclaimed: "He's a troublesome sort of individual by the sound of it and he does not seem very straight-forward. He tries to justify himself by accusing Raja Kelantan of not appointing him to any office. As regards appointing any of the relations, the

proper thing is for Raja Kelantan to write to me first, requesting the appointment and then I can formally appoint the man. But this fellow refuses to pay any respect to Raja Kelantan - so how can he complain that he hasn't received any appointment? His protests are simply attempts to justify himself and quite without foundation!"

After the reading of the letter had been completed, His Majesty asked: "The ships that went down there with my directives on the Kelantan situation - haven't any of them arrived yet?" The Treasurer replied that none of them had arrived. His Majesty said: "I wonder why none of them have arrived. I have written them one letter after another, time after time - where could they got to? I suppose they have been taking their time, wandering about all over the place?" The Treasurer replied that this was not so; some of the ships that had left earlier would probably have arrived by now. His Majesty said: "If they have, the instructions I sent down in the earlier letters weren't very far short of the mark. My previous letters made it clear how I wanted them to act." His Majesty then asked: "How many of the ships in the expeditionary force have still to arrive?" The Treasurer replied: "There are still eight vessels to come." His Majesty exclaimed: "Where could they have wandered off to - all this time and they still all haven't arrived!" After this the report was read out. When it came to the part about Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar both wanting one of the envoys - Khun In and Meun Thep to stay with them, and about Raja Kelantan wanting the army to intervene and carry off the rebels, His Majesty laughed and said: "What he says is true - he is at his wit's end - right up against it - and scared of what might happen to him. Their asking the envoys to stay there, one on each side, is because they don't trust each other and are afraid that fighting will break out again." When the report had concluded, His Majesty spoke about Tengku Besar, saying: "How can we give him our backing - he acts in such an erratic fashion, almost unbalanced I would not wonder - what he says is badly expressed and unconvincing. What Raja Kelantan says is well-expressed and to the point - he's a very shrewd fellow and deserves to be the ruler of the state."

After this the letter was read out and His Majesty observed: "They are too far away and they would have to wait too long to receive any instructions I might send down - there is no way they would get them in time. If he decides to send the army in, as Raja Kelantan suggests, well that is all right. Even if they all try to run away, they won't have time to take all of their followers with them - they could only take their own families. What do you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied that they would not be able to take many people with them - their followers would be too attached to their homes. His Majesty said: "They are not likely to go anywhere; when they find out that the army has come to the help of Raja Kelantan, they are bound to come over to him everyone of them." After this, the letter reporting Chao Phaya Nakhon's fatal illness was read out to His Majesty. His Majesty said: "When one's last

hour arrives, what can one do? He has my deepest sympathy. He never told me anything about this illness. How can find someone to replace him as Governor of Nakhon?" His Majesty then returned to the subject of Kelantan, saying: "To make arrangements on the lines suggested by Tengku Besar is very difficult. How can it be done? Suppose Raja Kelantan is eliminated and we appoint Tengku Besar - would Raja Banggul and Wan Muda go along with this? Both of them would want to be ruler and quarrels would break out again. However, as long as Raja Kelantan remains on the scene, well, he is the man we appointed as ruler and we must give him our support. If they will not be reconciled and take flight, there is no way they can carry off a lot of people with them - all they will be able to take will be their own families. If they try to recapture Kelantan, they will not have enough men - even if they try to persuade Trengganu people to help them, Raja Kelantan should be able to hold his own. If they escape into British territory and the British try to make something of it, well, it will simply be a case of relations fighting among themselves - the army goes down there to pacify them, they do not want to stay, so they run away, of their own accord. If they come over to us as I said, then we must be conciliatory and try to bring them up here. Whatever happens, the first thing we must do is to get hold of the people concerned. Details as to what action should be taken are contained in the letters I have already sent. The arrangements I proposed were substantially correct and only need some minor modifications. The important point is that we should not lose Kelantan. If they follow my earlier directives - it does not matter how they carry them out - then everything will turn out all right. It now looks as though they are becoming more amenable and are prepared to go along with us. It would be very difficult to follow Tengku Besar's suggestion and divide the country up into two separate states. Even if we did, then others would want to follow suit and then how many states would there be - two, three or what - do you not think so, Chancellor?"

The Chancellor replied that it was out of the question to comply with Tengku Besar's proposal - if we did, they would only start quarrelling again. His Majesty said: "Then what course of action should we follow?" The Chancellor replied: "We should see that the parties concerned are made to go and see Phaya Si Phiphat and discuss matters together and then have them brought up here [to Bangkok]. If they seem likely to refuse, then we must use guile to get hold of them - move our troops down there in small detachments and make sure we secure the people concerned." His Majesty said: "Only the innocent parties will come - the guilty parties certainly will not. But if they run away - let them. If they will not come, then we must send in the army, as Raja Kelantan suggests, and see that order is restored. You, Chancellor, and you, Treasurer - talk the matter over and let me know your views on the situation and whether you have any other suggestions."

In the evening, His Majesty spoke about Chao Phaya Nakhon saying: "He has served the crown over a long period of time, deserving our friendship and earning our respect and our esteem. Our relationship has always been an amicable one and I have always endeavoured to look favourably on him: he was shrewd enough to see that. I never took umbrage with him over anything, and I never allowed anyone to go over his head. I had hoped to continue to support him into his old age but the Angel of Death has visited him and cut short our relationship. It grieves me that our relationship had to come to an end before he had attained to a ripe old age."

His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "What was the result of your discussions on Kelantan?" The Treasurer replied that he had discussed the matter with the Chancellor and Phaya Rachasuphawadi and they had concluded that if the Kelantan people would not return to the fold, we would have to send the army in to attain our ends. His Majesty said: "Since we all seem to be agreed on that, would you, Treasurer, write him [Phaya Si Phiphat] a letter telling him what we have decided with regard to Kelantan. In fact I have already sent him a good many letters telling him what to do; when they get there he will understand what he has got to do and he will be able to take the appropriate measures. But as regards Kedah, Phaya Si Phiphat has not yet put us wise as to who should be appointed to rule there, and the matter is very important. Now that Chao Phaya Nakhon has passed away, we must do our utmost to ensure the security of the place. What do you think, Treasurer - who would you suggest should govern Nakhon?" The Treasurer replied: "It must be one of Chao Phaya Nakhon's three sons Phaya Phathalung, Phra Sanehamontri or Nai Rit - but Phaya Phathalung is an opium-smoker. They say that Phra Wichitsorakrai also smokes opium, but I don't know for sure." His Majesty said: "I never knew he was an opium-smoker," and asked Nai Rit if he knew whether Chao Phaya Nakhon had said anything about the matter. Nai Rit replied that he had not. The Treasurer told His Majesty that Phaya Phathalung had been Chao Phaya Nakhon's favourite. His Majesty said: "Phaya Phathalung is the eldest brother, but as for appointing him to succeed Chao Phaya Nakhon, he has a withered leg and would not be active enough to deal with any emergency that might crop up. Let Phra Sanehamontri succeed his father. Make Phaya Phathalung the Lord Lieutenant and Nai Rit the Assistant Governor and let all three stay together in Nakhon. Even if Phaya Phathalung tries to assert himself, Phra Sanehamontri and Nai Rit get along well together and the pair of them should be able to handle him<sup>1</sup>. Put Phra Wichitsorakrai in charge of Phathalung. As for Kedah, we must inform Phaya Si Phiphat of the result of our deliberations and make sure he includes Thalang and Phangnga in any arrangements he makes. Chao Phaya Nakhon has a good many sons and I shall support them according to their seniority. If he wants a Malay to rule Kedah, then move the Governor of Saiburi and Phra Senanuchit to Phangnga. I will raise Phangnga's status and put Thalang, Takua Thung and Takua Pa under it, as Phangnga is one of our strongholds. If he wants



the Governor of Saiburi to remain as Governor, we must see if the former Governor of Chaiya is prepared to go to Phangnga. If he is, then send him there. See that the letter makes the position quite clear. Now that Chao Phaya Nakhon is gone, all we have are his brood of sons, who all want to be independent of each other - things will not be the same as when Chao Phaya Nakhon was still alive. If trouble should break out again and the Malays, knowing that Chao Phaya Nakhon is no longer with us, turn against us and rebel again, it is most unlikely that the sons will cooperate with each other in the same way that they did when Chao Phaya Nakhon was still alive - they will disgrace us by making off with all speed. His Excellency must give the matter a great deal of thought and endeavour to promote harmony between the brothers and prevent any ill feeling between them. His Excellency must make sure that our position is safe against any eventuality."

On the 10th June His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 11th June, in the morning, the Treasurer presented to His Majesty the draft of the letter that was to be delivered by Meun Phimonkamchon. Nai Boriban, reading the letter out to His Majesty, quoted from the dispatch sent up, ending with the reference to the death of Chao Phaya Nakhon. He was about to continue with His Majesty's instructions with regard to the situation in Kelantan when His Majesty broke in: "Now that the letter has mentioned the subject of death, it would not be appropriate to continue with my instructions on Kelantan. It would be better to deal with these topics in two separate letters. Anyway just read on." When the reading had concluded, His Majesty said: "Yes, that puts it very well but there is a bit missing. Add that when order has been restored in Kedah, it will be under Nakhon, as before. Impress upon the Governor of Songkhla and Chao Phaya Nakhon's sons that they must live in harmony and all work together. There must be no quarrelling or animosity between them. If one of them has any trouble, then the other two must go to his aid right away - they must love one another like brothers. If he can bring this about, all will be well. Make the draft into two separate letters and let me hear them again, will you?"

On the 12th June, in the morning, His Majesty ordered Phra Narin to tell the Treasurer that in drafting the letter, when it came to discussing who was to take Kedah, he should be favourably disposed towards the Malays. His Majesty then said to Phaya Rachasuphawadi: "You must go and see the Treasurer and mention this point. If I leave it to Phra Narin, he will only forget all about it, but take him along with you, just the same." The Chancellor told His Majesty that, with His Majesty's permission, he would like to go and see the Treasurer. His Majesty said: "That is good. Go and see him and tell him that if a Malay is made ruler of Kedah, we must take away most of their cannon, muskets and other weapons, leaving them only a few. What we take

away, we must divide up between Trang and Setul so as to make them safe against attack. Find a Malay from the royal family and put him in charge. If we flatter him a bit, he will be really proud of his new rank. He will be on good terms with the old establishment and will enjoy their respect - get him to try and win them over - he will probably be able to persuade a lot of them to come back. If he rebels and tries to become independent and our Malays join him and attack Kedah again, we must send in the levies from the three or four provinces there to attack him and crush the rebels. However, if he proves amenable and is happy to obey us, then, if he wants to be a ruler in his own right (become independent) and sends up the gold and silver flowers, we can be nice to him and give him a try as sultan. What do you think, Chancellor, would our Malays take advantage of our goodwill and go as far as acknowledge him as *their* ruler?" The Chancellor replied: "Once he's appointed as ruler he will take pride in the high position he enjoys there. I think it's unlikely that he will allow any one else to become too powerful.

His Majesty said: "If arrangements are made to appoint a Malay to administer Kedah, then the Governor of Saiburi and Phra Senanuchit will have to be moved to Phangnga. If we cannot find a Malay to rule Kedah, it will have to be a Siamese and we cannot do better than the Governor of Saiburi, because he understands the Malay way of doing things. If he is to continue as governor, we shall have to make quite sure that Kedah is impregnable. If it is not, and he runs away *again*, we shall lose all respect in the eyes of the Malays. We must see that we have a garrison there of one or two thousand men to guarantee the security of the state and remove any anxiety on our part. These men should be drawn from the border regions of Songkhla or Phthalung or any province which borders on Kedah, so that they can be put under Kedah. Move their families and settle them in Kedah territory and then if trouble breaks out they can help to deal with it without delay. Some of the Nakhon officials of various grades who were stationed in Phthalung, Kedah and Trang when Chao Phaya Nakhon was still alive are still there. Find out which of Chao Phaya Nakhon's sons they would prefer to serve with, and make arrangements accordingly - we do not want to have them disaffected and quarelling. If the Governor of Saiburi is to continue as Governor, find out from the Governor of Chaiya whether he is prepared to take over Phangnga and if so, send him there. He must be particularly careful in dealing with the situation in Thalang, Phangnga and the Nine States. If we can ensure that they are safe from any eventuality, it would be a fine thing."

In the evening His Majesty asked the Treasurer whether he had finished the letters. The Treasurer replied that he had. His Majesty commented: "That's very quick, bring them here and read them out. I would like to hear what they say, just to set my mind at rest." When Nai Boriban, who was reading out the letter dealing with the arrangements to be made regarding Nakhon and Kedah, came to the point about His Majesty always supporting Chao Phaya

Nakhon, His Majesty broke in: "I would like you to add the necessary words to show that these are my very own sentiments - say that I have always shown him every consideration - this mark of royal favour will be appreciated by his offspring." After the letter had been amended, the reading continued and when it came to the part about having Phra Wichitsorakrai look after Phathalung, His Majesty said: "You have left out the bit about putting it under Bangkok, as it used to be - write so as to make it clear that formerly Phathalung looked up to Nakhon because of the father and son relationship, and so it reported to Nakhon. From now on however, if anything of importance happens, it is to be reported directly to Bangkok, although routine matters should continue to be reported to Nakhon, as from one brother to another. Tell them they must work closely together." When the letter had been amended, the reading continued, and when it had concluded, His Majesty said: "It seems to me that you have covered everything and expressed it very well too. The letters drafted by our servant Luang Si Sena are rather bald and not very well-phrased. It will not be too long before your Luang Thip Akson, the Clerk of the Seal to the Ministry of War, is the better of the two."

His Majesty went on: "There is something missing in the instructions I gave this morning, about having a Malay rule Kedah. Whether you include them in this letter or whether you put them in a separate letter of your own, that is up to you, Treasurer, but see that they go in. Say that, if we put a Malay in charge of Kedah, we must take away most of their cannon, muskets and other weapons, leaving them only a few. Find a Malay from the Kedah royal family, talk nicely to him and get him to go and administer the state - he's bound to be delighted to attain such a rank. He will be on good terms with the old establishment and enjoy their respect; he should be able to persuade many of them to place their trust in him and return home. If many of them join him and they then try to set themselves up as independent, then he must report to me and co-operate in crushing the rebellion. If *our* Malays go over to them out of respect for members of the former ruling dynasty, and are prepared to accept them as their rulers, throwing off their allegiance to us, and if they then decide to attack us again, then we must call out the levies from three or four provinces to co-operate in driving them out and grind them to pieces. However, if the man does what we say, and is prepared to send up the gold and silver flowers as in former days, then we will go along with him and give him a trial as Sultan. What do you think, Treasurer? - if we say something on these lines, that should do. I am still not fully conversant with the situation down there so I cannot give him any more detailed instructions." The Treasurer replied: "These directives of Your Majesty should enable Phaya Si Phiphat to deal with the situation without too much trouble." His Majesty said: "If we say clearly what we have in mind, it will be a great help to him and enable him to deal with the situation without too much difficulty. By the way, these last points - I told two or three people to tell you, but they still forgot." His Majesty went on: "Make sure you put them in - I leave it to you

to decide whether to revise the present letter or send him a separate letter on the subject."

On the 13th June, in the evening, His Majesty said to the Treasurer: "If a Malay is appointed in Kedah, this does not mean that the former ruler will come back over to us. The only people who might go back will be Tengku Mat Saad along with his sons and nephews. Even if the former Sultan *does* want to go back, will not the Malay we appoint as ruler be keen to hang on to his position and refuse to let him?" The Treasurer replied: "Very likely, Sire." His Majesty said: "If he will not let him return because he is keen on hanging on to his position, he should be able to persuade the Malays of the old establishment to go back: those who have fled into British territory." His Majesty then told Krommaluang Rakronaret about the arrangements His Majesty made with regard to Nakhon and Kedah saying: "Kedah is very important. If the Malays learn that Chao Phaya Nakhon is no longer with us and attack us again, will Chao Phaya Nakhon's offspring be able to cope as well as their father did? We must insist that they work closely together to maintain the security of the realm and safeguard it against attack. What do you think about putting a Malay in charge of Kedah and having the Governor of Saiburi take over Phangnga - is this a good idea or not?" Krommaluang Rakronaret replied: "I think it should be all right, Sire."

His Majesty then [turned to the Treasurer] said: "If you have got something to read out, please do so," whereupon the Treasurer then presented the letter to His Majesty. When Nai Boriban, who was reading it out, came to the part about appointing a Malay to rule Kedah, His Majesty said: "Put in a bit more saying that as Kedah is under Nakhon and is also close to Songkhla, both Phra Sanhamontri and the Governor of Songkhla should keep an eye on the situation there and make sure they are fully informed of what the Malays are up to." When the letter had been amended, the reading continued. When it came to the part about having Nakhon, Phthalung and Songkhla co-operate in raising troops to assist out in an emergency, His Majesty said: "Add Thalang as well." When this had been done the reading continued. At its conclusion His Majesty said: "You have dealt with everything quite satisfactorily, but there's still a bit missing. I would like you to add a bit more to say that if we appoint a Malay in Kedah we must move the Governor of Saiburi to Phangnga; see that he takes with him the Malays he trusts and who have been in his service for some time - this will increase our strength in Phangnga. Any rebel or anyone who cannot be trusted must be brought up here. We must leave only a small force in Kedah; he must see that the Governor of Saiburi takes away with him everything he had there in the way of ships, warboats, [pirate]-chasers, cannon, muskets and other weapons. If we abandoned Kedah, we would be losing a considerable source of revenue and the British would pick it up and annex it; we cannot treat the matter lightly. Add something on these lines, will you?" When the letter had been amended, the reading continued, and

at its conclusion, His Majesty said: "Read it out again, will you." When this had been done, His Majesty said: "That's good. That will do." His Majesty then ordered that the letter with details about the arrangements to be made regarding Nakhon and Kedah, should be read out to Krommaluang Rakronaret. When this had been done, His Majesty asked: "Does it sound all right?" Krommaluang Rakronaret replied: "It puts everything very clearly, Sire." His Majesty observed: "Putting things as clearly as this will be a great help to him and enable him to deal with the matter without too much difficulty. The present situation is a very difficult one for him as he has so many problems to deal with, and he needs to exercise the utmost care." His Majesty then asked: "Is the same person who brought the dispatches up going to take them back?" The Treasurer replied that he was sending down Meun Phimonkamchon, who had brought up the dispatches. His Majesty said: "See that he leaves at once; once he gets down there and he [Phaya Si Phiphat] learns the contents of the dispatches, it should ease his mind a good deal." All the details of His Majesty's observations on the situation in Kelantan and Kedah and the arrangements His Majesty has made with regard to Nakhon are set out clearly in documents taken down by Meun Phimonkamchon.

Details of His Majesty's observations which I have been granted permission to record and transmit to Your Excellency are based upon the discussions that His Majesty was gracious enough to allow me to attend. This makes the eleventh dispatch that I have sent to Your Excellency and I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties contained in it.

Dispatched on Friday, the 14th June 1839.

## Notes

- 1 It was no secret that Phaya Phthalung did not get on well with Phra Sanehamontri. Rama III had, therefore, transferred him to a post in Bangkok, with the title of Phaya Uthaitam.



# *The Thirteenth Dispatch*

6 July 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant, Luang Udomsombat, addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. I have so far sent Your Excellency eleven [sic] dispatches containing details of what has occurred viz, one with Chameun Inthrasena on the 14th March; one with the Assistant Collector of Phechaburi on the 23rd March; two with Khun Ritthironakrai - one on the 29th March and the other on the 22nd May; [one with Meun Chongsorasit on the 26th April]; one with Meun Nikon, the Annamese, on the 5th May; one with Nai To, the Supervisor of the Annamese unit, on the 15th May; one with the Superintendent on the 2nd June; two with Luang Kocha Ishak - one on the 5th June and the other on the 7th June and one with Meun Phimonkamchon on the 14th June.

On the 14th June, in the evening, Phra Narin informed His Majesty that Phaya Phathalung had sent Khun Chamnong up with a letter to say that Chao Phaya Nakhon had been suffering from pneumonia. He had been vomiting and his bronchial passages had been congested with thick mucus. His illness had begun on the 6th May and the illness had taken a turn for the worse on the 12th May. His breathing became laboured, there was [a great deal of] phlegm causing him to utter harsh wheezing noises; his limbs became cold and paralysed until finally, just after eleven o'clock at night, he passed away. The letter also stated that the Governor of Saiburi had reported [to Nakhon] that he had sent a fleet of 19 vessels to Langkawi along with a British warship. When the fleet arrived there, Wan Mali had fled, making for Batu Bara, apparently intending to go and stay on the islands off Mergui. As regards Kedah, the Governor of Saiburi had persuaded 1500 Malays to return home and had arrested 600 others. Also enclosed was Raja Kelantan's letter which Che Jaafar and Che Sulaiman had taken to Chao Phaya Nakhon, along with its Thai translation, and the report made by the two envoys. The details are identical with those contained in the dispatch previously sent up here by Your Excellency. His Majesty asked: "Why have they only now been sent up here? Since the details are exactly the same, just read me the letter about Chao Phaya Nakhon's illness." Luang Surinthamat however took the document containing Raja Kelantan and the envoys' report and proceeded to read it out to His Majesty, at which His Majesty exclaimed: "What on earth are you doing, Luang Surinthamat? I told you to read me the one containing details of Chao Phaya

Nakhon's illness but you go and read me the one dealing with Kelantan instead! You must be losing your mind - you're all confused!" When Luang Surinthamat had finished reading out the details of Chao Phaya Nakhon's illness, His Majesty observed: "So he had pneumonia? I wondered what it was, but he would never tell me. I kept asking but I could never find out what he was suffering from, it was most unfortunate. I feel very sorry for him." His Majesty then asked Khun Chamnong: "Where is the body being kept? Are the Governor of Phthalung and Phra Sanehamontri still in Nakhon or have they gone to Songkhla?" Khun Chamnong replied that Phaya Phthalung and Phra Sanehamontri had already gone to Songkhla and that Chao Phaya Nakhon's body was being kept in an inner chamber within his residence. His Majesty asked whether the Nakhon people who had been sent back down with instructions on how to deal with the situation in Kelantan had arrived there before Chao Phaya Nakhon's death. Khun Chamnong replied that he had seen no sign of them. His Majesty then asked Phra Narin whether his letter containing instructions about Kelantan had been taken down by Nai Duang and Nai Phae or by Nai Sikhong. Phra Narin replied that it had been taken down by Nai Duang. His Majesty asked: "When did he leave?" Phra Narin proceeded to consult his notes and did not reply so His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat whether *he* knew. Phaya Phiphat replied that all he knew was that it had been taken down by Nai Duang and Nai Phae. His Majesty then asked Phra Narin: "When did they take it down? Are you sure it was Nai Duang and Nai Phae who took it down or was it someone else?" Phra Narin answered that it had been taken down by Nai Sikhong. His Majesty exclaimed: "What do you mean? First it is the one and then it is the other - why can you never be sure of anything? When was it taken down?" Phra Narin remained silent and His Majesty exclaimed: "You are quite useless - whenever you fail to note down something for future reference, you say the first thing that comes into your head!" His Majesty then asked who had actually taken down the letter with His Majesty's instructions on Kelantan; His Majesty also asked the date of Meun Phimonkamchon's arrival. Phra Narin replied that he had arrived on the 24th May. His Majesty exclaimed: "You see - you are quite useless. Why, Meun Phimonkamchon arrived only the other day and you can't even remember that! What drivel you talk! I can never get an answer to any question!"

On the 15th June, in the morning, His Majesty talked to the Treasurer about Chao Phaya Nakhon's illness, saying: "I wondered what was the matter with him - I did not know it was pneumonia. What a shame he had to die like this. Last night I told them to read me out the details of Chao Phaya Nakhon's illness but they started to read me details of the Kelantan business again. I asked Phra Narin who had taken down my previous instructions about Kelantan and the date the man left; I then asked who [else] had been sent down but the only answer I received was that the first messenger had been Nai Duang. Phaya Phiphat said it was Nai Duang and Nai Phae. I asked them if they were sure and then Phra Narin said that the first messenger had been Nai Sikhong.



I asked them when the messenger left but I could get no answer - they're so confused! How could they!" The Treasurer told His Majesty that first of all Nai Duang and Nai Phae or Nai Si Khong had been sent down and subsequently some Songkhla people. In fact messengers had been sent on several occasions. The records were now being consulted to ascertain exactly who had been sent down. His Majesty then ordered the letters that had not been dealt with the previous night to be brought in and read out. When Luang Surinthamat, who was reading out the dispatches sent by the Governor of Phthalung, came to the point about Raja Kelantan sending Che Jaafar up with a letter for Chao Phaya Nakhon, His Majesty asked: "Did Chao Phaya Nakhon live long enough to read the letter?" The Treasurer replied: "No, Sire." Chao Phaya Nakhon had originally thought that Raja Kelantan would be able to resist Tengku Besar and when he learnt that this was not the case, his disappointment had aggravated his illness. His Majesty observed: "That's what I thought - it is this Kelantan business that has aggravated his condition." After the letter had concluded, Che Jaafar's statement was read out and when it came to the part about [Tuan Muda's son and Raja Bukit [Marak]'s son absenting themselves from the reading of His Majesty's proclamation appointing Raja Kelantan as ruler and about their sending for Raja Banggul from Manara<sup>1</sup>, His Majesty exclaimed: "What do they mean, sending for Raja Banggul! It was Raja Banggul who gave Chao Phaya Nakhon the slip! As to their refusing to attend the reading of the proclamation, why, it was this Tuan Muda who tried to become ruler himself, so when his attempts failed, he naturally wouldn't attend the reading of the proclamation!" After Che Jaafar's statement had concluded, Che Sulaiman's statement was read out. When it came to the part about the Raja Muda forbidding the people of Kelantan to buy rice from Tengku Besar, with the result that Tengku Besar took umbrage and eventually the parties came to blows, His Majesty exclaimed: "It's infuriating the way a trivial matter is blown up into a serious incident and they start to quarrel - they're brothers-in-law but they show each other no respect at all!" After Raja Kelantan's letter had been read out, His Majesty observed: "His letters sound as though he's really up against it - he seems thoroughly scared and in his fright, he begs us to send troops in right away." His Majesty then observed to the Treasurer: "There's nothing new in the letter. Have none of our letters on Kelantan arrived yet?" The Treasurer replied that some of the earlier letters would probably have arrived by now. His Majesty said: "Once they arrive, they should make it much clearer to him what are the right measures to adopt to settle the business."

On the 16th June, in the evening, His Majesty asked Khun Chamnong whether it was true that Phaya Phthalung was a confirmed opium-smoker. Khun Chamnong replied that he had heard that the Governor of Phthalung smoked opium but that he did not know how long this had been going on. His Majesty then asked: "Who do the people like most - the Governor of Phthalung or Phra Sanehamontri? Which of the two is the more oppressive?"

Khun Chamnong replied that Phra Sanehamontri was not very harsh and was greatly loved by the people of Nakhon. The Governor of Phthalung was much more oppressive. His Majesty observed: "From what I can make out, he certainly seems to be the more oppressive. I didn't know anything about his smoking opium. He's the eldest son and was Chao Phaya Nakhon's favourite, and yet despite this he smokes opium! His Majesty then asked: "Where has Phaya Senaphubet advanced to - how many men has he put into the field?" Khun Chamnong replied that he probably had some six or seven hundred men and that he had advanced as far as Songkhla. His Majesty said: "Good. He's taking them to join the main army - they can be used to help him deal with Kedah. Chao Phaya Nakhon is no longer with us; we have only his sons. If the Malays realise this and rebel again, his sons will be quite incapable of suppressing the rising and dealing with them as firmly as Chao Phaya Nakhon did - they'll just run away. Do you know what plans Phaya Si Phiphat has made to deal with the situation in Kedah?" Khun Chamnong replied that he knew that Phaya Si Phiphat was going to send the Governor of Chumphon down there and Phaya Senaphubet would apparently be sent down there after him. His Majesty said: "Sending these reinforcements will bring the situation firmly under our control."

On the 17th June, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty that the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that a vessel commanded by Nakhoda [I]shak, a trader from Trengganu, had put in. It reported that it had left Trengganu on the 3rd June and had taken 13 days to reach the Bangkok river. In addition, the Governor of Sakhonburi had reported that the Governor of Thalang had sent a letter to say that he was sending up the money from the tin concessions along with some opium, which was being brought up by Luang Narin and Luang Ratanaphimon. [The Governor of Thalang] had also sent a report on the situation in Kedah. His Majesty asked: "What does he have to report?" The Treasurer replied: "He reports that round about the end of January Tengku Mat Saad had sent a letter delivered by a Koramad Malay and nine other Malay gentleman requesting the Governor's permission to purchase 10 bars of tin. The envoys also brought gifts for the Governor, viz. some turtle-doves and some coconuts, saying that the Governor had previously asked them to obtain some white turtle-doves, some sea-shells with spirals running clockwise and cannon with breech-handles in the shape of a conch-shell, but they had not yet been able to obtain these and they requested the Governor to accept the gifts brought. They asked for the Governor's help and protection, saying that Tengku Mat Saad would like to send up the gold and silver trees as tribute. The Koramad Malay and the other nine Malays had arrived in Thalang on the 17th March. The Governor took the view that, as Tengku Mat Saad had several times sent Malays, saying that he would send up the gold and silver trees, but had so far failed to do so, he had suspected it might be a trick and had arrested the men and sent them up to the Governor of Chaiya. His Majesty commented: "They arrived there some time ago but he's only just reported it - the letter contains no new information at all!" His Majesty

then asked if the other Malay vessels in the area were going about their business peacefully. The Treasurer replied that the Governor of Chaiya had sent out a fleet of vessels drawn from Phangnga, Takua Thung and Thalang to patrol the seas and that all was quiet. His Majesty then asked: "After the Nakhon forces captured Kedah, they sent a fleet after Wan Mali on Langkawi. Wan Mali made off, apparently heading for an island off Mergui. Does he know if any additional vessels were sent out to help in the pursuit?" The Treasurer replied: "All he knows is that the Nakhon force has captured Kedah; he does not know anything about sending ships out in pursuit of Wan Mali or about Wan Mali going to stay on an island off Mergui." His Majesty commented: "All he's good for is reporting nonsensical trivia; how much better it would be if he could obtain some really useful information and help us intercept and capture Wan Mali." When the reading of the letter had concluded, His Majesty exclaimed: "What a useless report! He has no idea of the proper way to go about obtaining any really useful information. From the way he writes, he seems to have made no effort to investigate the situation - he treats the matter far too lightly. All this about white turtle-doves and shells with clockwise spirals! Nothing at all of importance!"

His Majesty then asked when the Governor of Chaiya would send in his report. The Treasurer replied that the Governor had already sent up a report, which had come via Chaiya. He had reported that he was also sending up the nine Malays referred to. His Majesty said: "In that case we shall be able to subject them to a thorough interrogation to find out how matters stand in the other areas." His Majesty then asked whether the ship that had arrived from Trengganu had any news about the situation in Kelantan. The Treasurer replied: "With Your Majesty's permission, I questioned them and learnt that they arrived in Kelantan at night-time and did not go ashore but came straight up to Bangkok. However, while still in Trengganu they heard that Raja Kelantan was fighting against Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul. In the second half of February, Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul had sent a letter to Tengku Dare [Idris] in Besut asking him to send them help. Tengku Dare had refused, saying that he could not help them in a fraternal dispute. Later they heard that Besut was sending help to Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul. During the second half of April Raja Kelantan had sent a letter to Tengku Wok at Kemaman asking to buy powder and shot. Tengku Wok had sent him 10 picul of powder and some shot." His Majesty said: "He should be all right with these additional supplies of powder and shot - they should enable him to continue the fight for a while." His Majesty then asked: "Did they know about Phaya Si Phiphat sending down an envoy ordering a ceasefire? Was the fighting still going on or had it stopped?" The Treasurer replied: "I asked them but they said they knew no more than what they had told us. They did however say that the gifts for Your Majesty are now ready and will soon be loaded on board a ship and sent up here." His Majesty said: "That's what they keep on saying. If they *do* send them, it will not be until the next monsoon!" His Majesty then

said: "They left Trengganu quite a while after Che Mustafa. Take them away and question them about the seven or eight days between Che Mustafa's departure and their own - they probably know something more."

On the 18th June, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that the Governor of Samut[prakan] had reported that one of the pirate-chaser boats had put in. Khun Ritthichonlathan reported that Your Excellency had sent him up with a letter and various other reports and statements. Khun Ritthichonlathan had sailed from Songkhla on the 6th June and had taken eleven days to reach the Bangkok river. His Majesty asked: "What does he have to report?" The Treasurer replied: "He says that Luang Phithaknathi, who was sent down after Luang Sonseni, has returned, and that Tengku Besar has sent Che [Mal]jid and Che Saripan up with a letter for Phaya Si Phipat." His Majesty asked: "What did the letter say? Has the fighting stopped?" The Treasurer told His Majesty: "After Luang Sonseni went down there and told them to cease fire, the fighting died down but did not stop completely; they were still exchanging fire during the evening. When Luang Sonseni sent someone to remonstrate with Tengku Besar, Tengku Besar said that Raja Kelantan had started shooting first and so he had returned the fire. When someone was sent to remonstrate with Raja Kelantan, he said that Tengku Besar had fired upon him first. The letter Tengku Besar sent to Phaya Si Phiphat accused Raja Kelantan and [Tu]wan Gagap, and the Raja Muda, of destroying the house belonging to his younger sister and seizing everything of value in it. They had also seized his ricefields and taken away the harvest. Tengku Besar had complained to Raja Kelantan but the latter had taken no action. Another thing was that earlier, when Tengku Besar had been about to go up to Bangkok, Raja Kelantan had asked him to put in a good word for him, saying that if things turned out well for him, he would see that Tengku Besar did not go unrewarded. In the event, things turned out very well for Raja Kelantan but Tengku Besar had obtained nothing. As regards Luang Sonseni's intervention and his orders for a cease-fire, Tengku Besar assured him that he had no intention of continuing the fighting. He wished to send up the gold and silver flowers and he was prepared to match whatever Raja Kelantan sent up in the way of presents.

His Majesty asked: "Now that Phaya Si Phiphat realises what's going on what action does he propose to take?" The Treasurer replied: "He has sent Khun Samut, Khun Raya and the Adjutant of the Asa Cham brigade down there with three letters, one for Raja Kelantan, one for Tengku Besar and one for Raja Banggul, telling them to stop quarrelling and end the fighting; if there was anything they were concerned about, they should jointly arrange to send a joint delegation up to Songkhla to discuss matters. Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul should withdraw their forces and bring them back to Tengku Besar's side of the river. If they did so, Raja Kelantan was not to pursue them and attack them. If the instructions contained in the letters were not complied

with, then the army would be sent in forthwith to punish the guilty parties." His Majesty said: "Good, that's the way to deal with them. If talking has no effect upon them, we must use force - what other way is there? What do you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied: "It looks as though we shall have to send the army in to achieve what we want. At the moment, Phaya Si Phiphat has sent the Governor of Pechaburi and Phra Sunthranurak to stay in Sai." His Majesty said: "Yes, it looks as though they will have to go in; if they show no sign of stopping the fighting, then we must start sending troops into Kelantan right away so that we can get hold of the guilty parties and arrest them - only then will the business be done with."

His Majesty then asked Khun Rittichonlathan if Your Excellency was keeping well. Khun Rittichonlathan told His Majesty that Your Excellency had not been ill at all and seemed to be in the best of health. His Majesty laughed and said: "In the best of health, eh? Nothing wrong with him - no attacks of fever or anything?" Khun Rittichonlathan replied that Your Excellency was not suffering from any ailment and was in the best of health. His Majesty smiled and asked: "Has he found himself a wife?" Khun Rittichonlathan replied that Your Excellency had not. His Majesty exclaimed: "I thought he had have found himself one by now!" and then asked whether any of the vessels from Bangkok with instructions about Kelantan had arrived. The Treasurer replied that Khun Rittichonlathan had met Meun Nikon's ship - one of the ships that had taken down dispatches - at the mouth of the Songkhla channel on the 5th June and that the vessel with the detachment of the Palace Watch and the Songkhla people, which had left earlier, had also arrived. His Majesty said: "Are they the two vessels we sent down there with instructions after we first heard about the situation from the *Withayakhom*?" The Treasurer replied that they were. His Majesty said: "If they get those instructions and act in accordance with them, they can't go far wrong. We said that either things must quieten down or else, if we had to send in the army, we would do so, the main thing was not to lose Kelantan. Once he gets our instructions, he'll know how to act and his worries will be at an end. But surely some more of our ships must have arrived by now?" The Treasurer replied that it looked as though three ships had already arrived. His Majesty exclaimed: "I do wish they'd get there - it will clear things up and will relieve his mind no end."

His Majesty then asked whether all of the ships taking part in the expedition had arrived. The Treasurer replied that not all of them had arrived; it was reported that the Assistant Collector's vessel had arrived, making a total of 49 ships in all. There were still another seven ships to come. His Majesty exclaimed: "Where could they have got to? How is it they still have not arrived? What has happened to the vessels on loan that arrived earlier - why have they not been allowed to sail back to Bangkok, to be returned to their owners?" Khun Rittichonlathan told His Majesty that Your Excellency was keeping them

in readiness to take the people back to Bangkok. His Majesty asked: "What people?" The Treasurer replied: "The people from Kedah." His Majesty asked: "The people the Governor of Saiburi said had come over to him - are they people detained for being involved in the rebellion or people who came over to him [of their own free will]?" The Treasurer replied: "They are the families who came over to him, whom he reported as totalling 1600 people; Phaya Si Phiphat thinks we must move a whole lot of people out of Kedah and leave only a few there. He has sent the Governor of Chumphon and Prathio down there first, with Phaya Senaphubet to follow. They are to make arrangements to send a whole lot of people up here." His Majesty said: "They are not likely to be able to get hold of those involved in the rebellion, so these people must all be people who came over to us, I suppose? This business about sending Phaya Senaphubet down there after the Governors of Chumphon and Prathio - I asked Khun Chamnong and he said the same thing. Phaya Senaphubet must be on his way by now."

His Majesty then ordered the letter to be brought and read out to him. When Nai Boriban, who was reading it out, came to the part about the parties firing on each other at night-time and about the fighting continuing at [Bukit] Marak, His Majesty exclaimed: "It looks very much as though they will not stop fighting!" The Treasurer said that it looked unlikely that they would stop fighting altogether - they are only waiting to hear the result of the letters they had sent. If they knew that the army was going to be sent in, they would all make off. His Majesty said: "If they do, so be it. If they will not obey our orders to stop fighting, then send the army in to crush them." When the letter had concluded, various statements were brought in to be read out, but His Majesty said: "Let us concentrate upon the business in hand - bring me the letter sent to Phaya Si Phiphat and read that out first. Tengku Besar's letter was read out and when it came to the part about the Raja Muda destroying the house belonging to Tengku Besar's younger sister, His Majesty asked: "After her house was destroyed, where would the Raja Muda's wife stay, with her brother or with her husband?" The Treasurer told His Majesty that the letter did not make it clear. His Majesty said: "If she stayed with her husband, Tengku Besar would probably have claimed that she had been abducted. All he says however is that her house was destroyed and all her belongings taken away. She must be staying with her brother - if she'd gone to stay with her husband, Tengku Besar wouldn't have failed to make something of it - he's the sort of man who likes to kick up a fuss and he would surely have made an issue of it." After the letter had concluded, His Majesty commented: "From the way he talks, he seems to be an argumentative chap who likes to quarrel with people." Subsequently, copies of letters sent to Raja Kelantan, Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul were read out, and when they came to the part about having Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul withdraw across the river, and not allowing Raja Kelantan to do them any harm, His Majesty smiled and asked the Treasurer: "Which side would you say he was favouring?" The Treasurer

replied: "He still seems to be adopting a neutral position." After [the first part of the letters] had been read out, His Majesty said: "I thought he would go into detail, but he has not said very much at all - just this. He should have reminded them of what happened previously but he has not. In view of what's happened, he should have said more, to put a scare into them and make them feel ashamed of themselves." After the reading had been completed, His Majesty smiled and said: "I say, Treasurer, why don't you get him to hurry here so he can report to us without any delay?" His Majesty went on: "Quite a number of the ships we sent down there with instructions will have arrived. Once they get there, the instructions they bring will make it quite clear to him what course of action he is to adopt. As for the situation in Kelantan, it looks very much as though they're both biding their time and waiting for the right moment to get the better of the other. If one side stops fighting, the other will probably seize the opportunity to attack them. I suppose that's why they won't stop." The Treasurer said: "It looks as though both sides are waiting for the right moment to attack the other. It seems unlikely that they will obey our instructions to stop fighting - they will probably attack each other again." His Majesty said: "If they refuse to obey, will Luang Sonseni not be killed? What do you think - won't Phaya Si Phiphat be worried about him?" The Treasurer replied: "Luang Sonseni is not staying in Kelantan. He sleeps on the brig." His Majesty said: "If they follow him back to the ship, it is likely that shots will be exchanged and then they'll have to fight the Siamese." When the reports were brought to be read out to His Majesty, His Majesty said: "Leave them till this evening" and His Majesty retired.

I returned from the palace and set about writing dispatches until just after four o'clock in the afternoon when my head began to ache and I started to shiver with the cold. The fever would not go away. In the evening, I waited upon His Majesty in company with Khun Ritthichonlathan. His Majesty said to Phra Narin: "He said he met Meun Nikon's ship at the mouth of the Songkhla channel. What sort of dispatches was Meun Nikon carrying? When was he sent here?" Phra Narin replied that Your Excellency had sent him up when reporting that the army had arrived in Songkhla. His Majesty said: "What are you talking about? It was the Chinese Pheuak who was sent up to report the arrival of the army. Meun Nikon brought the report about the Deputy Governor of Chaiya sending ships with supplies of fresh water or something like that. Whenever I ask you anything I never can get the right answer!" His Majesty went on complaining until midnight.

My headache and fever continued to grow worse. I kept feeling hot and cold and had a raging thirst. I crawled out of the audience hall shaking with fever as I made my way home. I continued to feel hot and cold and became dizzy. My chest felt as though it were burning and I had a raging thirst. I took some medicine but got no better. The attack continued until past five o'clock in the morning, when it began to ease off.

The next morning [19th June] I still had a headache and felt cold but I had no fever and in the evening I was able to go to the palace. I asked Luang Rachasetthi what His Majesty had said the previous evening, when I was ill but he only said that, after complaining about the Meun Nikon affair, His Majesty had sent for the reports and ordered them to be read out. His Majesty had observed that the statements claimed that lots of stockades with moats around them had been set up and that there were more Malays on Raja Kelantan's side than on Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul's. His Majesty had ordered Phaya Krai to note down the names of the Malays and to list the number of stockades. On the 19th June, in the evening, His Majesty asked to hear the details of the information which he had requested, and which was read out to him. When Luang Surinthamat had done so, His Majesty said: "They claim that Raja Kelantan has more Malays on his side than they have and they say that they're worse off in every respect, with [Raja Kelantan] having more stockades. Their claims appear at variance with the actual situation. It seems to me that they're not telling the truth - they must be lying. Who was the man who questioned them - how could he let them get away with these lies?"

On the 20th and 21st June, His Majesty made no mention of the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 22nd June, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that the Governor of Samutprakan had reported that Your Excellency had sent up Khun Bowonwanit on the *Nguang Seng* junk with 84 people. Khun Bowonwanit reported that he had sailed from Songkhla on the 12th June and had taken 10 days to reach the Bangkok river. His Majesty asked: "Is there any further news of Kelantan?" The Treasurer replied that so far no answer had been received to the three letters sent [by Phaya Si Phiphat]. His Majesty asked: "About these letters - will they stop fighting or not?" The Treasurer replied: "Phaya Si Phiphat is still waiting to hear from them; he proposes to send Chao Phaya Yomarat down as well." His Majesty asked: "What does he have to say?" The Treasurer replied: "One letter reports sending up the captives and another letter deals with Thalang, saying that a Malay called Pulusen, whom Wan Mali had carried off to Langkawi, had escaped with 153 people in one of the green-prowed [junks] and had made his way into the mouth of the [Thalang] river. When questioned, Pulusen said the he had lived on an island off Trang until Wan Mali had carried him off to Langkawi. When the army came after Wan Mali, the latter had made him take the people abducted and make for Batu Baru, but the vessel became becalmed and Pulusen brought it into the [Thalang] river. Phaya Si Phiphat had sent a letter in reply to the Governor of Chaiya, telling him to send the people up to Bangkok. His Majesty said: The ship is probably one of theirs that was blown off course." The Treasurer then told His Majesty: "Phaya Songkhla says he is sending up four Annamese who had been captured by pirates. The Governor of Chaiya and Takua Thung have both written to Phaya Si Phiphat to say that Luang



Phiphitphakdi abducted the Governor of Takua Thung's Chinese niece. The Governor of Chaiya sent Luang Phiphitphakdi to apologize to Phra Takua Thung but the latter locked the door of the house and seized Luang Phiphitphakdi and chained him up with a block around his neck. Phaya Si Phiphat has sent up the letters written by the Governors of Chaiya and Takua Thung, the statements made by Pulusen and the Annamese, and a copy of the letter sent in reply to the Governor of Chaiya." His Majesty said: "I told you so, did I not? This fellow's been making trouble from the very beginning. That time he took the letter accusing the Governor of Thalang and brought it to the Governor of Chaiya and got him to send it up to Bangkok - that almost caused a quarrel between the two governors. Having done the Governor of Takua Thung this favour, he then proceeds to act like this!" His Majesty then asked where the green-prowed junk had come from. The Treasurer replied that the vessel had been built in Trang but had been stationed off Perlis. When Wan Mali captured Trang he had taken it away to Langkawi. His Majesty asked: "Where did our ships get to before Wan Mali got away?" The Treasurer replied that our ships had almost reached Langkawi when Wan Mali and the garrison of the fort had abandoned the fort, taken to their ships and made off. When the British warship got there it set fire to the vessels left behind. The British then went up to the fort and found two cannon, which they levered up and dumped into the sea, after which they returned to the warship and sailed off to Penang. His Majesty asked: "Why did they dump the cannon in the sea - why did they not give them to us? These British must be the ones who accompanied the expedition." His Majesty then said, with a smile: "So Chao Phaya Yomarat has arrived at last - did he [Phaya Si Phiphat] have anything to say about that?" The Treasurer replied: "He did not say anything except complain about the 'Asa Cham' detachment on board [Chao] Phaya Yomarat's ship." His Majesty asked Khun Bowonwanit whether everything had been all right during Chao Phaya Yomarat's voyage and Khun Bowonwanit replied that it had. His Majesty then asked if everything was all right when they arrived in Songkhla and Khun Bowonwanit replied that it was. His Majesty then asked Phaya Chodeuk whether the *Nguan Seng* could be fitted out so as to get down there in time. Phaya Chodeuk said that it could. His Majesty said: "If it has any leaks, get the owner to repair it and send it off, will you." His Majesty ordered that the reading of the other letters be deferred until the evening.

Later that afternoon, His Majesty ordered Phra Narin to fetch the letters and have them read out. When Nai Boriban had read the letter reporting the delivery of the captives, His Majesty said to Phra Narin: "Hand the matter over to Phaya Rachawangsan. He wasn't in attendance this morning - he's hardly ever here when we're discussing matters that concern him. Tell him to wait upon me this evening." Then the letter sent by the Governor of Songkhla and the statement made by the Annamese were read out. His Majesty exclaimed: "I cannot make head or tail of their statement. Phra Narin, you must make sure they are kept in custody - don't let them get away!" Then the despatch

containing the Governor of Chaiya's letter was read out to His Majesty who exclaimed: "He [Phaya Si Phiphat] should not have sent a reply - he [the Governor of Chaiya] sent that wretched Luang Phiphitphakdi, resulting in all this trouble!" After the statement made by the Malay, Pulusen, had been read out, His Majesty spoke about Phaya Chaiya, saying: "All he can do is to send us bits of trivia - he has no idea of obtaining detailed intelligence and finding out the exact number of families involved. That's how he always is - quite hopeless!" After the Governor of Takua Thung's letter had been read out, the Governor of Chaiya's letter was read out, and when it came to the part about Luang Phiphitphakdi abducting the Governor of Takua Thung's Chinese niece, His Majesty burst out: "That is enough! All this trouble is caused by that wretched fellow - it is a waste of time listening to it - the whole business is futile! I appointed the Governor of Chaiya to a position of seniority but he cannot control his men - he allows this sort of thing to happen. What a filthy business - it is intolerable that I should have to worry about such things!"

In the evening, His Majesty said: "Bring the letter here and continue the reading; let the court hear it. What do you think of this, Phaya Racha[wangsan]? - you'll be in command of an army one day, just listen to this!" When the reading of the Governor of Chaiya's letter was continued and reached the part about questioning the two slaves who had accompanied the Chinese [girl] and claiming that they were not the Governor of Takua Thung's slaves at all, His Majesty interjected: "Just listen to this, Phaya Racha[wangsan] and Phra Mahamontri. It looks as though he [Luang Phiphitphakdi] realised that the Governor of Takua Thung is well off so he deliberately set out to curry favour with him and do him down. He must have got hold of a good deal of money and property to make the Governor of Takua Thung so angry - he really seems to have been touched on the raw or something! What do you think, Phra Mahamontri?" Phra Mahamontri replied: "From the way Phaya Chaiya questioned the slaves of the Chinese girl, it would appear that he is siding with him." His Majesty said: "The chap sees he is well off, so he tries to embark on an attempt to squeeze as much as he can out of him. The Governor of Chaiya is one of the senior officers down there and yet he can let this happen!" The reading then continued until it reached the part about the Governor of Chaiya sending one of his staff - Luang Wang - to take Luang Phiphitphakdi to apologise to the Governor of Takua Thung, and the latter seizing Luang Phiphitphakdi and chaining him up. His Majesty said: "It serves him right for being such a lustful fellow - he was sent down there to fight the enemy but all he does is to go chasing after women!" His Majesty said: "Just you listen, when it gets to the end of the letter and the Governor of Chaiya's contribution, it's much worse than this!" When the letter came to the part about the Governor of Takua Thung setting up cannon in the embrasures of the stockade around his house and about the Governor of Chaiya being prepared to bring up troops to storm the house and rescue Luang Phiphitphakdi, His Majesty commented: "Just listen, will you - this is how they go on all the time -

one of them goes crazy, and the other, instead of acting like a reasonable chap, goes crazy too. I sent the Governor of Chaiya down there to protect our territory and fight the enemy but instead they start fighting each other - it's quite disgusting! And this wretch, who was sent down to fight the enemy - he goes and acts like this! What do you think, Phaya Rachanikun and Phaya Rachawangsan? You have commanded troops in battle - could you ever imagine such behaviour?" Phaya Rachanikun and Phaya Rachawangsan replied: "Quite outrageous, Sire." His Majesty commented: "Here we have all the four sins combined - avarice, folly, anger and lust - it is these that make animals quarrel and kill each other and tear each other to pieces."

When the letter had concluded, His Majesty exclaimed: "All he can do is write drivel - it's so irritating to listen to. The more I hear, the more annoyed I get! Bring me the letters sent in reply and read them out." When the copy of the reply sent to the Governor of Takua Thung had been read out, His Majesty made no comment. Next, the copy of the reply sent to the Governor of Chaiya was read out. When it came to the part where Your Excellency said that Your Excellency had not taken down anyone as an arbitrator, Your Excellency had taken down an army and was equipped only with weapons for that army, His Majesty broke in: "What's all this about not taking down an arbitrator? The situation being what it is he should have given him a very forceful answer. The only way to deal with them is to knock some sense into them. Since he can't do this, then let the Treasurer deal with them!" After the reading of the letter had concluded, His Majesty said: "Why does he answer him at such length? All he needed to do was to write a few words telling him to go to hell and put a date on the letter! He is much too soft on him - it will have no effect on a chap like that." His Majesty then observed: "Never in my life have I heard of anything like this happening - it's the most outlandish thing that could ever happen. Who'd have expected them to start fighting each other - it is perfectly disgusting!" His Majesty then asked Phra Narin whether the Treasurer had seen Phaya Si Phiphat's reply and if so, what did he have to say about it. Phra Narin replied that the Treasurer had seen the rebuke [administered by Phaya Si Phiphat] to the Governor of Chaiya and he thought it would have the right effect, although he did not think that the Governor of Chaiya was competent enough to carry out his duties to the crown in a satisfactory manner in the future. His Majesty exclaimed: "How can he say that it will have the right effect! It is much too conciliatory in tone!" His Majesty continued to express his annoyance with the Governor of Chaiya right up to the time he retired.

On the 23rd June, in the morning, His Majesty said to the Treasurer: "It seems as though the Governor of Chaiya and the Governor of Takua Thung have both gone crazy. How could they act like this! To send out that worthless Luang Phiphitphakdi and then back him up to the extent of being prepared to send soldiers to start a fight - it's absolutely disgusting! He goes down

there with the rank of a high official but when his subordinate start to play up, he makes no effort to tell him off and deal with him firmly but is mad enough to take sides with the offender - this makes both of them - in fact all three of them - guilty. One of the parties is mad enough to commit a crime and the other party is crazy enough to do the same thing! At this rate, nothing will be accomplished! What a worthless wretch! Phaya Si Phiphat's reply was much too conciliatory - that's not all what I wanted; the situation being what it was, he ought to have cursed him up hill and down dale if he wanted his words to have any effect. What do you think about it, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied that with matters at such a pitch he doubted whether the Governor of Chaiya would be able to carry out his duties in a satisfactory manner. His Majesty said: "Never mind - just wait until my instructions about Phangnga arrive. Phaya Si Phiphat will probably send someone to take over in Phangnga and then they can come up to Bangkok to adjudicate on the matter - they will probably all come up."

His Majesty then asked how much opium had been seized and whether the Governor of Songkhla had been made to swear an oath. The Treasurer replied that the Governor of Songkhla had indeed been made to swear an oath and that fifteen cakes of opium had been seized in Songkhla along with three chests of opium from the sampan pukat. His Majesty observed to Khun Bowonwanit: "I thought they had get a whole lot but for some reason they only get 3 chests and 15 cakes. Why so little?" Khun Bowonwanit replied that the task had been entrusted to Chao Phaya Yomarat and Phra Inthararaksa who had begun the task three days after the edict had been received. The opium dealers had thus known what was coming and had taken most of the opium and made off into the forest. His Majesty said: "They were too busy with the campaign to devote their attention to the confiscation of opium, so the dealers were able to get away with they supplies. Still, never mind - if they don't succeed in confiscating all the opium, once the army returns I shall send down a special opium-suppression team to seize the whole lot." His Majesty then asked if the expedition's food supplies were running short. The Treasurer replied: "The army has sufficient supplies of food, but there is a severe shortage at Katong Karam. Two rice barns have been built in Songkhla into which the rice taken down by the army is being loaded. We do not yet know how much rice has been spoiled by water getting in. The rice taken down is being issued out regularly to the local people. He asks for more rice to be sent down - enough to continue the issue." His Majesty told Phaya Chodeuk: "See that the *Macchanu* is fitted out right away. I would like it to be loaded with a full cargo of rice - a hundred or two hundred piculs or whatever - make sure it's fully loaded. Tell Phaya Rachamontri<sup>2</sup> to obtain some chillis, onions and garlic and send them down. Please see that the ship leaves without delay." His Majesty then asked whether any more of the ships in the expeditionary forces had arrived. The Treasurer told His Majesty that every single one of the ships had now arrived.

On the 24th June, in the day time, Prince Chumsai<sup>3</sup> told His Majesty that the spires on all three of the pagodas in Wat Phrachetuphon had begun to lean; the northern one was leaning towards the north, the middle one was leaning towards the west and the southern one was leaning towards the south. They were a foot and a half or more out of the perpendicular. His Majesty asked how was it that all three pagodas had begun to lean. Prince Chumsai replied that it was because the decorations at the base of the spires were too heavy. His Majesty said: "When Phaya Si Phiphat was here, I relied upon him to look after them and nothing ever went wrong. Now that he's gone, no one bothers. If he were still here, this wouldn't have happened. I can't find anyone to look after them properly. Phaya Phetphichai<sup>4</sup> is quite useless - he takes no interest in looking after them. An important matter such as this and he lets this happen! How could he cause us such embarrassment!", after which His Majesty remained silent until retiring.

In the evening, His Majesty did not hold an audience, in fact he did not hold audience for a whole week, only appearing in public again on the morning of the 1st July. I heard that, on the 25th and 26th June, His Majesty remained in the Royal bed-chamber, holding no conversation with anyone, just resting with his eyes closed and [occasionally] reading passages from the chronicles and various maxims. His Majesty ate very little: all His Majesty had to eat at meal times was rice-broth [served] in a medium-sized goblet. Sometimes His Majesty would manage to eat three or four spoonfuls and sometimes even ten spoonfuls. The Patriarch, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, the Heads of Departments and other senior officials of various grades, submitted a joint proposal to His Majesty to allow Krommaluang Rakronaret, the Chancellor, the Treasurer and Phaya Rachasuphawadi to supervise the restoration of the three pagodas. Phra Mahathep would be appointed to undertake the restoration of the northern pagoda, Phra Inthradet the central pagoda and Phaya Racharongmeuang the southern pagoda. This proposal was presented to His Majesty by Chao Khun Prasat. His Majesty said: "I have not been well. I have been feeling giddy all the time. When I had a bowel movement, I had to strain and my stools - perhaps two or three lumps each time - were mixed with [blood and] mucus; it was most uncomfortable." His Majesty was too dizzy to be able to appear in public.

On the 1st July, in the morning, His Majesty appeared in public once again. All members of the Royal Family, whether holding office or not, and officers of the crown, both senior and junior, waited upon His Majesty. Before he mounted the throne, His Majesty talked about the pagodas saying: "What a shame - why have all three of them began to lean at the same time, every single one of them? Phaya Si Phiphat's gone away and it is no good relying upon Phaya Phetphichai to look after them. This has happened after their completion too. I would not have been so disappointed if it had happened while they were being constructed, but to happen like this, *after* their completion

- it is quite disgraceful! The more I thought about it, the more upset I became; it made me feel quite unwell and I had an attack of giddiness, so distressed was I." His Majesty told the Treasurer to take whatever measures were necessary to restore the pagodas and not to let the same thing happen again. His Majesty then mounted the throne and asked about the situation in Kelantan and whether any further messenger had been sent up. The Treasurer replied: "No, Sire." His Majesty said: "By now, some of my letters with instructions about Kelantan must have arrived. When Meun Phimon's ship gets down there, they'll know exactly what they should do."

On the 2nd and 3rd July, His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah and Kelantan.

On the 4th July, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that a *fish head* vessel had arrived. The master of the vessel, Nai Rak, had stated that he was a merchant from Bangkok and that he had gone down to Kelantan to trade. He had left Kelantan on the 21st June. His Majesty commented: "He's made good time, now we can question him as much as we like and set our mind at ease." His Majesty then asked: "What news did he bring?" The Treasurer replied that, with His Majesty's permission, he had questioned Nai Rak who had said that after the three envoys had arrived there had been a lull in the fighting. Before, Raja Kelantan had been really hemmed in, but now he had much more freedom of manoeuvre and some of his followers from the north had joined him. His Majesty asked: "How was it that they were able to join him?" The Treasurer replied: "In Kelantan, rumour has it that the Governor of Phechaburi's force is on the way and has advanced as far as the village of Phrawan, to the north of Saiburi, three days march from Kelantan. When Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul's people heard this, they stopped fighting to wait and see what would happen. The people of Kelantan have welcomed this and some of them have joined Raja Kelantan." His Majesty said: "They stopped fighting because they were frightened the army would move in. What is all this about the Governor of Phechaburi being on his way there? He would only have advanced as far as Saiburi, to await orders from Phaya Si Phiphat before advancing any further. I wonder what will happen - will Phaya Si Phiphat hold him there or will he order him to march into Kelantan. As things stand at the moment he should move straight into Kelantan - they'd soon stop fighting then, and that would be the end of the matter. They certainly won't take on the Bangkok troops - they'd be far too scared. Now that some of the people have joined Raja Kelantan, which side has the more men? Which of the two enjoys more support among the people of Kelantan? Phra Narin, take the man and question him."

Phra Narin did so and reported that Raja Kelantan was the more popular but had less men than Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul. His Majesty said: "If they favour Raja Kelantan, why have more of them not joined him? Phaya

Phiphat, ask him this, would you, and ask him too whether he thinks Raja Kelantan will be able to hold out during the ten days or so that have passed since he left there on the 21st June." Phaya Phiphat did so and told His Majesty: "Nai Rak estimates that Raja Kelantan can hold out for another month. Although the people would like to join Raja Kelantan, Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul have seized their families and they are frightened they may be bartered in exchange for powder and shot, so they feel unable to join Raja Kelantan." His Majesty said: "If they are intimidated and oppressed like this, why do they not band together and attack them? And what he says about Raja Kelantan being able to hold out for a month - is he sure? What evidence does he base his opinion on?" Phaya Phiphat replied: "On the fact that Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul are frightened of the Bangkok troops moving in; that Raja Kelantan has some ten cannon at his disposal; that Luang Sonseni has given him six barrels of gunpowder; and that Raja Kelantan's men are better fighters than Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul's men."

His Majesty smiled and said: "Good, if that's what he says, he's probably correct. What was the original cause of the quarrel? Were they scared when our envoys arrived there and told them to stop fighting or does he think they might attack them? Did our envoys seem frightened of them? Now that the army is advancing upon them, what defensive measures have they taken and what preparations have they made, on land and sea? Or are they prepared for a mass evacuation?" Phaya Phiphat questioned Nai Rak and told His Majesty: "There is no idea of resistance on their part and they do not seem to have made any preparations to resist our troops - they will probably take fright and run away. When Khun Yothasamut went down there to tell them to stop fighting, Tengku Besar said that if Raja Kelantan would dismantle his stockades, he would follow suit. On Raja Kelantan's side, he said that if Tengku Besar would dismantle his stockades first, he would do likewise. When Nai Rak left, he saw no sign of any of the stockades being dismantled. At first, Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul appeared to have considerable respect for the envoy but now they pay no attention to him. They are no longer in awe of him and pay him little respect, saying that he has taken sides with Raja Kelantan, by giving him gunpowder. It does not seem as though our officers are frightened of them; every day, early in the morning, they go ashore in a small boat and lecture them, returning on board the brig in the evening. However the officers are so few in number that we cannot be sure that the situation will remain under control. The dispute between them first began when Raja Kelantan ordered that old stocks of rice should be sold before the new season's rice. This made Tengku Besar annoyed; he says that Raja Kelantan had it proclaimed that the people should buy only *his* rice. He also claims that he put in a good word for Raja Kelantan with His Majesty but that despite this was not appointed to any office. This deeply offended him and a quarrel broke out with the sides taking up arms against each other".

His Majesty remarked to the Treasurer: "So, he was annoyed because I didn't appoint him to any position. Treasurer, send a letter to Phaya Si Phiphat telling him to take immediate steps to see that Tengku Besar is arrested. If he runs away, he can't go anywhere; if he flees to Trengganu, then send off a nice, polite letter to get them to expel him." The Treasurer said: "Once the Governor of Phechaburi's force arrives down there, that will be the end of the matter. It looks as though Tengku Besar is the man who makes the decisions there and he has said that once the army arrives and issues its instructions, he is prepared to dismantle his stockades." His Majesty said: "It's Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul who are the cause of all this. Once the army gets there, that will be the end of the matter. Phaya Si Phiphat has already sent them a letter threatening them with the consequences and they're bound to be scared. They're not likely to attack our troops or do our envoys any harm; they're much more likely to flee the country." His Majesty went on: "I think everything will be all right. Question the man a little more, will you - he seems to know a great deal. However, by this time the Commander-in-Chief must know even more about the situation."

In the evening, His Majesty asked the Treasurer what had been the result of the questioning. The Treasurer replied: "The information he gave us was largely the same as we heard this morning. However, before he left, he went to see Raja Kelantan to get him to pay him the money he owed him, but Raja Kelantan was unable to pay him and gave him three of his Malay debt-slaves." His Majesty said: "The rest of what he said was true, but the part about Raja Kelantan handing over three of his Malay debt-slaves can't be true. He saw that the place was in a turmoil, so he must have abducted them and brought them here, don't you think? Why should Raja Kelantan give him any of his people? Have the debt-slaves brought here and question them, and we shall probably get the truth of the matter. Take some money to redeem them and send them to Luang Rachasetthi to look after them for the time being. And see that they are questioned - they may well know more about [the situation down there] than their new master."

On the 5th July, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Treasurer: "Did you get the Malay debt-slaves and question them?" The Treasurer replied that the ship had not yet arrived in the capital. His Majesty said: "When it does, question them and we'll probably find out the truth - it seems unlikely that Raja Kelantan would have handed them over as claimed." His Majesty then said to the Treasurer: "I do not think the fighting will break out again, they'll probably just wait and see what happens. It looks as though everything's going to be all right. This fellow Tengku Besar became annoyed because I did not appoint him to any office - if I had have done so, he would have been even more troublesome! It's all because Chao Phaya Nakhon let Raja Banggul get away - that's why he [Tengku Besar] has become so aggressive - it was a mistake which followed him all the way to the grave." The Treasurer told



His Majesty: "The news of Chao Phaya Nakhon's passing away reached Kelantan round about the end of May." His Majesty said: "It should have done. When Chao Phaya Nakhon was alive, he didn't see that Tengku Besar was given an appointment and this naturally infuriated Tengku Besar."

Phra Narin then bade farewell to His Majesty on behalf of Khun Ritthichonlathan and Luang Narin from Thalang, who were going back. His Majesty asked the Treasurer: "What message would you like Khun Ritthichonlathan to take down?" The Treasurer replied that he would emphasize the importance of apprehending Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul. His Majesty said: "Yes, send him a letter stressing this. If by the time the army gets there, some of them have managed to escape, see that their remaining followers are rounded up, no matter how many there are, to prevent them causing trouble in Kelantan in the future. All steps must be taken to pacify the state. As for Thalang, see that you reply urging upon them the necessity of remaining vigilant, and constantly patrolling and reconnoitring so as to safeguard our interests. If anything crops up, they should report to Phaya Si Phiphat in Songkhla and await his orders. When Meun Phimonkamchon gets there, Phaya Si Phiphat will probably send him to take over at Phangnga. Emphasise that until such time as he receives explicit instructions, he must continue to exercise all possible vigilance."

His Majesty then said to the Treasurer: "As regards the situation in Kelantan, it looks as though most of what Nai Rak has told us is true. If they stop fighting and wait to see what happens, as he says, then everything should be all right. I would like to hear what Phaya Si Phiphat has to report in his next dispatch. If the situation in Kelantan remains tense then we shall have to send Chao Phaya Yomarat and his troops to help the Governor of Pechaburi. If he thinks the situation is not serious then he can just leave the Governor of Pechaburi there to deal with the situation. I would like him to bring the army back here before the middle of October. Tell me Treasurer, have they finished loading the rice on to the *Macchanu* yet? When can it sail?" The Treasurer replied: "The loading has been completed. The ship can sail on the spring tide in a few days time." His Majesty said: "See that it sails as quickly as possible and it can bring back Chao Phaya Yomarat. If Phaya Si Phiphat considers the situation will allow it, Chao Phaya Yomarat can bring the vessel back to Bangkok. See that 20 piculs of dates are taken aboard to be sent down to Phaya Si Phiphat. In your letter, Treasurer, you should emphasize the importance of arresting Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul and you should see that the letter gets off right away. The various other points we wanted to make, have already been made. No matter how the situation develops, the instructions we sent should still be quite applicable."

On the 6th July, in the evening, the Treasurer presented His Majesty with the draft of the dispatch which Khun Ritthichonlathan was to take down. After

Nai Boriban had read it out, His Majesty said: "That's fine; send it off right away. But I am still not sure what the situation is in Nakhon with the Governor of Phathalung and Phra Sanehamontri." The Treasurer said: "The Governor of Phathalung's mother has sent a letter to say that the Governor is annoyed with Phra Sanehamontri because he does not treat his mother with respect. If the Governor is made Chao Phaya Nakhon, it appears that Phra Sanehamontri will not be able to stay there." His Majesty said: "If he cannot, then it will not be long before the same thing happens as happened with Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar, and that would be disastrous. Treasurer, write him a personal letter, just a few words, telling him to send the Governor of Phathalung up to Bangkok." His Majesty's observations are reported in detail in the dispatches sent to Your Excellency. What Your Excellency said in reply to the Governor of Chaiya - that Your Excellency had taken the army down equipped only with weapons of war and that with a bit of self-respect, a man should be able to level a mountain, but that without it, it would be beyond his power to flatten even an ant-hill - was greatly admired by Phaya Phiphat, Phaya Racha[wangsan], Phaya Krai, Phra Mahamontri and other minor officials, who said that Your Excellency had a very fine turn of phrase, both clever and cutting.

I have had the honour to send Your Excellency in all some thirteen [sic] dispatches. I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties.

Dispatched on Sunday, the 6th July 1830.

## Notes

- 1 i.e. Narathiwat, now [1915] in the Patani region.
- 2 His name was 'Phu'. He was the ancestor of the Phamonmontri family.
- 3 Under Rama IV, he was promoted to the rank of 'Krommameun' and then to Krommakhun Rachasiwikrom. He was a son of Rama III.
- 4 His name was 'Ket Ketthat'.

# The Fourteenth Dispatch

## 28 July 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant Luang Udomsombat addresses this dispatch to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, to inform Your Excellency of its contents. I have now sent Your Excellency thirteen dispatches in all, including the dispatch entrusted to Khun Ritthichonlathan.

On the 7th July, His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 8th July, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that a vessel with Annamese type bows had arrived. The owner, a Chinese called Tek, stated that he was a merchant from Bangkok who had gone to trade in Nakhon. He had sailed back on the 1st July and had taken seven days to reach Pak Nam. His Majesty asked: "Does he bring any news of the situation down there?" The Treasurer replied that he had questioned him and had been told that Phra Sanehamontri had returned to Nakhon and that Your Excellency would follow him there. His Majesty asked: "Why is he going to Nakhon? Has he been invited to take part in the cremation ceremony or what?" The Treasurer replied that he had asked but the man did not know. If Your Excellency went to Nakhon it would probably be in connection with arrangements for Chao Phaya Nakhon's funeral. His Majesty asked: "Why is he going to make arrangements for the funeral now? If he *is* going, then he should go there on his way back to the capital and make arrangements for the funeral at the same time. How can he go backwards and forwards like this? If he were to go there and make arrangements for the funeral round about the end of September, on his way back here, then that would be all right. Well, does the man know anything about the situation in Kedah or Kelantan?" The Treasurer replied: "As regards Kedah, all he knows is that the people have all returned to their homes. As regards Kelantan, he heard traders in Nakhon saying that Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul had both fled and that Raja Kelantan was going up to Songkhla to see Phaya Si Phiphat." His Majesty said: "This is only hearsay, we cannot assume it is true, although the part about him sending Phra Sanehamontri back to Nakhon seems true. It would appear that Meun Phimon has arrived down there, and Phaya Si Phiphat has taken the point made in our dispatch about showing particular consideration to Phra Sanehamontri, so he has sent him back to take over the administration of the province, or something like that. The bit about Phaya Si Phiphat going to Nakhon and

about Tengku Besar and Raja Banggul making off is unlikely to be true. Let us wait until the next dispatch, when we should find out the truth of the matter." After this, during the session with the Corps of Pages, Nai Ritthi, Adjutant of the Corps, took leave of His Majesty before sailing for Nakhon. His Majesty said to the Treasurer: "Send down a letter from me, will you. Tell Lady In<sup>1</sup>, Phra Sanehamontri's mother, how grieved I was to hear that Chao Phaya Nakhon has passed away and how upset it made me. I shall look after his sons and see that they continue to bring honour on the family name. Tell her to see that the children do their best to work together in harmony - don't let them quarrel or fall out among themselves. Please write a few words to say how sorry I am."

On the 9th July, in the evening, Luang Rachasetthi brought the statements made by the skipper Nai Rak and by the debt[-slave] Che Pake [Pakih/Fakih?], who had come up from Kelantan, to be read out to His Majesty. Details are contained in the documents sent down with Nai Ritthi. After the statements had been read out, His Majesty commented: "From what I can make out, their statements seem to tally pretty well - they're probably true. All this quarrelling is the result of Tengku Besar's annoyance at not being given any appointment. It would be a good idea if the army can persuade him to give himself up, so that he can be sent up here. However let's wait until we hear the next dispatch and then we shall know for certain." His Majesty then told Phaya Phiphat: "Have Nai Ritthi take Che Pake and his two sons back with him; he can see that they are sent back to Kelantan to make their way home."

On the 10th July, in the evening, the Treasurer presented His Majesty with the drafts of the two letters that were to be taken down by Nai Ritthi. The first was a reply to the Governor of Phthalung referring to the Governor's reporting the passing away of Chao Phaya Nakhon on the 12th May and about the arrangements he had made to preserve the body, and about his intention to proceed to Songkhla and carry out his duty there, an action His Majesty was pleased to commend. Chao Phaya Nakhon's passing away had caused His Majesty considerable grief. His Majesty had been pleased to send Nai Ritthi, the Adjutant in the Corps of Pages, to take down a gold-plated funerary casket, twelve five-tiered umbrellas, various ornaments for the corpse, His Majesty's principal shawm-player and five pairs of victory drums, to be used in the funeral ceremony to be held in honour of Chao Phaya Nakhon. The second letter was addressed to Phra Sanehamontri's mother. Regarding Chao Phaya Nakhon's passing, His Majesty was graciously pleased to inform her that when Phaya Si Phiphat had passed on the news of Chao Phaya Nakhon's illness, His Majesty had been most distressed and had expressed his hope that Chao Phaya Nakhon would recover. His Majesty had kept himself informed of Chao Phaya Nakhon's illness and when His Majesty had received news that Chao Phaya Nakhon had passed away, His Majesty had been most distressed, because of the great affection in which His Majesty held him. His Majesty

would look after his sons and see that they continued to add lustre to the family name. She should exhort them to work together and live in harmony and not let any quarrel or dispute arise among them.

After the letters had been read out, His Majesty said: "That is good, send them off." His Majesty then remarked: "This business about sending Phra Sanehamontri back to Nakhon - I wonder what the reason is? It would appear that he prefers him as Governor of Nakhon and views the situation in the same way that I did, when I sent him my instructions - that is why he is sending him back to Nakhon. Or could it be that he favours Phaya Phathalung as Governor, so he sent for him to join him at Songkhla? Or perhaps he feels that Phaya Phathalung and Phra Sanehamontri cannot both stay in the one place and, preferring Phra Sanehamontri, he sends him back there. What do you think, Treasurer? From what you've heard, who would you say he favoured?" The Treasurer replied: "I do not think that he has given any indication; however the people in the provinces are saying that Phaya Phathalung will govern Nakhon. Phaya Phathalung is assembling a number of [his] men to go to Nakhon and take over the running of affairs there. He has ordered that the contents of Chao Phaya Nakhon's residence be handed over to him<sup>2</sup> and they say that before proceeding to Songkhla he ordered all the goldsmiths to be rounded up accompany him down there." His Majesty said: "Phaya Phathalung's a clever chap and has the gift of the gab. I wonder who he will prefer - Phaya Phathalung or Phra Sanehamontri - I am still not sure." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "In his dealings with them, whom does he entertain more regard for, Phaya Phathalung or Phra Sanehamontri?" The Treasurer replied: "His contacts with Chao Phaya Nakhon's sons have been too infrequent for him to have any preference in the matter." His Majesty exclaimed: "Phaya Phathalung is an opium-smoker and is handicapped by his disability - how can I appoint him as governor to look after the province? The only one I can appoint is Phra Sanehamontri. Just wait until Meun Phimon gets down there and he will see from my instructions exactly what I want."

On the 11th July, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty that a vessel with Annamese-type bows had put in. The master, a Chinese called Put, stated that he had gone to trade in Kelantan and had sailed back on the 23rd June, taking 16 days to reach Pak Nam. His Majesty asked what news he had brought. The Treasurer replied: "When questioned, he told us that three envoys had gone down there to tell them to stop fighting and that they had done so, but they had not yet demolished their stockades - they were still arguing about who should be the first to do so - exactly the same as we were told by the trader, Nai Rak, who came here from Kelantan. Before the envoys arrived, they [the two sides] had been fighting each other, but there was only one serious encounter, when Tengku Besar's men crossed the river. Apart from this, fighting has been sporadic and trading is going on as normal." His Majesty said: "Well, our people on the spot will know much more than this.

Let's just wait until we hear what Phaya Si Phiphat has to report."

On the 12th July, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty that a vessel with Annamese-type bows had arrived. Khun Sombatphakdi reported that Your Excellency had sent him up in charge of 121 [Malay] captives. He had left Songkhla on the 3rd July and had taken nine days to reach Pak Nam. His Majesty asked: "What news does he bring?" The Treasurer replied: "Khun Sombatphakdi himself is still sick on board and has not yet arrived in Bangkok. The Governor of Samut[prakan] has only sent up Nai Di, one of Phaya Si Phiphat's attendants. When we questioned him he stated that he had been put on board to look after the junk. He had heard it said that the Governor of Pechaburi had arrived in Kelantan and had sent a letter back to Songkhla reporting that he had gone down to order Tengku Besar and Raja Kelantan to stop fighting; they had done so and demolished their stockades. As regards Kedah, Phaya Wichitnarong had gone down to round up the people there. Apart from this Nai Di knew nothing." His Majesty exclaimed: "How could a ship's caretaker know anything! The bit about Phaya Pechaburi taking his troops down to Kelantan is quite wrong - if he has gone anywhere at all it is only as far as Sai." His Majesty then said: "This fellow is one of his servants - does he have a title or is he one of his bondsmen?" The Treasurer replied that he was one of the ten bondsmen sent up with Khun Sombatphakdi, the official in the Foreign Trade Department of the Treasury. His Majesty asked the reason for their being sent up and the Treasurer explained that they were there to look after the junk; they performed no duties of any importance and so had been sent back on the junk. His Majesty said: "They are his personal bondsmen and he ought to keep them with him. He should take them with him wherever he goes, even if he travels to the ends of the earth. Well, does the man know whether any of the ships have arrived carrying our instructions?" The Treasurer replied: "He knows that Khun Ritthironakrai's ship arrived on the 4th July, but he says that so far no other ship has arrived." His Majesty exclaimed: "What on earth has made them so late? There seems to be no prospect of them ever arriving!"

In the evening, His Majesty asked Phaya Phiphat whether Khun Sombatphakdi, the man who had brought up the captives, had reached Bangkok yet. Phra Narin replied: "No, Sire. The Treasurer sent an official down to fetch him but he only brought back the nominal roll of the [captive] families brought up here. Khun Sombatphakdi said that three ships had been sent up from Songkhla with the captives. The two other ships had left on the 2nd July; they were vessels under the command of officers of the Palace Watch and both were carrying dispatches." His Majesty asked: "These two ships that left the day before - how many of the captives were they carrying and how many of them were able-bodied men?" Phaya Phiphat replied: "Each of them was carrying just over 80 people - husband and wife couples - and there were lots of able-bodied men. The 121 people carried in Khun Sombatphakdi's

vessel were mainly women without their husbands - there were only two or three able-bodied men among them." His Majesty exclaimed: "They sailed [a day or] two before Khun Sombatphakdi - why have not they arrived yet? Could they have been careless and allowed something to happen to them or what? These women who have been brought up here without husbands - I do not know whether they belong to the crown or to the officers of the expedition. Now that they are here, hand them over to Phaya Rachawangsan for the time being. We will sort the matter out later when the army gets back."

On the 13th July, in the morning, the Treasurer told His Majesty that Khun Sombatphakdi, the man who had brought the captives up, had arrived in Bangkok. His Majesty asked what news he had brought. The Treasurer replied: "As regards Kelantan, he states that Phaya Phechaburi went down to Sai and sent a letter back to Songkhla to report that he had dispatched envoys to Kelantan ordering Tengku Besar and Raja Kelantan to stop fighting. They had done so and had demolished all their stockades. Tengku Besar has sent a messenger up to Phaya Phechaburi asking him not to send troops into Kelantan - if he has any consideration at all for Tengku Besar, he should on no account send troops into Kelantan. As it is, when the people of Kelantan learnt that troops might be sent in, they took fright and some of them had fled, taking their wives and children with them, about a hundred people in all. Phaya Si Phiphat thinks that Tengku Besar's request not to send the troops in is an attempt to gain time so that he can take his family and get away; he has therefore sent Phaya Chaiya with 4 ships and 300 men to blockade the mouth of the Kelantan river." His Majesty observed: "His sending Phaya Chaiya to blockade the mouth of the Kelantan river conforms exactly to the instructions I sent down. It looks as though he knows what my instructions are and has taken action accordingly."

His Majesty then asked: "Do we have any news of the situation in Kedah?" The Treasurer replied: "As regards Kedah, Phaya Si Phiphat has sent Phaya Senaphubet and Phaya Wichitnarong down there to round up the Malays. Phaya Senaphubet reports that the Governor of Saiburi has carried off some four or five hundred of them in the jungle and has sent another hundred or so up to Phathalung. He has been up to Songkhla to see Phaya Si Phiphat asking to be allowed to continue as Governor of Kedah. He has rounded up about a thousand of the Malays who joined the rebels. Phaya Si Phiphat thinks he needs to send a considerable number of the Kedah Malays up here and leave only a few to look after the state; he proposes to take one or two thousand men from the governor. In Phathalung, Khun Sombatphakdi heard that Phaya Si Phiphat would send for Phaya Phathalung and entrust the care of the province to the followers of the former governor. His Majesty exclaimed: "What sort of arrangements are these? They are not in line with the instructions I sent down. From where is he going to get these followers of the former Governor? How can he possibly let the Governor of Saiburi go back and govern Kedah

again - it would not be long before he was running away again! Even when Chao Phaya Nakhon was alive, he was not able to stay there - how can he possibly stay there now that Chao Phaya Nakhon is dead? Phaya Si Phiphat has not yet made any real arrangements for setting out how the state is to be administered - he is too busy dealing with the captive families. He should see about re-establishing the government of the state first and only then see about the captive families. I wonder what is happened to the ship carrying my letters dealing with the death of Chao Phaya Nakhon - why is it so late in arriving? It looks as though it will never get there! Do you think perhaps it could have wandered off or called in somewhere, eh?" The Treasurer replied: "No, Sire." His Majesty said: "Just wait until Meun Phimon's ship gets down there - he will see quite clearly what arrangements I have in mind for organising the state. All relevant details are contained in the dispatches Meun Phimon is carrying."

His Majesty then asked: "When does he think he will be able to return to Bangkok?" The Treasurer replied: "He will endeavour to complete his task as soon as possible so as to return sometime between middle of August and the middle of October, before the monsoon sets in." His Majesty said: "He will probably get my letters on his way back - he will be coming back while *our* people will just be setting out! If they don't catch him before he leaves but meet him on his way back, this will probably mean that the business will be left only half complete, I suppose?" The Treasurer said that the vessels carrying dispatches from Bangkok would probably arrive before the middle of August. His Majesty said: "If they do arrive, it will be about the end of September or the beginning of October before he can finish reorganising the state and came back here." The Treasurer then told His Majesty that Phaya Chaiya had sent up Luang Suphaphaeng with some eight of the Kuramad Malays handed over to him by the Governor of Thalang. The information contained in Phaya Chaiya's letter was identical with that given in the earlier letter from Phaya Thalang. His Majesty asked: "Are these Malays the ones who sailed one of the green-prowed junks to Thalang?" The Treasurer replied that they were not - they were the Malays whom Tengku Mat Saad was said to have sent as his envoys to Phaya Thalang. His Majesty said: "Send them to Phaya Mahamontri and have Phaya Krai subject them to a thorough interrogation to get some information out of them. They probably know quite a lot."

On the 14th July, in the morning, the Treasurer told His Majesty: "Phaya Si Phiphat sent Khun Sombathpakdi up with a sketch of the eyes of an elephant. He says that the eyes, which are yellow, are always on the move. The hair around its ears is white, but the hair around the belly is yellow with reddish roots, while the hair on its tail is yellow with black roots. Phaya Si Phiphat sent Phra San and Phra Chainat to see whether it met the desired criteria and has had a draughtsman make a sketch of the eyes, which he has sent up."



His Majesty laughed and said: "Where is it from - is it a female or a male?" The Treasurer replied that it was a female, from Phathalung. His Majesty said: "It is very difficult to get a [white] elephant in the south. They have reported having one several times but the reports were never really substantiated. I am afraid it may be like the one from Pathio which turned out to be no different from those used in the mines. I do not know what it is with the south but it seems to be impossible for them to find even one elephant with the right markings - if they do produce one, its colour is only a tiny bit different from the normal colour. They have reported finding one on several occasions but it is unlikely that they have actually got hold of one."

On the 15th July, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat told His Majesty: "An Annamese-type vessel has arrived from Songkhla. Meun Krai of the Palace Watch reports that Phaya Si Phiphat has sent him up with dispatches and some 82 prisoners, male and female, young and old. He left Songkhla on the 2nd July and took 12 days to reach the Pak Nam." His Majesty asked: "What news does he bring of Kelantan?" The Treasurer replied: "Phaya Si Phiphat reports that the Governor of Pechaburi has gone down to Sai and sent back a letter to say that he sent Khun In down to tell them to stop fighting and they had done so, but they were still arguing about pulling down their stockades; they had merely dismantled the cannon. Tengku Besar had written to Phaya Pechaburi saying that he was prepared to pull down his stockades and not engage in any further fighting, but that Raja Kelantan had not pulled down *his* stockades. Tengku Besar asked Phaya Pechaburi to help him by keeping his troops in Sai. He was happy to serve the crown in the same way as his cousins, but he could never work with Raja Kelantan and his men." His Majesty laughed and said: "It's just the one country - how can we divide it up into bits and pieces? From the way he talks, it would appear that he's frightened of the army and has therefore broken off the fighting. In that case, if another detachment of our troops gets down there in time, it will settle the matter once and for all. It looks as though we can say that the situation is now under control." His Majesty then asked if everybody was all right. Meun Krai, the officer of the Palace Watch, replied: "Yes, Sire." His Majesty said: "Bring the letter here and read it out." When Nai Boriban, who was reading the dispatches, came to the part about Tengku Besar writing to the Governor of Pechaburi and the latter sending a reply, His Majesty laughed and said: "From the tone of Tengku Besar's letter it looks as though he is well and truly scared of our troops. However, the Governor of Pechaburi's answer does not really say much or make any points - he should have adopted a more threatening tone and said a few things to scare him; but he has not. The letter is very vague and worded in Tengku Besar's favour. It looks as though he's accepted a bribe from him, and this has caused him to send an answer intimating that he can do something to help him." The Treasurer then said that the Governor of Pechaburi's reply had been intended to win Tengku Besar's confidence; his saying that the Malay states covered a large area and had lots of empty

territory was not referring specifically to Kelantan; he was simply speaking in general terms. His Majesty said: "If that is what he means, then he was quite correct to act as the situation demanded. How can one country be split up into two or three?" When the reading of the letter had concluded, His Majesty asked the Treasurer: "If they take their families and run away, will they go by land or sea?" The Treasurer replied that they would probably go by sea. His Majesty then said: "If they do run away, they could not get very far. If the Governor of Chaiya gets there in time, things should not be too bad. He can tell them to stop fighting and make sure they do so. He can order them to surrender and bring them all up here, and that will be the end of the matter."

When the letter dealing with Kedah had been read out, His Majesty said: "He has not really done much yet about reorganising the place - he has been too busy dealing with the captives. Well, what about these prisoners he's sent up - what sort of prisoners are they and where are they from?" The Treasurer replied: "They are people from Kedah, Chana, Thepha, Raman and Setul who are supposed to have joined the rebels. As for the women without husbands, some of them had husbands who were killed by the rebels while others had husbands who went over to the rebels." His Majesty said: "The people there must all come over to us - where else can they go? He must complete arrangements for the reorganisation of Kedah first before dealing with captives. It should not cause too much of an upset. We cannot possibly allow the Governor of Saiburi to go back there as governor again. If he thinks there's a Malay who can be appointed to look after the state, then let him go ahead and appoint him - he should be able to attract the people who ran away, whether previously or just recently, to take up residence in the state. I have been waiting to hear which Malay he proposes to appoint as ruler of Kedah but so far I have heard nothing."

After this, the Governor of Pechaburi's two letters were read out and when they came to the part about Tengku Besar sending Phaya Pechaburi a present of gold dust, and Luang Sonseni writing to inform him that Khun Yothasamut, Meun Thep, Nai Noi, Khun In and Khun Raya had gone down to get Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar to stop fighting and demolish their stockades but had in fact taken sides with Raja Kelantan, violating the agreement, His Majesty said: "This is how they go on all the time - they just will not work together! They are sent down as envoys of the crown, but they go and take sides with the people they are supposed to be giving instructions to - all they are doing is, to create more dissension! It is downright disgraceful! Luang Sonseni is one of our senior officials - why does not he punish them and have them flogged for their rascally tricks? They have compunction at all in taking the side of the party that offers them the most! As for Phaya Pechaburi - all it takes is an ounce or two of gold to make him talk the way Tengku Besar wants him to - he will not say a word against him! They are useless, the whole lot of them!" After the reading of Phaya Pechaburi's dispatches had been

completed, Khun In's report was read out. When it came to the part about Tengku Besar dismantling all the cannon in his stockade and storing them in his and Wan Long Mamad's compound, and about the envoys Khun Yothasamut, Meun Thep and Nai Noi going to see Raja Kelantan to make him stop fighting, but only telling him to dismantle his cannon and saying that he need not pull down his stockades, His Majesty exclaimed: "It is all because of people like this that they are arguing about pulling down their stockades! It's intolerable that they could act in such a fashion! The only reason Tengku Besar has dismantled the cannon in his stockade and stored it away is because he is frightened the army might move in - that's why he has given up the idea of fighting and has ceased hostilities. It would appear that neither side trusts the other an inch. This is because we have only a few of our representatives there to stop them - if they had been accompanied by a larger force, they had probably have pulled down all the stockades. They are bound to be scared of what will happen if our troops go in. Sending Phaya Chaiya down there was the right thing to do." After the report had concluded, His Majesty said: "That bit about Luang Sonseni asking Raja Kelantan for the loan of an elephant to go and tell them to stop fighting shows that he is a good, brave fellow, not scared of anything. He seems to be the sort of man we can use in our army."

When Your Excellency's reply was read out, reporting on the rice situation and asking for salt and requesting some ships to be sent down to bring up the captives, His Majesty observed: "He has got his hands full dealing with the prisoners - I do not know as yet what he's doing about reorganising the administration down there." When the report about sending up the prisoners was read out, His Majesty smiled and asked Phaya Rachawangsan if the women captives without husbands had been lodged outside the city. Phaya Rachawangsan replied that they had. His Majesty then told Phaya Rachasuphawadi and Phaya Rachawangsan: "See that they are brought back and accommodated by Silk Store. Do not let them be split up - make sure that their numbers tally with the total as stated on the list sent up." When the nominal roll listing the captives sent up on Meun Krai's ship was read out, His Majesty asked whether they had all kept in good health on the voyage. The Treasurer replied that they had. His Majesty said: "Send them to Phaya Rachawangsan to look after. Do not let them starve, look after them well. Wait until the army comes back to Bangkok and then we can settle to where they are to be sent." His Majesty then asked the Treasurer: "Has the loading of the rice on the *Macchanu* been completed? See that you get hold of some salt and put that on board too." The Treasurer replied: "The *Macchanu* is fully loaded with rice but if we unload some of it, we should be able to take aboard some salt and send the ship off." His Majesty then told the Treasurer and Phaya Chodeuk: "If the ship is been fully loaded with rice, never mind, do not unload it - see about getting another vessel. Tell Luang Sawatdiwari<sup>1</sup> to help load the salt, so it can be sent off as quickly as possible. As regards

a ship to bring the prisoners up here, see the tax-farmers about getting one." The letter about the elephant with unusual markings was not presented to His Majesty as His Majesty had already been informed of its contents.

In the evening, His Majesty asked Phaya Krai if he had finished questioning the Koramad Malays. Phaya Krai replied that he had not yet finished his interrogation. His Majesty then said to Phra Narin: "When the report came in this morning, where did it say Tengku Mat Saad and Wan Mali had fled to?" Phra Narin replied: "To Batu Bara, Sire." His Majesty said: "I heard that they had fled to Acheh and Penang. Who was it who told us where they had taken their people to?" Phra Narin remained silent and His Majesty exclaimed: "You have not made any attempt to copy down the details reported in the letter! I can never get an answer to any question I ask you!" His Majesty then told Phaya Krai: "Question the Koramad Malays more closely and see if you can get some more information out of them. The Sultan of Kedah has lots of sons and nephews. With them escaping like this, will they join up with the British and come back and attack Kedah again? Just make sure you find out about this point, will you - it is the most important thing. These fellows are the people used to carry messages to and fro - they must have a pretty good idea of what is going on - that's why they are used to deliver messages and carry out negotiations."

On the 16th July in the morning, His Majesty asked whether Meun Krai of the Palace Watch, who had just arrived, had come in as His Majesty had not yet questioned him. Phra Narin replied that he had. His Majesty asked what Phaya Si Phiphat was doing. Phra Narin replied that he was having book-rests made as well as whetstones for the monks to sharpen their razors on. His Majesty exclaimed: "What's all this about book-rests and whetstones? Why do you not say something about what's being done to rebuild Songkhla? What progress has been made on the work they started but hadn't yet finished?" Phra Narin replied that Your Excellency was having the Songkhla people rebuild the northern wall, part of which had now been completed. His Majesty asked whether the other walls were had been completed. Phra Narin replied that the southern wall had already been built by the Songkhla people, but the walls on the other two sides were not yet complete. His Majesty asked whether work had begun on these two sides. Phra Narin replied that he had questioned the messenger who had said that it appeared that they were still working on the northern wall. His Majesty asked: "Where is he getting the men from?" Phra Narin replied that he were using Songkhla people, with men from the army assisting them. His Majesty said: "If they need men from the army to help them, then see that they get them, so that they finish the job. How much longer must it remain unfinished? I have already sent them instructions to the effect that if they did not have enough men and needed men from the army to assist them, then arrangements must be made to get the army to help them complete the task. If they do not finish the job and the army comes back with

the work uncompleted, no one will ever finish it off. It will remain unfinished indefinitely, and if that's the case, our enemies will have scant respect for us."

On the 17th July His Majesty did not discuss the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 18th July, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that two Annamese-bowed vessels had arrived. On one of them, Meun Si Phokhai had reported that Your Excellency had sent him up with dispatches and a consignment of 126 captives. He had left Songkhla on the 8th July and had taken 10 days to reach Pak Nam. On the other vessel, the Adjutant of the Annamese [in Chantaburi] had reported that the Governor of Chantaburi had sent a message to the effect that the ship on which Meun Awutphuthon of the Palace Watch was bringing up 83 captives from Songkhla had been blown off course to Chantaburi, arriving there on the 7th July. He would follow the Adjutant later. His Majesty smiled and said: "When I heard Meun Si Phokhai report that he had left Songkhla on the 8th July, it gave me quite a shock - I thought we would never hear anything about Meun Awutphuthon's ship. Lo and behold, it was blown off course to Chantaburi!" His Majesty then asked whether anyone had brought any news of Kelantan up to Songkhla and was there anything new. The Treasurer replied: "The dispatches report that a ship arriving from Trengganu had said that the fighting had stopped on the 14th June. The ship subsequently sent there to bring about a cease-fire had not yet returned but all the ships sent down with instructions from Bangkok had arrived, except Meun Phimonkamchon's ship. His Majesty said: "In that case, everything will be all right - he should know how to proceed. The dispatch yet to reach him is only concerned with the arrangements to be made for Nakhon." His Majesty then asked if everyone was well and whether anyone had fallen sick or died. Meun Si Phokhai replied: "No Sire, everyone is well." Luang Surinthamat then read out the letter dealing with sending up the captives and when he came to the part about Khun Tani<sup>4</sup> sending a letter requesting that some of the captives be offered to the monks as labourers and [Your Excellency] sending her the 19 Malays from Rangae, His Majesty smiled and said: "Sending Malays to work for the monks? Can they eat pork?" After the reading was over, His Majesty smiled and said to the Treasurer and Phaya Rachasuphawadi: "See that arrangements are made in conformity with the letter. Have Chameun Sisorarak deliver to the Silk Store the captives who are to be accommodated there and see that the people allotted to work with the monks are sent to do the work. If they can get them to eat pork for a few days, well and good." When the reading of the dispatches had been completed, His Majesty said: "The ships we sent down have been very slow - they have taken up to thirty to forty days to get there - they have probably been wandering a bit, eh?" The Treasurer replied that this was not the case - they had been becalmed. His Majesty told Luang Surinthamat to have Phaya Narin copy down details

of the ships' movements as reported in the dispatches and keep them for future reference.

His Majesty then asked Meun Si Phokhai whether the expedition was short of food. Meun Si Phokhai replied that they had very little in the way of food; the rank and file had none at all. His Majesty smiled and said: "Let us have the details. What are they short of - tell me, is it rice, fish, chillies, salt or what?" Meun Si Phokhai replied: "We are short of everything, Sire, particularly vegetables, fish, chillies and belachan." His Majesty said with a smile: "Let's leave the fresh vegetables out of it - if I sent them down they would only go bad. Are they short of onions and garlic as well? And belachan too?" Meun Si Phokhai replied that they were indeed short of onions, garlic and belachan. His Majesty laughed and said: "If they are as short as that, let them hurry up and get the business over with as soon as possible, then they can come back here right away and they will not have to starve." His Majesty then said to Phaya Chodeuk: "See that Phaya Rachamontri is told to make arrangements and to obtain supplies and send down enough to make up the deficiencies reported." His Majesty then asked: "Did you hear what steps he proposes to take with regard to Kelantan? Has he sent Luang Kocha Ishak down there yet?" Meun Si Phokhai replied: "I saw Luang Kocha Ishak when I left and he was still at Songkhla, but as regards the situation in Kelantan, I heard that it was proposed to send him down to persuade them to obey our instructions." His Majesty said: "If we can get him [Tengku Besar] to come to Songkhla, we can give him an appointment, but he will have to effect a reconciliation with Raja Kelantan before we can appoint him to a post in the state."

His Majesty then asked with a smile: "The elephant with the unusual colouring that Phaya Si Phiphat mentioned - what colour was it?" Is he taking good care of it?" Meun Si Phokhai replied that it was being looked after very well; Your Excellency was keeping it in a stall and seeing that it was scrubbed every day. As regards its colouring, its eyes were yellow, as was its hair; its body was the colour of a young jambolan fruit." His Majesty smiled and said: "The colour of a young jambolan fruit? That is a bit of an exaggeration. Do the people down there call it a white elephant?" Meun Si Phokhai replied that he had not heard it referred to in these terms, they simply said it had an unusual colouring. His Majesty laughed and said: "I thought some of them were calling it a white elephant."

On the 19th July, in the morning, His Majesty asked the Treasurer: "Have you asked the envoy about the opium campaign? How much have they confiscated? Have they all been made to take the oath?" The Treasurer replied that he had been told that the task of confiscating the opium had been entrusted to Chao Phaya Yomarat, who had confiscated some eight or nine cakes. The opium dealers had found out about the campaign and some of them had taken

their opium and made off into the jungle while others had taken their opium and gone down to Trengganu; Phaya Songkhla and the opium dealers had been made to take the oath. His Majesty commented: "Such a tiny bit - he has hardly confiscated anything! They have taken it all away. Let them get away for the time being. When we are not so busy, I will send someone down to have another go at them and make sure we get the whole lot. Now that we've made them take the oath, we must see that they refrain from any more trading in opium - that will do for the time being."

On the 20th July, His Majesty made no reference to the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 21st July, in the evening, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that Your Excellency had sent up two vessels. On one of them, Khun Chonchaiklab and Meun Lobthorani had brought up a consignment of 111 captives, and on the other, Phan Racharit, a junior officer in the Athmat regiment, had brought up 54 captives. His Majesty asked when they had arrived and whether they had brought any report from Kelantan. Phaya Phiphat replied that there was only a letter to say that the prisoners had been despatched from Songkhla on the 11th July. His Majesty observed: "The ships are arriving so quickly - one after the other - they will not know anything new." After Nai Boriban had read out the letter, His Majesty said: "Hand the prisoners over to Phaya Rachawangsan to look after," and then asked Khun Chonchaiklab: "How much opium has been seized? Has the opium trade stopped? As an opium-smoker yourself, you should know all about it. Let us have the truth now - is the Governor of Songkhla still dealing in opium?" Phaya Phiphat put the questions and then informed His Majesty: "He does not know whether the Governor is still trading in opium but he still had some - he gave Khun Chonchaiklab a few cakes of prepared opium to smoke. When the contents of Your Majesty's edict on suppressing the traffic in opium became known, the trade fell off and his dealers took their opium and made off, some going into the jungle and others leaving by boat." His Majesty asked whether anyone had been sent after them to arrest them. Phaya Phiphat replied that someone had been sent out to intercept them. His Majesty exclaimed: "How are they going to catch anyone by such dilatory measures - they will never confiscate any opium like this! Phaya Songkhla is unwilling to help in the campaign - all he does is to try and cover up things and evade the issue, letting them get away! If the people of Songkhla still continue to smoke opium, they will be in no state to fight *anyone*, let alone the Malays!" His Majesty then told Phra Narin: "Tell the Treasurer to write to Phaya Si Phiphat to say that when the army returns to Bangkok, if they can bring back with them the entire supply of opium in the south, it will give me far more pleasure than presenting me with a thousand captives. Furthermore, if Phaya Songkhla refuses to cooperate in confiscating the opium, then tell him he is never again to wait upon me here in Bangkok."

On the 22nd and 23rd July, His Majesty made no reference to the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 24th July, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat informed His Majesty that Your Excellency had sent Khun Ritthironakrai up with dispatches from Songkhla; he had left on the 15th July and had taken nine days to reach Pak Nam. His Majesty asked: "Has [Meun] Phimonkamchon's ship arrived yet?" The Treasurer replied that it had; the dispatches just received were in answer to the instructions carried by [Meun] Phimonkamchon. His Majesty asked whether Your Excellency had completed the reorganisation of Kedah. The Treasurer replied that Your Excellency had reported that Your Excellency had been unable to find a Kedah man to appoint as governor of the state. It looked as though the only possibility was Tengku [H]asan, who was living in Penang. When Tengku Din had captured Kedah and Chao Phaya Nakhon had led his troops against him, Tengku Hasan had gone to Kedah but he had not helped Tengku Din in his campaign. After Chao Phaya Nakhon had recaptured Kedah, Tengku Hasan fled to Penang. Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent someone to persuade him to come back and stay in Kedah but he had been too embarrassed to do so. He had taken no part in Tengku Mat Saad's recent attack upon Kedah and whenever Chao Phaya Nakhon had sent someone to Penang to purchase goods, Tengku Hasan had helped make the necessary arrangements to obtain what was wanted. He had been someone upon whose services the late Chao Phaya Nakhon had relied. If we wanted to get him to come and stay in Kedah, he would probably do so, but he was not someone we could trust completely. If he were to return to Kedah and be given full powers to rule the state, he would probably allow the British to establish a factory there and allow them to do whatever they wished, and eventually Kedah would be lost to us. Phaya Si Phiphat proposed to put the Governor of Saiburi in charge of Phathalung, while in Kedah he proposed to appoint only a headman in each district. Phaya Sanhamontri and the Governor of Saiburi would then take it in turns to come down regularly and check up on what was going on. His Majesty said: "Well, is there anything more?" The Treasurer replied: "He also reports that in Phathalung the population has been considerably reduced; with so many people running away, there only a few left - the situation is very different to what it used to be and Phaya Si Phiphat has sent someone to take a census and see exactly how many there are there. He has also sent Phaya Aphaiphiphit to collect all the able-bodied Malays from Kedah whom the Governor of Saiburi had been prepared to send up after which he would round up their families. Phra Wichitsorokrai is to be sent to garrison Krut, since this is a harbour much resorted to by the pirates and those hostile to us. He will be able to look after the area and patrol it and keep an eye on the situation in the future. He also reports that lots of Nakhon and Phathalung people have run away from their homes and have taken up residence in the Nakhon metropolitan area and he proposes to send someone into the district concerned to collect them and resettle them." His Majesty said: "All the arrangements he proposes are excellent except



that I'm not sure that his proposal to divide up Kedah and have each district ruled by a headman will work. If the state is split up like this, there will be no one there with any influence, and if they start quarrelling among themselves, what can we do? There will be no one on the spot with the authority to decide the matter and if it has to be referred to Phthalung, it's too far away to get a decision. Even if they could get a decision in time, would the decision be acceptable to both parties? One side wouldn't be happy about it and would run away and tell the British, and if the British see that there is no organised state there, they will get them to come and ask for the state of Kedah to be set up again, which will put us in an invidious position. What do you, Chancellor and you, Treasurer, think? Don't you think that such an arrangement would be rather risky, or would it be all right? Or would it be better to appoint someone to rule the whole country? You two talk the matter over and let me know what you think best." The Treasurer replied: "By breaking the state up into districts, the idea is to divide it up into a number of separate administrative units as was done with Patani. Patani used to be a single state, but when it was divided up into districts, these districts eventually became separate administrative units under the jurisdiction of Patani and this has continued right up to the present." His Majesty said: "This is not something that can be accomplished overnight - it will take a long time and I am afraid we shall all be dead long before it happens. What do you think, Chancellor - is it a good idea to divide up the state into districts like this?" The Chancellor replied: "If it is to be divided into districts, we already have district headmen, but it means they will have to go a long way to settle any dispute and I am afraid that they will not be able to obtain a decision in reasonable time." His Majesty said: "How could they? I think the best thing would be to organise Kedah as a state and then we can issue instructions and take decisions without any unnecessary delay." When Luang Surinthamat proceeded with the reading of the letter dealing with the arrangements proposed for reorganising the state, His Majesty made no comment, remaining silent until the letter had concluded. His Majesty then said: "The arrangements proposed are excellent. If he succeeds in carrying out his proposal to transfer the Governor of Saiburi to Phthalung and sending Phra Wichitsorakrai to garrison Krut, that is fine. But to divide up Kedah into a number of districts under their headmen is far too risky. If the British learn there's no Raja there, only district headmen on the lines proposed, they will claim that we have abandoned Kedah and they will get someone to come and ask us to set up a state and they will send up the gold and silver flowers. And what could we say to them then? What do you think, Treasurer?" The Treasurer replied: "Phaya Si Phiphat thinks that if we are to appoint someone to rule Kedah it must be a Malay from the Nine States or Kedah, otherwise he wouldn't be able to stay there. But there *is* no Kedah Malay with any real power - there are only people with a limited amount of power - just enough to be made district headman. This is why he proposed to divide the state up into districts there are so few people there - so many have been carried off as captives. If someone could be found to appoint as

ruler, it would of course be a good thing, as Your Majesty says." His Majesty said: "What do you think, Chancellor and Phaya Rachasuphawadi, would indeed be a good idea to appoint someone as ruler of the state?" The Chancellor and Phaya Rachasuphawadi replied that it would be a good idea. His Majesty said: "That is what I thought. If we organise it as a state, the British will have no opportunity to interfere in the matter, since we will not have abandoned Kedah - they will have no case to argue. If we do not make it into a state and simply appoint district headmen, this will give them the opportunity to intervene. As for dividing it up on the Patani model, the two cases are not identical; in the case of Patani, all the inhabitants were there, not waiting around elsewhere. In the case of Kedah, three-quarters of the inhabitants have gone over into British territory and we have only been able to hold on to a quarter of the population. And a lot of these have been brought up here as captives, so there aren't many left. If we *were* to split it up into districts under headmen, what would we do if the fugitives decide to come back and attack it again? How could we come to its aid in time? We must find someone to appoint as ruler and make it into a state - that's the best thing to do. Even if he takes them all back and allows them to live there, provided he agrees to send up the gold and silver flowers, it will do more for our reputation than simply appointing district headmen and otherwise leaving Kedah to its own devices. I have already dealt with this point in the letters I sent down regarding the reorganisation of Kedah. What I said about carrying off the prisoners was couched in general terms, just to give him some idea. If he's going to transfer the Governor of Saiburi, he should also transfer as many men and weapons as he thinks fit but of course can't move the whole lot." His Majesty then asked if there were any other dispatches. Luang Surinthatamat replied that there were reports on the arrival of the ships sent down from Bangkok with dispatches. His Majesty said: "Just leave them till this evening," and said to the Treasurer: "Be sure to write to him telling him that he must find someone to appoint as ruler of the state. If he cannot find anyone with real power, then if he can find anyone at all who might be appointed, let him appoint him, so that the place is secure." The Treasurer then told His Majesty that he had asked Nai Ritthi who had told him that Tengku Anom seemed to be a good man to appoint. His Majesty said: "I do not care *who* it is, provided we go ahead and appoint *someone*."

In the evening His Majesty ordered that the dispatches left over from the morning be read. When the reader, Luang Surinthatamat, came to the part about the Annamese Adjutant failing to arrive by the date he had promised, His Majesty laughed and said: "Well, there is not much we can do about that, is there?" When the reading of the letter had been completed, His Majesty said: "Make a note of the day the dispatches say that each person actually arrived and keep it on file for reference in our future plans." Phaya Thep then presented His Majesty with the draft of the letter being prepared for His Majesty to send out acknowledging the arrival of the captives and giving details of the opium suppression campaign. When the final part had been read out, saying that

if the Governor of Songkhla did not wipe out the opium trade and the people there went on smoking opium, they would be in no state to fight anyone, let alone the Malays, and that Chao Phaya Yomarat and Your Excellency were to impress upon the Governor that unless the opium trade was completely eradicated, he was forbidden ever to come back to Bangkok and wait upon His Majesty again, His Majesty asked: "Why have you said so little?" and added with a smile: "I thought the Treasurer's remarks would have been more pointed." His Majesty added: "Put in a bit more to make it quite clear. Tell the Governor that he has shown precious little interest in helping the campaign to eradicate opium-smoking - he has done nothing about it and allowed them all to get away. If he does not wipe out opium-smoking they are to tell him that he is never on any account to wait upon me again." After Phaya Krai had amended the letter and read it out to His Majesty, His Majesty said: "That's fine; send it out."

On the 25th July, His Majesty made no reference to the situation in Kedah and Kelantan.

On the 26th July, in the evening, the Treasurer presented His Majesty with the draft of the reply which was to be taken down by Khun Ritthironakrai. When the reader had read the part about His Majesty's saying that Chao Phaya Yomarat and Phaya Si Phiphat were to finish off the business as soon as possible in order to sail back to Bangkok before the monsoon was over and if the reorganisation had not yet been completed, they should find someone competent and have him remain there to complete the reorganisation, His Majesty commented: "It is too short - not detailed enough. The report they sent up was a very detailed one. We need to go into much more detail about the reorganisation of Kedah, since this is the important point and one which has caused me considerable apprehension. See that the letter first of all states explicitly that Kedah must be organised in such a way as to guarantee its security. To split it up into districts as was proposed is against all the rules - there is no precedent for it. To organise the state without having anyone in authority as its ruler will simply mean that there *is* no state. If he expects the headman in each district to get the people now living in British territory to come back, so that every district has a population of some four to five thousand people, this is something we shall never see in our life-time. Moreover as the Malays who have run away are living in Perai, which is no distance away - they must know quite well exactly how many people we have carried off. They will not trust their headman and come back, they are bound to be scared that we are planning to carry them all off. They certainly will not come, because there is no person of authority they can look to, as there was before. Then there is the Sultan of Kedah's offspring - they are all living in British territory. When they know that there is no Raja ruling the state, only district headmen, this will be their chance to get the British to intervene, with a request to set up a state there, declaring their readiness to send up the gold and silver flowers -

and what could we say then? It would be a fine opportunity for them to take advantage of us and take over Kedah without our being able to do anything about it. And if they succeed in obtaining Kedah, the adjoining areas in the south will be affected and we shall have no peace - they will probably try and take over everywhere in the region, since the Sultan's sons and nephews are still there. If he [Phaya Si Phiphat] succeeds in carrying out my instructions, we can forestall any attempt on their part. In a situation like this everything depends upon Phaya Si Phiphat and his officers; if they do a good job, it will reflect great credit on us, but if things turn out badly, we shall be disgraced. Please emphasize this point when you write to him, Treasurer. Tell him that if trouble breaks out in the future as a result of the arrangements he proposes, we will have to send his army back down there - there's no one else we can send. And before we have time to send the whole lot of them down there, the pot will have boiled over, do you not think so, Phaya Rachasuphawadi?" Phaya Rachasuphawadi said: "I quite agree, Sire."

His Majesty then said to the Treasurer: "This is, after all, the responsibility of your Ministry [Ministry of War]. See that you make it quite clear to him - put in all the details, so as to convince him. If he does not comply but goes ahead with the arrangements he proposes despite whatever we may tell him, the result will be disastrous. If trouble breaks out again, you will not be able to get out of it, Treasurer - you will have to go down there and suppress it. I wonder why it is that he doesn't see things our way? His letters give the impression that he believes what the Governors of Songkhla and Saiburi tell him and is prepared to go ahead and carry off the population from Kedah and leave the place deserted. Is this the case, Treasurer - what do you think?" The Treasurer replied: "It looks like it, because he was thinking on these lines when he first went down there. I think he will bring the whole lot up here." His Majesty exclaimed: "But why? My instructions to him were to reorganize the state. His idea of obtaining some benefit for the crown and seeing that the army gets some recompense for its pains must be the result of his believing what the Governors of Songkhla and Saiburi tell him. [They must have said] that Kedah is no longer able to yield anything of value and that sending the army there has caused the crown to use up a considerable part of its resources, with the result that in order for the crown to recoup its losses and for the army to get some reward for its pains, we shall have to transport the population up here. We have known for some time now exactly how much advantage we derive from Kedah. The reason Chao Phaya Nakhon attacked Kedah was because he wanted to get as much out of it as he could, and that's why the south has been in such a bad way ever since. What can we do? I would like to get hold of someone who can talk to him, to go down there with my instructions, but such a man is not easy to find. What do you think, Treasurer? Don't you think it would be a good idea to send someone down?" The Treasurer replied that he thought that a senior official should be sent down. His Majesty said: "Send Phra Narin or some one. But will he arrive in time, do you think?"

They will be coming back soon and he might not get there in time." The Treasurer replied: "As regards his not getting down there before they leave, in fact they have not yet left - they are waiting to hear from Khun Ritthironakrai. When they sent him up here, he was told he had to be back there within the month." His Majesty said: "In that case, see that a letter on these lines is drafted right away, giving all these additional details and given to someone to take down. The important thing is that he be told to re-establish Kedah as a state."

On the 27th July, in the morning, His Majesty said to Phaya Thep: "I have been giving all these matters a good deal of thought. If I send someone down there, it might result in some ambiguity as to the policy to be followed. Tell the Treasurer not to go ahead with the arrangements to send anyone down. Just see that a letter is sent, carefully written, saying that as regards dividing Kedah up into districts under headmen, on the Patani model, the Kedah case is different because it's close to Penang and very vulnerable. The Sultan of Kedah's offspring are living in British territory and will always be keen to go back. If things are bungled, it will give them their opportunity. They will conspire with the British to have the British act as their agents in pressing their claims and Kedah will be lost to us for ever. You must see that he is sent instructions to re-establish Kedah as a state."

In the evening, the Treasurer presented His Majesty with the draft of the reply to be sent down with Khun Ritthironakrai. When Meun Nara, who was reading it out, came to the part about Phra Wichitsorakrai being a confirmed opium-smoker who would have a hard job to overcome the habit quickly - it would take him a long time, His Majesty said: "Put in a bit more, will you, expressing disapproval of the Governor of Phathalung and the Governor of Songkhla as well. Say that I cannot show favour towards anyone who has the reputation of being an opium smoker, by appointing him as governor of a province; such a man is not fit to hold any title, much less govern a province." After the letter had been amended, the reading continued and when it came to the part saying that if Kedah were not reorganised as a state but split it up into districts under headmen, this would give the British the opportunity to act as agents for the Malays in pressing for it to be made into a state, which we would find difficult to counter." His Majesty interrupted; "No, that is too short. Write down that if the British act as agents for the Malays in pressing the claims, what are we to say to them? Should we accede to the request, in which case Kedah will surely be taken over - or should we say no? If we say no, and they take it over just the same, are we going to fight them? If we don't fight them, they will become bolder and set out to capture Thalang, Phangnga and Takua Thung and in every province these people will be too much in awe of them to resist. Do you not think I am right, Phaya Rachasuphawadi?" Phaya Rachasuphawadi replied: "The observations Your Majesty has made are quite correct, Sire."

His Majesty then told the Treasurer to write down the two or three points raised as matters to be discussed with Your Excellency. After the letter had been amended, it was read out to His Majesty and when it came to the part saying that if Kedah was re-established as a state, even if the Malays tried to get the British to act as their agents and press their claims, they would have no case to argue, because we would have already reorganised it as a state, His Majesty said: "Make it a bit more substantial. Write down that once we have re-established Kedah as one of our states with its own ruler, it will be impossible for the British to act as agents in pressing the claims of the Malays and taking over our territory - they will have no case to put. They must have *some* scruples! It doesn't matter who it is - if something belongs to someone, how can someone else come along and claim it as his? If this were to happen, it would put it in a similar category to Chiang Mai, which now has a large population and is one of the states on our border. If we had to send an army there and back, we could never recoup the expense involved. If we were unscrupulous enough to take it into our heads to go up there and attack them and carry off the population, we could do so quite easily. This is an example where we have made one of our territories into a state so that there's no opportunity for anyone else to do anything about it - no one would dare lay claim to it. What do you think, Treasurer, Phaya Rachasuphawadi, Phaya Mahaamat?" Phaya Mahaamat replied: "Once it has been organised as a state, no one would dare to come forward to request that it be set up as a state. What Your Majesty says is quite right." His Majesty said: "No, they would be too ashamed to do so. See that this is made quite clear, will you." The letter was amended accordingly and the reading continued.

When it came to the part asking whether in re-organising Kedah it would be possible to have Tengku Anom as ruler, or in fact anyone else, just so long as *someone* was appointed, His Majesty said: "Add a little bit more in case he's influenced by other people - all this is the result of his being too ready to listen to the Governor of Songkhla and the Governor of Saiburi. Tell him not to bother his head too much with the idea and [that] even if Kedah is reorganised as a state, the Malays and the British will one day lay claim to it. Of course they will, whether it forms a state or not. Say something on these lines so as to stop any further argument on this point." After the letter had been amended the reading continued. When it came to the part dealing with the proposal to send Phra Wichitsorakrai to collect enough people to form a settlement at Krud and saying that His Majesty considered that he was unfit to carry out the business of the crown; he was totally unreliable and should be kept somewhere well inside the province - how could someone who smoked opium as he did manage to collect any people, His Majesty broke in: "You can add that it irks me even to hear the name of any opium-smoker mentioned." After the letter had been amended, the reading continued and when it had concluded, His Majesty said: "Read it back to me again." After this had been

done, His Majesty ordered a few more changes to be made - a word or two here and there - without however adding anything of importance. When it was finished, His Majesty said: "That's good. What do you think, Treasurer, Phaya Rachasuphawadi, does it set out things in a clearer fashion?" The Treasurer and Phaya Rachasuphawadi replied: "Much clearer, Sire." His Majesty smiled and said: "Setting out the arguments in detail like this should ensure that he conforms to our ideas." His Majesty went on: "What do you think about trying to get Tengku Hasan to come back as well? If we can persuade him to come back and settle there, it would probably be a good thing. If he does come back, it will not be by himself - he is bound to bring a lot of followers. But don't try to persuade him by holding out the prospect of becoming ruler; just put it to him that he might like to come back. All it will cost us is a bit of paper and ink - I think it would be a good idea to write to him and let him know. If he does take up residence in Kedah, then in say, nine or ten months' time or a year, if the man we appoint as ruler of Kedah turns out to be unsatisfactory, we can think of appointing Tengku Hasan in his place. What do you think, Phaya Rachasuphawadi, would it be better to try and persuade him to come back, or not?" Phaya Rachasuphawadi replied: "It would indeed, Sire. If he does come back, we should be able to get a lot of people to settle there." His Majesty then proceeded to ask the Treasurer whether he thought that Tengku Hasan would come if he were asked. The Treasurer replied that if we held out the prospect of his being appointed as ruler he probably would. His Majesty said: "No, do not do that. Just ask him whether he'd like to come back. He wouldn't come back before because he was on bad terms with Chao Phaya Nakhon but now that Chao Phaya Nakhon is dead, his resentment will probably have abated and he will quite likely come. Put in something on these lines, will you?"

When the letter had been amended and read out to His Majesty, His Majesty said: "Read it out once more, from the beginning, please. It seems to put everything very clearly. If you would care to write something, Treasurer, please do so; do not make it too long, just write a few words telling him to be sure to get hold of a Malay and reorganise the state of Kedah - that is all." When the draft of the letter had been read out to His Majesty, His Majesty smiled and said: "That sounds fine, that will do. Give it to the messenger to take down right away. Whatever you'd like to write, give it to him to take down." The Treasurer said: "There is nothing more for me to say, Sire; every point has been dealt with in Your Majesty's letter." His Majesty smiled and said: "Has the *Macchanu* left yet?" The Treasurer replied that it had left the day before at midday. His Majesty said: "It will not have sailed yet; Phaya Chodeuk has gone down to Pak Nam to see it off. Send another copy of the letter down on the *Macchanu*; with the copy going down on Khun Ritthironakrai's ship, that will make two copies going down, so whichever ship arrives first, he will get our instructions right away. Send someone down to hold the ship until the letter gets there and then it can sail. As regards sending someone down

there to deliver the letter who can explain matters to him personally, just forget it - do not send anyone down - just send my letter."

That evening His Majesty was busy amending the letter being dictated until past two o'clock in the morning; only then did His Majesty retire. So far seven vessels have arrived carrying Malay captives, 45 of whom had died on the voyage. Of those delivered, 402 are lodged with the Asa Cham brigade, 214 in the Silk Store and 17 have been put to serve the monks, making a total of 633 people and if the 45 people who died on the voyage are included, this makes a grand total of 678 people on 7 ships. Full details as to His Majesty's observations and comments are contained in the two letters being taken down by Khun Si Sakharet and Khun Ritthironakrai.

His Majesty has graciously allowed me to record details of His Majesty's observations, which I have set down in this hasty fashion so as to inform Your Excellency with all speed as to what has transpired. This makes the fourteenth [sic] dispatch I have sent Your Excellency and I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties contained in it.

Letter completed on Sunday, 28th July 1839.

## Notes

- 1 i.e. Lady In, the wife of Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi), a lady for whom His Majesty had great respect.
- 2 He even took the official seal (depicting Hanuman holding a banner). When Phra Sanehamontri was appointed Governor of Nakhon, Phaya Phathalung did not return this seal and another seal had to be struck. The original was not returned until after Phaya Phathalung's death. Chao Phaya Suthammamontri (Nu Phrom) once showed me the two seals concerned.
- 3 This was the Chinese merchant, Chim. He was later promoted to the rank of Phaya, with the same honorific title.
- 4 Princess Surithonrak, the elder half-sister of the Treasurer and minor wife of Rama by whom she had children.



# The Fifteenth Dispatch

15 August 1839

Your Excellency's humble servant Luang Udomsombat addresses this letter to Your Excellency's Clerk of the Seal, Luang Thip Akson, so that he may inform Your Excellency of its contents. I have so far sent Your Excellency fourteen dispatches containing details of what has occurred here, viz one sent with Chameun Inthrasena, one with the Assistant Collector of Phechaburi, three with Khun Ritthironakrai, one with Meun Chongsorasi of the Palace Watch, one with Meun Nikon the Annamese, one with Nai To, the Supervisor of the Annamese unit, one with the Superintendent, two with Luang Kocha Ishak, one with Meun Phimon [Kamchon] the Annamese and one with Khun Ritthichonlathan.<sup>1</sup>

On the 29th July His Majesty made no reference to the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 30th July, in the evening, His Majesty asked the Treasurer whether the dispatch on the re-organisation of Kedah had been delivered to the *Macchanu* and whether the vessel had sailed yet. The Treasurer replied that apparently it had not yet sailed [from Pak Nam]; the letter had been copied and sent out. His Majesty commented: "The *Macchanu* is a big ship; it will probably arrive before Khun Ritthironakrai does, do you not think so?" The Treasurer replied that he thought it would. However, the symbols of office that His Majesty was presenting to the future Raja of Kedah had already been put on board Khun Ritthironakrai's ship, viz an enamelled bowl complete with lid<sup>2</sup>, an enamelled goblet, a sword with bands of silver and a silk parasol, although the robes were to be made locally and presented on behalf of His Majesty. His Majesty laughed and said: "I thought you had written to him telling him to have the regalia made down there; if it were to be made locally it would take very little time. But since they have been sent, never mind. Kedah can be re-organised fairly quickly - now that we have sent them this sort of regalia, he can hardly fail to set it up as a state." His Majesty then observed: "I suppose the real idea behind their request for ships to bring up the captives here is to obtain transport to bring back the army, as all their ships have been sent off. He has no ships to send up, so he asks for some to be sent down. As it is, the ship with the captives on it that Meun Awutphuthon was bringing up here was blown off course to Chantaburi. How can it get here now? The monsoon is finished - it won't be able to get here and the captives will all be left there to suffer, I suppose.

On the 31st July, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat reported that Your Excellency had sent Meun Nikon up with dispatches. He had left Songkhla on the 18th July and had taken 11 days to reach Pak Nam. His Majesty asked if there was any news. The Treasurer replied that the Governor of Chaiya had sent Khun Wisut up [to Songkhla] with a letter to say that he had sent someone to tell [the Kelantan people] to dismantle their artillery and demolish their stockades and they had agreed to do so. Tengku Besar was fitting out five ships and would come up to see Your Excellency in Songkhla. He appeared to entertain no thoughts of running away and had said that he had been wrong to engage in combat with Raja Kelantan without first informing Chao Phaya Nakhon. He acknowledged his guilt, was ready to accept whatever punishment His Majesty might decide and put himself unreservedly at His Majesty's disposal. His Majesty said with a smile: "From the way he talks, it looks as though he is not running away. What do the people on Raja Kelantan's side have to say?" The Treasurer replied: "It sounds as though they are trying to put things off, unlike Tengku Besar." His Majesty asked: "Why is that?" The Treasurer replied that Raja Kelantan had delayed matters by saying he wanted to confer with Raja Changwang first before he went up, and then after his discussions with Raja Changwang he had delayed matters further by saying that he wanted to confer with Ku Seri Yama [Engku Seri Mas?]. Phaya Si Phiphat had questioned Khun Wisut as to whether he thought Raja Kelantan would come up to Songkhla or not and Khun Wisut had said that he thought he would not, he would send someone else in his place. Although Raja Kelantan had a boat available, it was one that did not have a mast and he was supposed to be still trying to obtain one. His Majesty asked what could be the reason for Raja Kelantan's unwillingness to go up to Songkhla. The Treasurer replied: "Khun Wisut says that he used to respect the envoy, Luang Sonseni, but not any more now; he says that Luang Sonseni has taken sides with Tengku Besar. Raja Kelantan has sent a letter to Phra Sanehamontri saying that the envoy who had gone down there had turned out to be of no use to him at all." His Majesty said: "Go back and find the dispatch which reports that the envoys who went down there to tell them to stop fighting had taken sides with Raja Kelantan or with Tengku Besar and then we will know how they've lined themselves up - we will know whose side Khun Wisut is on - the man who is just arrived back in Songkhla. If Khun Wisut is on Tengku Besar's side, his story will agree with that of Tengku Besar. I wonder if Raja Kelantan's unwillingness to go up to Songkhla is because of this." The Treasurer said: "Raja Kelantan is a wily fellow - he has never once been up to Bangkok. He's probably scared of what happened before, and so is reluctant to come up. Tengku Besar *has* been up here, so he is prepared to do so again. However, Raja Banggul is reported to have gone to the mouth of the Samro [Semerak] river, on the border with Besut. The Governor of Chaiya told Tengku Besar to write to Raja Banggul telling him to come up and see him but Tengku Besar said that he had already written to him once without any result. He was prepared to write to him again but he did not know whether he would come or not." His Majesty exclaimed:

"Of course he won't come! It looks as though Raja Kelantan will not come up to Songkhla because he does not trust Raja Banggul. He believes that as he is the ruler of the state he must stay and look after it, so he will only send Raja Changwang or the Raja Muda - this must be the reason."

His Majesty then asked if there was any news of Kedah. The Treasurer replied that a letter had arrived saying that the able-bodied men among the Malay captives whom the Governor of Saiburi had proposed to send up had now been sent to Phangnga and Phathalung, in all some 431 people. His Majesty commented: "That is a lot of people - we will have to bring some of them up here." His Majesty then asked if they were all well. Phra Narin replied that they were. His Majesty then said: "Well, are there any more ships coming in carrying prisoners?" Phra Narin replied that Meun Nikon had seen ships being fitted out and thought that another five ships would follow later. His Majesty said: "One of them has ended up in Chantaburi, so I suppose everybody on it will be thoroughly worn out by now."

His Majesty went on: "Bring the letter here and read it out." When Luang Surinthamat, who was reading out the letter to His Majesty, came to the part about Tengku Besar sending out a vessel to tow the Governor of Chaiya's ship in, His Majesty laughed and said: "It looks as though Tengku Besar is trying to gain a bit of credit for himself. He was afraid Raja Kelantan's people would be the first to welcome the Governor so he beat them to it, by having the Governor's ship towed in." When the reading had concluded, His Majesty said: "I wonder why Raja Kelantan will not go up? Still, if he does not go himself, he is bound to send someone - it is most unlikely he will refuse to send anyone. Once they are all up there, we can tell them what to do and settle the matter. Of course, Tengku Besar will have to go and see Raja Kelantan and acknowledge his authority quite unreservedly and Raja Kelantan will have to request that Tengku Besar be appointed to office before he [Phaya Si Phiphat] can allow them both to stay in the same state. If the matter cannot be dealt with satisfactorily, he must see about having Tengku Besar brought up here. It is entirely up to him to decide who should be sent back to look after Kelantan and who should be brought up here along with Tengku Besar - he must settle the business once and for all."

His Majesty then asked: "How far have they got with the rebuilding of Songkhla and where are they getting the men to do the work?" Phra Narin asked [Meun Nikon] and then reported that they were using Songkhla people; the two straight walls had been completed and work on the tapering part was still proceeding. His Majesty said: "Have them finish the work so that the town is secure against any future enemy attack". His Majesty then asked how much opium had been seized. Phra Narin enquired and then reported that [the messenger] knew that a great deal of opium had been confiscated but did not know the exact amount. His Majesty commented: "I can think of nothing

better than to seize the entire supply of opium and bring it up here." After the report about the able-bodied Malays sent by the Governor of Saiburi had been read out, His Majesty observed: "There are still a lot of people down there; we must bring some of them up here." His Majesty then asked Phra Narin whether all the provisions had been loaded and sent off, and if so on what ships. Phra Narin replied that they had all been sent off, loaded aboard the one ship, the *Macchanu*. His Majesty exclaimed: "Why have they been loaded aboard just the one ship? If the *Macchanu* is delayed, they will starve, will they not? For a voyage as long as this the best thing is to distribute the provisions among several ships, so that whichever ship arrives first, they will have at least something to eat. Loading all the provisions on just the one ship like this means that they will have to wait now until this ship arrives. How on earth could things turn out like this? I have issued instructions about this to lots of people but none of them have taken any notice. Not one of you makes any attempt to see that things are done properly - what sort of functionaries are you? I have got to fuss about and show you exactly what to do. As far as I know, it used to be that - all a king had to do was to give orders and it was done - they did not need any further instructions and there was no need for the king to repeat himself two or three times! But now, neither the Ministry of War nor the Department of Ports and Harbours can get anything done!" His Majesty then told the Treasurer: "See that whatever provisions they have written to ask for are loaded aboard various ships and sent down. Then whichever ship arrives first, they can have *something* to eat."

On the 1st to the 4th August, His Majesty made no reference to the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 5th August, in the morning, Phaya Thep informed His Majesty that the Deputy Governor and senior officials of Phechaburi province had reported that a vessel belonging to a Chinese merchant from Bangkok called Chiak had arrived from Kelantan. The Deputy Governor had asked him about the situation in Kelantan and had sent up a report with him. His Majesty asked what the report had said. The Treasurer replied that it said that Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar would go up to Songkhla and that the Governor of Chaiya had had the stockades pulled down and burnt. His Majesty laughed and said: "Now that their stockades have been demolished, it looks as though everything will be all right. They are bound to go up to Songkhla, all of them. It is most unlikely that they will refuse to go up there to receive instructions. It is lucky for Phaya Si Phiphat that he is been spared the trouble of taking the army down there. Anyway, let us hope that everything turns out all right and the business is settled." When Luang Surinthamat had finished reading out the report, His Majesty said: "Let us wait until we hear what Phaya Si Phiphat has to say; he must know much more about the situation there than this."

From the 6th to the 8th August His Majesty made no reference to the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 9th August, in the evening, Phaya Phiphat reported that a vessel belonging to a Chinese called Iam, which had been used as a transport for the expeditionary force, had gone on to trade in Kelantan and had now arrived back. Upon questioning the master, it had been learnt that Raja Kelantan was going to send Raja Changwang up to Songkhla along with Tengku Besar on the 1st August. Iam had left Kelantan on the 28th July and had seen Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar fitting out ships to go up to Songkhla. Iam had taken 12 days to reach Pak Nam. His Majesty asked how the people in Kelantan were - was trading going on as normal again? Phaya Phiphat replied that it was. His Majesty said: "If Raja Kelantan is sending up Raja Changwang it's probably because he feels worried about what might happen in his absence - that is why he is sending Raja Changwang. Anyway, let's wait until we hear what Phaya Si Phiphat has to report and then we shall know all about the situation."

On the 10th August, in the morning, His Majesty said to the Treasurer: "A ship belonging to a Chinese called Iam has arrived from Kelantan; he says that Raja Kelantan was sending up Raja Changwang along with Tengku Besar on the 1st August - did you know this?" The Treasurer replied that he knew that Raja Changwang was being sent up with Tengku Besar. His Majesty said: "When they get there, I hope that the gods will help Phaya Si Phiphat decide the right way to settle the business once and for all. It might be necessary to split it up into two separate states or perhaps some way be found to allow them to live side by side in the same state while recognising Raja Kelantan's superior status. I do hope he can settle things satisfactorily. The Malay territories stretch over a wide area and if it appears that Tengku Besar is not prepared to serve under Raja Kelantan but is prepared to serve us in a separate capacity, as he claimed earlier, it would be a good idea to see if we can find some other area to be made into a state, and thus increase the number of [our] states. What do you think, Treasurer? How large is the area where the Malays live? You have been down there and you should know all about it. Do you think it would be a good idea to divide it up into two states or what?" The Treasurer replied: "In the area adjoining Kelantan, on the coast between Kelantan and Besut there are two rivers; if we wanted to, we could probably set up another state there." His Majesty said: "I think it would be a good idea to set up another state. May the Gods inspire him with the foresight to make the right arrangements - he can then return here before the monsoon changes."

On the 11th August, in the evening, Phaya Phiphat reported that Your Excellency had sent up Meun Awutphuthon and Meun Si Phairot in charge of 83 captives. They had left Songkhla on the 2nd July and had been blown off course to Chantaburi, where they had arrived on the 8th July. They had

left Chantaburi on the 6th August and had taken five days to reach Pak Nam. His Majesty commented: "All is well that ends well! I thought the wind would have dropped completely but lo and behold, it's changed round, allowing them to get here in a mere five days! How could their ship have been blown off course? This chap Tod, the skipper, must have taken the ship to his home port. I thought about sending someone to punish him, but now that he's arrived, we will say no more about it." His Majesty then asked whether the captives were all well and how many altogether had now been sent up. Phra Narin replied: "Of the people brought up by Meun Awutphuthon and Meun Si Phairot, three died while still in the Songkhla river and two died in Chantaburi, leaving 78 people. There have so far been eight ships sent up, including this latest one, and 50 of the captives have died on the voyage, leaving 716 out of the 766 sent up." His Majesty said: "Tell Phaya Rachawangsan to see that they are taken care of." His Majesty then asked: "Did they see the elephant with the unusual colouring - what colour was it?" Phra Narin replied that it seemed to be a purplish colour. His Majesty said with a laugh: "So it is a purplish colour? That is very strange - surely they would have sent us a lot of reports about it? It cannot be anything very much because they have not reported it." His Majesty then asked about the horses sent down from the capital - whether they were in good condition and whether any of them had died. Phra Narin replied that they were all doing well. His Majesty commented: "The horses we have here in Bangkok have nearly all died. It is a good thing that those sent down there are doing well."

From the 12th to the 14th August His Majesty made no mention of the situation in Kedah or Kelantan.

On the 15th August, in the morning, Phaya Phiphat reported that Your Excellency had sent a Chinese called Thiang up with 21 captives. He had left Songkhla on the 4th August and had taken eleven days to reach Pak Nam. His Majesty asked: "Did he meet any ships on the way - what news does he bring?" The Treasurer replied: "He reports that Raja Kelantan has fitted out ten vessels, all highly decorated, and was supposed to be going up to Songkhla on the 1st August but Tengku Besar was supposed to be going up on the 29th July, three days before Raja Kelantan. As regards Kedah, Phaya Si Phiphat has sent Chao Phaya Yomarat to Nong Bua to take delivery of the captives. When Thiang left Songkhla, neither Raja Kelantan nor Tengku Besar had arrived. On the way here, Thiang met a vessel with decorated bows just below Sam Roi Yod; he said that it had had one of its yards broken in a storm and they had to find a spar to brace it before it could continued the voyage." His Majesty said: "It must be the *Macchanu* that we were sending down to bring back Chao Phaya Yomarat, but now that she's got a broken yard, she will take even longer to get down there. Do you think Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar will definitely go up to see him?" The Treasurer replied that he was sure they would. His Majesty said: "Once they do, he should soon be able to finish off the business

in Kedah and Kelantan, and come back with the monsoon before the middle of October. If he wants to send the captives up here before then, then let him. I suppose the 13 ships he asked for are to transport the captives and bring them up here." The Treasurer said that two of the standard model ships from Nakhon had been sent down and fitted out and were supposed to bring Chao Phaya Yomarat up. His Majesty said: "Is that so that he can return here as soon as possible? If he's not coming back on the big ship, she can be loaded with prisoners and opium." When the Clerk of the Seal had finished reading the letter out to His Majesty, His Majesty asked where the captives were from. The Treasurer replied that they were from Setul, but the details given in the letter to the effect that seven ships had been sent up with some 600 captives were not correct; eight ships had arrived with some 700 captives. His Majesty said: "He must have left out something by accident. See that they are handed over to Phaya Rachawangsan. When the army returns we can make the necessary arrangements to deal with them."

His Majesty has not said a great deal about the situation since the 29th July, when Khun Ritthironakrai left. Including this present dispatch, which is being taken down by Meun Udom, this makes fifteen dispatches that I have had the honour to send Your Excellency. I crave Your Excellency's pardon for any errors, omissions or improprieties.

Letter written on the 15th August 1839.

## Notes

- 1 Luang Udomsombat has listed the same person under two different names: 'Meun Nikon' is the same person as 'the Superintendent (of the Annamese)'.
- 2 The regalia of the Malay rulers included a pedestal-bowl with a lid instead of [the traditional Siamese 'unlidded'] pedestal tray; Malays of lower rank would have an enamelled bowl but people of high rank would have a bowl made of gold.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
LIBRARY  
540 EAST 57TH STREET  
CHICAGO, ILL. 60637  
U.S.A.  
TEL: (312) 937-1234  
FAX: (312) 937-1234  
E-MAIL: library@chicago.edu  
WWW: www.library.chicago.edu

1997  
1998  
1999  
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017



# Appendix A

## Developments subsequent to 'The Dispatches'

### Prince Damrong Rachanuphay

The following is an account of events connected with Phaya Si Phiphat's expedition to the South subsequent to those narrated in the 'Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat'.

#### Concerning Kedah

After the Siamese had put down the revolt of the Malays and recaptured Kedah for the second time, Rama III had Kedah divided into 12 'mukim' (comparable to the present-day 'districts') organised into four states, viz. Kedah, Kubang Pasu, Perlis and Setul, all of which were independent of each other and under the direct control of Nakhon Si Thammarat. His Majesty transferred the Governor of Saiburi (Saeng) and made him Governor of Phangnga with the title of Phaya Borirakphuthon; Phra Senanuchit (Nut) was first made Deputy Governor of Phangnga and subsequently, when the post of Governor of Takua Pa fell vacant, His Majesty was pleased to promote him to be Phaya Senanuchit, and Governor of Takua Pa. As for Kedah, now divided into four states, His Majesty appointed as rulers Malays of proven loyalty and who enjoyed general respect, viz. Tengku Anom as ruler of Kedah, Tengku [H]asan as ruler of Kubang Pasu and Tengku Mat Akip as ruler of Setul; these three were all related to the former Sultan of Kedah. To rule Perlis, His Majesty appointed Said [H]usain who later married into the family of the former Sultan.

Subsequently, in B.E. 2384 [1841-42], the former Sultan [Tajuddin] sent his son, Tengku Dai, along with Tengku Akip, up to Bangkok with a letter requesting the Ministers to convey to His Majesty acknowledgement of his past transgressions and his request to be allowed to serve His Majesty in the future. It so happened that at this juncture Tengku Hasan died and the position of ruler of Kubang Pasu fell vacant and His Majesty thereupon transferred

Tengku Anom to the post. His Majesty was graciously pleased to pardon the former Sultan and allow him to return to govern a Kedah now reduced in area.

### Concerning Kelantan

As regards Kelantan, it appears that after Phaya Phechaburi's force had set up camp at Saiburi, Phaya Si Phiphat sent the former Governor of Chaiya down to Kelantan with another force in a fleet of war-boats (the number of which is not stated). The fleet anchored in the Kelantan estuary and when Raja Banggul learnt that the Siamese had sent down both a naval and a military force he promptly fled. The ex-Governor of Chaiya ordered Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar to demolish their stockades and put an end to the preparations they had made to fight each other. He then took them up to Songkhla to see Phaya Si Phiphat. Phaya Si Phiphat told them to make peace with each other, which they did, after which they were sent back home to Kelantan.<sup>1</sup> However the agreement reached between the two parties did not last very long for in the very next year - B.E. 2383 [1840-41] - a fresh quarrel broke out in Kelantan. This time the quarrel was the result of Raja Changwang and Tengku Seri Indera refusing to bow to the authority of Raja Kelantan and it reached the point where trenches were dug in preparation for a fresh outbreak of fighting. When news of this reached Bangkok, His Majesty ordered the Governor of Nakhon (Noi Klang) to send some of his officials down there with a message threatening to take action against the parties involved, after which matters quietened down again. However in B.E. 2384 [1841-42], Tengku Besar went up to Bangkok and complained about the behaviour of Raja Changwang and Tengku Seri Indera (the Raja Muda) in appropriating for their own use the produce from his estates. At the same time, Raja Kelantan sent up a report complaining that Tengku Besar had sent someone to stir up Raja Banggul and the Trengganu and Lingga people to try and make fresh trouble for Raja Kelantan.

His Majesty decided that as Raja Kelantan's relations were always quarrelling and attempts to bring about a reconciliation between the parties had had no lasting effect - the trouble always breaking out again - it was not feasible to try to get them to live together in harmony with each other. It so happened that at this juncture, the post of Governor of Patani fell vacant and His Majesty ordered the Governor of Nongchik to go to Patani and take over the governorship there. His Majesty then asked Tengku Besar whether, if His Majesty were prepared to appoint him to the post, he would like to become Governor of Nongchik. Tengku Besar replied that he would, but that he wished to go down to Kelantan first to collect members of his family, his retainers and followers, to take along with him to Nongchik. His Majesty then sent the ex-Governor of Chaiya, whom His Majesty had promoted to the rank of Phaya Thai Nam, to accompany Tengku Besar down to Kelantan and supervise Tengku Besar in collecting the followers he proposed to take along with him to Nongchik and to see that no cause for dispute arose with Raja Kelantan.

Upon reaching Kelantan, Tengku Besar asked Phaya Thai Nam to send a letter to persuade Raja Banggul and Tengku Long Ahmad to leave Trengganu with about 200 of their followers and come up to Kelantan, to stay with Tengku Besar. Phaya Thai Nam had Raja Banggul and Tengku Long Ahmad take the oath of loyalty and drink the water of allegiance and urged them to go up to Nongchik with Tengku Besar. Raja Banggul and Tengku Long Ahmad were reluctant however and Tengku Besar also began to hum and haw and put forward excuses. He eventually wrote a letter to Phaya Thai Nam saying that if he were to become ruler of Kelantan, he would offer Phaya Thai Nam a present of ten thousand [Spanish] dollars. When Phaya Thai Nam saw that Tengku Besar was changing his mind once again, he reported to the capital, enclosing a copy of Tengku Besar's letter. His Majesty became angry and said that the people in Kelantan could think of nothing but trying to harm each other. His Majesty thereupon ordered the Governor of Nakhon to levy 2000 men from Nakhon, which Phra Sanehamontri was to take down to join up with another force of 2000 men from Songkhla, under the command of Phra Suntharanurak (Sang); the combined force was then to proceed to Kelantan in June 1842. When the Siamese force arrived, Tengku Besar, Raja Banggul and Tengku Long Ahmad agreed to leave Kelantan and take up residence in Nongchik without giving any further trouble. As regards Raja Changwang and Tengku Seri Indera (the Raja Muda), they were taken into custody by Phra Sanehamontri and detained in his camp, preparatory to being taken up to Bangkok. Raja Kelantan lost no time in requesting that Tengku Seri Indera be allowed to remain with him, so Phra Sanehamontri took only Raja Changwang with him up to Bangkok. His Majesty ordered that he be detained in Nakhon Si Thammarat.

Tengku Besar governed the district of Nongchik for three years and during this time both Raja Banggul and Tengku Long Ahmad passed away while residing in Nongchik.

In B.E. 2388 [1845-46], the Governor of Patani died and His Majesty was graciously pleased to appoint Tengku Besar in his place.

Subsequently, in B.E. 2396 [1853-54], during the 4th reign, the Governor of Jering died and His Majesty Rama IV was graciously pleased to appoint Raja Changwang as Governor of Jering.

After Tengku Besar and Raja Changwang and their adherents had been disposed of, Kelantan quietened down. There were no further quarrels between Raja Kelantan, Tengku Besar and Raja Changwang and the situation returned to normal.

## Concerning Nakhon Si Thammarat

Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) had, by his principal wife, three sons who entered the service of the crown. The eldest, called 'Noi Yai', became Governor of Phthalung and married a daughter of the Treasurer (Dit). The second - 'Noi Klang' - became Phra Sanehamontri and Assistant Administrator of Nakhon Si Thammarat. The third son is believed to have been called 'Noi Lek' or 'Noi Iad' and it appears from the 'Dispatches of Luang Udomsombat' that he served the crown in Bangkok as 'Luang Rit', a Superintendent in the Corps of Pages. He married Khun Sangiam, the granddaughter of the King of Thonburi [Taksin] and the daughter of Phra Phong Narin. When Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi) passed away, the Governor Phthalung and Phra Sanehamontri did not get on well with each other. Rama III took the view that as the Governor of Phthalung was an opium-smoker and infirm (as related in the 'Dispatches'), His Majesty could not appoint him to govern Nakhon Si Thammarat because if His Majesty was to leave him as Governor of Phthalung, Phthalung and Nakhon Si Thammarat would always be at odds with each other. His Majesty therefore brought the Governor of Phthalung (Noi Yai) up to serve in Bangkok, with the title of Phaya Uthaikam. His assistant governor [at Phthalung], whose name is not known (it appears that he was the son of the Chao Phaya Surinthrachra in the 1st Reign) was made Governor [in his place]. In Nakhon Si Thammarat, His Majesty promoted Phra Sanehamontri (Noi Klang) to the rank of Phaya Si Thammasokarat and made him governor of the province, appointing Luang Rit, the Superintendent in the Corps of Pages, to the rank of Phra Sanehamontri.<sup>2</sup>

## Regarding the British

In Chao Phaya Thiphakorawong's edition of the 'Royal Dynastic Annals' it appears that after Rama III had pardoned Sultan Tajuddin, His Majesty directed the Treasurer to write to the Governor of Singapore requesting the abrogation of clause 13 of the treaty, where it was stated that the British agreed to prevent the Sultan's adherents from attacking Kedah, and to move the Sultan elsewhere. This clause was indeed abrogated but I suspect that it was at the request of the British and not the Siamese as stated in Chao Phaya Thiphakorawong's version.

## Notes

- 1 This version of events is based upon the account given in Chao Phaya Thiphakorawong's edition of the 'Royal Dynastic Annals', which appears to fit the facts. The 'Annals of Kelantan' however state that only Tengku Besar went up [to Songkhla] and that Phaya Si Phiphat subsequently sent him up to Bangkok, where he was suitably admonished and then allowed to return home. The divergences between the two accounts may be more apparent than real, i.e. when Raja Kelantan and Tengku Besar went up to Songkhla, Phaya Si Phiphat allowed Raja Kelantan to return home to look after the state and took only Tengku Besar up to the capital. It appears that Phaya Si Phiphat left Songkhla on the 2nd October and reached Pak Nam on the 16th October 1839. The army taken down probably returned home in detachments.
- 2 It is not clear whether he was the Deputy Governor or Assistant Administrator. He subsequently became Phaya Sanchamontri.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS  
JANUARY 10, 1964  
DR. J. H. COOPER  
1000 UNIVERSITY AVENUE  
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS  
Dear Dr. Cooper:  
I have just received your letter of January 8, 1964, regarding the manuscript of "The Role of the Teacher in the Learning Process" which you have submitted to the Journal of Educational Psychology. I am sorry that I cannot give you a more definite answer at this time, but the manuscript is being considered by the Editorial Board. I will be sure to let you know as soon as a decision has been reached.

Sincerely,  
J. H. COOPER

# Appendix B

Compiled by  
Prince Damrong Rachanuphaph

I mentioned in my 'Introduction' to the 'Dispatches' that there were various points that I would explain at the end of the book, after readers had had the opportunity of reading through the 'Dispatches'. For example, readers may be surprised why a low-ranking official such as Luang Udomsombat should be allowed to hear His Majesty's discussions on affairs of state, as recorded in the 'Dispatches'. It will be observed too that these discussions took place, sometimes in the morning and sometimes in the evening, and sometimes went on until one or two o'clock in the morning before His Majesty retired. This may give rise to questions about the hours worked and the administrative methods employed in the 3rd Reign, questions which the following section[s] should clarify.

## The Daily Routine of His Majesty Rama III

I have heard from people older than myself (who were passing on what *they* had heard) that Rama III observed a regular routine in dealing with the work of government. His Majesty would rise at just after 8 o'clock and at precisely 9 o'clock His Majesty would present food to the monks from the royal temple, who used to take it in turns to receive the offerings. After this, His Majesty would proceed to the Phra Suralaiphiman Pavilion to pay homage to the image of the Buddha. By this time the ladies of the Court would have gone to wait upon His Majesty in the Phaisanthaksin Hall and His Majesty would leave the Phra Suralaiphiman Pavilion and pass through the Phaisanthaksin Hall on his way to the Phra Thatmonthian Pavilion, to pay homage to the ashes of His Majesty's predecessors. His Majesty would then proceed to the Amarinthara Winichai Hall, to offer food to another group of monks whom His Majesty had invited to dine in the Antechamber. After His Majesty had affirmed the Precepts of the Buddha, the monks would give His Majesty a blessing and His Majesty would offer them food and invite them to dine. Before leaving the monks would offer up a benediction and give His Majesty their blessing and then leave. A senior official from the Royal Treasury would then report to His Majesty on the disburse-ments made by the Treasury or if there was anything unusual to be reported by the Gentlemen of Household, it would be done at this time, e.g. the 'Dispatches' often say "His Majesty was apprised

of what had happened by members of the Household" which refers to the reports made at this time. After this, His Majesty would mount the throne and grant audience to his ministers. The first to wait upon His Majesty were members of the royal family and the officers of the Palace Watch. In the morning His Majesty would normally only give consideration to cases brought by his subjects, in particular to cases brought before the Court of Appeal which it was the duty of the senior officers of the Palace Watch and their Deputies to bring before His Majesty. Subsequently it was the turn of other government officials to be presented for audience, but for the most part His Majesty would deliberate upon the cases brought before him; only if urgent problems arose would His Majesty discuss affairs of state. His Majesty would retire at about 11 o'clock in the morning and dine in the Phaisanthaksin Hall. After dining, His Majesty would rest for a while and then go out on to the verandah of the Amarin Winichai Hall where the craftsmen in the service of the crown would wait upon His Majesty and present him with various draft and sketches, such as plans for the construction of a temple, for His Majesty's approval. This would go on until about one o'clock in the afternoon, when His Majesty would retire to rest in the Chakrapatphiman Hall. From about four o'clock until it began to get dark His Majesty would amuse himself on the verandah, after which His Majesty would proceed to the Phaisanthaksin Hall and discuss palace affairs until about seven o'clock. His Majesty would then proceed to the Amarinthara Winichai Palace and listen to a sermon, after which the Household would report on the various matters which His Majesty had asked them to investigate, e.g. details of the construction of a temple, or the state of health of members of the royal family. After His Majesty has heard the reports, His Majesty would mount the throne to receive his ministers in audience and allow lesser officials to wait upon him in a body. This evening audience given by His Majesty was the time His Majesty usually discussed affairs of state, and only when consideration of the business of the day was over did His Majesty retire to the [inner] part of the Palace. This was the daily routine of His Majesty Rama III and along with other government servants Luang Udomsombat would wait upon His Majesty everyday, in the morning and in the evening, so that he would hear what His Majesty had to say and what orders His Majesty issued when giving audience to his ministers.

### **The reliability of Luang Udomsombat's memory**

Anyone reading the 'Dispatches' cannot but admire the accuracy of Luang Udomsombat's memory. He can recall not merely the gist of a matter but the very words used by His Majesty in issuing orders. It is quite staggering and it would be difficult if not impossible to find someone today with such powers of memory. However, according to what I have heard Luang Udomsombat's ability in this respect would not have been considered particularly surprising to the older generation, because in those days the administration of government placed a high premium upon the ability to memorise. They



did not make much use of notes until later on, when letter-writing became more common and did away with the need to memorize things. Notes took the place of memory and the art of 'memorisation' declined. I have heard people in the Ministry of the Interior talk of the admirable powers of memory possessed by Chao Phaya Phutoraphai as Minister. [Another such person,] someone I can myself vouch for, having known him personally, was Phaya Chasaenbodi (Thai) who until recently was an official in the Ministry of the Interior. When I was appointed to the post of Minister of the Interior in the year B.E. 2434 [1892] Phaya Chasaenbodi was still 'Phra Montri Phochanakit' and when we were working together subsequently, whenever any meeting took place to discuss departmental affairs, no one of my age - i.e. some 20 years younger than Phaya Chasaenbodi - could surpass him in recalling what had taken place. If any questions arose, it was Phaya Chasaenbodi who could tell us the names, dates and substance of any matter. I have only met this one man who possessed this old-time accuracy of memory.

### Prisoners-of-War

In conclusion, there is one further point that I would like to elucidate, viz. the carrying off of captives [during a campaign]. Readers of the 'Dispatches' will have noticed the importance attached by the government of the time to carrying off to Bangkok those among the population who had joined the rebels in their attacks. Some of my present-day readers may consider that the methods adopted by the Siamese government of the day were oppressive and resulted in excessive hardship to those concerned. I cannot deny that those who were carried off did indeed suffer hardships. If we were to find ourselves in their position - even if we were merely compelled to abandon our home and our country - we should naturally feel hard done by. However I would point out that the custom of the victors in carrying off the population of a defeated country as captives is a practice stretching back far into the past as is clear from the inscriptions of the Emperor Asoka after his conquest of the Kingdom of Kalinga more than two thousand years ago, when he carried off more than 100,000 of the population of Kalinga as prisoners-of-war. The right of the victor to carry off prisoners-of-war in this fashion, was, I believe, the result of three factors. In the first place, when an army is raised and led into battle, even if victory is achieved, the number of men levied for the force must necessarily be reduced through death or other causes. Every war fought, even a victorious one results in the population of the country suffering a reduction in its manpower. The victor will therefore seek to supplement and replace the men lost, to prevent a decline in his manpower. In the second place, no one who went to war in former times, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, received regular pay, as do the soldiers of today; upon defeating an enemy country and carrying off its population, the officers of the victorious army would receive a share of the captives and this adds to their labour force. In the third place, the way a war was fought between countries of different races or different language

groups is in one respect the same now as it was then - i.e. if the fighting has been bitter or if a small country rebels and attacks a larger state which has customarily exercised dominion over it, the victors will try to make sure that no further war can break out and that the enemy is in no position to attack him again. The age-old practice of carrying off the population was viewed as a means of reducing the manpower of the defeated state and not allowing it to wage war again and was thus held to be a desirable practice. In the case of nearly every country, it has been practised since time immemorial for the reason mentioned until subsequently superseded by other practices. In the reign of Rama III, we still preferred the traditional practice, holding firmly to the desirability of carrying off a defeated population as captives. However in carrying out the policy (as can be seen from the instructions issued by His Majesty) it was very far from being the case that the captives were treated without any compassion. The Malay captives brought up here received all possible help and protection and eventually became free men, on an equal footing with their Siamese conquerors. Proof of this can be seen today in the fact that there are still descendants of these Malay captives living in Bangkok and in most of the provinces.

# Appendix C

## The Singapore Free Press

Compiled by  
Justin Corfield

In 1824 the *Singapore Chronicle*, the first newspaper to be printed in Singapore, was established by Frederick J Bernard. This remained the only newspaper to be printed in the settlement until October 1835 when the *Singapore Free Press* was established. This new journal was founded by William Napier, senior law-agent in Singapore; Edward Boustead, merchant; and George Coleman, an architect. Although forbidden by East India Company rules from criticising personalities, the *Singapore Free Press* successfully championed mercantile interest, and the *Singapore Chronicle*, unable to compete, collapsed with its printing-press and type shipped to Penang to start the *Penang Gazette* (see Appendix D). The *Singapore Free Press* became one of the sharpest critics of British policy during the Kedah uprising of 1838-39.

In 1846 the journal was bought by Abraham Logan, a Berkshire-born law-agent, whose brother, James Logan later bought the *Penang Gazette*. In 1845 the *Straits Times* had been founded, and Dr Turnbull noted that the *Singapore Free Press* was now a 'rather stiff sombre journal, a respected but dull ornament for Singapore breakfast tables.' Logan sold the *Singapore Free Press* in 1865 and in 1869 the paper was closed down.

### SINGAPORE FREE PRESS      23/8/1838.

QUEDAH RETAKEN BY THE MALAYS - The Malays are once more in possession of Quedah, having driven out their Siamese masters at the point of the sword. The struggle however, has not been a very sanguinary one. It appears that the Siamese, trusting perhaps more to the terror with which their cold-blooded butcheries rather than their prowess had on former occasions inspired the Quedans, had left a garrison of only 80 men in the fort, when it was attacked by a party of Malays headed by a nephew of the ex-King, and easily mastered with the loss of only one man on each side. It appears, however, that the Siamese, in their retreat, massacred about twenty Malay district chiefs

of the territory, who had been appointed to this trust under the Government of Siam, on a suspicion of having instigated or confederated with the invading force which had thus a second time wrested Quedah from their barbarous domination. It is said that numbers are crowding from Province Wellesley, and other places in the neighbourhood, to join the standard of the insurgents, who doubtless expect that the Siamese will again endeavour to bring Quedah under their subjection, and are consequently using every means in their power to resist the overwhelming force that will be sent against them, and to maintain the ground they have already gained. Although therefore they have achieved their conquest by a comparatively bloodless *coup de main*, the Malays are not likely to preserve it without great effusion of blood and a repetition of the same revolting barbarities which characterised their enemies in the unsuccessful struggle under Tuanku Koodin about seven years ago. They no doubt look forward with apprehension and anxiety to the probable part that will be taken by the British Government in the approaching struggle - and it is assuredly a question of deep interest and importance to what side our Government will lend its assistance - supposing it again to take an active part at all - or, to the claims of which side it will lend its countenance, should it attempt the office of mediation. That our Government feels a disinclination to assist the Siamese with arms a second time to recover possession of Quedah is, we should think, extremely probable - and it cannot but be equally reluctant to allow an overpowering army of barbarians to be poured down upon the devoted Malays who are engaged in the noble cause of rescuing their country from the thralldom of a hated enemy. In again taking an active part in the contest, on the side of the Siamese, our Government would probably only be assisting to extinguish the flame of insurrection to see it again break forth in a short period - for neither the recollection of our previous effective hostility, nor the determination we lately evinced to support the Siamese cause by dragging the ex-King of Quedah out of Bruas by force of arms, are, it appears sufficient to deter the Quedans from another effort to recover their independence. The proper course therefore we should say for our Government to follow - that which is dictated alike by humanity, justice and a sound policy - is to interpose between the Siamese and Quedah, and to endeavour to procure the restoration of that country to its former state of independence. As to the hateful Treaty of 1826 with Siam, that power may no doubt be made to understand that it would be unwise on their part to insist that the articles relative to Quedah should be rigourously observed - and if averse to seeing it again under the rule of a native prince would probably be found ready to consent that the administration should pass into the hands of our Government, an alternative to which the natives of Quedah would we believe joyously submit. We trust therefore that our Government will interpose its mediation to settle the affairs of Quedah on a basis which will ensure its future tranquillity, the peace of the neighbourhood, and with these advantages, the civilising influence of commerce, which is checked in its course by these disturbances. We have no hesitation - and feel sure we shall be joined by all who have any acquaintance with our

former relations with Quedah - in saying, that it will be most disgraceful should our Government lend its powerful aid to the Siamese to recover Quedah (let the Treaty say what it may) - and that it will be equally disgraceful to it to permit that country to be overrun by a barbarian and merciless horde of Siamese, capable of every atrocity under heaven, who have a new plea for their vengeance in the recent successes of their Malay foes.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 18/10/1838, p2-3.

SIAM - The arrival of the *Catherine* during the week from Siam has put us in possession of advices from Bangkok to the 29th August; but they supply no mercantile information of any consequence in addition to what we last published in the same quarter. The Siamese barque *Lightning* was the last arrival from Singapore.

The King of Siam, it appears, was a good deal disturbed by the intelligence that the Malays had once more possessed themselves of Quedah - and his Royal breast was filled with indignation at the thought of such an easy triumph over Siamese arms in that country. He threatened the Governor of Quedah, son of the Rajah of Ligore, with decapitation for his cowardly conduct; and pardoned him only on condition of his again bringing that country under Siamese domination. From this, as well as from other facts mentioned in our correspondence, it appears certain the Government of Siam are bent upon recovering Quedah. They seem however, to have entertained the belief that the Malays would be assisted by the British Government, a probability the contemplation of which filled them with no small alarm. The apprehensions of the King, his ministers and advisers on that score were however calmed on having their memories recalled to the part taken by the English during the attempt of Tuanku Koodeen - and they declared that, so far from calling upon us to take up arms, as on that occasion, against the Malays, they should be satisfied if our Government remained neutral - lending its assistance neither to one side nor to the other. When our neutrality is all that is either expected or wished for by the Siamese, the alacrity which we have already displayed to array ourselves on the side of the strongest, seems at least premature, and is certainly not very magnanimous. But we are far from thinking even neutrality a position creditable to our government in the affairs of Quedah and Siam. We rather regard it as a duty on their part to prevent any further attempts of the latter power to subjugate Quedah - not by assisting the Malays in the expected contest - but by entering into some negotiation with the government of Siam to induce that power to relinquish its claims on Quedah, and to consent to its being ruled, under certain conditions, either by its native and legitimate princes, or to its administration being confided to the British Government. Nothing perhaps but the exaggerated views entertained in Bengal of the power of Siam, and its importance as an ally, prevents the adoption of some measure

of this nature. We confess however our inability to discover in what respect we have to dread the hostility of the Siamese, or how they could make their co-operation against any expected enemy of ours effective. There is no power whose hostile movements we could more easily restrain, a fact of which they are themselves fully sensible - and when, from the dread in which they stand of Cochín-China at the present moment, they experience so much difficulty in mustering a force for the subjugation of the comparatively petty province of Quedah, we may judge of how little avail their assistance is likely to be to us in the event of any disturbance with Burmah - while the lasting enmity which has so long subsisted between these powers could never authorise any apprehension of their acting in concert against us at the present juncture.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 18/101838, p3.

The fine Siamese ship, the *Conqueror*, belonging to the King of Siam, has been wrecked on the west Coast of Hainan, and totally lost, though the crew, consisting of 82 individuals, chiefly Siamese, have been saved. The ship was on a voyage from Bangkok to China. The crew after crossing the narrow channel between Hainan and the continent, were sent on to Canton, which they reached after a journey of about 35 days, the greatest part of which they performed on foot; marching during 23 days, and have arrived here in very good health without the loss of a man. To judge of the appearance of some of the men, Malays, of whom there were five among them, the treatment they received from the Chinese must have been very good, and they seemed well-satisfied with their lot. These Malays, chiefly natives of Sourabaya, have, by the Government, been sent to Macao, there to be embarked for Singapore, whilst the Siamese are awaiting an opportunity here to return to their country. The humane conduct of the Chinese authorities on this occasion deserves much praise.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 25/10/1838, p3.

SIAM - By the *Dadaloy* which has arrived from Siam during the week, we have received advices from Bangkok to the 19th ultimo. Accounts of business are not very favourable; there was some demand for muskets and Gunpowder; Piece Goods continued scarce, but without any advance in prices, and there seemed little disposition to buy, notwithstanding the prevailing scarcity in the market. Produce was high, and in general little business going on. The new Sugar Crop was expected to be very fine and very plentiful - the cane being stated to be finer and larger than was ever before seen in Siam.

The King was busy with his preparations for war against the Quedah Malays - and his resentment for the loss of that province had manifested itself

in an extensive process of decapitation. The late Governor of Quedah is among the list of victims, being thus condemned to expiate the offence of permitting the territory to fall once more into the hands of the Malays. The Rajah of Ligore, as well as the Governor of Sangora, had already been despatched with orders to retake Quedah at whatever cost, and in defiance of every obstacle; and His Majesty was assembling a further force of about 7,000 men, which he proposed to send under the command of Phya Lee Peepat, the father of the unfortunate young noble who had been beheaded, and some other chiefs of high rank. A general belief that the Malays would be insisted by the British Government in the Straits had caused considerable alarm, having we understand, originated in some story about the seizure and subsequent release at Pinang of a certain quantity of warlike stores which were shipping at that port to supply the Malays in Quedah. The feelings towards European residents in Bangkok with which any confirmation of this rumour would have inspired his Siamese Majesty, would, it is believed, have operated considerably to their inconvenience, perhaps danger. But fortunately for them, if such were the case, and very unfortunately for the Malays, there is not the remotest probability of our Government encouraging, much less assisting, the efforts of the latter, - as the despatches from the authorities in the Straits, which would shortly after reach Bangkok, would fully satisfy the Royal mind. It is understood the Straits Government, in the present juncture of the affairs of Quedah, recommend the adoption of a neutral course. The Siamese are no doubt sufficiently powerful to reduce the revolted province to subjection without any assistance from us - and as it is of some consequence that the British name and Government should be favourably regarded by the Malayan states in the neighbourhood, among whom the cause of the Quedans is of course popular, we at least trust that in their further operations against Quedah the Siamese will be left to themselves, and that the active co-operation of our Government will be altogether withheld in the approaching struggle. It seems that our neutrality is all that is either expected or required by the Siamese themselves; and their Government must feel satisfied that, whatever the Treaty may contain, the English cannot be called upon to take up arms on every occasion that Quedah may be lost by their own carelessness or negligence, in failing to maintain within the province a sufficient force for its protection - a neglect to which the late successful *coup de main* of the Malays was wholly owing. These circumstances, it appears to us, not only fully authorise our neutrality, but leave scarcely any fair or decent pretext for our engaging at all in the contest. To be sure, if the struggle be protracted, and a strong confederacy of the Malayan states should enlist themselves on the side of Quedah, involving half the Peninsula in the war, interrupting commerce, and giving rise to predatory expeditions undertaken under the colour of hostilities, it may be necessary and proper for our Government to interfere for the sake of the general tranquillity. But there is little or no prospect of any thing of this sort. The Malay bands that retook Quedah are already weakened by dissensions among themselves, and one of their principal leaders has apostatized to the Siamese - the ex-King *ostensibly*

discountenances the insurrection, and if his good wishes are with the insurgents, as we have no doubt they are, he does not possess the means to render them *sub rosa* any effectual assistance, while the Malay states in the neighbourhood will be deterred from engaging in the business by their recollection of the active and decisive part taken by us during a similar attempt under Tuanku Kooden.

There seems therefore, no probability of a long struggle, involving the other states of the Peninsula - and nothing which in the circumstances of the case requires the British to take an active part in it on the side of Siam.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 22/11/1838, p3.

We have received during the week *Penang Gazettes* of 3rd and 10th November, which contain some allusion to the affairs of Quedah. According to our contemporary a force of some 10 or 12 thousand Malays has assembled in that territory with the determination of defending it to the last against any invasion from Siam. It would be most gratifying to us to learn from an authentic source that the Malays, who had taken up arms, in the cause of Quedah, were in such force as to incline the Siamese for some attempt at negotiation to the perilous chances of war. But although there has been some mention of an accommodation by treaty, there seems no prospect, from all we can learn of the Siamese being induced to it from any great appearance of numerical strength on the part of their adversaries; and they will be still less likely to adopt a pacific course when they become fully acquainted with the point of view in which the recent insurrection of the Malays has been viewed by the supreme government, who, we believe, recommend equally prompt and decisive measures as those which were followed to defeat the former attempt of Tuanku Koodeen. It will not probably be long before the Malays receive some evidence of the nature of our interposition in the matter - and as the Siamese are not likely to forget their late precipitate evacuation of the province, and with the cruelty natural to successful cowardice, are likely to indulge in every kind of atrocity, we hope the insurgents will abandon the territory before the Siamese pour down upon them with a force to which, backed by the assistance of our Government, they will be unable to oppose any effectual resistance.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 27/12/1838, p3.

The *Penang Gazette* of 1st, 8th, 15th and 22nd instant came to hand yesterday - but to what cause it is owing that we have thus received them *en masse* we are not aware. The last two numbers contain a good deal respecting the affairs of Quedah, and in that of the 15th is published a proclamation issued by the Straits Government declaring the Coast of Quedah to be under effective blockade etc, upon which we shall bestow some notice in our next number.



## SINGAPORE FREE PRESS 3/1/1839, p2.

AFFAIRS OF QUEDAH - The other dark spot in the annals of the British Government in the Straits of Malacca, in its relations with the surrounding states, has been stamped on them by our conduct in regard to Quedah. With this single exception the course of our policy towards the Malayan States, since the first establishment of our authority in Prince of Wales Island has been uniformly generous and liberal. It is worthy of note, too, that even in the case of Quedah to none of the Strait's administrations is the conduct which we deprecate in any one particular imputable. It was the work of Lord Amherst's chosen ambassador to the King of Siam to transfer Quedah to the arbitrary domination of that power, in the face of a treaty between our Government and its reigning prince, in which its independence was recognised in the most solemn manner. Mr Fullarton, during whose administration it occurred, condemned the transaction in the strongest language - and in all probability remonstrated with the Bengal Government against an act of such flagrant injustice, which had not one single political recommendation of any kind to redeem it from the general execration with which it was always mentioned. In those compulsory reunions of state with state, dissimilar in language, habits, and institutions - the one weak and the other powerful - which have so often been made the reproach of the far-famed Holy Alliance, there is nothing in its kind more truculently despotic, than the annexation by British power of Quedah to Siam. Had it taken place in Europe, it would no doubt have awakened the same indignant eloquence which was launched in the British Senate against the betrayers of Parga. But its very name and existence as a state are therein all probability alike unknown, and the voices of the humble advocates of its cause in this part of the world are too weak to "all across the Atlantic".

Within the last eight years the present is the second insurrection that has broken out among the Quedans for the recovery of their independence and, as on the former occasion a British ship of war, to which we suppose the steamer will shortly be added, is at present engaged in blockading the coast of the devoted territory, comfortably it is pretended to the provisions of Captain Burney's treaty with 'the magnificent King'; which stipulates that we are "not to permit the former Governor of Quedah, or many of his followers to attack, disturb or in any manner injure the territory of Quedah." The supreme Government in its avidness to comply with these requisitions of the treaty goes at once to war with Quedah; and the blustering precipitancy with which it thus proceeds to quell the efforts of the humble and despised foe of an ally, presents certainly a somewhat singular contrast with the measured progress of its advance to repel the aggressions or resent the insults of the more formidable Tharrawaddy. It is possible, indeed, that the same ignorant apprehensions of a union of the Burmese and Siamese, in the event of war with Ava, which it is understood to Captain Burney's embassy and treaty, may not at the present moment be without their influence in hastening measures against Quedah to keep the Siamese

in good honour with us.\* The Government of Bengal may not assumed that the Siamese hold up too much in awe ever to dream of an alliance with Ava against us, even should we deprive them of Quedah, and supposing that the well-known jealousies and lasting antipathies of the two nations rendered such a junction at all probable - and we feel confident that it would require nothing more than an earnest remonstrance with their Government to induce them to part with Quedah on terms which would for the future secure the undisturbed tranquillity of that province and relieve it from the state of odious oppression under which it labours. It is inconceivable to us how the supreme Government instead of at once directing summary measures against the Quedans for endeavouring to throw off the yoke which they detest, and to which we bore so large a share in subjecting them, should never think of having recourse to measures of a more permanent and a more pacific tendency than a blockade of the Quedah Coast every seven or eight years, for it cannot be supposed that the dispersion of the insurgent force which now holds possession of the province will prevent future and oft repeated attempts of the same kind.

There is no presumption more to the discredit of the British Government in India than that it does not possess the means of settling the affairs of Quedah save by the use of arms, and every motive of policy as well as of humanity calls for the exercise of other means. Under the policy we at present pursue in regard to it, that province must continue in the most unsettled and desolate condition, a set of tyrannical masters and fierce bands of insurgents alternately succeeding each other in authority. Under the former, the industry of the inhabitants can never thrive, and the latter as soon as they get possession, make plunder and devastation their chief business that the enemy may find nothing left should they in their turn prove victorious - while that taste for predatory pursuits which characterises in some measure all Malays, is sure to attract adventurers from the neighbouring coasts to a scene so well fitted for their operations, and thus become the means of extending and reviving habits which we have of late been taking some pains to extinguish. In short if Quedah is to be continued a province of Siam, we must look to its being the rallying point not only of the disaffected natives of the territory - and those who sympathise in their feelings of enmity to Siam, but for all the desperadoes of the coasts of the Peninsula, from one end to the other, as well as from the eastern Coast of Sumatra. Events prove that this is not likely to be less the case when the present ex-King dies, which in the ordinary course of nature must shortly happen - and it must be remembered that with respect to his heirs or succession we shall be without the pretext of any treaty to compel them to fix their residence where our Government may appoint, or to drag them by force of arms from one of their own choice. There is no provision of the Treaty of 1826 which extends beyond the life of the ex-King - 'the former Governor of Quedah' as he is there styled, although we treated with his immediate predecessor for the cession of Penang as 'His Majesty of Purlis and Quedah,' and on his own accession recognised his right to the same titles

and dignities - nor is there any stipulation which binds the British Government "not to permit" his successors from endeavouring to regain their independence. Unless therefore our Government is prepared to consummate its former perfidy to the King of Quedah by some fresh act of injustice to his descendants, there is, in this view of the case, an additional motive for causing the independence of Quedah to be recognised by Siam. To that power its possession can be an object of no real value, and the recognition of its independence can bring no loss of revenue - which under their barbarous rule, and the expenses of maintaining some force for the protection of the province, never we suppose amounted to the value of the *bunga-mas* or gold flower which was the only mark of homage or fialty ever before exacted from its former sovereigns by the King of Siam, but which was no more a symbol of national dependency, than the annual offering of a similar kind which the King of Siam himself makes to the Emperor of China. Let it be the object of our Government to incline the King of Siam to peace, instead of setting him the example of being the first to move in a question in which he is himself the principal - and to induce him to exchange the barren advantages accruing from the possession of Quedah, for the not more empty privilege of annually receiving a gold flower in token of his being the "magnificent king". His coffers we should think are much more likely to be filled even by that alternative, than by persisting in his recent course against Quedah.

\* It is rather a singular fact that one of the first and chief causes of the Siamese pretensions to the arbitrary dominion over Quedah, originated in the latter state being suspected of sending supplies of Provision to the Burmans when at war with Siam.

#### SINGAPORE FREE PRESS      24/1/1839, p3.

We have received during the week the *Penang Gazette* of the 5th instant, from which we observe that the blockade of Quedah was prosecuted with some appearance of vigour, thirteen Malays having been brought into Penang who were stopped by the boats of HMS *Hyacinth* while going up the river with cargo for sale. The *Gazette* also mentions that it had been thought necessary to send over a detachment of 15 sepoys for the protection of Province Wellesley. Our contemporary sneers at the idea of that district being in danger, but if the disposition of the Malay population there be such as he not long ago described it, the precaution is certainly not unnecessary.

#### SINGAPORE FREE PRESS      31/1/1839, p3.

From a *Penang Gazette* of the 19th inst received during the week, it would appear that the Quedah disturbances are not likely to be so soon brought to a close as seems to have been expected - at least if our contemporary is speaking

from authentic information as to the present posture of affairs. He gives it to be understood that they are meditating an incursion from Quedah into the territory of Trang, and states that "their forces have been strengthened by the Malays of Patani" - it is by no means improbable that the present inertness of the Siamese in vindicating their own cause in Quedah, may encourage some of the Malay states of the Peninsula to join forces with the insurgents who are now masters of that province, and render its recovery a task of greater difficulty than it has heretofore proved. It is only the awe in which the Malays hold the British Government, that prevents the whole western side of the Peninsula and several of the Sumatran states, from openly asserting the cause of Quedah against the Siamese, and joining heart and hand to restore it to its former condition of an independent Malayan principality. And although there may be no general rising or organised confederation among the Malays, so long as we appear in the character of an active ally of Siam, yet there cannot we think, be a doubt, if that power continues much longer to manifest the same indifference, or sense of weakness, in asserting its pretensions over Quedah, that the Malays will not be restrained by their fear of us from crowding in great numbers from every greater of the Peninsula to assist their brethren there in retaining possession of their conquest. We have heard it said by parties acquainted with Siam, that it is not so much a feeling of indifference on the subject, as the dread of an immediate invasion from Cochin China, that has kept the Siam Government from sending troops to reconquer Quedah. If this is at the bottom of the present inactivity on the part of the Siamese, in crushing a rebellion in her provinces, the fact is strongly indicative either of the inherent weakness, or misapplied resources, of a Kingdom which is always putting forward such lofty pretensions, and which the British Government has notwithstanding thought it worth while to conciliate by a shameful sacrifice of its own honour, and the expense of a confiding ally. Some accounts lately received by us from Maulmain, would seem to intimate that the ignorance or infatuation which has dictated the former policy of our Government towards Siam, still existed in their full force, as they state that Dr Richardson had been deputed to proceed across the country on a mission to the Court of Siam - for a second time, we presume, to dissuade the Siamese from joining their inveterate enemies of Ava in a war against us - and perhaps, as the reward of such disinterested inactivity, to offer to undertake the reconquest of Quedah without giving his Siamese Majesty occasion to trouble himself therewith! - So that, while the Straits Government is threatening to raise the blockade of the Quedah Coast, unless the Siamese exhibit some disposition to co-operate with them for its recovery, a deputation from the Supreme Government to the Court of Siam may at the same moment be very probably making a tender of our services to crush the rebellion without Siamese interference!

## SINGAPORE FREE PRESS 31/1/1839, p2.

Copy of letter published in *Penang Gazette*, 12 January 1839.

Translation - letter from the Rajah Abdulla and Rajah Mahomed Asmad? to Messrs George Scott, Charles Scott, Mr Lorrain and Mr Ferrao and the other merchants of the Committee at Pulo Pinang

(After Compliments)

We make known to our friends that last month there came a vessel of the Company to blockade the Quedah River, not allowing prahus to go out of, or come into, the several districts of Quedah, also to sail to Pulo Pinang, laden with rice, paddy and poultry. When permission is solicited for prahus to quit Quedah, the provisions allowed to be laden therein are only a ganton (sic) of rice and one or two fowls for each person's consumption, and nothing else whatever. The occupation of all the inhabitants of Quedah consists in carrying rice, paddy and poultry to Penang for sale, and receiving in return money with which they there purchase tobacco, salt and other necessities for their subsistence at Quedah. It is a great hardship that such obstructions should exist, and we are astonished at these proceedings, because we are not aware of the reason and have never known the Company to be guilty of similar oppression during all the time we resided at Pulo Penang, whether to any other country, or even to a single individual living under the protection of the Company. - At the time our grandfather gave Pulo Pinang, he had great confidence in the *faith, compassion and justice* of the Company, and that his children and grandchildren and the inhabitants would be protected; in consequence whereof he gave Pulo Pinang to the Company. - Now, alas why should oppression in this manner be entailed on the inhabitants of this country without any consideration or feeling or a knowledge what has been their fault to deserve thus much? Such are the reasons which induce us to make these circumstances known to our friends. - If our friends are aware of the reasons which cause such oppression we beseech our friends to send us information that we may be guided in our conduct and take care of ourselves as the ALMIGHTY never oppresses his Creatures.

Written 15th Shawwal, 1254.

## SINGAPORE FREE PRESS 7/2/1839, p3.

AFFAIRS OF QUEDAH - In the *Calcutta Government Gazette* of the 9th ultimo, we find published the following draft of an act, which is to be reconsidered at the first meeting of the Legislative Council after the 31st March next:-

"It is hereby enacted that whoever within the Settlements of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca wages war against the Government

of any power in alliance or at peace with the Government of the territories of the East India Company, or attempts to wage such war, or by instigation, conspiracy or aid, abets the waging of such war, or the making of any preparations to commit depredations on the territories of any such power, shall be liable to imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding fourteen years, and to such fine as the Court may in its discretion award."

This, our local readers will at once perceive, is intended to prevent the Quedah Malays from receiving any assistance from these settlements in the approaching contest with Siam for the maintenance of the independence they have lately achieved - but which seems doomed to so brief an existence. It is well-known that numbers of the native inhabitants of Quedah sought refuge from the arbitrary and tyrannical exactions of their Siamese rulers, in the neighbouring territories of Province Wellesley and Penang, under the mild and equitable rule of the British Government - and that, encouraged by the prospects held out by the late successful commencement of the exertions of their countrymen to rid themselves of the detested yoke of the Siamese, they eagerly crowded to the camp of the insurgents carrying with them considerable supplies of warlike stores; which we believe were furnished them on liberal terms by the merchants at Penang. It is to cut off the Quedans from succour of this description that the proposed act is manifestly intended - shewing as it effectually does the lengths the Government of Bengal is prepared to go in consummating the odious provisions of the memorable Burney Treaty with the King of Siam - which consigned Quedah to that barbarous power in undisguised violation of the most solemn treaties, and in contempt of every principle of justice, or common policy.

There is a peculiarity it appears to us, in the wording of the Act as regards the parties to whom it may apply, in saying "whoever *within* the Settlements wages war etc." This is no doubt designed to give it the most *extensive* application possible - but although the proposed measure is very likely to become law, it is consolatory to reflect that a Jury is necessary to give it efficiency; and we are strongly disposed to believe that a Straits jury would scarcely be found to bring in a verdict of guilty under the Act so frequently as circumstances might seem to render it desirable.

It is not improbable however that the present struggle may be at an end before the Act comes into operation, as by accounts which have been received within the last few days from Sangora, it appears a Siamese Army is on its march from that territory to Quedah, which with the assistance given by our Government will in all probability bring the contest to an early close. The Siamese at Sangora were in the meantime apprehensive of being attacked by the Malays on that side of the Peninsula; and signified their alarm by commencing to raise fortifications round the town. This goes to confirm the

opinion we have often expressed that the Malayan states of the Peninsula would confederate their forces in the cause of Quedah against the Siamese unless overawed by the superior power of our Government unfortunately enlisted on the other side.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 14/2/1839, p2.

**SIAM & QUEDAH** - By the arrival of the *Caledonia* from Siam during the week we are in receipt of advices up to 26th January from Bangkok. Our correspondent states that at the Capital they still continued to take the Quedah affair very coolly, and made sure of its being recovered from the Malays by means of levies in the provinces, and without any assistance from the seat of Empire. This inactivity the Government of Siam will find cause to deplore, if any dependence can be placed upon the intelligence contained in the late Penang papers of the destruction of Sangora, the chief town in the province of that name, by the Malays, who were further preparing to march in large force upon Ligore. Thus, instead of waiting to be attacked within the territory of Quedah by the Siamese, the Malays are prosecuting their first successes with a vigour that promises soon to carry them to the frontier of Siam proper - and of what effect will our present blockade of the Quedah Coast be in checking operations on the other side of the Peninsula, where the Malays, in possession of the principal towns on the coast, can receive supplies from the sea *ad libitum*, as well as assistance of another kind, unobserved and unobstructed by our ships-of-war? This state of affairs cannot be expected to continue much longer in the Northern part of the Peninsula without extending further, and the interruption to the commerce of the Straits ports which must succeed an extension of these disturbances will be another and appropriate fruit of the execrable Treaty of 1826.

The arrival of an English Envoy overland from Maulmain was expected at Bangkok, and preparations were making for his reception - so that no fears need be entertained of his being stopped on the frontier by the Siamese Officers, as seems to be apprehended by the *Maulmain Chronicle*. This mission being sent on the eve of a Burmese war, which gave rise to the last, the "Magnificent King" no doubt expects further concessions, and may probably stipulate for a slice of our future Burman conquests, to be added to Quedah in consideration of the powerful assistance he may lend us in the impending war with that power.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 14/2/1839, p2.

**AFFAIRS OF QUEDAH** - The latest accounts from Quedah inform us that the Malayan forces in the interior consisting of seven thousand men each, and which had been sent to the conquest of Madelong and Sangora, had been entirely successful. - Madelong in the district of Lampang had fallen into their hands

after a slight resistance; the Siamese having fled and taken refuge at Sangora supposing it a place of greater strength and security. Here a considerable concourse of people had assembled previous to the arrival of the Malayan chief Tuanku Mahamed Taheb, who, after some hostile preparations which occupied his attention for two or three days, commenced the assault upon Sangora. - Hostilities would appear to have commenced in the evening, and been continued partially throughout the night and renewed the following morning with the utmost determination, until about eight o'clock when the place was finally carried and a terrible slaughter ensued. - Those who escaped sought refuge in the jungles, and agreeably to usual practice among these people, no quarter was asked or given, with the exception of the women and children who to the number of upwards of one thousand five hundred were transmitted to Quedah with immense booty. - Quedah is said to be full of Siamese prisoners of all descriptions distributed amongst the villages. - Sangora, the renowned Sangora, is now but a heap of ashes having been burned to the ground by the Malays. It is stated also that great quantities of grain and other articles of provision were found in this place that would be of use to the conquerors. The victorious army thus flushed with victory were making forced marches upon Ligore, the strong and last frontier town formerly under the dominion of the Malayan Rajahs. The Malays express their determination to conquer Ligore, and from the contempt they have learned to feel for the Siamese are confident of its fall very shortly.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 7/3/1839, p3.

**PENANG** - We have received during the week a *Penang Gazette* of 23rd ultimo, from which we regret to perceive that Sir William Norris had found it necessary to proceed to sea on account of his health...

The same paper mentions that H.M. Sloop of War *Hyacinth* had returned to the blockade of the Quedah Coast, after having it appears been about 8 days in port. We have no doubt that Captain Warren acted either in pursuance of instructions from government or some necessary object, in leaving the blockade of Quedah - but if the blockading force or a necessary portion of it, is every now and then absenting itself from the coast or state declared to be under blockade, there is then, we apprehend, no regular blockade at all; and under such circumstances it would be both unfair and illegal to seize any vessel entering a Quedah port, when the blockade had thus the appearance of being raised - which by the bye we heartily wish had never been undertaken.

The Penang papers contain no confirmation of the accounts which they had lately gave of the siege and sack of Sangora by the Malays, and their threatened advance upon Ligore, which we may now conclude to have been without foundation - more particularly as later intelligence reports that a Siamese force has already advanced to the Quedah frontier.



**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 21/3/1839, p3.

The detention of trading vessels from this an other places at Calantan [Kelantan] to which we had occasion to refer a good many months ago, has not yet ceased or rather has been resumed, as well appear from the following circumstances. The mate of a Junk from Haitam appeared yesterday at the police office, and deposed that his junk having touched at Calantan about a fortnight ago, the Rajah attempted to detain the vessel as the place was at war, that he had to pay 100 dollars before she got way, and the Junk being outside the harbour hewas able to make his escape - otherwise, as we suppose, he would not have been allowed to get off easily. He deposed also to having seen in the harbour at Calantan the Nakhodas of three sampan-pukets belonging to Singapore, by name Ah-Tow, Ah-Chow and Kow-Chew, who all declared that they were prevented by the Rajah of the place from quitting Calantan and returning as they expressed themselves desirous to do, to Singapore, from which they had been four months absent.

It is intolerable that a petty chief of this description should thus continue to interfere with the trade of this port - and it says little for the influence of our government in such quarters that he should upon a pretext altogether empty, presume to detain vessels belonging to this port, notwithstanding the representations which were last year made on the same subject.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 28/3/1839, p3.

Private letters have been received here during the week from Penang, which state that several hundred Malay women and children had taken their departure from the Quedah fort in consequence of the approach of the Siamese force, and that the insurgents themselves manifested a wish to get clear of Quedah without further fighting.

Our readers will remember what we published last week from the *Penang Gazette* on the subject was, that Quedah enjoyed the most undisturbed tranquillity etc and that the Malays had pushed forward to the frontier of the Siamese to chastise their oppressors! They will therefore believe just as much of the present report as may seem to them meet altho' we are sorry to say we think it likely to prove too true.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 11/4/1839, p2.

SIAM - By the arrival of the barque *Hero* on the 9th instant from we have received letters from Bangkok of date the 18th March. We learn by these that the Siamese commander-in-chief Phya See Pee Pat, had embarked for Sangora two days before, with a force destined for the subjugation of Quedah, consisting of 40 war Junks with an array of 6,000 men on board and blazing

with innumerable red flags - to typify we may suppose the burning desire they experienced to avenge the affront their arms had sustained at the hands of the Malays by their expulsion from the fort of Quedah. The magnanimous Phya See Pee Pat, however, and his heroes would arrive Just in time to find the work done, as the evacuation of the fort and territory of Quedah by the Malays, and its occupation by a Siamese force, is officially announced in the *Penang Gazette* of 23rd March, and must have taken place some days previous, and before the army of red flags could have arrived from the Siamese capital, let it make what haste it might and to which, notwithstanding the crimson standards, we suspect a bloodless triumph is generally the most acceptable. Our letters make no mention of the capture and sack of Sangora by the Malays, which must, we infer, be classed along with the many other *authentic* reports the Quedah operations have given rise to. There is no doubt, however, that the Patani, in conjunction with the Quedans, had assumed the offensive against the Siamese; and that a large body of Malays were threatening Sangora, and were reported at Siam to be within a few days march of it, to overthrow whom, as well as to subjugate Quedah, this large force was doubtless despatched. Dr Richardson, it appears, was to leave Bangkok in a day or so; his visit having lasted about a month, and as we are informed, terminated unsuccessfully as to the objects of his mission. This was simply to induce the Court of Siam to remove certain existing difficulties in the way of the export of cattle and elephants from the Shan States which are tributaries or dependencies of Siam, into our provinces, and get the trade established on its former footing. At the present juncture it may be fairly supposed that political objects rendered it particularly desirable that this trade should be facilitated.

The state of our relations with Burmah, however, appears to have influenced the Court at Bangkok in a direction that ran altogether counter to the purposes of Dr Richardson's mission; and instead of disposing them, from a conviction of our superior power, to act a friendly part towards us, it seems they regard us as the certain victims of Burmese vengeance, whose hostility they fear to provoke by any overt act of friendship towards us! They have it at Bangkok, that the Burmese are soon to reconquer their provinces, and drive us from their country - that they have insulted and spat upon us, and that we dared not resent these affronts only because we had not the power. That such were the sentiments of the Court was it seems, plainly enough intimated to the envoy himself; and it must be confessed that the badge of sufferance our Government have judged it fit and proper to wear so long towards Ava, is but too well-calculated to inspire feelings of this kind into a semi-barbarous government, unacquainted with the complicated relations of our Indian Empire, and who themselves never feel on such occasions but that want of promptitude to strike is want of power. But the vapouring Burmans may yet be taught to feel that the blow which has been long suspended only falls the heavier, and find to their cost that:

"Achilles absent, is Achilles still."

In the meantime the conduct of the Court of Siam in this affair of the cattle and elephant trade, presents a notable contrast with the precipitate zeal with which our Government plunged into the late quarrel of that State about Quedah. We could not, it appears, be too vigilant in serving so valuable an ally, who allowed us to continue alone in the field for him, until it was quite convenient; and now rewards the display of so much zeal and activity in his cause, without which there is every probability the Malays would have retained possession of Quedah in his despite by refusing to reopen a trade formerly enjoyed by our provinces, from dread of offending a power which has bid us defiance, and with which his own country has ever been at variance! If the Siamese really entertain those high opinions of the present strength of the Burman empire which they now profess, it would be too much to expect from such a state that it would not do everything to avert, rather than the least thing to encounter, their hostility. But then, for what kind of an ally, or for what advantages gained by the Treaty or otherwise, is it, that we trampled public faith in the dust in order to make him master of Quedah? This all-important ally of ours too, for whom we have done everything we could do, and everything we ought not to do, it is further rumoured, was about to send a high personage of his Court on an Embassy to Tharawaddy, to open correspondence with that Prince, and evince the friendly feelings with which he is regarded at Bangkok. If the fears of the King of Siam can thus make him overlook the feelings engendered by the lasting enmity between his country and Ava, is it impossible that he may be further induced to strike up an offensive alliance against us with Tharawaddy - who must certainly be a man of some character, in order to convert the former enemies of his kingdom into sympathising if not active friends. - If it should come to pass that our tame attitude in regard to Burmah is to stand accountable for such an alliance, it will be another lesson to prove how short-sighted after all that policy ever is which is based on acts of perfidy, and is not checked in its course by the violation of the most solemn pledges of faith and friendship.

Affairs of Quedah - taken from the *Penang Gazette*, 23 March 1839.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 25/4/1839, p3.

**AFFAIRS OF QUEDAH** - By the accounts which have reached this [newspaper] during the week from Penang, it seems certain that the Quedah struggle has terminated for the present in leaving the Siamese again masters of that territory, without any immediate prospect of another attempt being made by the Malays to recover what they unsuccessfully endeavoured to retain. There seems no reason to conclude, however, that at some future and not very distant period, another effort will not be made to drive the Siamese from Quedah. We know indeed that it is by some contended that the recent attempt was little better than a mere predatory expedition in which those engaged were rather attracted by the hope of plunder, than animated with the patriotic feelings that inspired

Tuanku Koodin in a similar contest some years ago. This may be true - and we dare say the patriotism of the Malays generally is not a stronger feeling than their love of plunder - but it is so far from discountenancing the supposition of another attempt to expel the Siamese from Quedah at some subsequent period, that it rather induces an opposite conclusion, and seems to favour an opinion we lately expressed, that if Quedah was to be continued a province of Siam, it would prove from time to time a rallying point for all the desperadoes of the Coast of the Peninsula and the Eastern Coast of Sumatra, and thus tend to keep alive that taste for predatory pursuits, which particularly characterises the Malays, and which we had of late been taking so much pains to extinguish.

Because the Siamese are again in quiet possession of Quedah, it is therefore, in our opinion not the less incumbent on [our] government to endeavour to effect some arrangement with the Court of Siam for the restoration of Quedah to the Malays - if not to atone for our past breach of faith towards them, at least in order to prevent a recurrence of those commotions and disorders which cannot fail to operate as a check to the progress of civilisation among the Malays, nor to be unattended with injury to trade. Perhaps the present would not be the best moment to endeavour to set on foot any negotiation of the kind referred to, when, with the failure of Dr Richardson's mission from Maulmain to Bangkok before our eyes, we have such a specimen of the poor estimation in which our power is held at the Court of Siam from our seeming submission to the insolence of the Burmese. But the Siamese will no doubt return to views and opinions more befitting an ally for whom we have done so much when the Burmans have been taught a more submissive tone when Rangoon has become a British port, and Pegu perhaps a British province. We may then expect the Court of Siam to exhibit a more compliant disposition with any wishes our government may form for the restoration of Quedah to the Malays.

While in Quedah affairs, this is perhaps a proper place to notice an account we find in a late *Penang Gazette*, of an attack alleged to have been made, in sight of HMS *Hyacinth*, on the fleet of 8 boats containing a thousand helpless women and children on their passage over from Quedah to Penang by a brig that had been fitted out at that port to act against the Malays, and in which the largest prahu with two hundred of these people on board is said to have been sunk, and the others pursued on shore and every effort used to massacre them all. When an occurrence of this kind is reported to have taken place in sight of a British Man-of-War, without question or interruption, one is apt to derive consolation from the reflection that the tale must be fabulous - and accordingly we find on enquiry that the only foundation for the rumour exists in the fact of the brig in question, which had been purchased at Penang by the Rajah of Ligore and transformed into a Siamese Man-of-War, having stopped a number of boats filled with women and children on their own over from Quedah to Penang, and compelled them to return. A single gun only was fired to enforce this mandate which they seemed disposed to disobey, when the prahus

pulled in to the Quedah shore towards which they were pursued by the boats of the brig - and they were all allowed to reach the land in safety. To compel them to do this was it appears the object in view - as the Siamese are desirous to prevent the extensive emigration of Malays lately going on from Quedah to continue, and have taken these means to keep them where they are. This is the account, we have it from good authority, given by Captain Warren himself of the transaction - and although it is not to be contended that the Siamese are justified in thus preventing the Malay women and children whom they found in Quedah from leaving it at their pleasure, yet, that is something very different from the inhuman atrocity of sinking and massacring several hundred helpless and innocent beings for no purpose; under heaven, and who on the occasion in question could have given no manner of provocation.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 16/5/1839, p3.

H M Sloop *Hyacinth* arrived yesterday evening from Penang the 2nd instant, and we have received by her a *Penang Gazette* of 27th ultimo, containing extracts from the *Maulmain Chronicle* of 27th March in which we find the following piece of intelligence:

Article from *Penang Gazette* 27 April 1839,  
About schooner *Catherine*.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 23/5/1839, p3.

**OPIUM SEIZURE AT SIAM** - Accounts have reached this [newspaper] during the week, which, taken together with the circumstances noticed in our number of 4th April last, shew, we think, plainly enough that the Government of Siam is acting under the influence of that of China with respect to the trade in Opium. It appears that a Sampan pukut which sailed from this, having 19 chests of Opium on board, besides a large amount in Tecals, was seized at the mouth of the Meinam by a government boat, after a contest in which six men on board of the Pukut were killed - they having believed, or chosen to believe, that the Siamese vessel was a pirate, and resisted on consequence. Although the letter of the Siamese laws prohibits the importation of Opium, this is the first instance which has come under our notice of an *attack* having been made by Siamese cruisers on vessels supposed to have Opium on board. In a memorial addressed to the Emperor of China by the Viceroy Foo-yuen, and Hoppo of Canton in 1832, regarding the Opium trade, it is said that the 'Indian Territories belonging to England are not like Cochin-china, Siam etc, with whose Kings we might communicate, and desire them to issue commands prohibiting the Opium to be brought.' - We have no doubt that the seizure in question results from the expression of a desire by the Chinese Government that Opium should be prohibited in Siam, and we may thus see that the market for the drug is likely to be narrowed, every where but in the Archipelago, by the measures

of the Chinese Government; to which, unfortunately in this respect, the power and authority of China do not extend.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 13/6/1839

Articles on the Siamese Royal Edict against Opium Smuggling; and The West Coast of Sumatra.

Threatened Invasion of Calantan by the Siamese - We have had repeated occasion to notice the disturbed state of the Calantan territory for some time past, arising from the unsettled pretensions of some members of the late Rajah's family to the right of succeeding him, and the interruption to trade consequent upon this state of affairs in that quarter, which has now lasted for somewhere about two years. Perhaps our government might have been rather more beneficially employed by endeavouring to effect a settlement of these disputes, then it was of late when taking such an active part in bringing Quedah again under the subjection of the Siamese...

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 4/7/1839, p3.

CALANTAN - We understand that there are still funds to some amount, belonging to Chinese inhabitants of this settlement detained at Calantan in consequence of the disturbed state of affairs in that territory, to which we have had such frequent occasion to advert and that this detention was not long ago assigned as an excuse for inability to meet demands on them for credit-purchases of opium in February last, which was shipped to Calantan...

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 1/8/1839, p2.

SIAM - The arrival since our last of the *Catharina*, from Siam, brings us advices from Bangkok to the 27th June, which we regret still continue to supply very unfavourable accounts of the market, money still being extremely scarce, and no sales to the effected. The government had also evinced a disposition to raise the former duty of 600 Ticals per fathom on the measurement of vessels arriving at Bangkok, to 1,700 ticals; which it seemed probable would be done, notwithstanding that strong remonstrances were made against it to the usual authorities.

His Majesty had of late resolved to be particularly private, and had delivered himself over to the mortifications of solitude and fasting, in a fit of vexation at finding that three spires which he had ordered to be erected in front of a wat or temple, not one was built straight, each and all having got a leaning to one side or other, which was considered as a bad omen for the country at large. His Majesty, according to the last accounts from the penetralia of his

palace, had eaten nothing for three days, and during the whole of this time had refused to see or speak with any one - Such are the afflictions of princes!

SINGAPORE FREE PRESS 29/8/1839, p3.

QUEDAH AND SIAM - It is no favourite employment of ours to recur to the unhappy policy by which our government was actuated in abetting the Siamese in their claims over the Quedah territory, or to the deplorable spectacle of British arms lending their aid to overthrow and trample on those whom British faith had been solemnly pledged to cherish and protect. This is a consideration that might well make it desirable that the course of events should be such as gradually to sink this hateful proceeding into oblivion - to make us wish that the Quedah Malays should either remain passive bondsmen to their oppressors, or that the Siamese should prove such indulgent task masters as to propitiate the hostility of the Malays, and leave us less cause to deprecate the share we had taken in subjecting them to a detested enemy. Such a turn of affairs was indeed more to be wished than hoped for; nor could it be reasonable to expect but that some odious consequence must needs be eternally forcing itself on our notice as the offspring of such perfidious conduct - and, if anything has been wanting to render that conduct worthy of all the execration it has received it will, we think, be found in the following account of some of the atrocities which we have put in the power of the Siamese to perpetrate against the inhabitants of the unfortunate territory of Quedah.

When the Siamese, after the late struggle, were again in occupation of Quedah, means were taken by them to prevent the extensive emigration of the inhabitants that seemed likely to be consequence of that event. A brig had been purchased at Penang by the Rajah of Ligore, armed and commissioned to fight against the Quedah insurgents - and, when the contest had terminated, to prevent the Quedans from passing over to Penang, or proceeding to other neighbouring states. HM Sloop-of-War *Hyacinth* was still on the Quedah Coast when this brig intercepted and drove back a number of prahus filled with old men, women and children, on their way over to Penang - and it is probably within the recollection of our readers that we vindicated HM's vessel from a charge brought against it by our Penang contemporary, of having witnessed, without interposing, an attack made by this brig on the unoffending and helpless passengers on board of the prahus, in which 200 were said to have perished. We had hoped that we then satisfied the public that there had been no such inhuman butchery: although it was true that the prahus were compelled to put back - those on board of them being driven on shore; and it was also true that the *Hyacinth* (must unfortunately we think) was on the Coast at the time; but with what orders we are not aware. In adopting such unjustifiable means for compelling all the inhabitants of Quedah to remain in that territory on its again falling into their possession, the Siamese pretended that it arose from a desire to possess a population to cultivate the soil.

The following statement contained in the correspondence we have received during the week from Bangkok will however speak more clearly as to what was their intention in preventing these unhappy beings from flying to a place of refuge; also as to the impression which has gone abroad regarding the operations of HM Sloop-of-War *Hyacinth* on the Coast of Quedah:-

"The day before yesterday, 5 junks arrived from Ligore, full of Malay slaves from Quedah (!!) to be given away in presents to His Majesty, the Princes and his ministers. It was a miserable sight to see the poor wretched creatures pulled up past our house in open boats, containing about 50 each, with their heads thrust through triangular bamboo collars, and consisting of mothers with children at the breast, old man and young girls, young and old all jumbled together. I am told there are about a thousand in all - they tried to make their escape from Quedah on the advance of the Siamese army, but in so doing got 'out of the frying pan into the fire' - that is these poor miserable wretches in attempting to get out of the Quedah river, gave the British Royal Navy an opportunity of signalizing their valour by putting to flight 800 or 1,000 helpless children, old women, and a few old men, consigning them to worse than death, A BARBAROUS SLAVERY. This is the report - that the English ship-of-war drove them back and that they were seized by the Siamese. I hope for the sake of humanity, the flag of Old England, and the name of Britain, that it is not true."

We hope so too - we hope that at most it is a second, and incorrect, version of the occurrence before alluded to: that although the blockade or rather the necessity for it, had ceased, HM Sloop-of-War *Hyacinth* was then stationed off the Quedah coast for some other and better object than to intercept the flight of these unhappy refugees to a British port; and that if she did not cruise there for the express purpose of deterring the Siamese and their adherents from having recourse to any measures that would prevent the escape of the Malays, it was at least not intended that her presence intimated the sanction of the government to which she belonged to a course of proceeding diametrically opposite. But be this as it may; one thing is certain - that all this misery *has* taken place, and that it springs from the past enacted by the British government in the affairs of Quedah; in which we have assisted the Siamese in the very teeth of the most solemn engagements to protect that territory against their aggressions. Well, then may the *Friend of India* observe that 'of our perfidy we retain nothing but the disgrace, after having lost all benefit,' seeing that no sense of all the obligations we have laid these barbarians under, at such an expense of the national honour, is able to procure for us the most trifling concession, and that they are more disposed to act in fear of Tharrawaddy, than to respect our friendship or dread our power. These considerations ought to suffice in pointing out to us the propriety and expediency of adapting a different course of policy towards the Siamese, even if we did not possess



additional and stronger motives to get rid of an alliance, which while it continues can only serve to perpetrate our disgrace.

But is nothing to be done for the relief of these unfortunate Quedans who have, for no offences of theirs, been dragged into slavery 'compared with which' as our correspondent states 'the treatment of the slaves in the American slaveholding states is as that of princes'? The facts above recorded with respect to these unhappy beings do not depend upon any vague and inaccessible testimony - they can be proved on the oaths, if necessary, of respectable Europeans; and when these are before the public, the question is one from which it will be vain to attempt to avert enquiry.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 12/9/1839, p3.

SIAM - The *Hero* has arrived since our last from Siam by which we have accounts from Bangkok to the 11th ultimo. The letters received by this opportunity still continue to give the most deplorable details regarding the number and miserable condition of the Malay prisoners lately brought up from Quedah, as well as from Patani and Sangora. According to our correspondent's information, obtained in part from some of the wretched victims themselves, they amount altogether to several thousands doomed to a cruel and homeless slavery. They were to be seen huddled together in crowds, "the young and the old, male and female, the dead and the dying, on the floor of a bamboo shed," and were dying off fast, and welcoming death as a release from suffering. The inhuman savages who are guilty of these outrages against a population that ought to be under our protection, are the allies, the courted allies, of the British government.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 28/11/1839, p3.

SIAM - We quote the following Siamese news from what we deem an authentic source - but by the arrival from that quarter during the week, we have not received any correspondence of our own:-

"There has been more complaint at Bangkok for the last six months of the difficulty of collecting debts than at any former period. It is said that a great portion of the currency has found its way into the hands of the Officers, in the shape of bribes, in the Opium-business, and that many of them have become immensely rich thereby, but are afraid as yet to shew their wealth, lest the source of it be suspected." The Siamese are said to be sweeping up the Malays from Patani and Kalantan and bringing them to Bangkok by thousands, men, women and children!!!

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 5/12/1839.

SIAM - The arrival of the *Kusrovie* during the week from Siam put us in possession of advices from Bangkok to the 17th November. At this date the market was abundantly supplied with British Piece Goods; but the demand continued limited, and there was much shyness in making purchases. The Opium question was not yet finally settled, but an increased demand was looked for during the cold season, which was then fast approaching. With the exception of Stielac and Rice produce was very scarce - there was a plentiful supply of good quality of the former in the market at 16 a 19 ticals per picul, and the latter is quoted at Ticals 25 a 27 1/2 Ticals per coyan of 25 piculs. No sugar in the market, and the past season's crop nearly exhausted. The *Victory* and *Caledonia* were shortly to sail for this Port with cargoes of Rice and Oil.

**SINGAPORE FREE PRESS** 12/12/1839, p3.

QUEDAH - We have much pleasure in inserting the following from the *Penang Gazette* of 30th ultimo, which has reached as during the week, and hope the information on which it is founded may prove correct.

Restoration of the ex-Rajah of Quedah - We understand that Tuanku Daef, the youngest son of the ex-Rajah of Quedah, who lately arrived here from Malacca in consequence of a special invitation from the Siamese authorities conveyed to him through his relatives, Tuanku Anoom and Tuanku Hassan, who are now administering the affairs of Quedah jointly with a Siamese chief, has proceeded to that country for the purpose of arranging measures preparatory to the restoration of his father to the throne of his ancestors. We are informed that this invitation emanates from the King of Siam, who directed it to be transmitted through the Rajah of Sangora. Tuanku Daef, however, appeared at first to distrust the Siamese, but when Tuanku Hassan heard of his arrival here and came over from Quedah personally to assure him of their sincerity he made no hesitation in departing. This wise policy on the part of the Siamese will, we have no doubt be attended with the most beneficial effects to the Quedah territory, and set at rest the heart burnings which must ever have continued whilst the family of the ex-King remained expatriated. Good effects may be also safely anticipated in our increased supplies of provisions from that place, which were always very extensive whilst under the dominion of the Malays; and we are sure the arrangement now said to be in progress, is one which will give the highest satisfaction to our Government, as it will relieve them from the necessity of continuing a disagreeable course of policy towards the ex-Rajah's family, which circumstances obliged them to adhere to in consequence of Captain Burney's Treaty with the Siamese to preserve which they have experienced so much trouble and annoyance.

# Appendix D

## The Penang Gazette

Compiled by  
Justin Corfield

The *Prince of Wales Gazette* started publication in 1833, changing its name to the *Penang Gazette* on 7th April 1838 with the arrival of the former printing-press and type from the defunct *Singapore Chronicle* (see Appendix C). In 1855 the circulation of the newspaper was less than one hundred copies, and the paper was bought by James Logan, whose brother had bought the *Singapore Free Press*.

**PENANG GAZETTE** 30/6/1838, p2.

On Friday last HMS *Wolf* was rejoined in harbour by her two armed boats, which with two gun-boats of the station had been despatched by Captain Stanley in pursuit of the five Illanoon prahus that had escaped from the Steamer. At the Redang islands, the boats boarded a sampan with three men on her belonging to Tringanu and were informed by them that, on the morning of the 20th May, they had seen five Illanoon prahus in the neighbourhood, from use of which a number of dead bodies were thrown overboard...

**PENANG GAZETTE** 28/7/1838, p1.

Upon some report of fancied conspiracies of the poor Malays of Province Wellesley against Quedah, H M Sloop *Wolf* left this on Monday morning for Quedah which could not fail in this departure to [illegible]. Her departure did not raise any anticipation in the minds of any one of the results of the trip proving different to what it has done...

**PENANG GAZETTE** 11/8/1838, p2-3.

Previous to the publication of our number last Saturday, HM Brig *Victor* had left this upon a cruize, the importance of which was supposed by some few people so great as to warrant the necessity of considerable closeness. The mighty secret was at length revealed on her return in the early part of the week,

when it was discovered that Quedah was the unhappy land to which she had bent her course to surprise and scare away the Malays and render British assistance to their enemies and persecutors, the Siamese, should any of the latter have proved courageous enough to wait the arrival of the intended succour. It is reported however, that the valiant heroes of the Siamese Empire - highly attached as in all thankfulness they ought to be to their faithful allies of the British Government, - were fonder of their personal safety by flight than disposed to warm the crises of their Malayan foes with any portion of *their precious* blood by continuing at their posts for that aid which it would appear, will be perseveringly afforded, and which on the late occasion was assuredly sent for their protection and preservation. The rogues had all scampered off, and if our information is correct the fort of Quedah and adjoining country were once more in quiet possession of the gallant Malays; and long may they retain what they have regained so gloriously after a seventeen years struggle against the efforts of the Siamese nation backed as they have been during the whole of that long period by the influence of the British Government.

PENANG GAZETTE 8/9/1838, pl-2.

QUEDAH AFFAIRS - A communication has reached us intimating that the Malayan chiefs in possession of Quedah had written an address to the principal merchants of this settlement to exert their influence with Mr Governor Bonham to vouchsafe that the helpless, oppressed, and aged King of Quedah be suffered to quit Malacca, the place of his present illegal imprisonment. No opportunity more reasonable for independent men to frame a remonstrance against the mistaken and unjust policy into which the British Government has suffered itself to be in a manner inveighed; a milder term we should have been but too happy to use were it within our power: we have stretched a point not to offend; but few, we believe, will think that when people in official situations, knowing imposition is about to be practised upon them, wink at its preparation would have censored us had we inputted connivance instead of imbecility. It is to be hoped the mercantile community will not throw away so fitting an occasion for their intervention in the cause of justice and humanity.

We would urge them with the utmost sincerity to assert their independence, and throw aside that vulgar fear, if any of them should be possessed with it, of losing 'a dine out' here or there; a quiet dinner at home will be found to be infinitely more satisfactory, than the society of would-be great people where hypocrisy it is to be feared is the president. - If may be proper to explain what is meant by '*would-be great people*,' in order that neither ignorance nor malice may have a pretext to cavil.

We use the expression to bring Indian society into contrast with that of Europe; how many great boys filling high places in India, full of self-conceit and over-burdened with supposed wisdom, would dwindle into the most dwarfish

pigmies were they permitted to commix with better-bred and more intelligent company.

These observations, we have ventured thus boldly to utter from feelings opposite to personal ill-intention to any one or disappointment of any of our own private expectations. They are now expressed with a very different object in view; firstly, to incite and to encourage the mercantile gentlemen to act in union and think for themselves; and secondly to urge them to support a cause in every point of view just; and to those therefore who undertake its advocacy dignified as honourable.

The Chiefs in their letter give a concise but impressive account of the treacherous manner in which their forefathers and themselves were driven out of Quedah... and the cool contempt they received from the British, a supposed friend though perfidiously Ally for solicitation not for aid but to remain neutral.

Well might the poor but patriotic people say, on the disappointment of their hopes in the English character and faith, they must now rely upon the favour and assistance of the Lord of All World, and upon their own feelings, energy and labour. This faith in providence conjoined with the firmness of temper and determination terminated, as all such just and lawful proceedings will, in the [illegible] of the enemy, and the re-establishment of the Malays in their own country - to the merchants of this settlement, the Chiefs intimate their intention to throw the 'fertile fields' of Quedah once more into cultivation, and reproduce with abundance which formerly existed and without which Penang, a British settlement, never would have been known, but which from unhappy events which it was in the power, and the imperative duty of the British Government, if not to avert at least ameliorate ceased immediately on the occupation of the country by the Siamese.

**PENANG GAZETTE** 22/9/1838, p1.

It is rumoured that HMS *Hyacinth*, Captain Warren, is about to proceed on a cruize. We hope that her destination may be to the east and west coast of Sumatra, where the presence of a British Man-of-war must always prove highly beneficial to the trade of this port. The greater activity and vigilance that is exhibited in this matter, would operate we feel assured, as a wholesome, if not effectual check-mate, to the aggressive propensities of the Dutch, who, if due attention had been evinced by the British Government would never have ventured upon their past insidious, as well as prospective plans of encroachment on the Pepper ports on the west Coast of Sumatra.

As a correspondent Orang Lama re-introduces to our notice an editorial article published in 1827 in reference to Quedah matters we think it behoves us to say a few words more upon a subject which now enjoys the sympathy

of all persons who have any consideration for the observance and fulfilment of a solemn obligation. - To many of our readers the information in the extract appended to the letter of Orang Lama will be new, and will be a testimony to them of what was thought in no mean quarter of the perfidious treatment the King of Quedah received at the hands of the British government after the invasion and usurpation of his country by the Siamese, and of the shameful manner every consideration of national honour and integrity was disregarded by a British Ambassador to whom was entrusted the preservation of his interests and his final restoration to his throne.

Since that transaction nothing has been left untried by its defenders to soften down the iniquity of the thing as much as possible, and after various expedients to get rid of a difficulty, it now appears they have discovered a legitimate excuse for all the extraordinary conduct practised, and still practising, against the King of Quedah - namely that the people of Quedah were merely a horde of barbarians under the orders of a chief who himself had no pretensions to the rank and dignity of an independent sovereign. Thus if this argument has any force, against whom will it operate the more effectively? The Malays, or their *quondam* friends the English? - If they were a body of people merely in occupation by sufferance of a tract of country belonging to another nation, it is highly improbable that the Governor-General of India or his intelligent deputy Mr Light, would have perpetrated so gross a mistake as to solicit the permission of such personage to for a British settlement at Pinang, if previous investigation had not convinced them that he with whom they desired to treat was an independent prince and had the right to grant the favour which was sought from him. - Indeed, we find in Mr Anderson's work on the Malayan Peninsula that previous to the time of Mr Light the acquisition of this island was considered of importance, although the negotiation for that purpose ended unsuccessfully...

**PENANG GAZETTE** 29/9/1838, pl.

HMS *Hyacinth* is still in harbour and it is supposed that her detention here and has reference to some political movements on the return of the Hon'ble the Governor to this Presidency. We hope that her destination may be to the east and west Coasts of Sumatra, where the services of British Men-of-war are imperatively required for the protection of our trade - and for what other use are HM Ships of War sent to this country?

**PENANG GAZETTE** 27/10/1838, p1.

HMS *Hyacinth*, 18, Commander Warran, sailed from this port on Sunday last for Singapore with the mails on board for that place; when off the North Sand Head she fell in with HMS *Wellesley*, 74, Captain Maitland, bearing the Flag

of His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief on his return to Madras from China, with the Algerine Brig, Lieutenant Thomas, in company...

A rumour having reached this settlement that a considerable force of Siamese prahus had assembled for the purpose of making an attack on Quedah gained but little credence from us, until we saw HMB *Victor* accompanied by the government gun-boat proceeding in that direction, doubtless with the view of ascertaining the fact. The gun-boat under the command of Mr F Stewart returned yesterday morning, and was despatched again the same day for the purpose, it is understood, of recalling the *Victor* in conformity with the Admiral's orders. We have been unable to gain any information of what has been going on since the *Victor's* presence there, but hope, through the assistance of our friends to have an opportunity of laying particulars before our readers in our next number.

**PENANG GAZETTE** 3/11/1838, p1.

QUEDAH - Accounts have reached us by a prahu which left Quedah on the 28th ultimo stating that the whole of that country was in a state of repose and that in addition to the original force which reconquered Quedah, a further reinforcement of from ten to twelve thousand Malays had arrived from various directions with voluntary officers assistance against the Siamese in the event of a renewal of hostilities. The present conqueror of Quedah, Tuanku Mah Sahet, was by invitation from the Rajah of Sunkoora, about proceeding thither for the purpose it is alleged of entering into arrangements to reinstate the old King now in captivity at Malacca under the British into the land of his forefathers...

**PENANG GAZETTE** 10/11/1838, p2.

In our last number we said a few words in reference to a certain renegade Tuanku, from the cause of his countrymen at Quedah and we again bring the rogue to the notice of our readers, having been given to understand that, at Province Wellesley, he receives every encouragement to raise a force to be employed against Quedah, and that he is backed by a very active confederate of the name of Baba Seng at Quallah Muda stationed not within our own boundary but on the Malayan side of the river, it is stated by the authority of that Province and that too under a military force. A combined force of Chinese and Malays is the contemplated result of this well-planned conspiracy, but when they will be sufficiently trained for active operations would appear not to be very immediate from the account that we have been enabled to obtain. This may be all very agreeable and pleasant to those behind the scenes instigating such proceedings, not only amusing themselves at the public expense, but every now and then pestering government with idle reports for the foundation of which there is no better ground than their own added imagination. There

being however some reason to believe that a hostile force is about being raised in our territory under the cognizance of British authority we think it an imperative duty on our part to bring the subject under the consideration of our readers.

**PENANG GAZETTE** 17/11/1838, p1.

We understand that the services of one Company of the 12th Regiment M.N.I. [Madras Native Infantry] have been applied for as necessary on our Quedah Frontier, perception of the Siamese into the Malayan Peninsula:- and hope we may be able to furnish our readers at a future day with some information as to the movements of the contending parties in that neighbourhood. We have so frequently expressed our opinion on Quedah affairs, that we only think it necessary in reference to the circumstance before me to say that it will have its farcical end in "Much ado about nothing".

This was followed by a verbatim transcript of the *Singapore Free Press* article, 25 October 1838.

**PENANG GAZETTE** 24/11/1838, p1.

Last week our time did not permit of noticing certain proceedings connected with the Malays of Quedah, the information we are about to communicate having been received much too late to be then made available. In a former number we have mentioned that a person of the name of Tuanku Gappeie from his misconduct and tyranny at Quedah had been driven thence by his brother chieftains and had been for some time past prowling in Province Wellesley. It would appear this personage with another person named Baba Seng, had been committing extensive depredations on the Malayan side of the river Quallah Mudah, and securing the results of their villainy on the British side of the water.

To arrest this course of freebooting Tuanku Mah Sahet, the chief of Quedah despatched a force of about three hundred men to Quallah Mudah, the commander of which had orders previous to adopting any hostile measures, to submit these grievances to the civil authority at Province Wellesley. This courtesy was by a certain authority received as presumption, or perhaps represented as a hostile demonstration, for the consequence was, that a company of Sepoys under an officer was immediately dispatched with the view of obtaining satisfaction for this supposed attack, upon British honor. What the result may prove, a short time will show. On the approach of the Malayan force, however, Baba Seng and his followers hastily quitted their positions, and made their escape in a large boat towards the British side of the river, and commenced a fire of musketry, upon the Malays, which by the latter, was not immediately returned, fearing the consequence of coming into collision with the British. But there must be a limitation to tyrannical aggression and



when by the force of the current the boat of Baba Seng, drifted towards the Malayan side of the river, a chance shot struck down one of his party, when the wretched Baba Seng and his fellow marauders valiantly leaped into the water, and swam for their lives. The unfortunate man who fell, it is stated, was conveyed to the Police Office at Province Wellesley in order that a Coroner's Inquest might be held on the body, but the Coroner had wisdom enough to discover that under the circumstances, the case was not within his jurisdiction. We have a word or two to say about the Pangulu of Qualla Mudah, which we may perhaps do next week. In the meantime we believe him to be a person unfit to be employed in that situation.

**PENANG GAZETTE** 1/12/1838, p1.

**PROVINCE WELLESLEY AFFAIRS** - Allusion was made last week to a Pangulu stationed in the district of Qualla Mudah. His name is Patey and he appears to have been nominated to that influential post by the ruling authority of Province Wellesley. It is probable the latter may not have been aware of the demerits of this man, who, we are informed has been frequently tried as well at the Assize as at Quarter Sessions, and as repeatedly convicted, punished, and dismissed from his office of Pangulu for tyranny, oppression and extortion practised by him, not only against the riots of that particular district, but against traders generally passing from one territory to another...

**PENANG GAZETTE** 15/12/1838, p1.

**QUEDAH AFFAIRS** - In the early part of last week HMS *Hyacinth*, accompanied by the Government gun-boats, left this harbour for Quedah to announce in the shape of a proclamation to the Malays - the legitimate possessors of that country - that the English were about to become their mortal foes unless immediate submission was yielded to certain imperative demands...

**PENANG GAZETTE** 15/12/1838, p1.

Proclamation see note 44 to *The First Dispatch*.

**PENANG GAZETTE** 22/12/1838, pl.

The *Diana* left the anchorage again on Wednesday morning for Quedah - Mr Salmond, the Hon'ble Resident Councillor of this station, proceeded in the steamer for the purpose, it is said, of personally informing himself of the state of the conflicting parties in that country, or in other words to discover whether there be a Siamese force within any reasonable distance to receive over the territory from us after having forced the Malays to retire from their own country. Had government taken this step some time ago, we should not have fallen

into the dilemma into which we are thus inconsiderately plunged. The government order the blockade of Quedah, arresting people in their progress there for the purposes of trade who are altogether ignorant of our hostile dispositions, and then subsequently pay a visit to ascertain the true state of affairs, seems something more than inconsistent. It would be admitting that government had hitherto been wilfully groping in the dark, [illegible] only perhaps from the circumstance that every description of reports inimical to the interests of the Malays of Quedah had more than a chance of proving popular at higher quarters, and not from the absence of sufficiently correct data upon which government might safely have relied.

Whether there be any culpability in transmitting reports of the nature supposed to a distant government it is not now the object to discuss. All opportunity will doubtless offer in due course to descant more fully on this subject than at the present moment. In the meantime we shall proceed to state what has as yet been achieved since the blockade of the Quedah river. We are informed that on Saturday evening last a boat of HMS *Hyacinth* arrived from thence conveying a person of the name of Hadji Pakki and a party of twelve or thirteen men who were intercepted by a government gun-boat while crossing from Purlis to Quedah and taken prisoners to HMS *Hyacinth* and at the present time lodged in the police gaol. They are charged with an attempt to force the blockade with the object of joining themselves to the Malayan party in Quedah. The boat also, it would appear, was armed with a three-pounder besides having a quantity of small arms, and from these circumstances it was inferred (naturally enough for strangers to the manners and customs of a foreign people) that their intentions must have been hostile.\*

Upon the detention of the party, Hadji Pakki is said to have declared that his object in proceeding to Quedah was for the purpose of procuring cattle, and indeed from the inconsiderable number of his followers it is most probable he spoke the truth. The boat being armed with a three-pounder, and having on board a quantity of small arms are no proof of any hostile intention on his part: for all boats of that description are armed after a similar manner for their protection. We now see for the first time, the stone thrown in this and (as it will ultimately turn out) 'untoward event', and all we can do at present is to await with anxious solicitude the ultimate effects of a proceeding on the part of the government which is as unjust in principle to the parties concerned, as it is degrading to the national faith, in the enforcing of what they know to be based on the grossest perfidy towards the King of Quedah and his people, by the infraction of the sacred Treaty of Quedah, by that of Siam.

The steamer returned yesterday morning from the blockade station off Quedah. Every thing in that country remained quiet. Not a Siamese to be seen, heard of, nor expected by seaward or from the interior. We learn that Mr Salmond, accompanied by Captain Warren, visited Lungoo, late a Siamese

port, which they found deserted, the place having been burned down some time ago by the Malays. The Resident Councillor appears to have had no communication with the Malay Chiefs at Quedah, although it is stated, on the approach of the Steamer, a flag was hoisted in the fort but whether as a friendly demonstration, or a sign of preparation to resist an attack must at the present moment be left to the conjectures of our readers. \*\* Every one must sympathise, we think, with the officers and crew of HMS *Hyacinth* thus uselessly engaged in the unenviable employment of blockading a country for a people who evince no disposition either to appreciate or take advantage of the kindness and who appear resolved and wisely so, to take themselves no active part in the recapture of Quedah while they can get others to endeavour to do so for them. So far, therefore, as the Siamese are concerned the probability that the *Hyacinth* will be detained in this disagreeable affair for months, at the termination of which, the object for which she was sent thither to accomplish will be as nearly effected as at the commencement of her operations.

The river may be blockaded it is true, and also continued in that state for any length of time the English can conveniently spare for idling, by the force at present employed is quite incompetent to prevent communication with Quedah from other parts of the coast, and whether His Excellency the naval commander-in-chief will furnish any more men-of-war to complete this childish game seems very improbable. If the Siamese continue coy, as hitherto they have done, and our obstinacy remains unrelaxed, the blockade will be an interminable matter, without materially injuring any one but our own subjects, who are dependent on Quedah for poultry, cattle, and other necessities of life. By the Treaty too, the English cannot possess themselves of Quedah, nor can they put a foot on the territory to attack it; all which must be very pleasant to every one but those actually obliged to be engaged in so ridiculous a service without an object except an impossible one in which, and without a single soul at hand on whom Quedah might be bestowed. Considerable inconvenience is experienced from the supply of water required not being obtainable from any part of Quedah and only procurable at one of the Boonting Islands, a distance of about thirty miles from the blockade station? A state of things, which we opine, cannot last very long, and may be the means of our having to beat a retreat little calculated to raise the character of the Orang putihs in the estimation of the natives in this part of the world, after the awkward predicament in which the English have placed themselves with the Malays.

In our last number we promised to take some further notice of a certain proclamation issued by the government against the Malays of Quedah than we were then able to do from the lateness the document came to hand.

In the very first sentence of the recital of this proclamation we think, the framer has committed a mistake when he states it is in conformity with the British Treaty with Siam that the English, in the event of Quedah being

reconquered by the Malays from the Siamese, should 'cooperate with the latter power in the recapture of Quedah'.

In retaking of Quedah by the Malays seem never to have been contemplated by the high contracting parties, and no provision is made for such a contingency. It is therefore an erroneous view of the treaty to assert, as a settled opinion, that the English are in any manner bound to co-operate with the Siamese in recapturing Quedah in the event of their being driven out of that country. On the contrary the treaty merely engages that the English will not 'permit the former Governor of Quedah, or any of his followers to attack, disturb or injure in any manner the territory of Quedah, or any other territory subject to Siam.' But in all this we observe nothing of co-operation with the Siamese in expelling any power who may happen to have wrested Quedah out of their possession. Admitting however for a moment that such was the genuine intention of the treaty, might the English not as well have remained quietly at home and waited patiently until they had some power to cooperate with, instead of exhibiting so much knighterrantry in a cause none but themselves apparently care a straw about, and evincing so much zeal for a people to whom, as circumstances now are, we are under no moral obligation to support, much less to engage in actual hostilities on their behalf. If from want of sufficient power or influence, government were unable to prevent Quedah from being taken from the Siamese, in what clause of the treaty is there a provision that the English shall go to war with the Malays, or assist in the recapture of a conquered country, in order to restore the same to their loving allies the Siamese?

The second paragraph of the proclamation is equally erroneous in our opinion with the first. The Malays who fled from Quedah when that country was treacherously taken by the Siamese and who subsequently were received under British protection, both here and at Province Wellesley are denominated 'British subjects' and so they might fairly be considered when actually living under the British government; but because a people have at one time the misfortune to be forced from their country by a powerful enemy, and happen to locate in another territory who had friendship enough to permit them to do so, is that any argument that they shall not return to their own country when they think fit or a favourable opportunity offers? or that having resided *once* in British territory, they thereby become British subjects for ever and against their own inclinations? We would recommend the perusal of Vattel's Law of Nations before the publication of future proclamations.

The Malays therefore who have left this and Province Wellesley for Quedah can only be looked upon in the light of *foreigners* returned to their native country, and by no means amenable to the penalties attachable to 'British subjects found in open arms against its own Government.' And as to our right not to say anything about the justice of the measure, to blockade Quedah, we must look for its reputation to our treaty with the Malays - those very people whom

we are now so shamelessly oppressing - and to which we must beg to refer our readers - having already occupied perhaps too much of their time.

With respect to the letter obtained from the King of Quedah at Malacca we have already said enough in our last number; only adding to what was formerly written that what is thus procured to a man's own detriment while under duress, - which the King of Quedah virtually is and has been since he became under British protection - is altogether invalid; but the object was obvious, it was thought necessary to have his subjects *denounced as pirates* that a pretext might be had to expel them from Quedah, which could not be done under a mistaken imputation of their being *British subjects*!!

**PENANG GAZETTE** 12/1/1839, pl.

The East India Company Steamer *Diana*, Capt Congalton, left this port for Quedah, on Sunday last and returned yesterday afternoon at 3 o'clock. We are not aware of the object of her mission, but hope by our next advices from that quarter to be better informed upon the subject, and which we shall not fail to lay before our readers. We may surmise, however, and confidently hope, that she went to play her part, in the last scene in the last act of that very interesting Farce, and that ere long the curtain will drop around it, in good earnest forever, and shut from out of our sight we wish we could say remembrance, any traces of its former existence.

It is with considerable pleasure and gratification we recognise our contemporary the *Singapore Free Press* of the 27th ulto backing our efforts to condemn the policy of the Indian government in its bearing towards the Malay people in the affair of Quedah. It is indeed no very great matter of surprise to any, but those who are wilfully blind, when such a mighty big bubble has been blown up about Quedah, that our worthy contemporary 'expected advices from Siam would have announced some military operation of importance against Quedah, for when the King of Siam has lately had the credit of making considerable preparations.' Our contemporary however, it appears, has been 'informed that the Quedah ... [illegible].. present at rest and little or nothing said about it.' And this was always our opinion of the matter. Now if this information be correct, and our own correspondence furnishes us with the means of judging of its truth, in a tolerably accurate degree, so as to enable us to coincide with it - what is to be - or can now be said for bolstering up the necessity of those considerable preparations which were made on our part, in aid of those of Siam, when in fact there has been no actual cause of alarm, from any of the Siamese being in motion, to warrant or justify such a proceeding. We read that not a single soldier has been armed by the King of Siam for the recovery of Quedah: therefore it is very evident he does not want or care about it; - that it would be an encumbrance to him; ever a bone of contention;

and continually embroiling him with the Malay people; -moreover it does not nor ever did form an integral part of the Kingdom of Siam. We however being fashioned of more redoubtable and pugnacious materials, must, unmasked, make a demonstration in favor of the King of Siam, and 'show fight' for him unsolicited against our own people for the recovery of Quedah, in *maintenance of that Treaty* which surrendered the place to him; although founded as it was and is well-known to be, in the grossest injustice towards the King of Quedah, our natural, generous and faithful Ally, who was with his territory sacrificed to the mere shadow of expediency in the late Burmah War; and whose present decline into the condition of a state prisoner arising out of those events, will ever rebound to our everlasting disgrace as the representatives of a christian nation.

We are given to understand that the Commanders of British vessels at Bangkok make serious complaints against the means made use of by the nobles and officers of the country to decoy seamen from their ships by offering them higher wages, and holding out against other inducements for them to leave their ships, and join the Siamese service. A few English sailors had been thus led to quit their vessels; but finding the Lascars more accessible to the temptations offered, the Siamese had latterly confirmed their operations to that class of seamen, and with so much success that few ships manned by native crews leave the port of Bangkok with their proper compliment of men - often exposing the ship to danger, and always to inconvenience. This mode of proceeding it appears is patronised by the government - but the men who are seduced away from their vessel are not, it appears, on that account better treated, generally looking in vain for the fulfilment of the bargain made with them, and being often subjected to very bad treatment.

Having entered another service the consequence is their own look out - but we should think it would be easy for our government by remonstrating against the practice complained of, to induce the Siamese to abandon a course which exposed our shipping frequenting their ports to so much inconvenience and we hope this complaint may assume a form that will excite attention in the proper quarter.

We expected that advices from Siam of the date mentioned would have announced some military operations of importance against Quedah, for which the King of Siam has lately had the credit of making considerable preparations. We are, however, informed that 'The Quedah question is for the present at rest, and little or nothing said about it.' Meantime the British government are kind enough to become belligerents on behalf of HM against the insurgent province, and undertake to reduce it to subjection before he himself condescends to arm a single soldier for .. [illegible]! How grateful therefore must he feel for the generous and spontaneous assistance of an ally who thus take it upon themselves to fight his battles uninvited, leaving him to worship his White

Elephant undisturbed, do dutiful reverence to his white monkeys, and enjoy the listless response of his seraglio, free from the cares and thoughts of warfare!

And how gratifying a spectacle it must be to Englishmen to behold their government engaging in the quarrel with much alacrity and zeal as if their right to interfere took its source in all that was honourable, politic, and humane, instead of being stigmatised by about as large a portion of degrading prevarication and scandalous disregard of every principle of justice as ever the sense of physical superiority led a nation to indulge in! But the present posture of the affairs of Quedah will probably meet with our more particular attention at another time...

#### PENANG GAZETTE 19/1/1839

The East India Company's steamer *Diana*, Captain Congalton, left this Port on Monday last to resume her station for the blockade of Quedah.

Her Majesty's Ship *Hyacinth*, 18, Captain Warren, arrived at this Port on Wednesday afternoon from the Blockade of Quedah, and returned on Friday morning to resume her station for that very *unpopular* service.

HM Ship *Hyacinth* came in from Quedah on Wednesday last for water and provisions. We learn that her commander had experienced ill-health during the time he was in blockade of the Quedah river, and although it is with regret we have to communicate the intelligence a different result could scarcely otherwise be expected taking into consideration the locality he had been appointed to guard. Nevertheless the *Hyacinth* again proceeded to her station yesterday morning on reaching which it is understood, the steamer *Diana* will return to harbour. The reports prevalent for some few days past of the passing events at Quedah appear to be very favourable for Malays, who, it is stated, have lately captured several elephants loaded with baggage and valuables from the Siamese together with three golden [trees] and about two hundred women and children in addition to numerous male prisoners. It would seem the Malays have also advanced to conquer Trang, their forces have been strengthened by the Malays of Patani; so far therefore, as the present aspect of affairs indicate, the hostile demonstrations of the British have had an effect completely the reverse of what possibly was originally anticipated. In place of finding a timid, submissive, cringing opponent, as was expected, the unwarranted opposition which has been evinced has only served to call forth the energies of an indignant and insulted people who, while they intreat to continue our friends, the India government apparently has not the understanding to appreciate the consequences of neglecting this laudable proof of good-will on their part. The Siamese on the other hand continue to look upon the operations of the British government with their accustomed insensibility. It is true indeed some ragamuffins did arrive here from Siam via Trang; calling themselves delegates from the white

elephant to the Honourable the Governor of the Straits, the object of whose friendly visit appears to have been for the acquisition of a favour of no small importance which offers to our consideration a palpable trait of the character of the wretched people with whom the English condescended to seek an alliance. The chief of the gang made the very modest request that the Governor would place the steamer *Diana* entirely under his orders, to enable him at once to conquer the fort at Quedah, falsely representing at the same time, we learn, that all beyond the fort had submitted to the puissance of the Siamese. For our own parts we are by no means surprised at the demand. Indeed from the truckling policy and conduct of the British government generally with that of Siam, the requisition, when impartially considered, appears to have some reason. If unasked, we shall embark ourselves in hostilities - not on our own account be it remembered - but to maintain the honour of a foreign people who condemn us, it does not appear inconsistent that we ought to be called upon also to 'go the whole hog'...

**PENANG GAZETTE** 2/2/1839, p1.

The latest accounts from Quedah inform us that the Malayan forces in the interior consisting of seven thousand men each and which had been sent to the conquest of Madelong and Sangora had been entirely successful. Madelong in the district of Lampang had fallen into their hands after a slight resistance; the Siamese having fled and taken refuge at Sangora supposing it a place of greater strength and security. Here a considerable concourse of people had assembled previous to the arrival of the Malayan chief, Tuanku Mahamed Taheb, who, after some hostile preparations which occupied his attention for two or three days commenced the assault upon Sangora - Hostilities would appear to have commenced in the evening and continued partially throughout the night and renewed the following morning with the utmost determination until about eight o'clock when the place was finally carried and a terrible slaughter ensued. Those who escaped sought refuge in the jungles, and, agreeably to usual practice among these people, no quarter was asked or given, with the exception of the women and children, to the number of upwards of one thousand five hundred who were transmitted to Quedah with immense booty. - Quedah is said to be full of Siamese prisoners of all descriptions distributed amongst the villages. - Sangora, the renowned Sangora is now but a heap of ashes having been burned to the ground by the Malays. It is stated also that great quantities of grain and other articles of provision were found in this place that would be of use to the conquerors. The victorious army thus flushed with victory were making forced marches upon Ligore, the strong and last frontier town formerly under the dominion of the Malayan Rajahs. The Malays express their determination to conquer Ligore, and from the contempt they have learned to feel for the Siamese are confident of its fall very shortly.



**PENANG GAZETTE** 9/2/1839, P1-2.

**AFFAIRS OF QUEDAH** - The only dark spot in the annals of the British Government in the Straits of Malacca, in its relations with the surrounding states, has been stamped on them by our conduct in regard to Quedah. With this single exception the course of our policy towards the Malayan States, since the first establishment of our authority in Prince of Wales Island, has been uniformly generous and liberal. It is worthy of note, too, that even in the case of Quedah to none of the Straits' Administrations is the conduct which we deprecate in any one particular imputable. It was the work of Lord Amherst's chosen ambassador to the King of Siam to transfer Quedah to the arbitrary domination of that power, in the face of a treaty between our Government and its reigning prince, in which its independence was recognised in the most solemn manner. Mr Fullerton, during whose administration it occurred, condemned the transaction in the strongest language - and in all probability remonstrated with the Bengal Government against an act of such flagrant injustice, which had not one single political recommendation of any kind to redeem it from the general execration with which it was always mentioned. In those compulsory unions of state with state, dissimilar in language, habits, and institutions - the one weak and the other powerful - which have so often been made the reproach of the far-famed Holy Alliance, there is nothing in its kind more truculently despotic than the annexation by British power of Quedah to Siam. Had it taken place in Europe, it would no doubt have awakened the same indignant eloquence which was launched in the British Senate against the betrayers of Parga. But its very name and existence as a state as there in all probability alike unknown, and the voices of the humble advocates of its cause in this part of the world are too weak "to roll across the Atlantic."

**PENANG GAZETTE** 23/2/1839, p1-2

Her Majesty's Ship *Hyacinth*, 18, Captain Warren, returned to her blockade Station off Quedah on Thursday morning last.

**QUEDAH AFFAIRS** - Under the head of "Affairs of Quedah" will be found an Extract Draft of an Act, which is to be reconsidered at the first meeting of the Legislative Council after the 31st March next; with an able commentary thereon by our contemporary of Singapore; and we again repeat the pleasure we experience in finding that both he and our friend of Malacca have so zealously advocated the cause of our own people the Malays, in laying open to the public and the world at large the obdurate policy of our Government, in their endeavours to subdue the people into submission, by the operation of the act above referred to...

**SIAM AND QUEDAH** - By private letters, received during the week, we learn that a deputation from Siam arrived in Penang for the purpose of having an

interview with the Hon'ble the Governor; since which it has transpired that their object was to induce our Government to take possession of Quedah in the name of the Siamese Government until they could spare time from the affair that now engrosses their attention on the Cochin Chinese frontier, when they should then be prepared to resume possession of that country. How such a proposition was relished by the authority alluded to we know not, but knowing that our relations with Siam are regarded at present with peculiar interest, consequent upon the dubious state of affairs with regard to Burmah, we have no doubt that the wishes of that Government will be complied with. We have already had occasion to remark that the interests of the Old Rajah of Quedah were sacrificed to a mere state expediency, and although thoughts were entertained of re-seating him on the throne of his ancestors, still, as a matter of policy, the Siamese interests are sure to preponderate...

**PENANG GAZETTE** 16/3/1839, pl & 2.

On Wednesday last, the Brig *Anna* of about 200 tons burthen sailed from this Port, accompanied by two China junks for the Quallah Moodah river. The Brig has been fitted out at this port, it is said by a Chinaman, and armed with guns of various calibre, as well as a plentiful store of small arms, cutlasses etc etc, Powder and shot; -and the junks armed in a similar way, as far as their peculiar construction will admit: - they are manned principally by Chinese, and a few native Christians, and are intended to aid the Siamese in their reconquest of Quedah! The Brig *Anna* has a British register, and it commanded by a native Christian, although when she left the Port, she sailed under an accredited Siamese flag...

**KEDAH AFFAIRS** - We have been favoured with the subjoined relative to them.

'During last week a number of large prows, a junk, and several small prows were conveyed by the Honourable Company's cutter into the harbour from that unfortunate country Kedah laden with women and children; and as many more to Province Wellesley, and from what we are able to ascertain, amount to about 1800. We understand there are treble the number expected to arrive, and there are now on the Qualla Mooda side, waiting to come over into the British Territory about 6 or 800 more. The necessity of their being obliged to quit their native shore is for some good reason which the Chief Tuanku Mohamed Saad thought prudent to permit for their protection and safety. The numerous women and children already assembled in Kedah (sic) fort together with the men, are greater than the fort can hold, and there is no necessity for these females being intermingled with the warriors or people assembled for its defence. These Malay women and children are the people who Tuanku Mahamed Saad liberated from the Siamese in the several Siamese countries viz Trang, Sangora etc etc which the Malays lately conquered and who had

been carried away formerly from Kedah. The unfortunate people are the only remains of those who escaped from the cruelties of the villainous Siamese at the time when the Malays captured the above mentioned countries. Men, women and children were massacred in cold blood, the helpless children were not spared and even infants were torn from their mother's breasts and quartered before them; the pregnant women were ripped open to glut their ferocious animosity whether their wombs contained male children: such were the scenes of distress and destruction, and it is to such a barbarous and bloodthirsty people the British Government have degraded itself by courting its alliance. There had been no rain for many months, and the Tank attached to the Fort had become dry; from the many miseries expected to happen, the Chief Tuanku Mahamed Saad had persuaded all females to remove out of Kedah either to the British or any other protection which suits them best; retaining all the men for the defence of the country. The small prow with the females and children on board on their moving out of the river were taken alongside the *Hyacinth* and others to the steamer *Diana*. These unfortunate creatures who had never seen white faces before, imagined it to be their last moment of their existence from the cruelties of the Siamese being impressed on their hands and the same practices supposed to be common with Europeans, embraced their children and fellow sufferers, as the last act of affection, and on arriving alongside of the ship Capt Warren, his officers and men generously and with much compassion relieved the poor sufferers with provisions and such other immediate requisites as were necessary.

Capt Warren patiently and humanely examined the Prows; the deeply laden were lightened to enable them to reach their destination, and otherwise well-provided. Much is said in praise of Captain Warren, his officers and men; Capt Congalton of the Steamer and his officer Mr Mitchell and Mr Steward, the Commander of the Cutter, for their generosity and humane attention to the sufferers and thereby prevented many, particularly children and infants, from an early death. To witness such scenes of distress Captain Warren his officers and men and those belonging to the Company's Vessels must deem it a misfortune to be employed on such a service, as the blockade of bold and intrepid but an unfortunate people seeking to regain their Country and liberty, and also checking the freedom of thousands anxious to live under their own Sovereign and Government.

We understand from the same source that a body of Siamese to the number of 1000 men and 80 elephants attacked Alloo Ganoo village where 300 Malays were placed to guard the stockade and village. The Siamese came on them in their usual craft and cowardly manner; a small village some distance from Alloo Ganoo was attacked first and captured: in consequence of the Malays being absent with the other forces they seized all the women, cut their hair close as is the custom of the Siamese, and dressed them in their own costume; tied them by the ears and made to march before their Barbarian and cowardly

foes; the poor children male and female were next put to the sword their infants were slain before their mothers and pregnant women as usual torn alive. The main force of Tuanko Mahamed Saad was absent on duty, but the hero with a small number of his men went to their assistance, and Wan Mat Alli a brave Warrior soon dispersed the enemy having left dead on the field of battle 85 Chinese and from 400 Siamese capturing at the same time a number of elephants.

**PENANG GAZETTE** 23/3/1839, p1.

The Company's Steamer *Diana*, Captain Congalton arrived in this harbour on Tuesday evening last from her blockade station off Quedah. The object of her coming here, is to procure provisions and water for HMS *Hyacinth* employed on the same service and convey to this place nine Malays detained by that Ship, for citation before the Magistrates, and two runaway Convicts. The Steamer returned to her station on Thursday morning.

Correspondence: To the Printer and Publisher of the Penang Gazette.

'With reference to an article appearing in the last issue of the Penang Gazette dated 16th instant entitled 'Keddah Affairs' the following extract of a letter from Captain Warren of HMS *Hyacinth* to the address of the Governor of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca dated 20th instant reporting the evacuation of the Fort of Kedah by the Malays and its occupation by the Siamese is published for general information.

S.G. BONHAM

Governor of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca.  
Prince of Wales Island.

21st March 1839.

EXTRACT: 'I have the pleasure of informing you that very few or no lives have been lost in regaining this part of the Country and Fort etc, the women and children that were taken in the Fort by the Siamese were all at liberty about their usual avocations and not a single instance of cruelty has been committed. I am able to speak positively having been at the Fort a few hours after they had possession of it.'

S.G. Bonham, Governor.

# Appendix E

## Vessels mentioned in 'The Dispatches'

Compiled by  
Cyril Skinner

1. The 'Dispatches' mention a number of vessel types, viz.

*Reua Kampan Plaeng*  
*Reua (Yang) Nakhon*  
*Reua Khrut Plaeng*  
*Reua Phai*  
*Reua Pom Yang Yuan*  
*(Reua) Rajab*  
*Reua Sisa Khiao*  
*Reua Sisa Yuan*  
*Sampan Lai Salad*

The *Reua Kampan Plaeng* (modified European-type vessel) or the *Reua (Yang) Nakhon* (Nakhon-model vessel) were developed by Chao Phaya Nakhon in the late 1820s. These vessels had the open bows of a junk - the so-called *Pak Pla* (fish-head) bows - but a European-type stem. They were about 60 feet long with a beam of 14 feet and mounted cannon in the bows.

I take the *Reua Khrut Plaeng* (modified *Garuda* vessel) to be similar to the above but with some form of bowsprit in place of (or projecting through?) the open bows.

The *Reua Phai* (oared vessel) is a *Sampan Pukat* - a large fast boat with a crew of some 30 or more oarsmen, frequently used in trade between Singapore and the east coast of the peninsula. A *sampan pukat* seen by Midshipman Osborn in Singapore harbour in 1838 was ".... perhaps 120 feet long, with 20 feet beam, looking like an overgrown Malay sampan and pulling 50 or 80 oars: she resembled nothing so much in colour and appearance as some huge antipede ... they can outstrip the fleetest prahus, and are able to sail or pull with equal facility." In 1838, Earl met a Singapore *sampan pukat* with a crew of 35 which had just beaten off an attack from three pirate prahus.

The *Reua Pom Yang Yuan* (Annamese-model gunboat) refers to the gunboats designed by the Treasurer c1834-35, as a result of his appreciation of the effectiveness of the gunboats used against him by the Annamese in the 1833-34 campaign.

The expression *Reua Rayab* used to describe the vessels in Wan Muhammad Ali's fleet, is presumably the same as *reua yayab* - the Malay *penjajab* - a fast (because comparatively light) 2-masted sailing vessel whose crew of 30 or more men would, when necessary, 'double' as rowers. Basically a trading vessel but easily converted into a warship by the erection of breastworks and gunshields (*apilan*); apart from its swivels, it could mount a cannon of up to 5 1/2" calibre, firing an 18-pound shot.

The *Reua Sisa Khiao* (green-headed vessel) probably refers to the so-called Foochow junk - usually 3-masted, with batten lug-sails and open bows on either side of which were painted 'eyes'. A 'head' or board built across the lower part of the open bows indicated the province from which the junk hailed, a green 'head' denoting junks from Fukien.

The *Reua Sisa Yuan* (vessel with Annamese bows) is presumably an Annamese junk [perhaps with higher or squarer bows than the Chinese junks].

The name, *Sampan Lai Salad* (pirate-chaser boat) indicates the function of this gunboat, which appears to have a rather broader beam than was usual (and probably had a transom stern).

## 2. The following vessels are mentioned by name

*Amonmaensan*

*Kim Tai*

*Klaeo Klang Samut*

*Macchanu*

*Nguan Seng*

*Paklan*

*Phuthaamnat*

*Racharit*

*Thepkosin*

*Withayakhom*

### (a) Vessels on loan

We know that the *Nguan Seng* was a junk and although we are told nothing about the *Kim Tai* except its name, it seems very likely that it too was a junk. The *Nguan Seng* was the vessel on which Chao Phaya Yomarat travelled and might therefore have been a junk of up to two or even three hundred tons.

### (b) Vessels belonging to the Crown

The *Macchanu* - named after the offspring resulting from Hanuman's amorous encounter with Suwannamaccha, the Princess of the Sea - and the *Paklan* - named after the lake demon encountered by Rama on his way to Langka - were large sailing vessels, apparently built shortly before the European style of ship construction became popular and it is possibly therefore that they were modified junks. The 'Dispatches' show them being employed to transport troops and supplies (in which function they were also used in the 1841-42 campaign against the Annamese).

The *Amonmaensan* (Immortal Invention) was built in Nakhon Si Thammarat by Chao Phaya Nakhon (Noi). Construction on her started in 1832 but, probably because of the care lavished on her fittings and carvings, she was not completed until 1838. Although intended for use as a state vessel for Rama III, she was apparently never used as such and was put at the disposal of Phaya Si Phiphat for the 1839 campaign. She is said to have been a special version of the 'modified pattern' ships so that one would expect to have had open bows in the 'Dispatches', Rama III made the remark "if (the vessel) had a bowsprit, she must be the *Amonmaensan*". We are told that her beam was 18 feet and would probably have had provision for oars as well as sail. She would almost certainly have mounted cannon in the bows.

The *Klaeo Klang Samut* (Ocean Warrior) was built by Luang Nai Sit (the Treasurer's son) at Chantaburi in 1835, the first European-style vessel of any size to be constructed under Siamese supervision. She had a displacement of about 150 tons and mounted six guns. Contemporary European accounts usually refer to her as the *Ariel*, but her original (English) name was apparently the *Earl* which was misheard - perhaps when pronounced through Scottish lips? - as *Ariel* (see Brodbeck (1978) p. 218, note 99). She saw action again in the Annamese campaign of 1841-42 as the flagship of Phra Anurakyotha's squadron, charged with the duty of transporting supplies to Chao Phaya Bodin(thra)decha's forces and patrolling the coast off Banteay Mas (Hatien).

The *Phuthaamnat* (Power of the Buddha) and the *Racharit* (Might of the Crown) were apparently sister-ships of some 200 tons, mounting 10 guns. Both were built in 1836. The first-named was not in fact used during the 1839 campaign, as she could not be made ready in time, but both vessels were used in the campaign against the Annamese in 1841-42, the *Phuthaamnat* being the flagship of the Admiral of the Fleet (Krommakhun Isaretrangsang). The *Racharit* is usually referred to in European sources as the *Sir Walter Scott*.

The *Thepkosin* (Divine Indra) is said to have been built in Chanthaburi c1831 for use as a merchant vessel in the service of the crown and the 'Dispatches' show it being used for trade with Singapore. It was used by

Chameun Waiworanat (the former Luang Nai Sit) as his flagship when commanding the van against the Annamese in 1842.

The *Withayakhom* (The Sorcerer) is said to have been built by Phra Anurakyotha at Chanthaburi in 1836-37. She may well have been the largest of the vessels engaged in the 1839 campaign (when her master was probably the European, Captain Rogers) and estimates of her displacement range from 800 to 1400 tons. She was used by the Siamese Admiral as his flagship in the withdrawal from Banteay Mas (Hatien) in 1842. She was subsequently employed to carry the two Siamese embassies to China in 1851 and 1852 - the last of the formal 'tribute missions' sent by the Siamese king.



# Index of People

- Abdullah, Tengku; eldest son of Sultan Tajuddin, 39, 93, 103, 115, 138
- Akip Tengku; brother-in-law of Sultan Tajuddin, 41, 58, 60, 62, 93, 103, 132-3, 137-8
- Ang Thong, Luang Palad; Deputy Governor of Ang Thong, owner of a vessel taking part in the expedition, 117
- Anom, Tengku; cousin of Sultan Tajuddin, 248, 252
- Anurak, Luang; court official; official in the Chancellor's Dept, 91
- Anurakphubet, Luang; Songkhla official 33, 186
- Anurakyotha, Phra; official, commander of a crown vessel engaged in trade with Singapore and Penang 194
- Aphaiphiphit, Phaya; Bangkok officer commanding a vessel in the expedition 182, 246
- Aphaironarit, Phaya; court official, 62 (Krom) Asa Cham, Palad; Adjutant of the 'Asa Cham' unit, 167f
- At, Luang; a junior commander in the opium suppression squadron in the Bay of Bangkok, 106
- Atnarong, Khun; Bangkok officer commanding a vessel in the expedition, 146
- Awutphuthon, Meun; officer of the Palace Watch, sent up with captives from the south, 243, 255, 259-60
- Ayuthaya, last King of (Suriyat Amarin), 54
- Baba; Chinese merchant in Singapore trading with Kedah, 137
- Bamrung, Luang; (Chinese) merchant in Bangkok, 148, 155
- Bang(g)ul, Raja; uncle (and rival) of Raja Kelantan, 67, 158-9, 166-8, 171, 177-8, 184, 187-9, 193, 197, 202, 205, 215, 217-8, 220-2, 228-31, 233-4, 256-7
- Bangoi, Phaya; see 'Raja Bang(g)ul
- Banthale, Phaya; see 'Kampung Laut, Raja'
- Besar, Tuan/Tengku; cousin of Raja Kelantan, son of Raja Kampung Laut, 158-9, 161, 167, 175-6, 177-8, 187-9, 197, 201-2, 215, 217-8, 220, 228-31, 233-4, 235, 237, 239-41, 244, 256-7, 259, 260
- Bodin (thradecha) Chao Phaya [Sing], Minister of the Interior ('Chancellor'), 41, 48, 61
- Bonham, Mr Stephen; Governor of Singapore, 43, 52, 93, 123-4, 138
- Boriban, Nai, secretary at court, 187, 207-8, 210, 220, 225, 232, 239, 245
- Bowonwanit, Khun; Bangkok sailing-master, 94, 100-1, 222, 226
- Bukit (Marak), Raja; Tuan Long Ahmad, son of Tuan Muda, 215, 220
- Chae; Chinese ship-owner trading with Trad, 141
- Chainat, Phra; officer on the staff of Phaya Si Phiphat, 238
- Chaipannya, Luang; officer at Chaiya, 156-7
- Chaiphusa, Chameun; court official, 85-6
- Chaisurin, Luang; Songkhla official, 58, 69, 132-3
- Chaiya, Khun; emissary of Phaya Songkhla, 39

- Chaiya, Palad; Deputy Governor of Chaiya, 156-7, 221
- Chaiya, Phaya; Governor of Chaiya, 37-8, 63, 68, 92-6, 169, 208, 216-7, 222-6, 237-8, 240-1, 256, 258
- Chaiya, Phaya; former Governor of Chaiya, 33, 36, 39
- Chamnong, Khun; emissary from Nakhon, 39, 40, 51-2, 213-6, 220
- Chamroen, Luang; Chinese merchant dealing in opium, 161
- Chan Chonlamak, Luang; see Pran, Phra
- Chan, Nai; son-in-law of Khun Thon, 145
- Chana, Palad; Deputy Governor of Chana, 40
- Chana, Yokrabat; 'Justiciar' of Chana, 136
- Chang, Nai; an official (from Songkhla) holding a position in the Corps of Pages, 132-3
- Chang Wang Long; Chinese Merchant in Bangkok; trading with Nakhon (also engaged in the opium trade), 108, 155
- Changwang, Raja; brother (and backer) of Raja Kelantan (also known as 'Sultan Dewa'), 256-7, 259
- Chanphonlatob, Luang; Nakhon official, 139
- Chantaburi, Phaya [Song Meuang]; Governor of Chantaburi, 119, 243
- Chantaburi, Sarawad Yuan; Annamese Superintendent from Chantaburi, bearer of dispatches to and from Bangkok, 213, 255
- Chiak; Chinese merchant from Bangkok trading with Kelantan, 258
- Chitchairak, Khun; emissary of Phaya Songkhla, 57, 61, 69-70-71
- Chodeuk, Phaya [Thong Chin]; one of the wealthiest Chinese merchants in Bangkok and trading partner with the royal family, 33, 55, 70, 86, 89-92, 94, 100-1, 106-7, 121-2, 125, 193, 223, 226, 244
- Chomphunut, Meun; provincial official visiting Bangkok, 92
- Chonburi, Luang Palad; presumably the Deputy-Governor of Chonburi, 100, 102
- Chonchaiklab, Khun; Bangkok officer, bringing up captives from the south, 245
- Chongsorasi, Meun; officer in the Palace Watch, bearer of dispatches, 132-6, 141, 143, 150-2, 155, 163, 171, 175-6, 181, 193
- Chu; Chinese master of Bangkok vessel trading with Nakhon, 108-9, 110, 112, 116, 124
- Chuai, Nai; emissary of Chao Phaya Nakhon, 139-40, 144
- Chumphon, Phaya; Governor of Chumphon; later sent to reinforce Phaya Si Phiphat, 102, 140, 157, 220
- Chumsai, Prince; a son of Rama III, 227
- Dare, Tengku (Tengku Idris); a Malay chief (apparently in Besut Trengganu), 217
- Detnawa, Luang; Nakhon officer, 139
- Di, Nai; member of Phaya Si Phiphat's household, sent up to Bangkok, 236
- Din, Tengku; son-in-law of Sultan Tajuddin, leader of unsuccessful revolt in 1831, 34-5, 40, 74, 139, 142, 246
- Duang, Nai; emissary of Nakhon, 115-7, 122-3, 130, 214-5, 246, 253
- Hasan, Tengku; nephew of Sultan Tajuddin, resident in Penang, 246, 253
- Hunter, Mr; British merchant resident in Bangkok, 43
- Iam, Chinese owner of a vessel chartered to take part in the expedition, later going on to trade in Kelantan, 259
- In, Khun; subordinate official in the mission to Kelantan, apparently a Malay, 203-4, 240-1
- In, Khun Ying; wife of Chao Phaya Nakhon, 234

- Inthaphat, Chao; son of the Viceroy [and brother of] Rama I; [executed by Rama II], 160
- Intharak(sa), Phra; Bangkok officer commanding a vessel in the expedition, 146, 226
- Intharasombat, Luang; (?Bangkok) owner of a ship taking part in the expedition, 118
- Inthradet, Phra; court official, 227
- Inthrasena, Chameun; Bangkok official and emissary, 99, 152, 155, 163, 175, 181, 193, 201, 213, 255
- Isaranurak, Krommakhun [Ket], 119
- Isaretrangsang, Krommakhun; half-brother of Rama III and full (younger) brother of the future Rama IV, 189
- [I]shak, Nakhoda; (?Malay) merchant from Trengganu, 216
- Jaafar, Che; emissary of Raja Kelantan, 175, 177, 213, 215
- Kaeo, Nai; member of the Corps of Royal Pages, apparently Commander of a vessel sailing from Chumphon to Bangkok, 161
- Kakab, Wan (i.e. [Tu]wan Seni(k) Gagap); younger brother of Raja Kelantan, 159
- Kalahom, (Phaya) [Rachasena]; Minister of War in the reign of Rama I, 73
- Kampung Laut, Raja; father of Tengku Besar of Kelantan, 106
- Kelantan, Raja; Ruler of Kelantan, son of Long Temenggung and nephew of Long Muhammed and Raja Banggul; also referred to as 'Sani Pak Daeng' (=Senik Mulet Merani) and 'Tuwan Sani', 106, 159-60, 166-7, 169, 175, 178, 184-5, 187, 189, 198, 201-5, 215, 218, 220-2, 228-31, 233, 235-7, 239-41, 244, 256-9, 260
- Keu, Chinese trader from Ban Laem, 106
- Kocha Ishak, Luang; South Indian Muslim official (and Malay translator) in the Department of Ports and Harbours, used to carry dispatches to the south, 159, 189-90, 193, 198-9, 201, 213, 244, 255
- Krai, Meun; officer of the Palace Watch, bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat, 239, 242
- Krai(kosa), Phaya [Thet Phumirat]; a court official (apparently in the Treasury of the 'Front Palace' - the Palace of the Heir Apparent), 69, 88, 110, 137, 141, 161, 222, 231, 238, 242, 249
- Kraitriphet, Khun; emissary from Chao Phaya Nakhon Rachasima, 68
- Krayaboribun, Luang; Bangkok ship-owner, 56
- La; [? Abdullah] a Malay from Akua Thung, 93, 96
- La Muda, Wan Che; apparently the Malay headman of Thung Bang Nok, 115, 125
- Lobthorani, Meun; Bangkok officer; bringing up captives from the south, 245
- Lakkhonanukhon, Prince; son of Rama III, born 1813, died 1835, 175
- Laksamana, Luang; bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat, 145
- Lamduan, Chao; son of the Viceroy and nephew of Rama I, executed under Rama II, 73, 160
- Lang, Che; (?Malay) with the Nakhon levies, 139
- Lian; a Chinese opium-trader, working for Luang Bambrung, 161
- Lim Hua; Chinese merchant, 138
- Long Ahmad, Tuan; cousin (and opponent) of Raja Kelantan, 158, 241
- Long Ali, Tuan; cousin of Raja Kelantan, later turning against him, apparently married to a daughter of Raja Banggul, 184
- Long Mamad, Wan; see 'Long Ahmad'
- Long Muhamad, Wan; see 'Long Ahmad'
- Long San, Che; Songkhla Malay loyal to Bangkok, 39
- Long Yong, Che; Songkhla Malay loyal

- to Bangkok, 39
- Madtafa, Che; see Mustafa
- Mahaamat, Phaya [Pom Amatyakun]; court official, 46, 52, 54, 95-6, 104, 155, 252
- Mahamontri, Phra; court official (presumably the author of the celebrated parody 'Raden Landai'), 224, 238
- Maharaja, Tengku (Winaputra?); adherent of Raja Kelantan, 159
- Mathathap, Phra [Thongpan]; Bangkok official, sent to assist in opium suppression campaign [presumably the man depicted as a sort of Siamese Trimalchio in Phra Mahamontri's satirical poem], 107, 140, 227
- Mahmud, Wan; Malay chief at Perlis, 138
- Majid, Che; emissary of Tengku Besar, 218
- Mak, Nai; in the service of the Treasurer; master of a vessel sailing from Tha Thong (in Nakhon territory) to Bangkok, 136
- Mali, Wan (=Wan Ma(t) Ali) i.e. Tengku Mohammad Ali, nephew of Sultan Tajuddin, Commander of the Malay fleet fighting the Siamese, 37-40, 50, 74, 86-7, 88, 92-3, 138, 142, 148, 213, 217, 222-3, 242
- Man; Chinese emissary of Phaya Songkhla, 146
- Mao; Chinese ship-owner, apparently trading in opium, 161
- Mara, Panglima; (?Patani) Malay chief, 39
- Mat Ali, Che; see 'Mali, Wan'
- Mat Jiwa, Che; (=Tengku Muhammad Jiwa) nephew of Sultan Tajuddin, 39, 58, 60, 62
- Mat Saad, Tengku; son-in-law of Sultan Tajuddin, 48, 62, 65, 93, 103, 115, 125, 133, 137-9, 148, 187-8, 210, 216, 246
- Matayaphithak, Krommameun [Phra Ong Chau Siri Wong]; a son of Rama III, owner of a vessel sailing between Chantaburi and Bangkok; [born c. 1812] died 1839, 140
- Meun, Khun; minor court official, 122
- Mi; Chinese trader in Nakhon, 108-9
- Muda, Raja; i.e. Tuan Banggu, younger brother of Raja Kelantan, 215, 218, 220, 257
- Muda, [Tu]wan; brother of Raja Banggu and uncle of Raja Kelantan, 205, 215
- Mustafa, Che; (?Malay) merchant from Trengganu, 197-202, 218
- Nai, Khun Phra; see 'Waiworanat'
- Nakhon Kheuan Khan, Phaya; Governor of Nakhon Kheuan Khan, 71
- Nakhon Rachasima, Chao Phaya [Thong In]; Governor of Rachasima (Khorat), 68
- Nakhon (Si Thammarat), Chao Phaya [Noi]; Governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat since 1811 *passim*
- Nara, Meun; a secretary at court, 251
- Narenthrawangsa, Luang; apparently a Malay chief in the territory under Thalang, 93, 96
- Narin, Luang; Thalang official sent up to Bangkok, 265
- Narin, Phra; court official, 33, 38-9, 41, 43, 46, 51, 53, 56, 88-9, 91, 95-6, 109, 146, 163, 182-3, 207, 213-4, 223, 225, 236, 242, 244, 245, 250, 257-8, 260
- Narong, Luang; emissary from the south sent to obtain intelligence at Singapore, 137-8
- Narongchonlathi, Phra; referred to as 'Palad Sai(buri)', i.e. Deputy Governor of Kedah, but this is perhaps an error for 'Assistant Governor', as the former title was apparently borne by Phra Senanuchit, 103, 108, 115
- Narong Ritthikosa, Phaya; Bangkok officer placed in joint command of the opium suppression fleet in the Gulf of Siam, 101, 106-7
- Niam, Nai; member of the Corps of

- Pages, 118
- Nikon, Meun; an Annamese from Chanthaburi, the bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat to Bangkok and vice-versa, 158, 163, 169, 181, 193, 201, 213, 219, 221-2, 255
- Noi, Nai; member of the Corps of Pages, employed by the court in trading with Singapore and Penang, 194
- Noi, Nai; son of the former Phaya Chaiya (perhaps the same man as the following), 150
- Noi, Nai; subordinate official in the mission to Kelantan, 240
- Nu, (Mrs); Bangkok trader arriving from Songkhla, 70, 72
- Nud, Che; emissary of Chao Phaya Nakhon to Kelantan, 175
- Nure, To; (?Patani) Malay chief, 39
- Ok, Tengku; (?Tengku Wok) apparently the Raja of Kemaman, 159
- Padang, To; (?Patani) Malay chief, 39
- Pake, Che; (?Malay) debt-slave from Kelantan, 234
- Phae, Nai; emissary of Nakhon, 115-117, 122-3, 130, 214
- Phakdi, Meun; official, under Phaya Chaiya, 92, 95
- Phakdinarong, Phaya; Bangkok officer sent down with the expedition, 70
- Phakdisongkhram, Luang; a Nakhon officer, 139
- Phat, Khun; Songkhla official, 49, 53, 71, 119
- Phathalung, Palad; Deputy Governor of Phathalung, 40, 49
- Phathalung, Phaya [Noi Yai]; Governor of Phathalung; eldest son of Chao Phaya Nakhon [Noi], 188, 202, 206, 209, 213-5, 232, 235, 237, 239-40
- Phechaburi, Luang Palad; Deputy Governor of Phechaburi, 52-3, 56, 62-3, 65-7, 102, 146, 164, 169, 170, 176, 185-6, 188-9, 199, 203, 219, 228, 237, 239-40
- Phechaburi, Rong Suphamatra (Assistant Collector) of Phechaburi; bearer of dispatches to the expedition, 115, 129, 155, 163, 175, 181, 193, 201, 213, 219, 255
- Phech(ra)phichai, Phaya [Ket Ketthat], 227
- Pheuak; Chinese (?merchant) employed by Phaya Si Phiphat to bring dispatches up to Bangkok, 221
- Phimon (Kamchon), Meun; Annamese officer, bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat, 202, 207, 211, 213, 214, 228, 231, 238, 243, 246, 255
- Phimonphanit, Luang; Bangkok ship-owner, 90-1
- Phimukmontri, Luang; Bangkok ship-owner, 56
- Phiphat (tanakosa), Phaya [Bun Si]; court official (strictly speaking under the Treasury); also referred to as 'Khun Phiphat', 33, 38, 42-3, 48-9, 50, 52, 54, 55-6, 59-60, 62-3, 68-70, 72, 91, 95, 99, 101, 104, 106-108, 111, 117-8, 126, 129, 136, 140-1, 147-8, 150, 163-6, 181, 184-5, 188-9, 197-8, 201, 214, 218, 229-30, 231, 236, 234, 239, 243,
- Phithak, Luang; Bangkok officer commanding a vessel in the expedition, 146
- Phithaknathi, Luang; apparently an officer on Phaya Si Phiphat's staff, 218
- Phithaknawa, Meun; emissary of Chao Phaya Nakhon, 103-5, 107, 109-10, 116
- Phithaksongkhram, Khun; member of the Songkhla administration; bearer of dispatches, 150-2, 155, 163, 171, 175
- Phithakthani, Phra; apparently the Deputy Governor of Sai, 58
- Phithakyotha, Khun; emissary of Phra Takua Thung, 137
- Phong; Chinese master of vessel arriving from Songkhla, 33
- Phonlaphikat, Khun; Bangkok officer

- with the advance-guard of the expedition, 109, 134
- Phonlathep, Chao Phaya [Chim]; Minister for Lands, 41, 94, 155
- Phrakhleng, Chao Phaya; [Dit]; Treasurer and Acting Minister of War and Southern Provinces *passim*
- Phromthiban, Phra; Bangkok officer on the staff of Phaya Si Phiphat, 167, 184-5, 189
- Phun, Nai; member of the entourage of the former Phaya Chaiya, commander of a vessel sailing from Songkhla to Bangkok, 150
- Pop, Panglima; (?Patani) Malay chief, 39
- Pran, Phra; presumably Governor of Pran, an officer on Phaya Si Phiphat's staff, formerly entitled 'Luang Chan Chonlamak', 156-7, 164
- Prasat, Chao Khun [Tai]; an older brother of the Treasurer, 227
- Prasoetwanit, Phra; a Bangkok ship-owner, 151
- P(r)athio, Phra; Governor of Pathio, 219-20
- Pulusen; (?Abu'l-Husain) a Malay from Trang, claiming to have been captured by Wan Mat Ali and to have escaped from him, 222
- Put; Chinese master of a vessel trading with Kelantan, 235
- Rachaban, Chameun [Khun Thong]; court official, 42
- Rachaborirak, Luang; emissary of Phaya Chaiya, 148, 151
- Rachamat, Chameun [Kham Bunnak]; Bangkok official employed in opium suppression campaign in the provinces, 155, 181
- Rachametha, Luang; officer on staff of Phaya Si Phiphat, 186
- Rachamontri, Phaya [Phu]; court official, 226, 244
- Rachanikun, Phaya; court official, 165, 225
- Racharin, Phra; officer in the advance guard of the expedition, 42, 45-6, 48-9, 73, 104, 107, 109-112, 116, 117, 119, 122, 132-3, 145, 149, 150-1, 169
- Racharit, Phan; junior officer in the 'Athmat' (Mon) regiment; bringing captives from the south, 245
- Racharongmeuang, Phaya; court official, 227
- Rachasetthi, Luang; court official, 222, 230, 234
- Rachasuphawadi, Phaya [To]; senior official at court, in command of the Siamese troops in Siem Reap, 48, 71, 135, 178, 183, 187, 189, 206, 227, 244, 248, 250, 251-3
- Rachawangsan, Phaya; Bangkok officer, apparently entrusted with supervision over the Muslims of Bangkok, 85, 167, 183-4, 223-4, 237, 241, 260
- Raja Muda (of Kelantan) i.e. 'Tuan Bungsu' younger brother of Raja Kelantan, 132
- Rak, Nai; master of a Bangkok vessel trading with Kelantan, 229, 231, 234
- Rakphiman, Chameun; Bangkok official sent down to help with the opium suppression campaign in the south, 194
- Rakronaret, Krommaluang; son of Rama I and uncle of Rama III, 33, 35, 48, 50, 54, 64, 66, 69, 70, 111, 170-2, 210, 228
- Rama III; King of Siam 1824-1851 *passim*
- Rumaphakdi, Khun; official in the unit collecting the tin levy in Chaiya, 129
- Rangae, Phaya; (?Malay) Governor of Rangae in Patani, 58
- Ratanakosa, Phra; Bangkok officer (apparently in the Treasury) in command of one of the vessels in the expedition, 141, 164, 182
- Ratanaphimon, Luang; Thalang official sent up to Bangkok, 216
- Raya, Khun; officer on the staff of Phaya Si Phiphat, emissary to Kelantan, 218, 240
- Raya Muda; see Muda, Raja
- Rayamuda, Luang; apparently a

- Malay chief from Songkhla loyal to Bangkok, 132
- Reuang, Nai; emissary from Nakhon, sent up to Bangkok by Phra Wichit Sorakrai, 36
- Richardson, Mr (in fact Dr); British official, 52, 103
- Ritthi, Luang [Noi Lek]; a Superintendant in the Corps of Pages, son of Chao Phaya Nakhon, 49, 234
- Ritthichonlathan Khun; bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat, 218-9, 221, 231
- Ritthikhamron, Luang; a junior commander in the opium-suppression fleet in the Gulf of Siam, 106, 111
- Ritthironakrai, Khun; the Annamese, bearer of dispatches to and from Phaya Si Phiphat, 118-20, 122, 152, 155, 163, 166, 169, 171-2, 175, 178, 181, 193, 195, 201, 213, 246, 249, 251, 254, 261
- Sacca, Meun; subordinate official in the mission to Kelantan, 203, 236
- Saha, see '[I]shak
- Sai, Phaya; Malay Governor of Sai (one of the Patani states), loyal to Bangkok, probably identical with 'Phaya Phithak Thani', 41-2, 58
- Sai(buri), Palad; Siamese Deputy Governor of Sai(buri)/Kedah; see 'Senanuchit' (and also 'Narongchonlathi')
- Sai(buri), Phaya [Saeng]; Siamese Governor of Sai(buri)/Kedah, son of Chao Phaya Nakhon, 36-37, 39-42, 50, 103-5, 108, 115, 117, 125, 130, 133, 141-3, 149, 176, 178, 185, 198, 207-8, 210, 213, 220, 237, 246, 248, 250, 252, 258
- Said Husain, Tengku; Achinese prince fighting with the Malays, killed at Kubang Pasu, 115
- Sakda, Meun; apparently a Malay chief in the area under Thalang, 93, 96
- Sakhonburi, Phra; Governor of Sakhonburi [Tha Chin], 155
- Sakhonphanit, Phra; trader acting as Siamese emissary to Singapore, 93
- Salae; (?Saleh) a Malay captured by the Songkhla levies, 132
- Salam; a Malay captured by the Songkhla levies, 132
- Saliphithak, Phra; Bangkok ship-owner, 56
- Saman, Che; Malay captain in Wan Mat Ali's fleet, 92
- Samut, Khun; see 'Yotha Samut'
- Samutprakan, Phaya; Phaya Surasena, Governor of Samutprakan (= Pak Nam), the port and naval base at the mouth of the Chao Phaya (Bangkok) river, 49, 88, 91, 101-2, 108, 118, 121, 216, 218, 222
- San, Phra; officer on Phaya Si Phiphat's staff, 238
- Sanchamontri, Phra [Noi Klang]; a son of Chao Phaya Nakhon, 167, 170, 185, 206, 214-5, 232, 233-5, 246, 256
- Saneraksa, Nai; Bangkok official sent down to assist with the opium-suppression campaign in the south, 194
- Sang, Nai; emissary of Chao Phaya Nakhon to Kelantan, 176
- Sankhaburi, Phra; Governor of Sankhaburi; apparently called to Bangkok in order to be sent down with the expedition, 67
- Sarawad, Khun; see 'Chanthaburi, Sarawad, Yuan Saripan, Che; emissary of Tengku Besar, 218
- Sawatdiwari, Luang [Chim]; Chinese merchant in Bangkok, 241
- Sawatphakdi, Luang; Assistant Governor of Yaring (Jering), 58
- Senanuchit Phra [Nut]; son of Chao Phaya Nakhon and Deputy Governor of Kedah, 36, 60, 103, 115, 207-8
- Senaphiphit, Phra; apparently a Nakhon official (although the name may be an error for '(Phra) Senanuchit', 37, 103

- Senaphubet, Phaya; apparently a court official seconded for duty in Chumphon, later sent to reinforce Phaya Si Phiphat, 33, 42, 130, 146, 149, 187, 216, 220, 237
- Senik, Tu(w)an, see Raja Kelantan
- Seri Putera Maharaja, Tengku; member of the Kelantan royal family whose son was opposed to Raja Kelantan (Senik), 158-9
- Seri Yama, Ku; ? Engku Seri Mas, an older relation of Raja Kelantan, 256
- Si Khong, Nai; emissary of Nakhon, 149, 151, 214
- Si Phairot, Meun; Bangkok officer sent up with captives from the south, 259
- Si Phiphat (Ratanarachakosa), Phaya [Thad]; Head of a Division of the Treasury, commander of the army sent to pacify the south; younger brother of the Treasurer [Dit] and employer of Luang Udomsombat, 42, 49, 68, 72, 88, 135-6, 140, 158, 160, 167, 169, 176-7, 185, 198, 202-3, 205-6, 209, 217-21, 222-7, 230, 233, 237, 238-9, 242-7, 249, 258-9
- Si Phokhai, Meun; Bangkok officer; bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat, 243-4
- Si Sakharet, Khun; Bangkok official, bearer of dispatches from Bangkok to the south, 254
- Si Sanghan, Khun; ?Bangkok master of a vessel, 176
- Si Saorak, Khun Phra Nai; presumably Chameun Si sorarak [lam], a court official, 151, 244
- Si Sena, Luang; a secretary to Rama III, 209
- Singhaburi, Phra; apparently called to Bangkok and sent down with the expedition, 67
- Sirisombat, Phra; a Bangkok official (probably in the Department of Ports and Harbours), 107, 110-1
- Sombatphakdi, Khun; official in the treasury sent down with the expedition; bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat, 235-8
- Songkhla, Palad; see 'Suntharanurak'
- Songkhla, Phaya [Seng]; Governor of Songkhla, 40-1, 42, 44, 48, 50, 58, 67, 69, 71, 104, 131-3, 135, 140, 147-8, 165, 172, 207, 223, 226, 245-6, 249-50, 252
- Songkhramwichit, Phra; (administrator of Trang), 37
- Sonseni, Luang; Bangkok officer (the adopted son of Phaya Rachawangsan) used as an envoy to Kelantan, formerly holding the rank of 'Luang Narong' in the Viceroy's establishments, 167, 176, 184, 186, 202-3, 218, 221, 240-1, 256
- Sudin, Khun; emissary of Phaya Chaiya and Phaya Takua Thung, 92-3
- Sulaiman, Che; emissary of Raja Kelantan, 177, 214-15
- (ex-)Sultan of Kedah (Tajuddin Halim Shah); referred to by the Siamese as 'Chao Phaya Sai(buri)', 39
- Suntharanurak, Phra [Sang]; Assistant-Governor of Songkhla, 33, 39, 219
- Sunthronwari, Luang; Bangkok officer serving in the south, 161
- Superintendent; see 'Chanthaburi, Sarawat Yuan'
- Suphaphaeng, Luang; emissary of Phaya Chaiya, 238
- Surasena, Phaya; see under 'Samutprakan'
- Surin, Khun; apparently a Malay chief in the Thalang area, 93, 96, 150
- Surinthamat, Luang; secretary at court, 176, 185, 213-4, 222, 243, 258
- S(ur)iyaphakdi, Phra; Bangkok official, son of Phaya Si Phiphat, also referred to as 'Nai Sanit', 86
- Takua Pa, Phra; Governor of Takua Pa, 68
- Takua Thung, Phra; Governor of Takua Thung, 92, 95-6, 138, 223-5
- Tangta, Khun; apparently a Songkhla official, 132
- Tani, Khun; the Dowager Princess Surinthonrak, elder (half-) sister of



- the Treasurer, 243
- Tengah, Tuan; son of Raja Banggul, opposed to Raja Kelantan, 175
- Thalang, Phaya; Governor of Thalang (Phuket), 93-6, 148, 216, 223, 238
- Thamma, Chao Phaya; Minister of the Palace, 94
- Thanyaboriban, Phra; Bangkok ship-owner, 56, 117
- Thep, Meun; apparently an official of the Treasury, sent down with the expedition; accompanied the mission to Kelantan, *passim*
- Thep(arachun), Phaya [Buntheung]; also referred to as 'Khun Thep', 39f
- Thep Aya, Khun; Songkhla official, the bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat to Bangkok, 46-7, 51, 54, 56, 181-2, 248
- Thep Sena, Luang; apparently an official under the Treasurer, 140
- Thepseni, Luang; Bangkok official, presumably in the Ministry of War, employed in the opium-suppression campaign in the provinces, 224
- Thiang; Chinese master of a ship bringing up captives from the south, 368
- Thip Akson, Luang; apparently Secretary to the Ministry for War and Southern Provinces, sent down with the expedition as secretary to Phaya Si Phiphat, 58
- Thip Akson, Luang; Secretary to the Department of War in the Front Palace, 85, 100, 115, 129, 155-6, 163, 168, 175, 181-2, 193, 201, 209, 213, 233, 255
- Thok; Chinese trader, the bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat, 186
- Thon, Khun; commander of a vessel sailing from Songkhla to Bangkok, 144
- Thongdet, Nai; emissary of Chao Phaya Nakhon, 40, 43, 51-2
- To, Nai; Supervisor of an Annamese unit, bearer of dispatches from Phaya Si Phiphat to Bangkok and vice-versa, 175, 181, 193, 201, 213, 255
- Tod; Chinese master of a vessel bringing up captives from the south (and calling in at Chanthaburi - his home port), 260
- Treasurer; see 'Phra Khlang'
- T(rengganu, Raja; the Sultan of Trengganu, 197
- Tunga, Wan; see 'Tengah'
- U Ba Kong; Burmese commander defeated by the Siamese Viceroy in the reign of Rama I, 73
- Udom, Meun; bearer of dispatches to the south, 261
- Udomsombut, Luang; assistant secretary to Phaya Si Phiphat and compiler of the 'Dispatches', *passim*
- Waiworanat, Chameun [Chuang]; Bangkok official in the Corps of Pages, son of the Treasurer, also referred to as 'Khun Phra Nai', 86, 100, 110-1, 172
- Wan Chi Kanam; (?= Wan Chik Anom), said to be the brother-in-law of 'Wan Mali', 92-3, 96
- Wang, Luang; official of Takua Pa, 68, 224
- Wichan, Luang; (?Bangkok) officer under Phaya Si Phiphat commanding the left section of the 'Golden unit', 176
- Wichitnarong, Phaya [Fak]; officer in the advance guard of the expedition, 42, 45-6, 48-9, 71, 104, 107, 109-10, 112, 116, 119, 122-3, 132-3, 145, 149, 165, 169, 209, 237
- Wichitsorakrai, Phra [Hong]; son of Chao Phaya Nakhon, 36-7, 60, 103, 115
- Wichitwathi, Khun; interpreter sent to Kelantan by Phaya Si Phiphat, 167
- Wisetsakda, Phaya; Bangkok officer placed in joint command of the opium-suppression fleet in the Gulf of Siam, 101, 106-7
- Wisetsongkham, Luang; captain of the

- Song Dam levies and commander of one of the vessels chartered for the expedition, 121
- Wisut, Khun; officer in Phaya Chaiya's mission to Kelantan, 155, 256
- Wisut(kosa), Phaya [On Siriwatanakun]; Bangkok official employed in the opium-suppression campaign in the provinces, 256
- Wok, Tengku, 217
- Yan, Khun; Chinese merchant, engaged in the opium trade, 155
- Yalan(?), Che; emissary of Raja Kelantan, 184, 186
- Yapa; see 'Jaafar'
- Yi, Chun Chu; Chinese 'master' (chun chu) of a vessel (owned by Phra Prasotwanit) used as a troop transport, 151
- Yiring, Phaya; Malay Governor of Jering, loyal to Bangkok, 41, 42, 58, 132-3, 145
- Yomarat, Chao Phaya [Bunnak]; Minister of Palace Affairs, sent down as commander of the expedition, 43, 48, 50, 64, 68, 70, 90, 100-1, 106-7, 116-8, 121, 125-6, 140, 144, 158-9, 163-5, 176, 182, 186, 222-3, 226, 231, 249, 260-1
- Yothasamut, Khun; officer on Phaya Si Phiphat's staff; emissary to Kelantan, 229, 240-1

# Index of Places

1. In the case of compound names, where the name proper is preceded by one (or more) of the following topographical features, the entry will usually be found under the name proper, e.g. 'Chong Ang Thong' is listed under the letter 'A' as '(Chong) Ang Thong'.

Ao	Bay
Ban	Village
Bang	(riverine) Village
Chong	Strait(s)
Ko	Island
Khao	Mountain/Hill
Khlong	Canal/River
Laem	Cape/Point

2. Distances on land are given in kilometres; distances at sea in nautical miles.

Achch	i.e. Aceh, in North Sumatra, 115, 242
Alor Setar	see 'Lo Sata', 115
Ang Thong (Chong)	strait between Ang Thong and Phalui islands about 40 miles north-east of Bandon, 149
Annam	referred to as 'Yuan', 111
Ayuthaya	referred to as 'Krung Kao' - the old capital - 40 km north of Bangkok, 56
Bandon	now known as Surat Thani; at this time part of Nakhon, 105
Banggul	about 4 km north of Kota Baru on the right bank of the Kelantan river, 67
Bangkok river	used in the translation to denote the Chao Phaya river south of Bangkok, 218
Batu Bara	port situated about 90 km south-east of the modern Medan, on the east coast of Sumatra, 213, 222, 242, 298
Besut	referred to as 'Phisut'; in Trengganu some 50 km south-east of Kota Baru, 187
(Ko) Boi	island in Phangnga Bay a little to the north of Ko Yao Yai (Greater Pulau Panjang), 92-3
Bukit	referred to as 'Muket', i.e. Bukit Marak about 15 km south-east of Kota Baru, 158

Chachoengsao	about 60 km due east of Bangkok, 155-6
Chaiya	situated at the northern entrance to Bandon Bay, about 30 km north-east of Bandon, 33, 40-1, 46-7, 66, 86, 88, 96, 129, 132, 193, 216-7
Chana	between Songkhla and Thepha, 40-2, 44, 50, 93, 125, 133, 141, 145, 147, 169, 181, 185
Chanae	village about 80 km south-east of Songkhla (see footnotes 30), 40
(Ko) Chanak	? = Ko Phanak, an island in Phangnga Bay, about 3 miles north-east of Ko Boi, 92
(Ko) Chang	island some 5 miles from the mainland, south-west of Trad, 123, 141, 164
Chantaburi	about 300 km south-east of Bangkok, 101, 106, 117-8, 129, 163, 179, 243, 255-7, 259-60
Chao Lai	about 35 km south of Phechaburi, 144
Chao Phaya	the river on which Bangkok stands (see 'Bangkok river')
Chiang Mai	about 700 km north of Bangkok, 73, 103
Chonburi	about 80 km by road south-east of Bangkok, 100, 102, 155
Chumphon	about 500 km by road south of Bangkok, 33, 40-1, 46, 52, 66, 101, 137, 144, 151, 164-5, 181, 193, 220
(Ao) (Khao) Daeng	bay, some 11 km north-east of Kui, 129
Hadyai	some 30 km south-west of Songkhla, 37, 41, 48, 103
(Ao) Bang Hia	apparently a bay in the vicinity of Bang Laem, 106
Hin Lek (Fai)	the 'Hin Lek' river crosses the Hadyai-Sadao road approximately 15 km south of Hadyai, 41-2, 58, 132
Hua Ro	district in the north-east corner of Ayuthaya, 54
Jala/Jalur	referred to as 'Yala'; Patani statelet south of Nongchik and west of Raman, 58
Jering	referred to as 'Yaring'; Patani statelet east of Patani and north(-west) of Sai, 42, 53, 58, 60, 62, 132, 185
Kalok Sisa Phi	promontory some 10 km south-east of Pranburi, 130-1
Kampung Laut	referred to as 'Ban Thale'; village on the left bank of the Kelantan river, a few km north of Kota Baru, 106
Kanchanaburi	122 km west-north-west of Bangkok, 52

- (Khao) Kao Seng hill situated on the coast just under 4 km south-west of the town of Songkhla, 58, 132, 165 perhaps referring to 'Kampung Ketong', on the Muda river, some 40 km due east of Alor Setar, 125, 226
- Katong Karam
- Kedah referred to as 'Sai(buri)'; the term used both for the state and capital (then situated at Kuala Kedah), *passim*
- Kelantan also used for the capital, situated in the Kota Baru area, 106, 147, 163, 167-8, 176-8, 144-5, 187-8, 207, 213-5, 217, 219, 222, 228-231, 233-4, 235-7, 240, 244
- Kemaman about 130 km south of Kuala Trengganu, 217
- Kemasin referred to as 'Bang Nam Khem', at the mouth of the Kemasin river, some 15 km due east of Kota Baru, 184
- (Ban) [Thung] Khamin a village situated just under 15 km south-east of Hadyai and about 20 km west of Chana, 58
- (Khlóng) (Bang) Khanak the eastern extension of the Saen Saeb Canal (connecting the Chao Phaya river with the Bang Pakong river, 44
- (Ko) Kham presumably referring to 'Ko Kham' [k khaam], a small island close to the west coast of Ko Samae San, 141
- (Ban) Khwang perhaps referring to Alor Ganu, some 10 km NNE of Alor Setar, 139
- Kliaio coastal village some 6 km east of Kui, 129-30
- (Koh) Kong island (now part of Cambodia) approximately 100 km south-east of Trad, 123
- (Ao) Krabi Krabi Bay, about 1,000 km south-west of Bangkok, 92-3
- Bang Kradan apparently also referred to as 'Wang Kradan', close to Khao Luk Chang, south of the town of Songkhla, 132
- Krut some 20 km north of Mae Rampheung Bay, 139, 246
- Kuala Muda coastal town on the Malay mainland just north of Penang; the Muda river formed the boundary between British territory and Kedah, 115
- Kubang Pasu referred to as 'Kabang Pasu', district north of Alor Setar and south-east of Perlis as an administrative centre, Kubang Pasu was presumably situated just south of Changlun, 36-7, 39, 103-4, 115, 130, 133, 135
- Kui approximately 35 km north of Alor Setar, 46
- (Laem) Kwian apparently a promontory situated to the south of Plak Raed, 69

(Ban) Laem	on the west coast of the Bay of Bangkok, some 15 km north-east of Phechaburi, 106-7, 145
(Ao) (Ban) Lamung	on the east coast of the Bay of Bangkok, some 10 km north of Phathaya, 140, 155
Lang Suan	on the east coast of the peninsula, just over 60 km south of Chumphon, 130
(Ko) Langkawi	referred to as '(Ko) Nangkawi' - the Langkawi islands, off the coast of Perlis, 92-3, 124, 142, 185, 213, 217, 222-3
Langu	the district north of Setul, 92, 125
Lo Sata	explained as referring to 'Alor Setar' (the present-day capital of Kedah) although the reference in the text is apparently Kuala Kedah, 115, 138
(Khlong) (Ban) Luang	the canal known as 'Khlong Bangkok Yai', on the Thonburi side of the Chao Phaya river into which it flows (almost opposite Khlong Lod), 60
(Khao) Luk Chang	a hill some 6 km south-west of the town of Songkhla, 58-60, 104, 132-3, 144
(Ao) Mae Rampheung	bay on the east coast of the peninsula some 100 km north-west of Chumphon, 139, 144, 164
(Ko) Mak	i.e. 'Areca-Nut Island', see 'Penang'
Manara	see 'Narathiwat'
Marid	see 'Mergui'
Maying	river in Nakhon territory, probably in the U Ta Phao district some 70 km south-east of Songkhla, 133
Mergui	referred to as 'Marid', 217
Meuang Mai	i.e. 'New Town', see 'Singapore'
Muket	see 'Bukit (Marak)'
(Ban) Na	now the site of the district office in (the town of) Chana, 40, 42, 58
(Bang) Na	on the east bank of the Chao Phaya river some 15 km south-east of the Royal Palace (as the crow flies; it is about 28 miles - approximately 46 km - following the course of the winding Chao Phaya river), 90
Nakhon Chaisi	just over 40 km west of Bangkok, 103, 155
Nakhon Kheuan Khan	some six miles down-stream of Bang Na, on the Bangkok river, 71, 103
Nakhon Nayok	just over 100 km north-east of Bangkok, 155
Nakhon Rachasima	260 km north-east of Bangkok, 68
Nakhon (Si Thammarat)	about 1,200 km by road south of Bangkok, <i>passim</i>
(Bang) Nam Khem	see 'Kemasin'

- Nam Krachai probably the same as 'Nam Chai', some 10 km SSW of the town, 60, 132-3
- (Khlong) Nang Hong The initial (eastern) section of the Samrong Canal flowing south-east of the Bangkok river from Nakhon Kheuan Khan, 183
- (Ko) Nang Prasong presumably a coastal village close to 'Khao Prasong' (Mr Prasong) which is just under 20 km north of Chaiya, 156
- (Ko) Nangkawi see 'Langkawi'
- (Bang) Nara(thi wat) referred to as 'Manara', on the Patani coast southeast of Sai and north-west of Kelantan, 215
- Nom Khwai about 12 km north-west of Sadao, 33
- Non(thaburi) a few miles upstream of Bangkok on the east bank of the Chao Phaya, some 20 km due north of Bangkok, 43-4
- Nong Bua presumably the village situated some 13 km north-east of Sadao and 20 km south of Songkhla, 33, 260
- Nongchik Patani statelet situated to the east of the town of Patani, 42, 58, 125, 147, 169
- (Ko) Nu small island just over a mile ENE of Songkhla, 146-7
- Pa Bon apparently situated a few km north-east of Chana (and not the village of the same name situated 25 km south-east of Thepha), 58
- Pachim i.e. Prachinburi, 134 km north-east of Bangkok, 155
- Pak Nam popular name for 'Samutprakan', at the mouth of the Chao Phaya river, some 25 km south of Bangkok, 38, 49, 55-6, 91, 97, 99, 101, 106-7, 118, 156, 236, 239, 243, 246, 256, 259-60
- Palit see 'Perlis'
- (Pulau) Panjang referred to as 'Ko Yai' (Long Island); some 6 miles east of Phuket, 68
- Patani referred to as 'Pattani', denoting both the town on the Patani river and surrounding area, 42, 53, 58, 62, 93, 106, 136, 147, 169, 181, 185, 247-8, 251
- Pathio see 'P(r)athio'
- (Laem) Pathio promontory just under 30 km north-east of Chumphon, 169
- Pathum see 'P(r)athum'
- Penang Prince of Wales island; referred to as 'Ko Maak', 139, 223, 242, 251
- Perai the river which gives its name to the 'Seberang Perai' district - the former 'Province Wellesley', 108, 138, 142, 187, 249

Perak	state south of Province Wellesley, 138
Perlis	referred to as 'Palit'; at this time a district belonging to Kedah, between Kubang Pasu and Setul; as a location, the modern town of Kangar, 37, 40, 93, 223
Phanatnikhom	about 70 km (by road) south-east of Bangkok, 43-4
Phala	perhaps referring to the 'Khlong Lam Yai', river running roughly parallel the west of the road running south from Hadyai; it forms a junction with the Hinlek (Fui) river, some 15 km south of Hadyai river, west of Thepha and east of Hadyai, 41, 58
(Ko) Phangan	island, just over 6 miles north of Ko Samui, 146
Phangnga	some 94 km (by road) north-east of Phuket and about 85 km north-west of Krabi, 37-8, 68-9, 93-5, 148, 155, 208, 217, 226, 231, 251
Phangla	some 5 km NNE of Ban Prik, 33
Phthalung	on the western shore of the Thale Luang, about 75 km due north-west of Songkhla, 34, 36, 38-9, 40, 49, 51, 57, 93, 104-5, 188, 210, 246-7
Phechaburi/Phetburi	some 160 km (by road) south-west of Bangkok, 43, 46, 51, 55, 66, 72, 86, 89, 92, 99, 102, 107, 121, 140, 155
Phisut	see 'Besut'
(Khao) Phloi	apparently a hill/mountain in the vicinity of Trang (Khuang Thani) see Khao Rachasi
Phra Men	literally 'Royal Funeral (Ground)', the public square outside the Front Palace (now the National Museum), commonly called 'Sanam Luang', 155
(Baen) Phra Muang	village on the promontory forming the eastern entrance to the Trang river, 39
(Ban) Phrawan	described as being 'to the north of Sai [therefore presumably in the modern Panare (Penarik) district], some three days journey from Kelantan [however, as Sai itself is approximately 100 km from Kelantan, to march from Ban Phraiwan to Kelantan in three days would be quite a feat, so presumably a voyage of three days is intended], 60, 228
Plak Raed	apparently some 5 km south-west of the town of Songkhla, 58-9, 69, 71, 132
Pran(buri)	about 140 km south of Bangkok, 46, 131, 176
P(r)athio	some 80 km ENE of Bangkok, 40-1, 46, 220, 239
P(r)athum (Thani)	some 50 km due north of Bangkok on the west bank of the Chao Phaya, 43



- Prawan possibly identical with '(Bang) Phraiwan'? 58, 60, 62
- (Ban) Prik approximately 9 km NNE of Sadao and just under 5 km south of Phangla, 33, 36-7
- Rachaburi/Ratburi approximately 100 km west of Bangkok, 43, 46, 70, 72, 86, 89-99
- (Khao) Rachasi apparently a range of hills in the vicinity of Trang, 37
- Raman Patani statelet, south of Jering and west of Rangae (Legih), 58, 142, 240
- Rangae Patani statelet (in Malay, usually referred to as 'Legih'), south of Sai and north-west of Kelantan, 60, 62, 243
- Ranod see 'Thung Ranod'
- Rayong coastal town some 200 km south-east of Bangkok, 155
- Rong Mai literally 'the Silk Store', presumably referring to a location situated on northern section of the present-day Khlong Lod (between Chao Ra Rd. and Rachini Rd.), 241
- Saba Phen probably the village of Sintok, just under 30 km south-east of Sadao, 39
- Sadao some 60 km north of Alor Setar, 33, 36-7, 41, 103-4, 108
- (Chong) Saem San strait about 24 miles west-south-west of Rayong, 141
- Saen Saeb canal running almost due east, parallel to and slightly south of Phechaburi Rd. and its extension (and linking up with the Bang Khanak Canal), 183
- Sai(buri) [Saaj(burii)] Patani statelet, south-east of Jering and north-west of Rangae (Legih), 53
- Sai(buri) [Saj(burii)] Thai name for Kedah, 60, 62, 132, 185, 198, 219, 237, 247
- Sakhonburi now known as 'Samut Sakhon' (and formerly as 'Tha Chin'); at the mouth of the Tha Chin river, 50 km SW of Bangkok, 38, 155
- Sam Roi Yod spectacular range of mountains (the name means 'the 300 Peaks') between Pran(buri) and Kui(buri), 126, 130, 136-7, 140, 144-5, 260
- (Chong) Samet strait some two miles wide separating Ko Samed from the mainland at Cape Ya (some 20 km south of Rayong), 110
- Samro see 'Semerak'
- (Ban) (Khlong) Samrong the Khlong Samrong runs from Tao It to the west coast; it forms the southern limit of the modern town of Songkhla, 58-60, 71

(Ko) Samui	island some 5 1/2 miles from the mainland, just under 50 miles due east of Chaiya, 150
Samut Songkhram	about 140 km south-west of Bangkok, situated at the mouth of the Mae Klong river, 140, 155-156
Samutprakan	see 'Pak Nam'
Semerak	referred to as 'Samro', located at the mouth of the Semerak river some 45 km south-east of Kota Baru, 256
Setul	referred to as 'Satun', district between Perlis and Langu; once forming part of Kedah, 40, 50, 74, 87, 93, 124, 142
(Ko) Seua	apparently an island to the west of Chong Saem San, 141
Siam Rab	i.e. Siem Reap, just north of Angkor Wat in Cambodia, 86, 135
(Ko) Sichang	island about 3 miles off the coast, some 30 km south-west of Chonburi (a little to the north-west of Phathaya), 99-101
Singapore	referred to as 'Meuang Mai' (New Town), 40, 71, 93, 109
Songkhla	about 160 km south-east of Nakhon Si Thammarat, <i>passim</i>
Takua Pa	port on the west coast of the peninsula about 150 km by road WSW of Bandon (Surat Thani), 37-8, 68-9, 94, 148, 155
Takua Thung	20 km (by road) south-west of Phangnga, 37-8, 68-9, 73, 93-4, 137, 148, 155, 207, 217, 222-3, 251
Tao It	i.e. 'Brick Kiln'; on the northern side of Khlong Samrong, approximately 2 km south of the town of Songkhla, 58
Taphan Chang	i.e. 'Elephant Bridge' - 'Titi Gajah' in (Kedah) Malay - presumably the village some 10 km north of Alor Setar, 37, 39, 103, 108, 115, 130, 138-9
Taphan Sung	i.e. 'High Bridge' - Titi Tinggi in (Kedah) Malay - presumably referring to the village some 25 km north of Arau (in the modern state of Perlis), 39
Tha Thong	the present-day 'Kanchanadit', some 25 km east of Bandon (Surat Thani), at the time under Nakhon, 37, 137, 156
Thalang	the island now known as 'Phuket', 33, 38, 66, 68, 73-4, 87-8, 94, 206-7, 210, 217, 222, 231, 294
(Ban) Thale	see 'Kampung Laut'

- Thale Sab  
Theha  
(Laem) Thong Lang  
Thung Ban Nok  
Thung (Ban) Pho  
Thung Ranod  
Ton Pho  
Trad  
Trang  
Trengganu  
Triphet  
  
Wang Kradan  
Wat Liab  
  
Wat Mae Nang Pleum  
  
Wat Phrachetuphon  
  
Wat Saket  
  
Wat Sampheng
- the lagoon east of Songkhla, 58  
district between Chana and Nongchik, 40, 42, 44, 50, 125, 141, 145, 147, 169, 181, 185, 241  
promontory a few km east of Bang Saphan, forming the northern entrance to Mae Rampheung Bay, 136-7  
village in the Penarik district, about 30 km east of Patani town, 115  
village about 15 km south of Sadao, 39, 41, 50, 103-4, 138  
on the east coast of the peninsula, some 75 km north of Songkhla, 151  
probably referring to 'Thung (Ban) Pho', 35, 37  
coastal town/province on the modern border with Cambodia (Kampuchea) almost 400 km by road from Bangkok, 141  
as a province, the area north-west of Langu; as a town referring to Khuan Thani (south-west of the modern town of Trang), 34, 37, 39, 93, 124, 142, 222-3  
East coast Malay state, between Kelantan and Pahang, 33, 147, 187, 197, 214, 217-8, 230, 243  
fort (built during the reign of Rama III) on the east bank of the Bangkok river, off the village of Bang Cakreng near Samutprakan (Pak Nam), 90  
  
apparently identical with 'Bang Kradan', 104  
popular name for 'Wat Rachaburana' in Bangkok, situated east of Triphet Rd and south of Phahurat Rd, a little to the north of the modern 'Saphan Phut' (Memorial Bridge), 60  
situated in the angle formed by the old course of the Lopburi river (where it flows southwest into the Chao Phaya, forming the northern boundary of the town of Ayuthaya), 54  
i.e. 'Wat Pho', the 'Temple of the Sleeping Buddha' in Bangkok; immediately south of the Royal Palace, 227  
situated east of the Ong Ang canal and a little to the south of the Mahanak canal (in Bangkok), 35  
perhaps referring to 'Wat Pathum Kongkha', which is situated on the river-bank just south (-east) of Sampheng Lane (in Bangkok), 72

- (Khao) Wiang presumably referring to 'Ko Wiang' (Wiang Island) which the Admiralty charts call 'Ko lang', an island close to the shore and forming the eastern entrance point to Pathio Bay, 145
- Yala see 'Jala/Jalur'
- Yang Ngam probably a few km to the north-west of the modern Padang Besar (on the map the 'Ngam' river appears to cut the railway line between the Malaysian border and Hadyai some 7 km north-west of Padang Besar), 36-7
- (Ko) Yao see '(Pulau) Panjang', 38, 68-9, 86, 92
- Yaring see 'Jering'
- Yuan see 'Annam'